



SECURITY INTRANSITION

HOW TO COUNTER
AGGRESSION WITH LIMITED
RESOURCES

Kyiv
2016



This report was prepared within the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.

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Cover Picture: Michelangelo, David and Goliath, 1509

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FOREWORD

The Russian threat, inconsistent public policy, lack of political consolidation, institutional incapacity- the Institute of World Policy examined these dangers facing Ukraine back in 2013 in a paper called “Ukraine: Diagnostics of national (in)security.”¹ The report was published just a few months before Russia’s aggression began in earnest. In many ways, that three-year-old study has remained very current even today—and the list of threats has only grown. The Rating Group’s latest survey, in October 2016, showed that most Ukrainians consider the conflict in Donbas the biggest issue facing Ukraine now.²

Our current report, “Security in Transition,” serves to respond to this enormous list of threats. **Our main goal here has been to analyze security options based on five models: cooperation with NATO, regional security pacts, armed neutrality, bilateral security instruments, and the asymmetrical model.** Each of the five parts of this report is dedicated to one of these security options and analyzes each option according to these five aspects:

- 1) an assessment the current status of the model, especially in relation to Ukraine;
- 2) best examples of the application of the model worldwide;
- 3) the model’s drawbacks;

- 4) how well the model might work to restrain Russia’s aggression;
- 5) how probably the model might be implemented in the short (1-3 years), medium (3-5 years) and longer (5 and more years) terms;
- 6) recommendations.

Each section also contains a table summarizing the pros and cons of the analyzed model.

In any case, the Institute of World Policy has no doubt that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is inevitable. Still, as analysts, we were obligated to consider other security formats, especially to be able to assess the pros and cons of each of the options during a transition period. For instance, an analysis of recent trends in the modified neutral model could be of interest both to other researchers and, in particular, for decision-makers. Indeed, the Institute’s research shows that neutral states are gradually becoming less and less neutral in the traditional sense of this model: such countries are aware of their vulnerability before a number of different threats, whether that be terrorism for neutral Turkmenistan or hybrid or even traditional war for neutral Finland and Sweden.

The asymmetrical model is a transitional model that fully permits the use of elements from any of the other security options analyzed in this report. It in no case stands in the way of Euro-Atlantic integration but, on the contrary, could prove to be an additional advantage through which Ukraine might become more

¹ <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/pub/958.html>

² http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obshchestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_naseleeniya_oktyabr_2016.html

interesting and valuable to the Alliance. As to Euro-Atlantic integration itself, Ukraine needs to stop looking for new formats and focus on implementing those programs that are currently on offer through its partnership with NATO. **Deeper, not broader, integration must become the main motto for all those involved in carrying out the reform plans intended to move Ukraine towards the Alliance.** For instance, Ukraine's current Administration is insisting that the country be included in NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Program, which currently includes Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Neither NATO itself, nor the countries participating in the program, can clearly explain how this format might be important for Ukraine. Nor is there any obvious evidence that this program might somehow bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance.

The Institute of World Policy is aware that the risk of a "*grand bargain*" among global players is

always there, but it is not inevitable. In recent years, responses to Russia's aggression were accompanied by countless 'revelations' about how international partners will or did cut deals with the Kremlin that were against Ukraine's interests. But three years of growing military strength in Ukraine, the dedicated voluntarism of Ukrainians in support of their own army, and Ukraine's active political and diplomatic engagement have ensured that this kind of conspiratorial scenario did not materialize. For Ukraine, a successful security model is, above all, the further reformation of its Armed Forces, but not only. It also means combating corruption, including in the defense sector, attracting investment to the economy, gaining the trust of ordinary citizens in their government, and establishing a government that is accountable before its citizenry.

Alyona Getmanchuk

Director, Institute of World Policy

1. ASYMMETRIC SECURITY MODEL

The order is submerged not primarily from military defeat or an imbalance in resources (though this often follows) but from a failure to understand the nature and scope of the challenge arrayed against it
Henry Kissinger

In the contemporary world, the security of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers depends on the international status quo
Zbigniew Brzezinski

INTRODUCTION

After the events of early 2014, which are defined now as the Ukraine crisis (events in around Ukraine), the issue of security models and possible security guarantees became of critical importance for Ukraine and rather important for its neighbours. The course of previous crises in the new century and the experience of the Ukraine crisis show that the known classical models either do not work or are not very effective, especially for Ukraine.³ It is Ukraine who, almost entirely, pays the cost of these erroneous calculations and hasty actions,⁴ or their failure. In

the case of Ukraine, attempts at unconventional approaches to develop its own security model⁵ when traditional tools began to fail or get stuck were not systematic and, what is more important, were not supported by the government. The official documents⁶ usually include conventional answers and are not always able to be quickly actualized according to the needs of the time. Meanwhile, the world's leading actors (es-

³ Even such safe countries as Sweden and Finland recently have seriously examined the efficiency of their previous security models and do not exclude their significant changes. Zwischen Allianzfreiheit und Einbindung.Finnland und Schweden auf der Suche nach einer neuen Sicherheitsstrategie. SWP-Aktuell, April 2015. Retrieved at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/sicherheitsstrategie_fuer_finnland_und_schweden.html

⁴ Examples of the decision of 2010 on non-alignment; it was not thought out well and not supported by sufficient supporting measures and major international negotiations.

⁵ For example, a scientific analysis of possible security models is set forth in: V.A. Manzhola, V.M. Vdovenko. Neutrality and non-alignment in the foreign policy strategy of Ukraine. / "Ukraine in the post bipolar system of international relations" (the lead author: V.A.Manzhola) K.: "Kyiv University" Publishing and Printing Center, 2008 P.374-387

⁶ For example, the latest edition of the National Security Strategy, approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine on May 26, 2015. <Online> Available: <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015> or the "Concept for the Development of the Security and Defense Sector". Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 4, 2016" <Online> Available: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/92/2016>

pecially the United States, Russia and China) are developing and testing systems of modern integrated non-military actions and means to force their counterpart to either conduct a policy suitable for them or terminate certain actions.⁷

This leads to the conclusion that **Ukraine needs to go beyond previous canons if we are to survive as a country and a state in the current turbulent period**, both for our region and for the world.⁸ Modern threats and challenges are complex and require the same systemic reaction or actions ahead of the curve, because "those under assault are challenged to defend not only their territory, but the basic assumptions of their way of life, their moral right to exist and to act in a manner that, until the challenge, had been treated as beyond question."⁹ For the Ukrainian security model such disposition implies the need to develop a sufficiently dynamic security system, which would include some variational basic elements and the ability to be quickly reconfigured depending on changes in key circumstances.¹⁰

The purpose of the security model should be to ensure the reliability and sustainability of security in peacetime and the ability to break the will of the enemy (and not his military power) to continue further aggression against Ukraine if the conflict bursts out.

One of the important issues in the construction of this model is to determine the main threats and enemies (which are often interrelated) and ways of responding. Given the current circumstances, in the near future the Russian Federation is likely to be Ukraine's opponent in the context of security (with threats which derive from this fact). But is Russia the only enemy now and will it be the enemy in the next 10-15 years? Should our security system be built solely as a response to the threat from Russia? Should we completely exclude the possibility of obtaining new security assurances, including from Russia (given voluntarily or under pressure of our allies) in the medium term, given the negative experience of when the security guarantees¹¹ under the Budapest Memorandum (1994) failed to work properly?¹² Can we consider sufficient the current proposals of our Western allies

⁷ See a more detailed analysis of the US means and mechanisms to force the enemy to necessary actions without the option of a military conflict in the study David C.Gompert, Hans Binnendijk. The power to coerce. Countering adversaries without going to war. RAND, 2016. Retrieved at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1000.html

⁸ According to the authors' opinion, it will take the next 5-10 years to reconfigure these systems and to establish new ones (or strengthening old ones, which is unlikely) with appropriate balance

⁹ H.Kissinger. World Order. M.: AST Publishing, 2015. P.474-475.

¹⁰ Today, unfortunately, so far there is no such integrated system that would rely primarily on the own resources or concepts, and some existing elements are too rigid for the present very ambivalent time

¹¹ According to the American side these are assurances, not guarantees (based on the English version of the text of the memorandum)

¹² Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (Effective date – December 5, 1994) <Online> Available: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158 Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. United Nations, 19.December 1994. Retrieved at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/49/765

to improve the security situation in Ukraine?¹³ And can the security assurances for Ukraine be considered quite effective and sustainable, if Russia is not involved in them?¹⁴

Given the very difficult situation in Ukraine in the socio-economic, socio-political, industrial and infrastructure areas today and bleak prospects for its quick improvement in the near future, when planning responses in the security sector we need to seriously work out variants of asymmetric responses or actions¹⁵ in case of aggression and asymmetric security models (ensuring security mainly through non conventional asymmetric means)¹⁶, i.e. to ensure the secu-

rity of the state with limited resources (or significantly superior enemy's resources) or using a non-traditional model (traditional ones, such as guarantees from certain states or security associations do not seem possible for Ukraine in the near future).

The development of asymmetric security models is quite an innovative¹⁷ step; that is why they do not have a clear definition yet and there is no established list of their mandatory parameters and components. The adjacent topic of asymmetric or hybrid conflicts and wars¹⁸ is much more advanced; some of their elements can be also used in the asymmetric security model. That is why we are in a wide field of uncertainty, which is still to be developed and systematized. So, probably, the Ukrainian approaches, groundwork and proposals¹⁹ (subject to the quality development and subsequent successful application) can be the beginning of the systematization and formation of a new division of general security models.

¹³ For example, proposals by high level US experts on the necessary policy of the United States, which however have not been implemented yet. Steven Pifer, Strobe Talbott, Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, Ambassador John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Admiral James Stavridis and General Charles Wald. Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do. In: Brookings Report, February 2015. Retrieved at: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/02/ukraine-independence-russian-aggression>

¹⁴ The only scenario that cancels this need is option of a collapse of today's Russia or its very serious (disastrous) weakening.

¹⁵ Asymmetric warfare – unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other. In "Encyclopedia Britannica" Retrieved at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/asymmetrical-warfare>

¹⁶ "To develop by less-advantaged side counterstrategies for asymmetrical warfare, whereby unconventional means might be used to overcome more technically advanced adversaries". Definition in "Nuclear strategy after the Cold War" In "Encyclopedia Britannica" Retrieved at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear-strategy/After-the-Cold-War>

¹⁷ Although in the world's history it is possible to find examples of successful asymmetric responses to aggressive actions of more powerful opponents by the weaker counterparts – for example, Finland against the USSR in 1939-1940, Algeria against France after the World War II, Vietnam against the United States in 1960s-70s, Israel against the Arab coalition in the 1960s.

¹⁸ Common approaches to world recent asymmetric conflicts are quite well analyzed in: L.V. Deriglazova. Asymmetric conflicts: the equation with multiple unknowns. Tomsk, 2009.

¹⁹ As in the case of the idea to create in Ukraine a center of expertise on hybrid methods of war under the program of cooperation with NATO

1.1. DEFINITION OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY MODEL

An asymmetric security model involves giving up the traditional security model and a situation when a state with limited resources must find an effective response to the threat(s) of obviously superior enemy(ies) and discourage him from further aggressive actions. It is characterized by the following parameters:

- less important quantity and lower quality of available traditional security resources in comparison with the enemy;
- focus on maximizing the cost of aggressive actions against yourself through significant losses incurred by the aggressor in this case
- transfer of the resistance balance to unconventional responses sector (technologies of social influence and manipulation, cybersphere, information weapons, the possibility of significant damage to the aggressor's state administration systems)
- creation of informal support networks in various areas among foreign partners (to obtain the necessary resources and increase pressure on the aggressor from the other side)
- purposeful "snap to ourselves" (especially by involving in the possession of certain assets in the country) of influential regional and international actors, especially among neighboring countries
- development and presence of high-tech and network army capable of long resistance, including the tactics of "death by a thousand cuts"
- high level of the coherence of society, commitment to the idea of their own statehood

and trust between the people and the ruling circles.


As you can see, **Ukraine in many ways meets the model or can meet it in the near future (with the exception of the high-tech network army parameter and, to some extent, trust between the people and the ruling circles).**

Concerning the question of actual threats and opponents, one needs to answer what exactly from this list Ukraine can use and apply today? To be more specific, we will use the case where we define Russia²⁰ as our today's main enemy and threat. Also, one must take into account the fact that Russia itself now successfully employs hybrid tools and mechanisms of influence or coercion for certain advantageous action actions²¹ in regards to Ukraine and some other countries. At the same time we can assert that the time spent outside direct subordination to Russia plays in favour of an independent security model creation for Ukraine.²²

²⁰ If any power or country is dangerous for Ukraine in the near future, the security model should be appropriately adjusted.

²¹ These aspects are pretty well covered in a publication of The Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI: Putin's Hybression. Non-military aspects of new generation wars. Kyiv, 2016

²² According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "hence time may not be working in favor of a voluntary submission by Kyiv to Moscow, but impatient Russian pressures to that end as well as the West's indifference could generate a potentially explosive situation on the very edge of the European Union». Zbigniew Brzezinski. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. Lviv.: Litopys, 2012. P.80



1.2. KEY ELEMENTS IN DEVELOPMENT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY MODEL

1. CONVENTION (ARMED) ELEMENTS AGAINST RUSSIA AS A DETERRENT FACTOR (HIGH COST OF LOSSES FOR THE AGGRESSOR)

Ukraine is now noticeably inferior to Russia in terms of the existing armed and human potential²³ and long experience in conducting military operations in different conditions. In particular, it concerns the experience of so-called hybrid wars, the main outlines of which were presented by the Chief of Staff, V.Gerasymov in January 2013.²⁴ They anticipated the growing role of non-military means (political, economic, information, humanitarian, together with the active use of the protest potential of societies) in achieving political and strategic goals and their often higher effectiveness compared to the force of arms. Meanwhile, it was suggested for conventional military means to focus on creating mobile combined task forces operating in a common reconnaissance and information space; the remote contactless impact on the enemy with massive use of high-precision weapons is

becoming a dominant feature of the new war (not a frontal collision of large groups).

Therefore it is advisable to develop own conventional elements with primary emphasis on deterrence and making significant harm to the human and material component of the Russian army in case of aggression. **A special attention should be paid to the tools of reconnaissance, air defense, coast guard and artillery systems. It is essential to create an effective and efficient system of mobilization in case of aggression and ensure periodic training of most of the manpower that can be used for this.** Effective Special Operations Forces (which recently have received the necessary regulatory and legal framework for their activities according to the current conditions)²⁵ must become another important element; they will, when necessary, cause a significant damage to key parts of the army and state maintenance and management system at the territory of the aggressor along the front, behind the front line in Ukraine and on the aggressor's territory. To some extent, Ukraine should be ready to use the same hybrid war tools against

²³ Russia. Military strength. In: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=russia Ukraine. Military strength. In: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=ukraine

²⁴ V. Gerasimov. The value of science in anticipation. Military-Industrial Courier Issue 8(476), February 27, 2013. <Online> Available: <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>. A good analysis of Russia's conducting of hybrid wars (including the Crimea and Donbas) is also done in: Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith. Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going beyond the Label. In: Aleksanteri Papers #1, 2016. Retrieved at: http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf

²⁵ According to the Law of Ukraine on amendments to some laws of Ukraine concerning the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (signed by the President of Ukraine on July 26, 2016), the list of their tasks includes, in particular, "organizing and maintaining the operations of the resistance movement, conducting military information and psychological operations" <Online> Available: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=59372

the aggressor which the latter has been using against Ukraine in recent years.²⁶

2. SMART DEFENSE AND NEW GENERATION ARMY

One of the key prerequisites to building an effective asymmetric security model is to build a new generation army, where the emphasis is made on quality staff (including in reserve) and modern technical equipment (modern protected communications systems, high-precision means of destruction, mosquito fleet for a blockade and a powerful coast guard system, integrated combat system already at the level of company-squads). Certain examples of this approach to building such a system can be found in the experiences of Switzerland²⁷, Sweden, or Israel.

The Swiss model is based on a regular army that is sufficiently large (currently approx. 140 thousand people²⁸, and according to the Security

report of the Federal Council of 2010, its number by 2018 should not exceed 100 thousand people²⁹) for the size of the country, with necessary military preparation for the majority of the adult population that is enrolled in the reserve. These citizens get periodic training, where their coherence and compliance with modern war conditions are tested and worked on. For example, recent similar national security trainings were conducted in 2014 (the next are scheduled for 2019), and a detailed report on their results has been issued and recommendations have been drafted.³⁰ In general, this model focuses almost exclusively on the existing strength of the country. It can be described as a dynamic (if necessary, it rapidly increases its potential) and high-technology (based on the power of the country's economy) model.

The Swedish model has a slightly different emphasis, because of its history and different security environment. It provides for a fairly strong regional army (until 2010 the system of call to military service was used. It will be completely replaced by a contract army by 2018)³¹ – today the Swedish Armed Forces comprise about

²⁶ James Sherr describes the complex of Russia's actions as follows: "Today as in the past, the combination of means that Russia relies upon – blatant and insidious, coercive and coercive, 'humanitarian' and destructive – causes disorientation as much as discord, and it brings an antagonistic spirit to many a cooperative enterprise. (...) The 1990s revived the Muscovite principle that chaos is simply a medium to be exploited for achieving concrete objectives" James Sherr. *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*. K.: Zapovit, 2013. P.119

²⁷ The RAND Corporation recently has even developed proposals for the Baltic countries on non conventional options for the defense based on the Swiss approach. Read more: *Unconventional options for the defense of Baltic States. The Swiss approach*. RAND Corp., 2016. Retrieved at: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE179.html>

²⁸ Information about countries' military strength. Switzerland. Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=switzerland.

²⁹ Data of the Government of the Confederation on the future army development. Retrieved at: <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/verteidigung/weiterentwicklung-armee.html> and a report «Our Swiss Army Tomorrow» Retrieved at: <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwicklung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publications/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Brochure-WEA-d.pdf>

³⁰ Read more in «Final report on security trainings of the Confederation». Retrieved at: <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsverbund-suebung-2019.html>

³¹ More about Swedish Armed Forces: <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/organisation/the-army/>

40 thousand people³² – and a defense sector with intensive security cooperation with NATO, Finland, and the Nordic countries. Due to the recent heightened turbulence of the international environment (particularly in Europe) Sweden has decided to increase defense spending (it is stated in the defense policy and the budget for 2016-2020 years³³) and to develop the Total Defense concept, which includes military and civil protection. So, the model makes more emphasis on their own ability to deter together with active cooperation with allied countries (mainly neighbors) and institutions.

The example of Israel has significant differences and its own specificity. First of all, the priority of the security policy from the beginning was, and still is, the survival of the state of Israel. It is even reflected in the major goal of Israel's Defense Forces – “responsible for ensuring the existence of Israel, its security and sovereign rights.”³⁴ Currently, the Israeli armed forces comprise 160 thousand people, while another 630 thousand are in reserve³⁵ (with a total population of 8 million.). This demonstrates the fundamental and conceptual approach to security

and armed forces – the maximum and comprehensive mobilization of society in terms of security and clear positioning of the army as the people's affair (from the general concept to the smallest detail), which puts in the center the life of every citizen of Israel. A systematic approach like that also includes economic components that naturally promote good economic dynamics and an extremely successful development of the military industrial complex of Israel (with special emphasis on high technology products). This model requires huge constant efforts and big expenses, but has proved to be highly effective in an almost completely hostile environment for nearly 70 years already.

In general, for the successful construction of a smart defense system, a systematic approach in reforming the military sector should be applied – a new army model (staff, scheme of interaction between different levels, quality management, technical equipment), development of the military industrial complex to meet the needs of the new generation army (modernization of existing weapons, new quality models and a rapid launch of their serial production), and active practical cooperation with foreign partners to acquire necessary skills and best practices in implementation of the latest equipment in an integrated model of modern warfare. **In smart defense a special role in asymmetric operations will be played by information and cyber technologies, and the use of outer space for effective reconnaissance and damaging the enemy's communications.**

In many of these areas Ukraine already has a good groundwork, but it still lacks consistency in its implementation and the coordination of its parts, as well as a stable state policy in

³² Information about countries' military strength. Sweden. Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=sweden

³³ Read more in Sweden's Defense Policy 2016 to 2020. Retrieved at: http://www.government.se/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020

³⁴ Read more in the Jewish Virtual Library “Israel Cabinet Ministries: Ministry of Defense” Retrieved at: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/mod.html>

³⁵ Information about countries' military strength. Israel. Retrieved at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=israel

this direction. A critical issue in this context is appropriate personnel and financial support for creation of such a new generation army. According to the author, one of the necessary steps for this should be, for example, to legislate for the next 5 years at least 3-4% of the GDP for spending on the army.

3. ASYMMETRICAL INFLUENCE THROUGH SMART DIPLOMACY

Smart diplomacy plays a key role in the development of an effective asymmetric security system because it allows for restraining the aggressor through efforts of other actors and in different directions, thereby blocking his resources and tying his hands to prevent more aggressive actions. History knows many examples of a successful diplomatic game when there was an apparent disparity in the armed component. In this context and in view of present realities, **it is important to more actively engage in influencing Russia through its important partners that it respects (China, India, Japan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the USA, Germany and France). Ukraine should pay particular attention to establishing such contact with China**, which now plays an essential role in the global strategy of Russia. So far, it is not possible to talk about an effective cooperation in political and security terms between Ukraine and China. Although there are all preconditions for this, there is no political will.

Each of these countries has a different level of relationship with and priority for Russia, as well as having different influence, which we should definitely take into account when promoting models of influence on Russia via a

specific country.³⁶ During a crisis contacts with these countries should be prompt and systematic in order to ensure that the overall signal and its effect on Russia from different sides reach maximum efficiency. To this must be added influence through these countries on the position of certain international organizations, in which most of these countries play an important role. The existing efforts to form “coalitions” using foreign partners when deciding or discussing issues which are important for us in international institutions should also be strengthened.

Nor should we exclude the creation of “distracting targets”³⁷ for the aggressor within his territory or next to his borders. But this tool should be applied only in case of emergency and already inevitable armed escalation by the aggressor in the short term.

4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF UKRAINE INTO AN IMPORTANT MULTIFUNCTIONAL HUB OF CONTINENTAL IMPORTANCE

A derivative element of smart diplomacy is the policy of turning Ukraine into an important hub in its sub-region³⁸ and a key stabilizing balance lever at the crossroad between Europe,

³⁶ Although at the same time Russia's behavior particularities concerning its counterparties should be observed. According to James Sherr, «it trusts interests more than principles, the sense of agreements more than their spirit. For the Russian diplomacy – what is not negotiated, is not obligatory». James Sherr. *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*. K.: Zapovit, 2013. P.121

³⁷ Creation, encouragement or facilitation of evolution of crisis situations in or around Russia, that would distract from the realization of undesirable aggressive plans in regard of Ukraine.

³⁸ The example of Singapore for Southeast Asia and of Switzerland and Luxembourg for Western Europe

Eurasia, and Asia. This will require an extremely cautious and skillful diplomatic game (because the reverse side of the coin in this case is disastrous competition for this hub between geopolitical actors aimed at getting a mandatory control over it). The main functions of the hub could include: a neutral platform for financial and economic exchanges, moving resources and goods from different areas and their possible reformatting, balancing migratory flows, creating a soft offshore jurisdiction for legal entities, and a possible negotiation platform.

Given the growing instability in Asia, Eurasia, and the Euro-Atlantic area, creating a stable hub with necessary infrastructure and human resources could satisfy a request for a safe place for various transactions from a wide range of subjects. At the same time, its existence would additionally increase the cost of aggressive actions against a hub like that due to the harm for many subjects from different regions of the world. It would also accelerate the pace of socio-economic development and modernization of the governance system of the state and it would stimulate the economy to move towards more modern structures. The increase of the resources that could be invested in the further development of the asymmetric security model (its state system, military and industrial components) would be an important side result.

5. MASSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GLOBAL PLAYERS' COUNTRIES AS A GUARANTEE OF THEIR INTERVENTION IN FAVOUR OF UKRAINE IN CASE OF A CRISIS

In addition to strategic interests or their own obligations under certain associations, every modern state is rather sensitive to the interests

of its own economy and representatives of its business. The presence of significant assets abroad (especially in important sectors for a specific country) can serve as a practical guarantee that, in case of aggressive actions by another actor, they will be actively protected and at least pressure will be put on the aggressor in case of danger or even that substantial assistance will be provided to the victim of aggression in order to protect their assets. **For the optimistic development of this approach in the medium term, Ukraine has to become an independent connecting node of the continental geopolitical (similar to the role of Switzerland in Western Europe) and geo-economic architecture (the role of a big porto franco, which is beneficial to all major actors),** thus making impossible an overpressure or threat from one side (due to excessive losses for that side).

However, Ukraine has to diversify strategic investments, both by the countries of origin and by specific sectors. The ultimate goal should be a balanced system of foreign capital presence without substantial domination by any of them, which can be achieved, as well, by involving several parties in the same sector. Today, a similar distribution (involvement) of influential actors in Ukraine could look like this:

- **For the US** – nuclear power, oil and gas extraction sector, banking and financial sector, venture capital and IT sector, creative economy
- **For Germany** – biochemical industry, machine building (especially machinery, transport and agriculture), energy efficiency and renewable energy industry, metallurgy
- **For the UK** – financial and banking sector, creative economy and venture capital

- **For France, Italy** – light industry, entertainment, food production
- **For Switzerland and Austria** – financial and banking sector, eco-industry (development of a premium brand “Ukraine” for food) and bioengineering, renewable energy and waste management
- **For Canada** – aircraft construction, nuclear industry
- **For China** – large infrastructure projects, military industrial complex, high-quality food and deep processing, IT sector
- **For India** – the sphere of military-industrial complex (especially shipbuilding, maintenance and modernization of Soviet weapons models), pharmaceutical and food industry
- **For the Gulf countries** – aircraft construction, chemical industry, agricultural sector and resort industry
- **For Iran** – military-industrial complex, agriculture, food industry, chemical industry
- **For Japan** – new technological production of the 5th-6th waves of innovation (possible use of the FTA with the EU for export of products manufactured by Japanese technology, but at a lower cost), nanotechnology, energy and renewable energy industry, technologies and production for waste management, transport engineering
- **For South Korea** – space, nuclear and missile technologies, agricultural sector, new composite materials

6. ACTIVE EMBEDDING OF AS MANY TNCs AS POSSIBLE IN PRODUCTION CHAINS

Another important economic tool for the development of the asymmetric model is a conscious embedding of as many Ukrainian

enterprises and companies as possible in global corporations' production chains. And, **it is necessary to deliberately seek to occupy critical positions in them that would prevent or minimize the possibility of a quick change of the “Ukrainian element” in these chains.** As in the case of attracting investments, it will increase the cost of Russia's aggression due to the possibility of a direct confrontation with TNCs, some of which may be present on the Russian market or play a vital role in the supply chain in various critical areas.

Given the dependence of TNCs' business on the political climate and the sensitivity to instability (the factor of direct losses and a drop of their own capitalization in case of force scenarios), TNCs can often act in advance to prevent an escalation if they see such threat (almost all world major corporations have appropriate analytical and planning departments to assess the situation and risks of political and military nature) and not to respond to the development of the aggression. It will also include pressure on governments of certain countries to intervene in the situation in order to prevent the implementation of aggressive scenarios against Ukraine.

Initially this embedding will require an individual approach to involve every major TNC into a specific project or sector (including contacts at the highest political level) in order to create a success story for other TNCs. Later, there will be a need to systematize it and to propose to concrete TNCs well-prepared projects, where Ukraine has calculated the desirable positive consequences and minimized the possible negative ones.

7. ACTIVE WORK WITH SOCIAL ELITES AND COMMUNITIES IN KEY COUNTRIES ABROAD AND THEIR ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE "PROJECTS" ON UKRAINE

Today, in most countries, there is a very effective relationship between public opinion and actions of the authorities (in Western democracies the sensitivity to the sentiment factor is even far too high because of elections). Therefore, the formation of this opinion or influence on it, and not only in usual formats,³⁹ becomes extremely important. The opinion of events outside the country is usually formed by the expert community and media in the first place and, in the second place, by the political class (which often takes into consideration the expert opinion of the first two ones). Currently, we are perceived more or less positively in the most important countries for Ukraine in regard to the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. This position is, however, based on 'being the victim' and on an almost complete lack of our own significant progress, which is the basis for productive long-term cooperation with groups of supporters abroad. Therefore, to fix the positive attitude, **we need to create and then intelligently promote our own success stories, because only this can be the basis of a constant positive attitude towards us.**

An additional element to gain favorable opinions of Ukraine on certain important issues (including on the Ukrainian-Russian

confrontation) is **systematic work with opinion leaders and groups of local people, which, for various reasons, have a more or less regular contact with Ukraine** (diaspora, business, social and cultural groups, expert community, scientific and academic community). This would mean regular contact with them, their involvement in bilateral projects in different areas, and periodic invitations to various programs and visits to Ukraine.

8. USE OF INFORMATION WEAPONS AND INFLUENCE ON THE PUBLIC OPINION OF THE AGGRESSOR

For now, for various reasons Ukraine is mostly in a defensive position in the context of the information warfare against it. At the same time it has existing preconditions for effective counteractions in this area, despite Russia's very efficient system of information influence and control of their own information environment today. First of all it concerns the struggle between the senses⁴⁰ and conducting media and narrative wars,⁴¹ development and subsequent use of ideas-viruses which then begin to live their own lives and destabilize your opponent's system. Ukraine today does not have a mechanism of impact on the information environment of the enemy to change its behaviour, despite all the declarations of its necessity.

³⁹ More about possible ways of influence: G.Pocheptsov. Invisible informatics influences. 2013- <Online> Available: <http://psyfactor.org/lib/effects-based.htm> G.Pocheptsov. Media communications as a basic component of sociosystems. 2013. <Online> Available: <http://psyfactor.org/lib/media-communication-4.htm>

⁴⁰ G.Pocheptsov. New approaches in "soft" info wars: from influence operations to behavioral conflicts. 2015. <Online> Available: <http://psyfactor.org/psyops/behaviorwar6.htm> G.Pocheptsov. Influence tools: old approaches and new prospects. 2016 <Online> Available: <http://psyfactor.org/lib/propaganda46.htm>

⁴¹ More about media and narrative wars: G.Pocheptsov. Mind control. K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2012. P.214-249

Considering nowadays, the most realistic task in the short term is to influence public opinion in Russia and change the relevant information mainstream concerning Ukraine.⁴² This can have an indirect (we should not hope for more under Russia's current system of power) influence on the attitudes and actions of Russia's leadership; as the greatest effect it may have is to break or damage the existing negative informational templates and matrices in regards to Ukraine, which can be considered a satisfactory result. Considering the still intensive contacts between the two nations and societies, a gradual change in the public opinion in Russia towards a direction favorable for Ukraine (including through strategic and network communications⁴³) seems possible even if Russia's current propaganda machine keeps working.

9. FOCUS ON OPTIMAL USE OF THE OWN HUMAN CAPITAL AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPORTS FROM OUTSIDE

The next element of the model provides for a focus on the development and optimal use of human capital and maximum containment of its irrevocable outflow from the country. Given the demographic (namely the decrease in Ukraine's population) and climate (both the increase of migrants in the world because of the bad conditions of their former territories, and Ukraine as an attractive place for migration) trends, Ukraine in the near future should be able to welcome a

growing number of migrants from outside. The modern world, among criteria of the strength of states and their economies, prioritizes the quality of human capital and the availability of opportunities for its sustainable development. Therefore, to improve our own sustainability we have to focus both on the already existing human capital and on the design of policy, aimed at attracting high-quality human capital from outside and its successful integration into Ukrainian society.

However, in order to enfeeble the enemy's⁴⁴ capacity, one should consider the possibility of draining from the enemy best parts of his human capital. In the case of Russia, Ukraine has serious advantages due to close contacts and the already existing migration of a large part of opposition-minded people out from Russia. Given that a significant part of this new wave of emigration (which mainly goes to the West) is well-educated and creative and has good resources, "poaching" them to Ukraine's side (reasons for this could be different) can increase the capacity of our country.⁴⁵

⁴² More about opportunities and implementation of information influences: G.Pocheptsov. *Mind control*. K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2012. P.39-72

⁴³ More on this: G.Pocheptsov. *Mind control*. K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2012. P.176-213

⁴⁴ However, we must not underestimate the strength of the current system of government of Russia. According to James Sherr, "Russia's neo-feudal system might reward mediocrity, diminish value and institutionalize theft, but that does not make it unstable. (...) Russia's strength lies in prolonging the life of outmoded practices. If these practices cannot produce a positive end (...), then the achievement of negative ends is sufficient. (...) If Russia cannot have a seat at the table, it will be the elephant in the room. The effectiveness of this mode of statecraft and management should not be dismissed" James Sherr. *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*. K.: Zapovit, 2013. p.122

⁴⁵ In particular, and thanks to the reverse impact of those who left on those who stayed in Russia; it will be of a multifunctional nature.

At the same time, the numerous risks that could be caused by migration of this kind from Russia to Ukraine in the present situation should be also considered. However, the “deterioration” of the Russian human capital through the emigration of its best part abroad, coupled with the ability to redirect and use at least a part of it in Ukraine, is quite an ambitious task, which is worthy of attention in the context of asymmetric actions.

10. CYBER ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OBJECTS AND IMPORTANT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS

Given the need to ensure your own safety against your superior enemy, the ability to affect, damage, or destroy the enemy’s critical infrastructure objects (to prevent aggressive actions against you and to reduce the scale of aggression once it starts) is important. The best tool for this for Ukraine would be the use of the cyberspace with relevant cyber attacks against these objects or the ability to control them remotely (i.e. activation of the destruction scenario at the right time). However, this automatically means a deployment of a reliable effective defense system of one’s critical infrastructure objects.

Such actions are aimed at either disabling these networks (for a short or long time) or demonstrating the vulnerability of the aggressor in specific areas that would stimulate him to redirect efforts; it will gain the time needed to eliminate the damage caused to specific areas and to work to prevent this in the future. The efficiency of this element requires constant work to identify the opportunities of access to such networks via cyberspace and improvement of cyber tools to affect or destruct relevant facilities remotely.

Cooperation in this area and exchange of experience and technology with foreign partners and allies which are also interested in weakening this international aggressor are necessary.

1.3. THE MODEL'S STABILITY (SUSTAINABILITY) IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG TERM

If it is fully applied, the asymmetrical model is quite stable in the short term, as it provides a good level of proactive defense⁴⁶ against the current main adversary. The only significant risk is in the process of necessary internal transformations to build up the model and the need to quickly launch the country's economic engine for its full application.

The model is also quite balanced in the medium term, as it creates a prerequisite for stability thanks to many pillars (i.e. losing one pillar would not cause the collapse of the entire model). In addition, it reduces the risk of possible aggression against Ukraine because of the relentless growth of its own power and increase of influential foreign actors' interest in the absence of such aggression and willingness to actively oppose it if the situation evolves in a negative way. At the same time this model will growingly contribute to the country's overall rapid development and successful transformation of its socio-economic model both by ensuring the necessary security circuit and because of the multiplier effects of its own implementation.

In the long term this model is quite dependent on external factors: for example, the end of the turbulence in the surrounding world and some stabilization may eventually require the model's transformation to its softer modifications or a switch to a different security model (a model for a quiet, peaceful time). Then it

will need, for sure, a specific regulatory handling and organizing, as well as a full legitimation through representative bodies and democratic mechanisms of Ukraine's citizens' expression of will. If the opinion that the model has fulfilled its main mission prevails, in peaceful time this model can be curtailed or preserved for turbulent times in the future.

Economic and political cost of the model's development and application

It is difficult to calculate more or less accurately the cost of the development and use of a model like that in financial and economic terms. Only military components will require an approximate annual expenditure of 2% to 6% of the GDP, depending on how critical the state of safety is and on the level of aggression and threats to Ukraine's security.⁴⁷ It is impossible to calculate correctly the non-military expenditures for the model, because they vary too much and highly depend on the internal development of the country and the situation around it. Although in general we can say that this model will require significant expenditures at the first stage of its development – both direct (e.g. for upgrading and reconfiguring the army) and indirect (e.g. for reforming the state apparatus and the overall socio-economic model of the state). At the same time it should be noted that this model provides for its fast return because it rapidly ensures an acceptable level of safety and

⁴⁶ It includes not only defense and response to enemy's actions, but also "counter" attacks and proactive actions when needed.

⁴⁷ As an example we can adduce the expenses of Switzerland, Israel, Sweden and Finland in the defense sector. In: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> The World Bank. Military expenditure (% of GDP) Retrieved at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CH-SE-IL-FI>

multiplier benefits from the overall transformation of the country and development of many related areas (e.g. the defense industry sector, creative economy, IT, information technologies and the cyberspace).

The political cost of building the asymmetric model for the current system of government in Ukraine is very high or even unacceptable; with high probability it provides for a radical transformation (a real willingness for which has not been noticed yet) or a complete replacement (of the model and certain personalities). The key reasons for this are some important features and requirements of the model that the current state of affairs in Ukraine does not meet. Namely, the issue of trust, support for the government by the people and the ability to mobilize the society and all state mechanisms to create such a system for the effective confrontation of the enemy which dominates you, not tactical manoeuvring in a “neither peace nor war” style; lack of serious foreign investment and inclusion of Ukrainian enterprises in important production chains due to the high distrust of authorities in Ukraine (the key causes – corruption and authorities’ chaotic actions) and poor business climate. This model also requires a dynamic development of the economy and its profound transformation to meet the needs of key elements of the model, such as modern tools of conventional and non-traditional warfare; unfortunately, despite the many preconditions, there are no signs of it in Ukraine.

It should also be noted that not all current allies will appreciate the use of such an asymmetric model, because Ukraine, in case of the successful application of the asymmetric model, would become a quite independent entity and

to some extent even a player on the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian chessboard. This transformation of Ukraine from its current pitiful state could conflict with a number of interests of influential players in these regions,⁴⁸ including the undesirable appearance of a rather strong competitor in some areas. In this context, the cost of the model can also be quite high because of the need to overcome some external resistance along the way, even from actors which are friendly today to Ukraine, because some of them can have their own vision of the necessary positioning of Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic area and of her fulfilment of certain limited range of functions without much space for her own independent actions.

⁴⁸ Resistance of Russia is a separate topic, because in the baseline scenario, Russia is categorized as an enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In situations where, for Ukraine, traditional security models fail or are unable to provide adequate security, it's worth developing modern adaptive models that can answer the most important security challenges. These models should go beyond the established canons, and survivability and effectiveness should be their main criterion.
2. Given the real situation inside and outside Ukraine, the asymmetric security model is able in the short and medium term to give adequate answers to the most important security issues in Ukraine. One of its key features is the ability to provide an effective response to a dominating enemy using limited resources and to break his will to continue aggression. So, a broad professional discussion on real security models for today's Ukraine should be initiated. The presented model is to be one of the models to discuss.
3. The implementation of this model will require considerable efforts and investment in the first phase, along with the need for a fundamental change in the current state system (primarily, in regard to staff). Therefore it is necessary to begin a systematic work on planning the implementation of the asymmetric model initially at the level of its elements and their promotion in the society, because without their approval any model will not be stable and strong.
4. In the development of conventional military capabilities the emphasis should be on building a system of "smart defense" and a relevant new generation army (some examples can be found in the armies of Switzerland, Israel and Sweden). Particular attention should be paid to work with the society, which must clearly link the army and security system.
5. A critical role for the success of any security model for Ukraine is played by a smart and proactive diplomacy – systematic work with all important partners, creation of necessary networks and coalitions, actions in advance, promotion of the transformation of Ukraine into an important continental hub (an attack against which is too expensive), work with the social elites and business in key countries. Therefore, the support for a reasonable reform of the Ukrainian diplomacy and allocation (despite all difficulties) of adequate resources should be one of the few (3-5) real priorities for the state in the medium term.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL

Advantages of the asymmetric security model	Disadvantages of the asymmetric security model
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. It is sufficiently flexible and adaptable, able to respond to most Ukraine's security problems and challenges in the short and medium term.2. It is able to provide an effective response to a dominant enemy with limited resources and break his will to continue aggression.3. It provides vitality for the state and an acceptable level of safety for the public in quite an ambivalent and adverse external environment.4. It uses an integrated approach – a combination of traditional security tools (with necessary modernization) and the latest developments (e.g. smart defense, proactive diplomacy, information work and cyber-tools).5. Has a positive macroeconomic effect.6. The sustainability of the model and its resistance to external shocks are ensured due to the fact that the model is based on numerous (not just 1-2) basic elements.7. Provides potential for transformation into other security models.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Its innovative nature and the lack of other examples where it has been tested (to assess its effectiveness and quality characteristics).2. Implementation of this model will require considerable efforts and expenses in the first phase3. A serious internal «state reset» is quite possible to launch the model (especially staff renewal); it has a risk of turbulence and destabilization.4. There is a possibility of resistance from the outside during its implementation – and not only from Russia (the model gives a role to Ukraine which differs from how some external actors would like to see it).5. Because of its novelty this model does not have yet the necessary legitimization in Ukraine.

2. A SECURITY MODEL BASED ON A BILATERAL US-UA PACT

INTRODUCTION

The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 has been the most obvious example of how institutionalized security guarantees offer no certitude that they will actually be implemented. The problem lies in how this kind of guarantee is perceived by its stakeholders. Ukraine saw the guarantee as a real guarantee, while other partners saw it as simply an assurance. After Russia's aggressions, Ukrainians began to debate the option of getting more specific guarantees from the United States. One concept was that a Singaporean model of cooperation with the US would push Ukraine to more actively modernize its own Armed Forces. This type of strategic framework agreement not only encourages restraint on the part of an aggressive neighbor but also the possibility of expanded defense cooperation in the future using other available security instruments. Kuwait and Bahrain cooperate with the US in the framework of a Defense Cooperation Agreement of DCA, which eventually allowed them to gain MNNA status as a major non-NATO ally. The main flaw with American security guarantees is that Washington is not prepared to take on any new third-party commitments, a trend that is likely to be strengthened by the coming to power of Donald Trump.

2.1. CURRENT FORMATS OF UKRAINE-US COLLABORATION

The basis for security cooperation between Ukraine and the United States is established in Section II of the Charter on Strategic Partnership, which emphasizes Ukraine's status as a state that has not been granted the Membership Action Plan by NATO but is considered a potential future member. Against the background of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and Ukraine's fears regarding the prospects for its membership in NATO, the Charter could be seen as a symbolic gesture to reassure Kyiv of Washington's support.


As can be seen in Figure 1, prior to Russia's aggression in 2014, military and political aid to Ukraine had been slowly shrinking, partly as a result of the 'reset' between the US and Russia and partly because of Viktor Yanukovich's claims of "non-bloc status" after he came to power in 2010. This negative trend in security cooperation between Ukraine and the US may be one of the reasons why Moscow decided to annex Crimea and stir up an armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine. **Although the main variables in Russia's calculations when it decided to be aggressive were the political instability in Ukraine and the deteriorated state of its Armed Forces, the absence of real security measures on the part of NATO and the US are likely to also have been a factor.**

SECURITY IN TRANSITION


How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources

Figures 1-4. US assistance to Ukraine


Military and police aid volume (sum) / year



Arms sales by year authorizations (sum) / deliveries (sum)



Humanitarian and development aid volume (sum) / year



2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

The conflict in Ukraine changed the US's strategy towards Russia. After 2014, Ukraine became one of the priorities on the American security agenda. **Despite Ukraine's obvious position as the victim of Russian aggression and as an integral part of Europe's security architecture, the country is not even written into the existing institutional mechanisms that the US set up during the Cold War or its War on Terrorism.** Ukraine has not been offered a mutual security agreement along the lines of those signed with Southeast Asian countries, nor status as an MNNA, that is, a state that cooperates with the United States against radical groups.

Although the main accent continues, as before, to be placed on Ukraine's prospects for NATO membership, this is only a medium- or

long-term prospect. For the next while, Ukraine needs to look at intensifying cooperation with the US, which continues to insist on the necessity for sanctions against Russia, in the context of programs designed to train and re-equip the Armed Forces, and to provide non-lethal aid. In this context, it's extremely important to analyze the available security formats and to consider whether the current level of bilateral security arrangements provide the kinds of options that will restrain an aggressor.

According to data from the US Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), there are now three programs providing aid in security areas between the US and Ukraine (see Table 1).

Table 1. US aid programs and purposes⁴⁹

US assistance	Purpose
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)	Assistance to the governments of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine; the placement of additional equipment and forces in the relevant countries and their territorial waters. Aimed at increasing defense potential of allies and partners in the framework of NATO.
Global Security Contingency Fund (Ukraine) (GSCF-U)	Improving national armed forces and enforcement agencies responsible for domestic security and defense. Anticipates short- and medium-term aid programs.
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	A comprehensive program that authorized the US Government to provide Ukraine's Armed Forces with assistance, including trainers, equipment, lethal defensive weapons, logistical support, provision of materials and services, provisions, as well as intelligence data for national armed forces and law enforcement agencies; replacement of weapons and defensive equipment provided to the Government of Ukraine from the US Government.

⁴⁹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, BPC Programs and Authorities. Available at: <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/table/table-c15t2>


• **European Reassurance Initiative⁵⁰**

In some sense, the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is Washington’s strategy in response to the challenge coming from Moscow. In order to reach these objectives, the ERI focuses on increasing the US presence, carrying out bilateral and multilateral exercises, increasing deployment effectiveness, improving infrastructure, and increasing the capacity of partner countries.

In the 2017 financial year, the ERI budget is triple the funding directed at increasing the US presence in Europe after Russia’s aggressions in 2014. A budget of US \$3.4 billion means not only the placement of additional American forces in

Europe but also the strengthening of Ukraine’s security sector (see Table 2). Of the US \$85.5mn earmarked for strengthening the capacity of partner countries, US \$5.6mn have been set aside for the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine under the US’s European command and for a program to train and equip Ukraine’s Armed Forces under the US’s special ops command in Europe. With in this second program, the main focus is on establishing a new generation of Ukrainian special operations forces.⁵¹

Table 2. European Reassurance Initiative, 2015-2017



⁵⁰ European Reassurance Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Available at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/def-budget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf

Source: comptroller.defense.gov

⁵¹ Ibid p.19

2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

- **Global Security Contingency Fund (Ukraine)**

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is an experimental initiative whose aim is to ensure common technical assistance from the U.S. Department of Defense and the State Department. It is also intended to combine the resources of these two agencies to fund emergency security assistance for US partner countries.⁵² The main focus of the GSCF is ensuring that armed forces are prepared and equipped and providing assistance in areas such as rule of law and domestic stability.⁵³ In Ukraine, the goal includes combating the Russian proxies and basic infantry training.⁵⁴ Another element of the program is reforming Ukraine's police force and assisting in the formation of the National Guard, which turns out to be a key approach to reforming the security sector and aimed at protecting Ukraine, not only from external aggression but also from internal threats. Given that this Fund has been built on the principle of combining resources from various agencies, the ultimate extent of the support is not that easy to calculate. However, an important nuance in this specific instrument is its orientation towards short- and medium-term results: current projects are expected to be funded until September 2017.

- **Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative**

After Russia invaded Crimea and began the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the US Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which authorized the President to raise sanctions against Russian defense companies and to provide Ukraine with “defense articles, defense services and training... for the purpose of countering offensive weapons and reestablishing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”⁵⁵ In the 2015 FY National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress recommended a needs assessment of Ukraine's Armed Forces in terms of military technology and services, previously provided assistance, and ways to improve the situation.⁵⁶ In the 2016 NDAA, Congress formally identified the range of security aid and support for intelligence-gathering under the general name “Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.” Section 1250 (b) clearly states what kind of support Ukraine may receive from the United States:

1. Accurate real-time or near-real-time updated intelligence, including by leasing the necessary technology from private companies in the US.
2. Lethal weapons, such as anti-tank systems, mortars, guided weapons systems

⁵² U.S. Department of State, The Global Security Contingency Fund. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/gscf/>

⁵³ Rachel Clark, Army contracting team in Ukraine to support U.S. initiative, U.S. Army, 12.03.2015. Available at: https://www.army.mil/article/144312/Army_contracting_team_in_Ukraine_to_support

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Congress.gov, S.2828 – Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014. Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2828>

⁵⁶ Congress.gov, H.R.3979 – Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Section 1275. Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3979/text>

and ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, small arms and ammunition.

3. Counter-artillery radars, including mid- and long-range radars capable of locating and artillery batteries.
4. Intelligence-gathering drones.
5. Assistance in cyber security.
6. Instruments to combat electronic warfare, such as secured communications systems and other electronic security systems.
7. Other instruments for electronic warfare.
8. Training in the repair and use of technology described in items 1-7.
9. Training in carrying out critical battle operations: planning, commanding and management; small unit tactics; counter-artillery tactics; combating homemade explosive devices; tactical combat casualty care; treatment of combat wounds; and medical evacuation.

Although the current cooperative security programs between the US and Ukraine provide for a broad range of measures, Washington has been placing the priority on training and non-lethal weapons, not on supplying lethal weapons. This approach on the part of the Obama Administration has probably been driven by concerns about escalating the crisis should Ukraine receive lethal weaponry, and also that such

weapons might fall into the wrong hands.⁵⁷ In light of this, technical aid and institutional development, including the set up of a Special Ops Command, remain the key aspects of bilateral security efforts.

Today, Ukraine is one of the top recipients of foreign aid from the US, but war fatigue in general and a rough period in European and American politics could upset the current level of collaboration. This is why one condition for maintaining existing achievements is institutionalizing bilateral security relations. This means analyzing available formats and formulating proposals regarding alternative architectures.

⁵⁷ Ivan Medynskyi, U.S. Lethal Weapons for Ukraine: Mechanisms and Consequences. Institute of World Policy, p. 5. Available at: http://iwp.org.ua/img/US_weapons_eng.pdf

2.2. BEST-CASE SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE US

The nature of international relations around security since the end of the Second World War spurred both superpowers to draw up mutual defense agreements that de facto established a bipolar world. Bilateral agreements with Japan, Korea and the Philippines, trilateral defense pacts such as ANZUS,⁵⁸ and regional alliances along the lines of NATO and the Rio Pact⁵⁹ reflected US determination in combating the challenges of the communist world. Once the Soviet Union fell apart, Washington's leading role only strengthened in the new international order.

2.2.1. MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT

Bilateral security agreements were signed between the US and the Philippines, Japan and the Republic of Korea at the beginning of the Cold War as a way to contain communism in the Far East and ensure America's own security. In the new security environment, the US saw Japan and the Philippines as key logistical centers for the projection of power in the war on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam. Washington saw Seoul as the frontline of the defense of Japan and an instrument of direct contact with China. In this situation, the Philippines and South

Korea were partners in security agreements with the US as guarantees of security against the remilitarization of Japan. This possibility is now causing concern in the region.

Bilateral agreements between the US and South Korea, the Philippines and Japan unified the regional security arena of all these countries: an armed attack on one side is automatically considered an attack on the other and is seen as a threat to the security of the United States itself. However, these agreements are not binding but rather provide for each country to participate in any potential conflict in line with its own Constitutional provisions. According to the US Constitution and the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the Commander-in-Chief is empowered to declare war without the approval of Congress only in the case where there is a direct attack on the United States or its armed forces. Thus, **the real guarantee of security is provided, not by the agreements, but by the presence of American bases on the territory of other countries.**


In the case of Japan, a separate agreement provides for measures ensuring security for the US and Japan to be regulated by an "administrative agreement" that allows the US President to immediately send forces in case of an attack.⁶⁰ In contrast to the arrangement with the Philippines, the security agreements with Japan and South Korea call for military bases on their territories. Between Manila and Washington, separate interstate agreements govern the place-

⁵⁸ ANZUS, the security treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In 1986, the US terminated its security obligations towards New Zealand, which had established a nuclear-free zone around itself, but continued them in relation to Australia.

⁵⁹ The Rio Pact or the InterAmerican Agreement on Mutual Assistance came into effect in 1948. Art. 3 of the Pact declared that an attack on one of the countries of the Americas would be considered an attack on all and that every country was obligated to provide support to such a country.

⁶⁰ Ricardo Saludo, Big holes in the Philippines-US defense treaty. The Manila Times, 20.03.2014. Available at: <http://www.manilatimes.net/big-holes-in-the-philippines-us-defense-treaty/84117/>

Figure 3. Top recipients of the U.S. aid in 2016 by country (\$, bln.)



Source: "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016"

ment of military bases. This gives the Philippines the option of unilaterally regulating the presence of American forces on its territories without amending the main agreement on security or withdrawing from it altogether.

When the Cold War ended, bilateral security pacts began to lose their primary meaning and in 1992, Manila was the first to tear up its agreement about the placement of American military bases on its territory. The ensuing security vacuum in the Philippines was suddenly filled by China's occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. By 1998, the US and the Philippines signed a new agreement that allowed joint military exercises to resume. However, joint exercises proved unable to prevent military aggression: in 2012, China continued its expansionist policy, seized the Scarborough Shoal and is continuing the same policy with the Spratly Islands.

Despite Manila's desire to have security guarantees from the US, the Obama Administration made no statements as to whether the disputed territories came under the security guarantee.⁶¹ **Critically, the United States has no wish to be drawn into any open conflicts with major regional powers.** What's more, growing nationalistic fervor in the Philippines regarding America's military presence there is preventing the country from being a reliable long-term partner in terms of Washington's ability to project power in that region. But the US also needs to maintain its role as security guaranty in the region in order not to have the Philippines move into Chi-

⁶¹ Geoff Dyer, Tom Mitchell, Hague ruling: US, China on collision course? Today, 19.07.2016. Available at: <http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/hague-ruling-us-china-collision-course>

2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

na's sphere of influence or to undermine trust in its security guarantees in Japan and South Korea.⁶² For this reason, the US has continued to support the Philippines in settling territorial claims with the help of international law.

One of the main reasons why the dialog on security was picked up again between Manila and Washington after the end of the Cold War was new common threats: terrorism and China's growing power. In 2002, the Philippines and US signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) that allowed the Philippines to be used as a logistical hub in supplying the war on terrorism in the region. In return, the Bush Administration granted the Philippines MNNA status.⁶³ This status increased the Philippine's defense options at a time when China was starting to flex its muscles.⁶⁴ By 2011, the US's foreign policy focus began to shift from the Middle East to the Far East in the framework of Obama's Asia rebalance policy. One result of this policy was the signing of an agreement to expand the US military presence in the Philippines, which brought American marines and air force personnel back to the island country on a rotational

basis.⁶⁵ According to this agreement, US service personnel were to be established at five bases.

Today, the Philippines' armed forces remain among the weakest in the region⁶⁶ and suffer from lack of funding and endemic corruption.⁶⁷ To compensate, Washington has not only been providing material and technical support but has focused on helping reform public administration and the judiciary, and on combating corruption.⁶⁸

However, Filipino policy shifted with the election of Rodrigo Duterte president in late June 2016, towards reviving dialog with China and gradually reducing cooperation with the US. Duterte's initiatives to stop joint marine patrols and have US military advisors withdrawn from the island could end in a rupture of these areas of cooperation. On the other hand, a future Trump Administration could well agree to a

⁶² Bonnie S. Glaser, *Armed Clash in the South China Sea*. The Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>

⁶³ Michael B. Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, p.266.

⁶⁴ Rommel Bantaoi, *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World*, p. 317.

⁶⁵ Wyatt Olson, *Philippine base upgrades for US troops in limbo as president-elect prepares for office*. Stars and Stripes, 14.05.2016. Available at: <http://www.stripes.com/news/philippine-base-upgrades-for-us-troops-in-limbo-as-president-elect-prepares-for-office-1.409552> ; Ralph Jennings, *US Navy edges back to Subic Bay in Philippines – under new rules*. The CS Monitor, 12.11.2015. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1112/US-Navy-edges-back-to-Subic-Bay-in-Philippines-under-new-rules>

⁶⁶ *Philippines: US Lifts Restrictions On Military Aid*. Defense News, 22.01.2015. Available at: <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/01/22/philippines-military-aid-funds/22173719/>

⁶⁷ Eleanor Albert, *The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance*. Defense One, 29.06.2016. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us-philippine-military-alliance/129504/>

⁶⁸ Eleanor Albert, *The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance*. The Council on Foreign Relations, 21.10.2016. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/philippines/us-philippines-defense-alliance/p38101>

compromise and not challenge these initiatives. At the same time, given China's growing appetite for territory, the Philippines will likely have to rely on the United States on national security issues in the future.⁶⁹ In other words, Washington's security guarantees will continue to be a major factor in Manila's security policy, as President Duterte's rhetoric has already shown.

In contrast to the Philippines, the US sees South Korea and Japan as more reliable partners, which is related to the continuing presence of American military in these countries since the end of WWII. In this context, the US, unlike with the Philippines, has guaranteed Japan that their security agreement will extend to all of Japan's territory, together with the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands that China has also been trying to claim.⁷⁰ In addition to this, the US has guaranteed both Japan and South Korea, which it is covering with its "nuclear umbrella," protection using all available military means, including nuclear ones.⁷¹ Despite this, **there are doubts on the South Korean side about US reassuranc-**

es of "extended deterrence" that have led to debates over restoring the country's own nuclear capacities as a more reliable guarantee of deterrence.⁷² Similar concerns have emerged in Japan as the global security environment shifts in the region and Japan is now also gradually remilitarizing itself: in the 2016 state budget, a record US \$42bn was allocated for defense.⁷³ By contrast, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) places Ukraine 44th among 140 countries for defense spending in 2015, at a mere US \$3.622bn.⁷⁴

Moreover, Japan is in the process of changing its Constitution to shift its defense position to "active pacifism." Washington sees this as a positive change, because it would like Tokyo to be a more equal partner, capable of taking on at least some responsibility for regional security.

With Korea and Japan both arming and modernizing their defense sectors, they have gained status as NATO plus 5 countries, which offers broader possibilities than MNNA. In 2014, South Korea was the US's biggest buyer of arms, with total purchases worth US \$7.8bn.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, in addition to gaining greater access to the US arms market, Japan has won a license from

⁶⁹ Eleanor Albert, The Now and Future US-Philippines Military Alliance. *Defense One*, 29.06.2016. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/us-philippine-military-alliance/129504/>

⁷⁰ Disputed islands covered by US-Japan security treaty: Obama. *The Straits Times*, 24.04.2014. Available at: <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/disputed-islands-covered-by-us-japan-security-treaty-obama>

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment The New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, 27.04.2015. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/241125.htm>; United States Forces Korea, Full text of 47th ROK-U.S. Joint Communique, 01.11.2015. Available at: <http://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/626859/full-text-of-47th-rok-us-joint-communiqué/>

⁷² Charles D. Ferguson, How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons. Available at: http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch4_Ferguson.pdf

⁷³ The Japanese government approved a record defense budget BBC, 24.12.2015. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2015/12/151224_japan_defence_budget

⁷⁴ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

⁷⁵ Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014. Congressional Research Service, 21.12.2015. p. 40. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/spp/crs/weapons/R44320.pdf>

an American manufacturer to produce its own weapons.⁷⁶

In contrast to the Philippines, Japan's and Korea's deterrence is based on the size of the military contingent based on their territories. **More US military are stationed in Japan than in any other country in the world:⁷⁷ nearly 54,000 service personnel from the army, navy and air force.⁷⁸** Japan's marine forces are among the most powerful military fleets in the world, and the US is more closely tied to them than to any other naval forces: every year, it organizes about 100 joint exercises⁷⁹. Meanwhile, Korea has around 30,000 US service personnel permanently stationed there.⁸⁰ Since 2004, the US Air Force has increased its attacking force in South Korea through regular rotations of frontline bombers, which are intended to serve as a guaranteed deterrent from external threats against this country.

Still, **even the presence of such a military contingent is not an absolute guarantee that the**

United States would immediately respond to an external threat. After North Korea fired at South Korea, Seoul received no active military support from the US and was unable to strike back significantly itself since operational control was with the US Command. The US is very sensitive to the possibility of military responses, concerned that a massive attack could lead to a new war between North and South Korea⁸¹ and drag China and the US into a global confrontation.

US support for cooperation between Japan and Korea is now changing from bilateral local cooperation to multilateral regional collaboration. Washington believes that the only possible effective restraint on China and North Korea is this kind of broader format. One of the deterrents that the US uses in the region as the confrontation over the Eastern and South China Seas grows is to build up Japan's multilateral connections with Australia, South Korea and ASEAN countries.⁸²

In the context of these policies, the US has been working to establish the PRO triangle with the participation of Korea and Japan. In 2003, Japan began to acquire PRO systems from the US, which gave it the second strongest anti-missile

⁷⁶ Robbin F. Laird, Edward Timperlake and Richard Weitz, *Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy*, p.166.

⁷⁷ Hannah Beech, *The Tense Relationship Between Japan and the U.S. Military*. Time, 08.06.2016. Available at: <http://time.com/4360940/us-military-navy-japan-okinawa-alcohol-bases/>

⁷⁸ About USFJ. U.S. Forces, Japan, *The Cornerstone of the Pacific*. Available at: <http://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/>

⁷⁹ Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*. Congressional Research Service, 09.02.2016, p.18. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>

⁸⁰ North Korea: US forces in South put on highest level of alert; allies discuss 'strategic assets'. ABC News, 11.01.2016. Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-11/us-troops-in-south-korea-on-high-alert-after-north-nuclear-test/7081296>

⁸¹ Kyung-young Chung, *The Year 2015 or After: Transition of Wartime Operational Control, Self-esteem of the Republic of Korea, and Trust-building Process*. East Asia Institute, 30.09.2013. Available at: http://www.eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&code=eng_report&idx=12522&page=4

⁸² U.S. Department of State, *Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment The New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, 27.04.2015. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/prs/ps/2015/04/241125.htm>

defense system in the world.⁸³ So far, Washington has also come to an agreement to set up its PRO THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems in South Korea.⁸⁴ Given that China agreed to this, in return for certain concessions regarding North Korea, fearing that its nuclear program could become an excuse for the US and its allies to use force.⁸⁵

2.2.2. PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE

The fact that the idea of a bilateral security agreement similar to those with South Korea and Japan is not currently being considered by the US as a possible option for Ukraine has become a sore spot in dialog with Washington.⁸⁶

America's security agreements with Asia-Pacific countries were rooted in regional history and seen as a guarantee that the US would regionally be in a position to counter the communist threat, later as a platform in the war on terrorism, and now as a deterrent against North Korea and China, and protection for trade routes in the South China Sea.

On the European continent, the North Atlantic alliance serves the same function

historically. Since 1991, Ukraine has been seen by the US as an important component of regional security structures, although giving up its nuclear arsenal was critical for American security policy in Europe. At the same time, US reluctance to enter into conflict with the Russian Federation is obviously not improving Ukraine's prospects for getting bilateral security guarantees in the foreseeable future. What's more, the challenge presented by the RF is seen in Washington as more of a regional than global threat. This means that offering security guarantees will only increase risks for the US itself.

Still, **Washington will clearly benefit from a strategy that will increase Ukraine's status as a NATO partner that can effectively deter Russia on its own.** At the same time, Ukraine could depend on the US for assistance in structural reforms of the security sector, combating corruption in the defense arena, holding joint exercises, and modernizing its defensive capacities.

LESSONS FOR UKRAINE

- **Be a reliable partner.** The examples of the Philippines on the one hand, and the Republic of Korea and Japan on the other show that the US grant security guarantees only if Washington is confident in the long term reliability of the partnership. Ukraine need to guarantee the United States that Ukraine's geopolitical vector on the Euro-Atlantic integration will remain unchanged. .
- **Arm oneself.** Today, none of the three countries that have bilateral security agreements have confidence that the USA would provide security guarantees in the case of conflict

⁸³ Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, The U.S.-Japan Alliance. Congressional Research Service, 09.02.2016, p. 19. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>

⁸⁴ The US and South Korea deploy the THAAD anti-rocket system. BBC, 08.07.2016. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/russian/news-36744604>

⁸⁵ A. Lankov, Why real sanctions are being employed against North Korea. The Moscow Carnegie Center, 17.03.2016. Available at: <http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=63046>

⁸⁶ A. Getmanchuk, Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-USA. World Policy Institute, 29.03.2016, p.10. Available at: <http://iwpp.org.ua/ukr/public/1982.html>

escalation; all three states set their courses toward strengthening their own defense sectors. Meanwhile, the US welcomes the fact that its partners in the Asian-Pacific region are claiming more responsibility for their own security. Establishment of a powerful army, capable of effective deterrence, is one of the guarantees of American support in the event of an armed conflict.

- **Fight corruption.** One of the main focuses of the US in strengthening the security of the Philippines is the fight against corruption in the defense sector. The transparency of Ukraine's defense sector should become one of the key tasks in cooperation with the United States.
- **Procure lethal armaments.** The sensitive issue of granting Ukraine lethal armaments might be replaced with providing licenses on their production, or with joint projects with American companies on the development of new weapons.
- **Attempt to procure the necessary defensive lethal armaments.** If the US further refuses to provide Ukraine with the necessary lethal armaments free of charge, Ukraine could try to submit an official application to the US State Department for acquisition of the appropriate antitank missile systems (Javelins). During the talks with the US on the possibility of ATMS procurement, Kyiv should actively promote the idea that selling defensive armaments will not place any obligations on the United States to provide military support in the event of escalation of the conflict. In return, procurement of weapons would actually create a sustainable deterrence effect against potential future aggression by

the Russian Federation. It should be clearly stated that providing Ukraine with armaments will transfer responsibility for further conflict escalation exclusively on Russia, as Ukraine will use the new armaments only for defensive purposes, and not for a possible operation to return the SDDL by military means.

- **Take advantage of the situation created by the conflict on the territory of Ukraine.** Strengthening the security cooperation between the USA and the Republic of Korea, Japan, or Philippines occurred only in the face of common threats and decreased after they have been overcome. Ukraine should make the best use of time for cooperation with the USA to complete modernization of its own defense sector before resolution of the conflict in Donbas by any means.
- Ukraine should focus on keeping the American and NATO member states military contingent, which provides training for Ukrainian military staff, on the territory of Ukraine. Moreover, Kyiv should put maximum efforts in promotion of the idea of strengthening the presence of the US and the NATO in the Balkans and in the Black Sea region. This would force the Russian military contingent in Crimea to focus not on further aggression against Ukraine, but on opposing NATO forces. The necessity of such strengthening of the Southern part of the NATO's eastern flank should be substantiated by the fact that today the Russian force in occupied Crimea is more potent than the one Kremlin placed in the Kaliningrad region in terms of both numbers and advanced armaments.

2.2.3. MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY

Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) is a term used by the United States to designate countries, which do not have bilateral defense agreements with Washington, but either have long term security partnerships or seek strategic cooperation. As of today, MNNA status has been granted to Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tunisia, while Taiwan is considered a major ally without official status⁸⁷ (see Appendix 1. Allies of the USA).

According to the United States Code, in order to grant MNNA status, the US President should inform Congress in writing at least 30 days before making such a decision.

MNNAs are entitled to a wide range of financial and military benefits. Among them are the opportunity to receive additional funds from the US government for research programs, coordination of bilateral counter-terrorist exercises, and development projects. **Furthermore, MNNAs have the opportunity to purchase or lease surplus American military equipment and use American financial aid to do that⁸⁸. However, the MNNA status does not provide any agreement on mutual defense**, which clearly distinguishes the members of NATO from MNNA states. **Although this**

model does not provide any security commitment from the White House, it emphasizes the strategic role of the respective state for the region, as well as for the United States.

After Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the United States Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act introducing sanctions against Russia and allocating funds to support the security sector of Ukraine. According to the first proposal of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ukraine, together with Moldova and Georgia, had to be granted MNNA status, which would facilitate the procedure of supplying all three countries with military equipment⁸⁹. However, this provision was removed from the final version of the document. The reason for this decision could be associated with the approach applied by the US lawmakers: to use the MNNA status as a bargaining chip in talks with the US President to ensure the adoption of the law as a whole⁹⁰ (see Appendix 2. The major documents adopted by the US Congress to support Ukraine).

Although Ukraine hasn't received MNNA status, the level of American aid aimed at strengthening its security sector through the provision of non-lethal equipment and instructors, as well as the organization of joint exercises is comparable with the level of support currently provided for certain countries

⁸⁷ Designation of major non-NATO allies. Available at: <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2321k&num=0&edition=prelim>; U.S. Department of State, Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Afghanistan, 07.07.2012. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194662.htm>

⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally, 10.07.2015. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm>

⁸⁹ Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, Background and Key Details. Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/UFSA_1-pager.pdf

⁹⁰ George Barros, Analysis of Ukraine Freedom Support Act after amendments. Euromaidan Press, 17.12.2014. Available at: <http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/12/17/analysis-of-ukraine-freedom-support-act-after-amendments/#arvlbdata>

with MNNA status. Despite refusing to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons armaments, such as anti-tank missile systems, Washington has been consistent in providing other necessary equipment. Over the past two years, Ukraine has received Humvee armored vehicles, anti-artillery and anti-mortar radars, medical equipment, radio systems, and other non-lethal military equipment. Moreover, focus has been shifted towards training Ukrainian armed forces and assistance in the implementation of defense reform, two factors that could significantly increase the capability of Ukrainian armed forces. Another reason for this approach stems from the fact that Ukraine remains one of the largest exporters of armaments, and its own military industrial complex is able to both meet the requirements of the armed forces and stimulate the economy.

The questions of both the likelihood and the potential benefits of MNNA status for Ukraine remain open. Since the Bush administration, MNNA status has been granted to the respective countries as a reward for their participation in the fight against terrorism. Today, it is difficult to predict whether this practice will be maintained and, if yes, whether Ukraine will be able to help allies in the War on Terror.

If Ukraine received MNNA status, it would secure the position of a key US ally. Despite the fact that there were discussions within the United States about revoking the MNNA status for some countries, e.g. Argentina, due to anti-American sentiments, so far there is no example of a country having lost MNNA status due to a decrease of its strategic utility. Through receiving the MNNA status, Ukraine would ensure its place on the security agenda of the

United States as not a situational partner, but as a long-term ally.

The draft budget, proposed by the House of Representatives for the 2017 fiscal year, includes the allocation of 150 million dollars of aid to Ukraine, compared to 300 million allocated in the previous year⁹¹. If the amount of aid further decreases, the Ukrainian government will be able to get loans, provided by MNNA status, to fund future projects, and to procure military resources at discount prices.

However, despite the pretentious name, the real benefits of the MNNA status are sometimes hard to distinguish. MNNA status has the right to lease military equipment and receive the US funding to purchase it, but on the other hand, they do not have the right to get it free of charge. It is up to the countries themselves to take advantage of these opportunities. **If the Ukrainian government does not have a clear plan for the effective use of MNNA status benefits, receiving this status will be of little significance by itself.**

MNNA status will not necessarily become a panacea for the problems of Ukraine. Members of the US Congress have repeatedly stated that the current system of granting MNNA status does not encourage countries to implement comprehensive internal

⁹¹ Mike Eckel, U.S. Bill Backs More Defense Spending For Europe, Ukraine. Radio Liberty, 28.04.2016. Available at: <http://www.rferl.org/a/us-bill-more-defense-spending-for-europe-ukraine/27705097.html>

reforms.⁹² If the Ukrainian government does not manage to overcome corruption that drags the country backwards, they will definitely not manage to take advantage of MNNA status benefits.

2.2.4. ALTERNATIVES TO MNNA STATUS

Instead of seeking MNNA status, Ukraine could follow the footsteps of Singapore and achieve the signing of a separate bilateral security and defense agreement with the United States. For instance, Singapore refused to accept the US proposal to grant MNNA status due to concerns regarding a potential negative response from China and its Islamic neighbors in the region⁹³. In 2005, Singapore and the United States have signed the Strategic Framework Agreement that complemented the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding of 1990 regarding granting the access to US troops to military facilities in Singapore⁹⁴. Both agreements have laid the foundation for joint military exercises, as well as to exchange of information and equipment between the two countries. In 2015, the United States and Singapore have signed an addi-

tional agreement aimed at developing cooperation between the two countries in one of the most essential aspects: retrofitting the Air Force of Singapore. After signing the agreement, it was announced that Singapore signed a 914 million dollars worth contract for the supply of required equipment with Lockheed Martin⁹⁵.

Following the footsteps of Singapore could be a more pragmatic option for Ukraine.

⁹² Gayatri Oruganti, Todd Ruffner, U.S.-Tunisia Security Cooperation: What It Means to be a Major Non-NATO Ally. Security Assistance Monitor, 14.07.2015. Available at: <http://securityassistance.org/blog/us-tunisia-security-cooperation-what-it-means-be-major-non-nato-ally>

⁹³ Tan, See Seng, "America the Indispensable Power: Singapore's Perspective of America as a Security Partner," Asian Politics & Policy 8, №1, 2016, p.127.

⁹⁴ The Strategic Framework Agreement- official release. Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 12.07.2005. Available at: https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/12jul05_fs.html#.V35GiTX4XE8

⁹⁵ Wendell Minnick, Singapore-US Agreement To Boost Defense Cooperation. Defense News, 08.12.2015. Available at: <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/leaders/2015/12/08/singapore-us-agreement-boost-defense-cooperation/76980618/>

2.3. NEW FORMATS OF SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE USA

The critical role of the US in maintaining the security architecture in Europe in the light of aggression from the revanchist Russian regime is becoming increasingly apparent. Sanctions became the main mechanism of deterrence from further invasion on the territory of Ukraine. It is likely that Obama's decision to apply sanctions came from his belief that direct military support for Ukraine could lead to an escalation of the conflict. Moreover, it can be argued that his previous experience in dealing with Iran's nuclear program through a set of sanctions showed their efficacy in putting pressure on Tehran. **If we compare Washington's actions aimed at eliminating the threat posed by Iran and Russia, it becomes clear that the US relies on deterrence, rather than on the open confrontation.** The major difference between these cases is that Washington's decision to impose sanctions against Iran was accompanied by powerful declarations on the protection of regional partners, which were subsequently institutionalized through bilateral agreements, while **in the case of Russia, Ukraine has not get the opportunity to become a part of the "improved" model of bilateral relations with the United States.**

Although Kyiv officially declared its course towards NATO membership, this should not prevent both countries from reaching a new level of bilateral security cooperation, which would serve as a deterrence factor in the nearest future. At this stage, it is essential for Ukraine to institutionalize security partnership between the two countries in order to avoid its weakening due to the changes in the US leadership,

expiration of the existing programs, etc. **The security assurances provided by the United States in the Budapest Memorandum should be backed by real security mechanisms.**

Our analysis of the existing modes of bilateral security cooperation between the US and its partners indicates that while the Mutual Defense Agreement could provide the most reliable security guarantees for Ukraine, it is rather unlikely, even in the long term. **We recommend following another scenario, which includes signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement or the Strategic Framework Agreement with the US, in the short and medium term.** The Strategic Framework Agreement, signed by the US with Singapore, is broader than MNA status; however, it opens the door to closer working relations in the fields of security and prevention of terrorism. This agreement has formalized bilateral security relations between the two countries and is based on the "places-not-bases" strategy in the region. This approach granted the US military access to military facilities of the country on a rotational basis without affecting the sensitive sovereignty issues⁹⁶.

The progress of relations between the US and Singapore shows that the gradual development of security relations with the United States is possible without irritating their major regional rival. Ukraine should emphasize this when trying to negotiate new security agreements with the United States. In addition, Kyiv has already signed a Memorandum of Understanding

⁹⁶ Emma Chanlett-Avery, Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, 26.07.2013, p. 3. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20490.pdf>

with Washington in 1992, laying the foundation for future projects between the two countries.

The Strategic Framework Agreements and the Defense Cooperation Agreements have a less serious tone than the Major Non-NATO Ally Status Agreement. It is vital to emphasize that such documents such as the Strategic Framework Agreement would demonstrate the US's commitment to Ukraine without provoking Russia, unlike the other types of security and defense agreements.

The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed by the United States with the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, is another format that could be modeled for Ukraine. After the security crisis in the Middle East in the early nineties, the United States imposed sanctions against the countries that violated the sovereignty of their neighbors, and extended security commitments towards their strategic partners in the region. Those agreements included the following main aspects:

- Joint response to external threats, if each party recognizes that necessary;
- Granting US troops access to military facilities of the respective country;
- Early deployment of the US military equipment in the respective country by mutual agreement between both parties;
- Provision on the status of military forces, which regulated the legal status of US troops stationed in the respective countries⁹⁷.

⁹⁷ Russell, James A. "Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf," *Strategic Insights*, Volume VIII, No. 5 (December 2009).

In general, such agreements have strengthened security relationships between the United States and every country that has signed them, thus creating additional preconditions for long-term defense relations, as well as opportunities for military exercises, training, and supply of defensive armaments. The presence of American troops in these countries in the form of a limited military component with pre-installed infrastructure has become an important deterrence factor against potential aggressors⁹⁸.

It is also important that the examples of Bahrain and Kuwait show that the DCA is not a barrier to future expansion of relations with the US; on contrary, it could serve as an additional incentive. Having signed the Defense Cooperation Agreements in 1991, Bahrain received MNA status in 2002, and Kuwait – in 2004.

As noted above, the presence of the US troops in the partner countries proved to be an effective tool for deterring the aggressive policy of their neighbors during the Cold War, and continues to perform this function today. **The logic of deterrence is that the aggressor country will not attack if the cost of such an action is too high.**

Despite the presence of American military servicepersons in Ukraine as consultants and participants of joint exercises, the probability of permanent deployment of the US forces in Ukraine is very low, given the cautious approach applied by Washington. However, the institutionalization of the existing level of cooperation is vital for maintaining and improving the security dynamics in the short

⁹⁸ Sami G. Hajjar. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. p. 27

term. Therefore, institutionalization of security cooperation with the United States through the Strategic Framework Agreement or the DCA in the short to medium term would allow maintaining the existing level of cooperation and would not hinder Ukraine's main goal, which is either membership in the NATO or MNNA status.

Establishing long-term, formal, and practical security relations between Washington and Kyiv would have a multiplier effect not only on the prospects of Ukraine's membership in the NATO, but also on the current deterrence strategy of the Alliance, where Ukraine is a key element.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Ukraine should gradually expand cooperation with the United States by seeking additional common interests in the defense sphere. Step by step development of relations between the US and Ukraine and their institutionalization through official agreements should be accompanied by modernization of Ukrainian military capabilities in the medium term. In terms of validity, such a document should be more effective than the Charter, and eventually should reach the level of the Strategic Framework Agreement, or the Defense Cooperation Agreement. In order to narrow the negotiation corridor for the allies and approve a final document, the tactics of negotiations on such an agreement should be based on the demand for higher level of cooperation than the current one. Ukraine should be cautious and not put pressure on the US until the point when Kyiv is ready to get the final answer. Otherwise there is a risk of failure. Such an agreement should cover the following priority aspects:

- *Joint military exercises;*
- *Cooperation in armaments development;*
- *Consulting, material, and technical aid for defense sector reform;*
- *Cooperation in cyber security (an important element of cooperation with the US, given that Russia had been conducting hacker attacks against both the US and critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine);*

- *Cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, which would strengthen Ukraine's role as a strategic country for the United States. It is important to fill this cooperation with real content and avoid a declarative character;*
- *Joint research and analysis of the methods of hybrid warfare.*

2. A gradual rapprochement between the US and Ukraine in the field of defense through the Strategic Framework Agreement, or the DCA, as well as the gradual modernization of the defense sector of Ukraine should develop into closer cooperation with the United States through integration into NATO or signing of a Security Agreement between Ukraine and the USA in the long term. The new forms of regional defense cooperation in case of NATO format changes under Donald Trump's presidency should also be considered.

3. Attempt to reach an agreement to install the rotation-based US military base in Ukraine. On the one hand, it would become a symbolic gesture of support from the US, and on the other, it would create additional preconditions for joint exercises with Ukrainian military staff and enhance the interoperability between the two armies. Such a military base could become a hybrid warfare research center, which would increase the US's interest in it. In case of a refusal to install a military base in Ukraine on the "places-not-bases" principle, Ukraine should focus on maintaining the presence of the US and the NATO member states troops on its territory to continue military exercises.

4. Ukraine should promote the idea of strengthening the presence of the US and the NATO in the Balkans and in the Black Sea region. This would force the Russian military contingent in Crimea to focus not on possible aggression against Ukraine, but on opposing the NATO forces. The necessity of this action should be substantiated by the fact that today Russian force in occupied Crimea is more potent than the one Kremlin placed in Kaliningrad region in terms of both numbers and advanced armaments.

ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT OR THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WITH THE USA

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="91 472 803 643">1. A number of successive security agreements (e.g. the experience of Singapore) could become an incentive for the Ukrainian government to continue implementing the necessary reforms aimed at integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security space.<li data-bbox="91 681 803 757">2. The agreement would not prevent Ukraine's integration into the NATO].<li data-bbox="91 795 803 891">3. The agreement would promote the institutionalization of a security partnership and prevent the weakening of cooperation between Ukraine and the US.<li data-bbox="91 929 803 1252">4. The progress of relations between the US and Singapore shows that the gradual development of security relations with the United States reduces the frustration of the latter's major regional rival. Deployment of US military forces in Ukraine under the "places-not-bases" strategy (see the example of Singapore) would create less than any bilateral security agreement, following the examples of Japan or the Republic of Korea that allowed installation of the US military personnel on a regular basis.<li data-bbox="91 1290 803 1405">5. The US military presence in Ukraine under the defense agreement between the two countries would serve as an additional deterrence factor against Russian aggression.<li data-bbox="91 1443 803 1532">6. The agreement would enhance bilateral relations in such aspects as military exercises, training, and supply of defensive armaments.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="803 472 1180 719">1. The US is not willing to engage in a global confrontation with Russia, which could result in a declarative international instrument without any effective defense mechanism for Ukraine.

ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS (THE PHILIPPINES, KOREA REPUBLIC, JAPAN) WITH THE USA FOR UKRAINE

Advantages	Challenges
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. A formalized bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the US would serve as an additional deterrence factor against Russia in Ukraine. At least, this agreement would make the Kremlin more cautious in its military activities aimed against Ukraine.2. A full bilateral security agreement, similar to the agreements signed by the US with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, would force Washington to support Ukraine more actively in deterring Russia in order to not undermine the confidence of other allies of the United States.3. Installation of US rotation based military bases in Ukraine under the security agreement would not only serve as a deterrence factor, but also create additional preconditions for joint military exercises. The red line for the Kremlin in case of full-scale hostilities on the territory of Ukraine would depend on the geographical location of such bases.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Washington's reluctance to engage in global confrontation with Russia.2. Kyiv's activation of dialogue with the US on signing a bilateral security agreement might result in the intensification of provocations, armed hostilities, and Russian pressure on Ukraine.3. The issue of American security guarantees for Ukraine is currently an irritator in the dialogue between Kyiv and Washington, and it will remain so at least until the moment when Ukraine is institutionally ready to provide the US with a "success story" if the security agreement is signed between the two countries.4. Washington's consent to approve the bilateral security guarantees could result in additional agreements limiting Ukraine's freedom of military decision-making during the activation of hostilities (e.g. the example of the Republic of Korea).5. The US President may initiate military activities without the Congress' consent only in case of attacks on US military personnel. Therefore, any security agreement without American military presence in Ukraine would be less effective than the agreements signed with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF MNNA STATUS FOR UKRAINE

Advantages	Challenges
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Provides Ukraine with the guaranteed and consistent role of Washington's major ally.2. Allows Ukraine to procure additional military resources.3. Allows Ukraine to receive American credit aid in the case of limited direct funding.4. Would become a strong signal of partner support for Ukrainian public.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The MNNA status has more symbolic than practical meaning.2. The Ukrainian public might become disappointed in this format, if it is not followed by decisive support, especially in the case of further provocations by Russia.3. The White House is concerned that the new, higher status might further worsen relations with Russia.4. The credits themselves are not sufficient to resolve the significant issues in Ukraine's defense sector.5. MNNA status would undermine Ukraine's commitment to the course towards integration into the NATO.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Allies of the USA

NATO	Albania, Belgium, the UK, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the US, Turkey, Hungary, France, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia
ANZUS	The agreement between the US, Australia, and New Zealand (in 1986, the US suspended security guarantees for New Zealand)
Bilateral security agreements	The Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Japan
Major allies without official status	Israel, Chinese Taipei ⁹⁹ , Singapore
Rio Pact	Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (the status is uncertain) ¹⁰⁰ , El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
MNNA	Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tunisia

⁹⁹ Beckley Michael. The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts, 2015, c. 24. Режим доступу: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf

¹⁰⁰ Neelesh Moorthy, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson mischaracterizes U.S. defense obligations. Politi Fact, 09.06.2016. Режим доступу: <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/09/gary-johnson/libertarian-candidate-gary-johnson-mischaracterize/>

2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

Appendix 2. Major documents adopted by the US Congress to support Ukraine

Name	Type	Adoption date	Number	Main terms
Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act	Law	03.04.2014	H.R.4152	Support for reforms and assistance to security sector of Ukraine. Authorization for the US President to impose sanctions against persons involved in violation of the territorial integrity and stability of Ukraine.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016	Law	18.12.2015	H.R.2029	Providing additional funding for the armed forces and national security forces of Ukraine. Demand to instruct every representative of the US in international institutions to vote against any program that would violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation in order to provide additional support for Ukraine and other objectives	Law	18.12.2014	H.R.5859	Imposing sanctions against Russia. Allocation of \$350 million to Ukraine for military purposes, including defensive armaments and aid for the IDPs. This law was adopted as an alternative to the Bill S.2828, which initially granted Ukraine the Major Non-NATO Ally status.

SECURITY IN TRANSITION

How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources

Calling on the President to provide Ukraine with military assistance to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity	Resolution adopted by the House of Representatives	23.03.2015	H.Res.162	Includes calling on the US President to provide Ukraine with lethal defensive armaments.
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016	Law	30.09.2015	H.R.719	Ensuring financial flexibility for specific international actions to support Ukraine in countering external aggression and influence.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016	Law	25.11.2015	S.1356	Allocation of \$300 million to promote security, military training, logistics, as well as for the needs of other security services of Ukraine. A ban on the use of funds for co-operation between the US and Russia as long as Moscow keeps occupying the territory of Ukraine and does not take actions to implement the Minsk Agreements.

2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017	Agreed	14.07.2016	S.2943	A ban on the allocation of funds from FY2017 on military cooperation between the governments of the US and Russia until the end of Russian occupation of the territory of Ukraine. Allocation of funds for military support to Ukraine.
Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act	Draft adopted by the House of Representatives	21.09.2016	H.R.5094	Maintaining the sanctions against Russia until Moscow implements the Minsk Agreements. A ban by the US government on recognition of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Support for investments in Ukraine. Maintaining sanctions in Crimea until Ukraine regains sovereignty over the peninsula. American support for Ukraine includes supply of lethal defensive armaments.

3. THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE. DEEPER BUT NOT WIDER

INTRODUCTION

The integration of Ukraine into NATO has been of a zigzag nature: until 2002 collaboration was characterized by a “special relationship” partnership schema. Kyiv officially maintained a course of integration into NATO during 2002-2004, and later during 2005-2010. In the last year of Leonid Kuchma’s tenure, the issue of joining the Alliance was withdrawn from the agenda, and the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovich in 2010 was marked by a “non-alignment” status proclamation which was not understood by most experts. Such inconsistency highlighted the strategic weakness of Ukraine: NATO partners did not understand completely what Kyiv wanted; Russia, meanwhile, was well aware of the vulnerability of the country.

After Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, public support for integration into the Alliance has significantly increased (almost double compared to 2013). However, any future membership is in no way affected by this. The factor of public support has not played a key role for NATO membership, as it had not in the prewar period. Above all, the reluctance of Alliance members to aggravate relations with Russia was however a factor up to 2014. The NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 showed the Alliance’s readiness to further support Ukraine.

Today Ukraine can not afford any rhetoric along the lines of “membership or nothing”, but must make the most of all opportunities for partnership with the Alliance. Ukraine cannot afford to ignore any fundamentally new

format of working with NATO. Moreover, Ukraine has currently not fully utilised all those mechanisms for collaboration that it has been offered. The partnership between Ukraine and NATO is unique, with an unprecedented level of support for its partner nation. This does not exclude any possibility of scaling up aid, but the Alliance has stressed that in the first instance Kyiv should demonstrate a proper level of mastery of the current amount of support, for Ukraine now has to fully take advantage of current aid up to its absorption capacity. **Ukraine should not expand areas of cooperation, but deepen existing formats, focusing on the implementation of current programmes.**

To go up to another level of cooperation it is important that there are not only and not so much changes in the international regional situation, but reforms inside Ukraine itself. To counter the hybrid war, Ukraine should focus on closer collaboration not only with NATO but also with its member states, particularly in information-sharing and cyber security spheres. **A bilateral agreement should not become a substitute for collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, but has already demonstrated its greater efficiency.** At NATO’s headquarters, when Ukrainian experts complain about the lack of aid in certain sensitive areas, they get the response that they had better come to a bilateral agreement, especially when it comes to sharing intelligence.

The nation needs to create key narratives for the Alliance. In particular, **Ukraine has been a giver, not a taker, of security ever since 1991.**

3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider

Its expertise in combatting a hybrid war against one of the most powerful armies in the world is already causing significant interest from Western partners. The particular areas of interest is Ukrainian resilience from the side of its servicemen and volunteers.¹⁰¹

3.1. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO

Ukraine is the largest recipient of assistance from NATO. It is also the only partner of the Alliance which is involved in **all major** peace-keeping operations under auspices of the Alliance. Since 2014 Ukraine has taken first place in receiving funds from NATO for scientific projects. For example, the Alliance highlighted its work with Ukraine under the “Science for Peace and Security” programme in 2014, when 2.2 million euros, and later 3.4 m. euros in Euros, were provided. The total planned budget for 2014-2019 will be some 15 million euros (see. Infographic 1).¹⁰² In Ukraine itself the NATO “Improving Military Education” (DEEP) programme is the largest that the Alliance has implemented in any partner country. Below we consider some areas/issues in the collaboration between Ukraine and NATO.

3.1.1. THE COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF AID TO UKRAINE

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016 a comprehensive aid package for Ukraine was approved, as then confirmed at NATO headquarters, – the largest plan for aid in the history of the Alliance. It provides 40 targeted support measures in 13 key areas. In fact, this package represents a systematization of all the assistance that NATO is providing Ukraine as well as support for some new areas, including countering

¹⁰¹ Medynskiy, I., “What Ukraine can Offer to NATO?” / Institute of World Policy, 15 December 2015. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1870.html>

¹⁰² NATO's Support to Ukraine, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, fact sheet, – July 2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-eng.pdf

improvised explosive devices and hybrid war. Forming a platform to study the experience of hybrid warfare is especially important because in this Ukraine will demonstrate its added value to the Alliance. One of the important aspects of measurable effectiveness which should be noted is cooperation with the Parliament and security sector reform (SSU).

Relations between Ukraine and NATO are characterized by an uncertain level of confidence, and a mismatch of expectations. **If Ukraine wishes to count on timely, flexible, and large-scale aid, the Alliance insists that Kyiv moves away from its traditional ad hoc approach and moves to more rigid strategic planning that will change the quality of defence and the national security sector.**¹⁰³

However, the Alliance responds negatively not only to the lack of a strategic approach by Ukraine, but also to the lack of compliance with certain procedures, and protocols of a diplomatic nature. Thus, **in NATO there is a view that there is a short-sighted lack of purpose by Kyiv in the appointment of a Head of Mission in Ukraine for NATO.** According to NATO officials, on the eve of the Warsaw Summit it was expected that the President of Ukraine would approve a certain long-awaited candidate, but this did not happen. The last Head of Mission, Ihor Dolhoh, ceased to undertake his functions in spring 2015. The Alliance perceived this as a lack of a permanent representative in addition to a lack of focus on a strategic partnership.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine was recognized by NATO as one of the threats to the Alliance itself. According to the last summit in Warsaw, in addition to allocating Ukraine a comprehensive package of aid, a number of important decisions related to this were taken:

- 1) establishment of a Joint Intelligence and Security Directorate, to be managed by the Aide to the Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. Up until now Intelligence belonged more to the authority of most member states themselves;
- 2) assigning four battalions to the eastern borders of NATO in 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland;
- 3) willingness to employ Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to hybrid war, and adopt a strategy and action plan concerning NATO's role in combating hybrid warfare;
- 4) a cybersecurity operational space was recognized that NATO is ready to defend as effectively as the Alliance functions on land, in the air, and on water. Indeed, NATO and the EU signed an agreement in February 2016 to strengthen mutual work on cybersecurity, which included the creation of two teams that will operate in emergency conditions.

The Warsaw Summit saw a logical continuation of this policy, the first outlines of which were formulated in Wales in September 2014. But if the summit in Wales suggested ad hoc solutions in response to changes in the security situation, the summit in Poland adopted a special communiqué that laid the foundations of a new NATO strategy. The Warsaw Summit also brought Ukraine the news that it was possible

¹⁰³ Getmanchuk, A., "Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration or Undeclared Neutrality?", 26 June 2015. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html>

3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider

to design a new form of partnership with the Alliance, under the auspices of the Enhanced Opportunities Programme with its enhanced capabilities. This format was launched at the summit in Wales in 2014, calling for greater cooperation to improve interoperability, starting with five countries: Georgia, Finland, Sweden, Jordan, and Australia. Then NATO agreed that this list may be extended by other countries that have “engaged in significant contributions and have interest.” During the Warsaw Summit, Ukraine expressed such an interest. However, for Kyiv it is important to understand that **this very initiative may not provide anything more than Ukraine has already received. The Alliance cannot at the moment assess additional benefits for**

another country under the new programme, as well as benefits of the programme for participating countries. Ukraine should focus less on external effects, and more on practical content to fulfil existing initiatives. At NATO headquarters an impression has been formed that for Kyiv the programme of enhanced opportunities is only important for communication and to demonstrate progress in relations with the Alliance.

3.1.2. TRUST FUNDS

The NATO assistance package also includes 6 new trust funds that have been launched since 2014. The planned total budget for these funds is more than 9 m. euros. Currently this is an increase of over 50%.¹⁰⁴

Name of Fund	Planned Budget	Contribution
Fund for the modernization of command systems, management, communications and computerization	€ 1,760,000	€ 1,541,081
Fund for retraining and social adaptation of service personnel	€ 435,000	€ 435,000
Fund for medical rehabilitation	€ 2,250,000	€ 187,610
Funds for the reformulation of logistics and standardization systems	€ 4,100,000	€ 1,263,146
Cybersecurity Fund	€ 560,000	€ 1,065,000
Fund for land-mine removal		€ 50 000
Total	Overall budget: 9,105,000	Already accounted for: 4,541,837

As of June 2016

¹⁰⁴ NATO Trust Funds to Support Ukraine, Institute of world policy. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/2094.html>

Trust Funds are perhaps the most striking example of delays in collaboration between Ukraine and NATO. They identify key challenges for deepening cooperation, and also that the Alliance is cooling off in its response to proposals from Kyiv to extend support, because the nation can not yet deal with the available aid in terms of its absorption capacity. The main problems found in collaboration in terms of trust funds are:

- 1. Slow response by Ukraine.** Trust funds that were launched at the NATO summit in Wales in early September 2014 to mid-2015 have not yet come into play due to the lack of an appropriate legal framework in Ukraine.
- 2. Lack of strategic vision.** Ukraine for a long time could not offer actions plans for cooperation in any particular sector. Without a proper understanding of the situation and accordingly, without an incremental working plan, any measures taken would be a chaotic waste of money. This situation can change with the Strategic Defence Bulletin. Perhaps this is **the first document of this kind in the history of Ukraine which contains clear goals and indicators of defence reform.**
- 3. Problems in bilateral cooperation.** Any aid from trust funds is predominantly the result of bilateral agreements. It is not sufficient that Ukraine negotiates support for defence reform only with NATO, but also necessarily with the relevant decision makers in the EU Member States. In particular, the situation looks rather strange in that France – according to official data – has not contributed a single cent to the

trust funds. One can only express hypotheses about the causes: either Paris has a greater interest in the southern directions of its foreign policy or simply the Ukrainian government is not sufficiently articulate with their expectations in negotiations with partners.

It is likely that efforts by a largely inactive Kyiv in the above-mentioned issues have led to a clotting in any large-scale support from NATO – trust funds are being added to very slowly. **Two years after their creation, the countries have contributed only 50% of the planned amount.** The major problems in finance are in perhaps the most important funds – Logistics and standardization, and medical rehabilitation (see. Infographic 2).

In addition, there is a slightly different vision in the direction for financing by trust funds. Ukrainian Agencies expect more urgent provision of specific logistical and medical assistance that could be used rapidly – specifically for Ukraine to house military forces responding to Russian aggression. In turn, the Alliance Member States prefer to channel funds to consulting and advisory services, through sending their experts to Ukraine.¹⁰⁵ The first stage of procedures by the Alliance for trust funds is a gap analysis and feasibility study comprising an analysis of the needs and future requirements of the implementation. In the area of logistics, this process took a year, on some other issues

¹⁰⁵ Getmanchuk, A., “Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration or Undeclared Neutrality?”, 26 June 2015. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html>

3. The Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider

Infographic 2. NATO trust funds supporting Ukraine



even longer. Ukraine was not quite ready, as noted at the headquarters, with Kyiv expecting to launch practical projects immediately after the first funds were available. Currently, as of the second half of 2016, trust funds are coming to a stage of practical implementation. For the sake of objectivity it should be noted that there were deficiencies both on the part of Ukraine and by the Alliance.

Comparing trust funds for Ukraine and analogous projects with other NATO partner countries, it appears that **Ukraine is among the**

leaders as a recipient, along with such countries as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Serbia. Budgets implemented by NATO in trust funds for countries range from €205 thousand to almost €10 million. For example, financing for the retraining and reintegration of soldiers and civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, completed in 2009, totalled €5.83 million. When taking into account the trust fund for the disposal of surplus/obsolete weapons in Ukraine which was launched in 2006, Ukraine moves into absolute first place – the project budget exceeds 30 m. Euros.

Tabl. 2. The Largest Trust Funds of NATO to Aid Other Countries¹⁰⁶

Country	Trust Fund	Budget
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Fund for the retraining and reintegration of soldiers and civilians (2006-2009) ¹⁰⁷	€ 5.83 m.
Afghanistan	Fund for NATO to raise physical security and stockpile management (2008- 2011) ¹⁰⁸	€ 7.7 m.
Serbia	Fund for the development of alternative sources of livelihood for released Serbian defence personnel (2006-2011) ¹⁰⁹	€ 9.65 m.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Fund to aid those released personnel of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010-2013) ¹¹⁰	€ 4.82 m.

¹⁰⁶ Status of trust fund projects. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 June 2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_06/20160313_160610-trust-funds.pdf

¹⁰⁷ NATO-Perspektiva programme. International organization for migration – Fact sheet, December 2013. Режим доступу: <http://bih.iom.int/sites/default/files/factsheets/FOR%20WEB%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20NATO%20Perspektiva%20Programme.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ NATO assists Afghanistan to improve munitions stockpile safety. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 07 May 2016. Режим доступу: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_7258.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹⁰⁹ Trust Fund project helps former Serbian defence personnel find jobs in the private sector. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 17 May 2011. Режим доступу: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_74420.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹¹⁰ NATO-Perspektiva programme. International organization for migration – Fact sheet, December 2013. Режим доступу: <http://bih.iom.int/sites/default/files/factsheets/FOR%20WEB%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20NATO%20Perspektiva%20Programme.pdf>

3.1.3. STRATEGIC DEFENCE BULLETIN AND INTEROPERABILITY

For the first time in the history of collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, NATO showed their active interest in reforms in Ukraine, namely the support of the Alliance in developing a Strategic Defence Bulletin, which provides for the introduction of NATO standards in defence and security by 2020. **Ukrainian authorities had until recently not been acting seriously manoeuvring and unready to undertake certain fundamental Alliance provisions**, in particular, civilian control over the Armed Forces and restructuring of the Armed Forces (it is proposed that the General Staff will be controlled by the Ministry of Defence and that the Minister will be a civilian).

It should be emphasized that the Armed Forces interoperability with the armed forces of NATO Member States had been set as the goal in the Charter. In 2017 it will be 20 years that Ukraine has been working on this task. However, the most significant progress in the reform, the introduction of civilian control and management of security services, has not taken place. Achieving interoperability is also one of the key objectives of a comprehensive package of assistance for 2016. **It is important to note that the newly formed Committee for the Coordination of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine has been engaged in monitoring effective implementation of the Annual National Program**. Lack of coordination and political will is traditionally an obstacle to implementation of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and bringing the national defence sector to the standards of the leading countries of NATO. **Strengthening the role of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration may be one of the indicators**

of a visible commitment of the Ukrainian authorities to the course of reform and, above all, in the defence sector. This is not only about financial support, but also about raising the professional level of the Government's staff, i.e. representatives of Ministries coordinating the implementation of reforms in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration. The Government of Ukraine needs to submit to NATO Member States a proposal to improve the qualifications of those responsible for these reforms.

For twenty years Ukraine has been undervaluing the essence of interoperability. After the military aggression of Russia, Kyiv has no alternative but to show a serious approach to achieving the highest possible levels of interaction between the Ukrainian army and armies of NATO countries. **Interoperability with NATO forces today is fundamentally pragmatic in nature for Ukraine.** Ukrainian troops still have the opportunity to acquire skills in accordance with the rules prescribed within NATO peacekeeping operations and military exercises (the most famous of them being Sea Breeze, Fast Trident, Cossack Steppe, Secure Sky, Light Avalanche and Maple Arch). Those soldiers who have experience of working within Alliance missions have especially excelled in the battle with terrorism, which should serve as the most significant evidence of the need to adapt to the models of military management training. One of the most striking examples is the 95th Zhytomyr Paratrooper and Assault Brigade. Currently, 600 Ukrainian soldiers are part of the 'LITPOLUKRBRIG' which is being trained in accordance with the NATO

standards.¹¹¹ Participation in such joint military units only promotes the absorption of NATO standards of management and communications into the Ukrainian military.

3.1.4. ASSISTANCE FROM ADVISORS OF NATO MEMBER STATES

Member States have provided advisory services to Ukraine for the development and reform of the security sector and defence. In Kyiv today there are over 15 advisors operating, seconded from their NATO countries. Their expertise includes defence planning, logistics, information systems development, civil and military cooperation, and cybersecurity. However, even in 2015, these advisers did not have permanent access to the Ministry of Defence – **NATO was outraged: Why invite experts if Ukraine does not trust them at all?** Today, the issue of access to information and facilities has been removed from the agenda, largely thanks to the personal will and intervention of Defence Minister Stepan Poltorak. For the sake of objectivity it should be recognized that the work and qualifications of all the advisors are not equally effective, and this is not always the fault of Ukraine. For example, the cybersecurity advisor sent by Turkey, has been replaced every six months – during which time each of them barely has time to come to terms with the situation in Ukraine.

The plan for interoperability between the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of NATO Member States is highlighted also in the

Annual National Programme (ANP) of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. However, the ANP does not show clear results and indicators, which should fully reach Ukraine: **the document is written in a way that the appraiser has no alternatives but to place high scores for the implementation of the programme. NATO similarly recognizes that until now Ukraine has been preparing the ANP as a formality:** only in the second half of 2016 have there been changes in this sense, since the Cabinet has attracted representatives from the non-governmental sector to advise on the development of new programmes. For example, the ANP prepared in 2015 indicated that the priorities are “to consult,” “study the issues,” “continue cooperation,” “take measures to further reform,” “hold meetings of joint working groups,” and so on, so that the ANP led to a process and not to an outcome.

The authors of the ANP have to at the very least undergo appropriate training on writing policy documents on the basis of results-based management. This tool has long been used by foreign governments and international organizations. The UN moved to this technique for planning in 2000. If the check indicator of success for the ANP is measured by the SMART test (specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, and time-related), then the Ukrainian document may not reach 5% on a scale for objectives that meet those rules. If Ukraine fears that such clarity in the document may weaken the security of the state for targets in sensitive issues, then this should be declared in the indicators from the start and the ANP simply be classified as “secret”. However, what should not be taken away is the whole document, – only that part relating to the defence sector. Political and economic topics

¹¹¹ Siruk, M. One of the most limiting factors for Russia today is Ukraine. Den, 1 July 2016. Available at: <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/den-planety/odnym-iz-naybilshyih-strymuyuchyih-chynnykiv-rf-sogodni-ye-ukrayina>

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could well be in the public domain, if only for the public sector to control the pace of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration . **NATO should be involved in the preparation of the ANP at every stage** – from training document authors to adjusting unclear wording in the programme. In this sense, the parties can be of mutual benefit in the preparation process of an SDB.

3.1.5. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

NATO provides Ukraine with advice and financial support for public diplomacy, working with the mass media and strategic communications, to help Ukraine strengthen the robustness of opposition to Russian news manipulation.

Work on the implementation of a Road Map for a Partnership in Strategic Communications between the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and NATO International Secretariat has been sagging on both the side of NATO, in that initiatives lack a systematic nature, as much as on the side of the Ukrainian authorities. Among the results can be seen a crisis help-centre in Ukrainian media, and information from the Kyiv Post on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by their reporters.¹¹²

Ukraine must establish communication not only with the NATO Alliance but primarily with the member states themselves, and for that it has to invest not only in communication at the inter-governmental/inter-parliamentary level, known as track I diplomacy, but also between

the government and civic society(track II diplomacy) and inside the community (track III diplomacy).¹¹³ **It should be noted that in this context the non-government sector needs to be progressive in the mobilization of all these “tracks” of diplomacy. Extensive experience has particularly been gained by the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, the Institute of World Policy, and the Renaissance International Foundation.**

3.1.6. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND CYBERSECURITY

Since the beginning of the aggression by Russia against Ukraine, the exchange of information with the Alliance focused on the question of the ability of the Nation to protect its territorial integrity. Given the increasing number of terrorist attacks, NATO also came to understand the need to strengthen collaboration in this area between the Alliance nations and between partners. This was demonstrated in the decision at the Warsaw Summit to create a Joint Intelligence and Security Agency. **For Ukraine this is crucial in becoming a reliable partner who can be trusted.**

CIA Director John Brennan, during his visit to Ukraine in December 2014 discussed the creation of new, safer channels of communication between the Ukrainian side and American intelligence to help Ukraine withstand the onslaught by Moscow. It was also reported that the purpose of the visit was to identify support within the political leadership of Ukraine and to inform it about new practices in limited intelligence

¹¹² NATO support for Ukraine. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, fact sheet, – July 2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-nato-ukraine-support-ukr.pdf

¹¹³ Lete, B. How Ukraine Can Open Its Door to NATO, Institute of world policy, 6 July 2016. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/2088.html>

sharing. Traditionally, the US side provided information to Ukraine, however it had been reported that **the main problem is that the communications network and military officer environment had been deeply penetrated by the Russian security services.**¹¹⁴ In this regard, the Americans provided satellite images to Ukraine with delayed and intentionally degraded quality because of fears that US information and technology had become accessible to the Russians.¹¹⁵

Sometime in February 2015, images of the location of pro-Russian terrorists and military equipment in the combat zone in Eastern Ukraine were provided by Canada.¹¹⁶ A public notice was made in 2016 that the provision of images was to be discontinued, although Canada argues that this was due to financial considerations, yet this was still for the Ukrainian side a negative political signal.

The disappointment in the delay in carrying out reforms by Ukraine is of particular concern against the background of increased cooperation between some NATO member states and

Russia to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. This was demonstrated by the Obama administration in offering Russia an expanded exchange of information on terrorist organizations in Syria.¹¹⁷ The Trump administration is likely to remain consistent in the matter of trying to cooperate with the Kremlin.

NATO does not hide the fact that the coordination of intelligence efforts is the weakest factor in Euro-Atlantic cooperation: even allies do not fully trust each other. It is unlikely that the Alliance will be able to soon change this situation and therefore remains reliant on cooperation in this sensitive area without any alternative on a bilateral basis. Establishment of cooperation with NATO depends on Ukraine itself, in so far as it can demonstrate its reliability and added value to NATO as a whole, or to individual Member States.

3.1.7. REFORM OF THE SECURITY SERVICE AND INTELLIGENCE OF UKRAINE

The process of reforming the Security Service of Ukraine began in 2016 on the level of development of new legislation. **Having a large number of staff in the Security Service does not always affect the efficiency of the structure.** Thus, the Law of Ukraine "On the overall structure and size of the Security Service of Ukraine"

¹¹⁴ Lake, E. Here's What the CIA Director Was Really Doing in Kiev. The Daily Beast, 16 April 2014. Available at: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/15/here-s-what-the-cia-director-was-really-doing-in-ki-ev.html>

¹¹⁵ Dyrektor TSRU Dzhon Brennan nanis nespodivanyj vizyt do kyyeva. Europe-Ukraine, 15 April 2014. Available at: <http://ua.europe-ukraine.eu/2014/04/15/dyrektor-tsru-dzhon-brennan-nanis-nespodivanyj-vizyt-do-kyyeva-na-tli-pogroz-pro-vvedennya-novyh-sanktsij-proty-rosiyi-foreign-policy/>

¹¹⁶ Shevchenko rozpoviv pro vyskovu dopomogu Kanadi Ukraini. Liga.Novosti, 01 June 2016. Available at: http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/10981038-shevchenko_rozpov_v_pro_v_yskovu_dopomogu_kanadi_ukra_n.htm

¹¹⁷ DeYoung, K. As Kerry pushes for coordination with Russia in Syria, others in administration cry foul. The Washington post, 12 July 2016. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-kerry-pushes-for-coordination-with-russia-in-syria-others-in-administration-cry-foul/2016/07/12/83623008-484d-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html

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approved the number of staff in the Service at 27,000 for the given period, unless there were to be a special period (except for a period of martial law) when that could rise to 31,000 people.¹¹⁸ In comparison, the British MI5 Service has 4,000 staff.¹¹⁹

Ukraine needs to reform and restructure all agencies and services involved in the exchange of information, to reduce the number of people with access to confidential and sensitive information, and to be sure that they work exclusively in the interests of Ukraine (a polygraph is not an absolute guarantee of employee loyalty). Distrust of the Security Services of Ukraine by western partners is associated with a good example of betrayal of the Ukrainian Security Services oath by officers in 2014. Immediately after the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovich, employees and main offices of the Ministry of the Interior and the Security Service of Ukraine in Crimea and in Sevastopol began sabotaging orders from Kyiv. Of the 20,000 military service personnel from the Armed Forces, Security Service, State Guard Service, and police officers of the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine, and intelligence agencies stationed in the Crimea, only 6,000

left the occupied peninsula, moving to other areas of Ukraine.¹²⁰

The Concept document on Security involved both NATO and the EU Advisory Mission. This is a good and constructive example of coordination by the EU and by NATO to provide advisory assistance. These recommendations are primarily strategic in nature and do not provide quick fixes for the SSU.¹²¹ The key NATO interests lie in implementing democratic oversight, focusing on parliament and civic society, as well as the de-politicization of these structures.¹²² NATO believes that it would be appropriate to create a civilian oversight committee to NATO standards, with the assistance of international and Ukrainian experts, under whose supervision there would be reform of the security services. **It is important to establish a mechanism for strategic communication between different departments, civic society, and international partners to strengthen mutual trust.**¹²³

Ukraine spends about 10,000 euros per year per full-time employee of the security services.

¹¹⁸ Law of Ukraine «On the overall structure and size of the Security Service of Ukraine». Available at: <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3014-15>

¹¹⁹ People and organization. Security service Mi-5. Available at: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/people-and-organisation>

¹²⁰ Remarks to the second anniversary of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. UCMC, 18 February 2016. Available at: <http://uacrisis.org/ua/40347-gorbulintezy>

¹²¹ Experts summed up the preliminary results of NATO summit. Defense express, 20 July 2016. Available at: <http://defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/publikatsiji-partneriv/1277-eksperty-pidvely-poperedni-pidsumky-samitu-nato>

¹²² Governance and reform of national security and intelligence: the best international practices, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 24 May 2016. Available at: <http://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/130638.html>

¹²³ Speech by the Deputy Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine Ann-Kristin Bjergene, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 24 May 2016. Available at: <http://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/130638.html>

In some of the intelligence structures of the US and Europe, this figure exceeds €100,000.¹²⁴ Since 2014 Ukraine has increased its yearly budget for the SBU to about 1 billion UAH. However, in US dollar terms, the security budget has by contrast declined over the past 3 years. Thus, **on the one hand, we talk about efficiency in terms of financial constraints, while on the other hand, Ukraine still needs to increase the budget of the SSU, given the escalating threat of Russian aggression.**

NATO does not fully take into account that Ukraine is at war, and so the process of reforming the intelligence services needs to be approached with wariness. In addition, it should be noted that dilemmas in the reform processes during a state of war arise not only in the context of the SSU, but also in the defence sector as a whole. Recommendations made by Alliance representatives have been based more on models of countries not at war. Their advice focused on a strategic development perspective. Ukraine in NATO communications must be clearly emphasized with the need to take into account the situation under which it has found itself. However, without reform of the Security Service, Ukraine cannot count on confidence and cooperation in information exchange with the Alliance member-states.

3.1.8. FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Corruption is one of the key factors standing in the way of not only deepening relations

between Ukraine and NATO, but, above all, seriously weakens national security to external challenges. **The battle against corruption – especially in the defence sector – may be the first and most obvious fundamental task for Ukraine in its determination to implement change, but at least it does not require money and expenditure. Instead it saves money.** NATO countries have in this sense substantial experience that can be shared with Ukraine.

In 2008 Ukraine joined the NATO programmes for building integrity, transparency, accountability, introducing ethics, and implementing reductions in corruption risks in defence and security institutions.¹²⁵ That is, programmes have now been implemented for 8 years aimed at reducing corruption risks in the defence sector. In a study by the Transparency International, published in December 2015, the **level of corruption in the defence sector of Ukraine was ranked as a D, which is for countries with a high risk of corruption.** The study also identified procurement as the most risky area in the Ukrainian defence sector. One establishment that has begun to fulfil its obligations is the Training and Educational Centre of Building Integrity of the National Defence University of Ukraine, where representatives of NATO member states lecture.¹²⁶ **The ANP has not defined clear and specific steps to be taken to combat corruption in**

¹²⁴ The issue of intelligence in terms of financial constraints, using the experience of leading countries for Ukraine. Policy Brief, National Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: <http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/896/>

¹²⁵ Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building – PAP-DIB. Available at: <http://ukraine-nato.mfa.gov.ua/ua/ukraine-nato/programa-iniciativa-natoreap>

¹²⁶ Ukraine is still a high risk of corruption in the defense sector. Transparency International, 03 December 2015. Available at: <http://ti-ukraine.org/news/oficial/5636.html><http://ti-ukraine.org/news/oficial/5636.html>

the defence sector – this situation needs to be changed in the new paper.

To reduce corruption risks in the defence and security sectors, effective civilian control needs to be introduced. An efficient measure would be to introduce higher penalties in cases of corruption in the defence sector (for example, in 2014 the US company Hewlett-Packard was fined 108 m. USD¹²⁷) and the inevitability of punishment for being involved in corruption, despite the statute of limitations for such crimes.¹²⁸

3.2. BENEFITS OF THE NATO PARTNERSHIP

In general, the Alliance works closely with 41 nations around the world, together with international organizations including the UN, EU and OSCE.¹²⁹ In 2011, after the Lisbon Summit, NATO developed partnerships, built frameworks for mutual work, and individual programmes, which include about a thousand activities and areas of work available to all partner countries. Partnership with NATO is aimed at building up the capabilities of partner countries, so as to strengthen regional security and combat crises.

When looking at imminent partner countries, such as Finland, Sweden or Australia, then in the long run, their formats of cooperation and action differ little from those areas provided for in the partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Another thing is that they do not just use them to the maximum in implementation, but demonstrate significant added value for the organization. In fact, both Finland and Sweden, in the event of expressing political desire for NATO membership, would automatically become members of NATO. Moreover, Sweden and Finland have signed a 2014 memorandum with NATO under which the alliance and the Scandinavian countries will strengthen their mutual work in the defence industry, and NATO troops will be present on their territory.¹³⁰ **These countries have reached the maximum level of interoperability**

¹²⁷ SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 09 April 2014. Available at: http://www.ethic-intelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/sec_charges_hp.pdf

¹²⁸ International experience in fighting corruption in the security sector: Lessons for Ukraine. Policy Brief, National Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: <http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1848/>

¹²⁹ NATO partners. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11 November 2015. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm>

¹³⁰ Sweden Ratifies NATO Cooperation Agreement. The Wall Street Journal, 25 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-ratifies-nato-cooperation-agreement-1464195502>

with the forces of other NATO countries. In this sense, Ukraine must learn from such countries.

Given the fact that in the short term Ukraine cannot count on NATO membership, for us the main goal at this time should be to get maximum use and benefits provided by the partnership format.

Benefits for Ukraine of partnership with NATO:

- **Getting assistance in conducting reforms.** The financial and advisory assistance from the Alliance, which is implemented in particular through a comprehensive package of aid and trust funds and the work of advisors from NATO Member States, promotes faster implementation of reforms and partially covers the financial costs of their implementation, which is crucial for Ukraine in terms of opposition to Russian aggression and a total lack of funds in the Ukrainian budget. Utilising the experience and resources of the Alliance to implement reforms in security and defence is already yielding tangible results.
- **The opportunity to learn from the advanced military experience of the Alliance.** Participation in military exercises, peacekeeping operations, and NATO partnership programmes all contribute to effective reform of the Armed Forces and increase defence capabilities, through experience of professional levels of achievement and interoperability with the forces of NATO member states.
- **Involving representatives of the Alliance in the preparation of strategic documents.** Cooperation with NATO in this area has been successfully demonstrated in the development of the Strategic Defence Bulletin. This

has contributed to a new qualitative approach to planning and evaluation of reforms in security and defence. Currently, it is important to involve the Alliance to develop the ANP further in defining clear programme objectives and benchmarks for performance.

- **Obtaining financial assistance for the implementation of projects.** Ukraine receives funds from NATO for the implementation of research projects within the framework of the “Partnership for Peace” project, and in 2014 even took first place in the receipt of funds from the Alliance, which helps to preserve and develop the scientific potential of Ukraine.
- **Opportunities to modernize the Ukrainian Military-Industrial Complex (MIC).** Even though Ukraine has massive potential to develop its MIC (it has a complete cycle of aircraft designs, engines, and components; has experience in building warships and civilian vessels for various purposes, a unique complete manufacturing cycle for tanks and armoured vehicles, and is one of only 10 nations that are developing missile and radar technology, and precision weapons¹³¹), it still needs the help of NATO in the modernization and development of new models of weaponry. Working with defence enterprises in NATO Member States will in the future allow companies in the Ukrainian MIC to participate in NATO projects from production, modernization and disposal of military equipment to world standards.

¹³¹ Kryvtsun, D. Rozumna oborona. Den, 21 April 2015. Available at: <https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobyci/rozumna-oborona>

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- **Partnership with NATO provides Ukraine with an important platform for communication with the leading nations of the world.** The ability to report directly their own vision to the Alliance allows Kyiv to defend its interests in one of the most influential international platforms. NATO's policy of containment of Russia (even against the backdrop of continued dialogue) should indicate that Ukraine will listen. In NATO countries it is increasingly recognized that Ukraine well understands what is expected of it, hence the high value of keeping the channel of communication.
- **The positive dynamics of the partnership with the Alliance as a whole can help increase confidence in Ukraine and to strengthen ties with individual Member States.** This in turn enables Ukraine to work with individual Member States, for example in such critical areas as information sharing and cybersecurity.
- **Partnership with the Alliance helps to strengthen cooperation with other partner countries of NATO.** For example, Finland, Sweden and Japan, as partners of NATO, have joined the finance trust funds in support of Ukraine. It is important for Ukraine to be able to study the experience of Finland, Sweden and Georgia in achieving compatibility with NATO standards.
- **The risk of losing the support of the Alliance is an important stimulus for the Ukrainian authorities to implement reforms.** In particular, the preparation of SDB has demonstrated that NATO has sufficient ammunition to

influence the acceleration of the reform process in Ukraine. Work on the new ANP with representatives of NGOs is actually as a result of the policy conditions instigated by NATO.

- **In the long term successful partnership opens the doors for full integration- membership.** Although at present Ukraine's membership of the Alliance is not officially on the agenda, it is obvious that for an increasing number of Ukrainians integration with NATO appears to be the inevitable route for providing security for the nation. In 2008, when Ukraine did not receive a Membership Action Plan, there were discussed three main obstacles to deepening cooperation between our nation and the Alliance: lack of public support; lack of reforms in Ukraine; and Russia's reaction. This last factor was publicly mentioned by few politicians. Of the first hurdle today, we can say that it has been overcome (in fact half the population now supports Ukrainian integration to NATO). Currently, Ukraine is moving towards overcoming obstacles in the second area, when Ukraine will take advantage of opportunities for partnership with NATO with its reforms, then membership becomes feasible as the necessary standards are reached. The chances of joining the alliance will increase proportionally. At the time, respectively for various reasons, the issue of NATO membership may disappear but the need to withstand Russian threats will continue even if Ukraine refuses membership of the Alliance.

Partnership with NATO, even with all the benefits that were mentioned above, has a number of shortcomings, even weaknesses. In particular, the following topics point away from membership.

- **Partnership does not provide any security guarantees.** Partnership with NATO cannot be an effective tool to counter aggression because of the inability to become involved under the fifth article of the Washington Treaty. However, in fairness it should be noted that most NATO countries are currently not fully sure whether the Musketeer principle of “one for all and all for one” would actually be activated in the event of a serious threat. These fears intensified especially against the backdrop of pre-election promises by the new US president Donald Trump.¹³²
- **Bureaucracy weakens NATO.** The Alliance has a complicated bureaucratic system, so decisions are made over a long period. Accordingly, NATO responds slowly to modern challenges. This is an especial threat when, for example, in Russia decisions are actually made by one person and in a matter of hours. The need for consensus on any decision weakens the NATO Alliance in terms of rapid response. In the case of unexpected threats, this does not play in favour of NATO.
- **Duplication and contradictions in partnerships.** The NATO bureaucratic machine can be avoided by establishing direct relationships either with individual Alliance Member

States or groups of countries. For example, the United States initiated a Joint Coordinating Committee on military cooperation and defence reform. Later, this association was joined by Britain, Canada, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.¹³³ The problem of such associations may be in that they do not necessarily coordinate their assistance with the Alliance, so it may be duplicated, or even worse, advisors can provide conflicting recommendations.

- **Not taking urgent needs into account.** The reforms to be carried out by Ukraine and NATO assistance are both aimed at the future and geared to a quick response strategy, which is extremely dangerous in terms of aggression and unpredictability from Russia.¹³⁴ Of course, there is nothing wrong with this approach, but Ukraine has always lacked an effective leadership strategy. However goals biased towards the long-term can still be relevant in a period of open conflict, which continues at this moment in time.
- **Mismatch of expectations and opportunities.** NATO expects from Ukraine more than it can do. For example, reform can require major financial outlay. Without financial help from the NATO countries, Ukraine cannot fully reform the security sector and ensure

¹³² Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey's Coup Attempt and the World. The New York Times, 21 July 2016. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html?_r=0

¹³³ Bilateral military cooperation of Armed Forces of Ukraine has steadily expand. KМУ, 05 July 2016. Available at: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=249163648&cat_id=244277212

¹³⁴ Getmanchuk, A., “Ukraine-NATO: a Hidden Integration or Undeclared Neutrality?”, 26 June 2015. Available at: <http://iwp.org.ua/eng/public/1588.html>

large-scale rearmament of the Army.¹³⁵ On the other hand, some Ukrainian stakeholders are too focused on the narrative of membership, not on what is given by the current level of partnership. If there is only focus on returns, not the actual changes required under “membership or nothing”, then Ukraine can eventually get “nothing”.

Thus, the number of benefits provided by partnership with NATO is much greater in the case of successful implementation, and Ukraine can in the future reach a level that it will apply for membership of the Alliance.

3.3. THE LIKELIHOOD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL

In the short term, i.e. until 2020, the main task for Ukraine is the proper execution of an updated RNP. **If Ukraine proves to its partners that it is not a Client State, but a Contributor State, and in this experience in countering Russia is particularly important, in the medium term Kyiv may have a chance for deeper cooperation, including membership.**

The approach to the development of annual national programmes should be revised. It is advisable to strengthen the work of Ukraine with NATO at an inter-institutional level to ensure proper implementation of the ANP – strengthening the human resources and financial office of Deputy Prime Minister by far-reaching stages. Communication must occur at all levels, including at the level of individual departments and services that are directly involved in the implementation of tasks. Civil servants, who are responsible for reform in Euro-Atlantic integration, need to have the opportunity to improve their skills in accordance with NATO standards.

In the medium term Ukraine must complete the necessary reforms and achieve interoperability with NATO member countries. Fundamentally, it is also necessary to achieve success in the implementation of other reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, judicial, reform of the Prosecution Service, improving socio-economic status, and other such tasks.

The threat of political instability could aggravate the situation. Therefore, it is important for Ukraine to achieve significant results as soon as possible, and depoliticize the security structures so that a change of government

¹³⁵ Experts summed up the preliminary results of NATO summit. Defense express, 20 July 2016. Available at: <http://defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/publikatsiji-partneriv/1277-eksperty-pidvely-poperedni-pidsumky-samitu-nato>

or coalition does not become a threat to national security.

Implementation of these conditions will allow Ukraine in the long term, in the most optimistic case, to count on NATO membership, while even in a less optimistic scenario, to become a sufficiently strong state even to curb Russian aggression. Support from the Alliance will increase if Ukraine proves its credibility and value as a partner.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strengthen the human resources and financial coordination of reforms in Euro-Atlantic integration.
2. Develop documents that regulate the scope of reforms to bring Ukraine closer to NATO standards, with clear objectives and success indicators by results-based management. Involve NATO representatives in the development of the Annual National Programme with defined and clear objectives, indicators to measure responsibility, and timescales.
3. Prepare a clear action plan for monitoring and evaluating the ANP. The NGO sector should continue to be able to influence the preparation of such a document, as well as its evaluation.
4. In the shortest terms possible show the results of fighting corruption in the defence sector. Punishments should be more severe than in the civilian sector. Legislation should provide for punishment of companies that send proposals to corrupt structures in the areas of defence and national security.
5. Avoid delays in decisions that do not really require a lot of time, but affect the country's reputation. For example, delaying the appointment of Head of Mission of Ukraine to NATO.
6. Reforming the SBU must restore trust between NATO and Ukraine in more effectively combatting hybrid war.
7. The Government needs to work more closely with the non-governmental sector as Ukraine and NATO Member States have to create new positive narrative about the nation as a country that is a contributor to the Euro-Atlantic security environment and as a nation that has unique experience in terms of sustainability in combatting hybrid war.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO

Strengths of partnership with NATO

1. Ukraine belongs to the top group of recipients of aid from NATO. Financial assistance by NATO, including that through the Trust Funds, partially covers the reform of the security sector and defence, which is essential given Russian aggression.
2. Participation in the NATO partnership programmes contributes to effective reform of the Armed Forces
3. Participation by representatives of the Alliance in formulating strategic documents contributes to changing the approach to planning and evaluation of the reform of defence and the security sector
4. NATO funding helps maintain the scientific potential of the nation as a whole
5. Partnership with NATO provides Ukraine with an important platform for communication with the leading countries of the world, clarifying their own positions, and protecting national interests.
6. Partnership with the Alliance and the risk of losing its support is an important stimulus for the Ukrainian authorities to implement reforms.
7. Successful partnership could in the long term lay the foundation for full integration- membership.

Weaknesses of partnership with NATO

1. Partnership cannot guarantee the safety and protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Alack of prospects for membership in NATO could negatively affect reforms in the defence and security sectors.
3. NATO Bureaucracy is slow in decision making. Some NATO countries, fearing a deterioration of relations with Russia, could block any deepening of relations with Ukraine.
4. Financial assistance by NATO, including that through trust funds, is not sufficient to fully implement reforms in security and defence and stop Russian aggression.

4. REGIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The current security situation requires the use of new approaches by Ukraine in building a regional security system that takes into account trends in the hybrid war and utilises multilateral diplomacy to strengthen its position in the international arena. The main slogan for the determination of new configurations of regional cooperation should be: more cooperation – more security.

The regional security of Ukraine should be based on several pillars: 1) bilateral cooperation with friendly neighbours; 2) multilateral cooperation in infrastructure, economic, cultural, etc. projects with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; 3) bilateral cooperation with the US, Germany, and Britain, whose policy on Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region is a deterrence factor in the area; 4) bilateral cooperation with Japan and the strengthening of its support for Ukraine's presence in Asia; 5) regional cooperation within the GUAM organization in the post-Soviet space; 6) multilateral military and military-technical cooperation with defence associations in Europe; 7) international cooperation with the UN and the OSCE.

Each of these formats of cooperation has its strengths and weaknesses, as well as in that the development and implementation of each of them requires careful strategic planning with the joint participation of experts and staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

4.1. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE

The National Security Strategy of Ukraine document as adopted in May 2015 provides external guarantees of security “by the means of creating a network of alliances with both individual nations and regional organizations, and initiatives demonstrated by concluding agreements on joint defence or military assistance, and with international security organizations, by participating in the mechanisms of collective security.”¹³⁶ Furthermore, bilateral cooperation with the United States and China was defined as key. In terms of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, it is planned to further develop relationships with the OSCE and Council of Europe. Otherwise, no less important for Ukraine, in the Black Sea this can be achieved through denuclearization and demilitarization in common with the policies for the Black Sea region of European allies. At the same time, this strategy does not provide for the implementation of their own initiatives aimed at ensuring that Ukraine has truly effective mechanisms to ensure security with respect to neighbouring countries. Instead, references are made to existing formats that still have no real impact on improving the climate of security in the region, such as the Visegrad Group (V4), GUAM, BSEC or the CEI.

Key factors for the security of the state have now been specified in the new “Military Doctrine

¹³⁶ Strategy of the National Security of Ukraine, <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>

of Ukraine.” This analysis has focused on specific trends of the modern world and regions. A particular point is that we cannot fail to agree with the conclusion of the analytical section – “foreign political conditions are not conducive to the settlement of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine” and followed by the statement: “In such circumstances, Ukraine must count primarily on its own strength and support of the US, EU member states and NATO who believe that preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring global and regional stability.”¹³⁷

Ukraine has a long history of collaboration in different regional formats, which today has acquired a new context. In particular, the restoration of active cooperation within GUAM has more and more support. Since the Russian aggression against Ukraine started all the GUAM participant countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) have found themselves in the same situation – at different times the territorial integrity of each of them has been violated. It is considered as part of their collaboration in the framework of the General Assembly of the UN to provide mutual support and joint efforts to protect national interests. Accordingly, GUAM may provide these four nations with the same functions as the Visegrad participant countries – an intensified political voice in the international arena to draw attention to the UN of the problems of prolonged conflict: a zone of instability, destabilization, and internally displaced persons. These issues were raised during the

visit of President Petro Poroshenko to Azerbaijan, presiding over GUAM in 2016.

In addition, economic cooperation in four areas has strengthened: transport, energy, culture, and the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Specifically, Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman announced an initiative to restart economic and trade cooperation within GUAM, which provides practical benefits and a FTA between the quartet of nations. However, the International TransCaspian Transport Consortium needs to be highlighted and utilised to enhance the investment appeal of the GUAM Space. In its turn, Ukraine has the opportunity to build transit routes bypassing Russia for goods manufactured in Ukraine and attract rail capacity to the nation as part of the “New Silk Road” project from China to the EU through Ukrainian territory. This would be in addition to developing internal cooperation together with mutual projects as part of GUAM+. In particular, the organization is actively interested in Japan. Collaboration was established in 2007 and provides for meetings and seminars to deepen sectoral projects of mutual benefit. It is noteworthy that as one of the achievements of “GUAM-Japan”, Tokyo is considering strengthening its presence and reputation with the international community.¹³⁸ Given this experience GUAM can revitalize another initiative, launched at the beginning of the 2000s under the format “GUAM-USA” and establish close liaison with Visegrad Group. In addition, meetings between Altai Efdiyeva, General Secretary of the organisation, and ambassadors of EU member states in Kyiv have resulted in Europe-

¹³⁷ Military doctrine of Ukraine, <http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/documents/410.html?PrintVersion>

¹³⁸ Croatian Ambassador to Ukraine reception of GUAM Secretary General, 23/06/2016, <http://guam-organization.org/node/1918>

an countries being interested in supporting GUAM as a separate regional organisation. In particular, Croatia may also share its European integration experience as well as experience in conflict resolution.¹³⁹

Another proven area of regional cooperation is the development of multilateral relations in a number of formats between NATO Member States and the EU. At this stage we can only develop models of deeper cooperation in the long run. **Instead, in the short term relations will develop bilaterally with allocated sectoral aid, involving military units of the Armed Forces in joint exercises and operations of NATO and the EU and regional development programmes of NATO.**

Today Ukraine already has positive experience in military collaboration in the form of EU Battle Groups (under the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy), Balkan (HELBROC) and Visegrad (V4 EU BG), as well as in numerous exercises and NATO operations, as well as significant experience in working in UN peacekeeping contingents. In addition, the agreement finally achieved the creation and development of a trilateral brigade – LITPOLUKRBRIG (Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine) – whose HQ is stationed in Lublin, Poland and which is aimed primarily at peacekeeping. Also the possibility of creating another tripartite brigade has been discussed, consisting of military units in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The interaction of engineering units of national armies has partially been worked out under the Multinational Engineer Battalion TISA (Carpathian region) format.

4.2. EXAMPLES OF MODELS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

International relations at a regional level is best seen as an analysis of regional security conglomerates – “a group of nations whose security issues and risks are so inter-related that the problems of national security of each of them cannot be analyzed or resolved away from other groups of nations.”¹⁴⁰ This can have the character of: conflict formation, in which the basis of relations is competition and mutual threats; a security regime, in which the threat level is reduced due to appropriate measures/ agreements; a security community, in which states are no threat to one another, and thus none of them applies force against another. This focus on the analysis of relations between neighbouring nations which incorporates geographic location, based on the understanding that the danger is to a specifically individual nation which is often neighbouring, and not a remote nation. Accordingly, it focuses on the dynamics of relationships, on examples of alliance and hostility within a security conglomerate and from the balance of power there arises an overall conceptual analysis. Also important is the reference to two key aspects that determine the interdependence of relationships in the region – the balance between friendly and unfriendly steps and the existence of common threats.¹⁴¹ Due to these, we can determine the configuration in the present environment and predict the occurrence of future regional associations.

¹³⁹ Japan-GUAM cooperation program, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000115518.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. – Cambridge, 2003. – P. 44

¹⁴¹ For more details see: Barry Buzan, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-92.

Ukraine is on the knife edge of two security conglomerates: the former Soviet Union, which is dominated by Russia, and Europe, which today coincides with the territory of the EU. Russia announced its rights to the post-Soviet region at the beginning of the 1990s, when in 1993 it defined the idea of “near abroad” with a foreign policy main priority of expansion of spheres of influence in the newly independent nations. It attempts to defend its assumed Great-State identity and recognition in the world as an international player through a peremptory status as a regional leader in the post-Soviet Space. In fact, the creation of GUAM in 1997 can be considered the first reaction to this “near abroad” policy from the new post-Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 1996 in response to the strengthening US role in the world and as an attempt to strengthen the influence of Russia and China are extremely important to the interests of Washington in the Asiat – especially in Central Asia. Nevertheless, all of these have failed to implement their policy in the post-Soviet countries during the 1990-2000’s, which attempt to apply mutually exclusive tactics: on the one hand, strengthening the unipolar nature of the region (including attempts at different levels of influence and the impact of political blackmail on neighbouring countries), and on the other hand, initiating several proposals at unifying multilateral cooperation (the Customs Union, the CSTO, strengthening security unions in the CIS), which could not attract all newly-independent nations to the creation of a post-Soviet State.

Analysis of this regional security conglomerate also shows that membership in NATO and

the EU is not a guarantee of non-interference in the complex area of European security. This is particularly true in the Baltic states, who feel that they are the subjects of Russian propaganda and a Russian hybrid war, as well as Sweden and Finland, where their possible membership in NATO is kept under close supervision by Russia. In addition, Moscow has demonstrated that it is ready to use Kaliningrad and its military presence in Belarus for turning the Baltic territories into an A2/AD zone for NATO, with a prohibition zone and limited access. Despite all the measures taken by the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, there still remains the question of whether through bilateral agreements, such as with the United States and Britain, between Sweden and Finland, and between Denmark and Sweden, or multilateral cooperation in the format of NORDEFCO, the Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) with NATO, CFSP of the EU, and others, they can strengthen the military presence of NATO in the region so as to retain key islands (Bornholm, Åland, Gotland) and offset the possibility of the creation of an A2/AD situation in the region by using the “Bastion” complex in Kaliningrad.¹⁴² For Kyiv the consequences of this situation are clear: **Ukraine cannot get rid of the influence of the Russian factor in the security situation in the nation, even by becom-**

¹⁴² For more details see: Baltic Sea security: How can allies and partners meet the new challenges in the region? / ed. by Ann-Sofie Dahl. – Center for military studies, university of Copenhagen, <http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/publications/balticseasecurity/download/BalticSEASecurity.pdf> See also: Edward Lucas, The coming storm – Baltic Sea Security report, June 2015, [http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20\(2\).compressed.pdf](http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf)

ing a member of the EU or NATO. The priority is to develop effective strategies for the containment of Russia.

The disinterest of Russia in the stabilization of the situation in neighbouring countries is also reflected in its destructive role as a mediator in resolving the now so-called frozen conflicts in the GUAM countries. This approach helps to Moscow to continue military and political pressure on neighbouring countries and to suppress their economic development. Some tactics used in this strategy include support for pro-Russian political forces in these countries (e.g. Moldova), and strengthening military-technical cooperation and collaboration with the energy sector from the centre (e.g. Azerbaijan). Thus, where there is no fixed presence by Moscow today under the CSTO and an additional bilateral agreement on a regional air defence system, it is installed by supporting “breakaway regions” and pro-Russian political players.

4.3. DISADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL

When assessing models for multilateral cooperation in this region is important to understand that none of the models available today for regional associations in other parts of the world and Europe can be fully transferred to Ukraine. In particular, because in the regional security conglomerate the aggressor was the former nuclear leader-state of the region, which led to a situation that only hypothetically appeared in other security groupings in the world. Most of the examples of such formats include associations that may be deterrents in such cases, but in reality no one knows how effective such a deterrent will be in a case similar to our situation – for example, if China refuses peaceful coexistence with Asia.

Therefore, **a brief description of the situation in regional security associations in the post-Soviet territory, which is dominated by Russia, shows how limited the possibility is for developing an effective model of regional security for Ukraine. There is no talk of creating a new security model since that is currently impossible by definition, as is the search for strategies that develop the new requirements for regional associations with neighbouring states that share the threat with Ukraine.** When developing such models however, we should not always look back to Russia, because it often ends with the recognition of an assumed right by Moscow to veto different steps by Ukraine and its allies. Instead, it is necessary to analyze what the tactics and goals are at a regional and global level and then look for the corresponding balancing response.

4.4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF GUAM INTO A UNITED SECURITY GROUPING FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF ASEAN

When planning the further institutional development of GUAM, if such a decision is made (which today looks doubtful), we should take into account the achievements of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), including the political, security, economic and socio-cultural environments.

Security has been the foundation of ASEAN since its inception in 1967. Ensuring such security was not to be through legal mechanisms to formalise security guarantees, but by development of a culture of internal dialogue. Non-interference in internal politics, non-implementation of force and peaceful conflict resolution, development of bilateral and not multilateral military cooperation, consultation and consensus are the essence of dialogue in ASEAN. This union of states in Southeast Asia manages to hold a balance in Asia. In addition the Community involves all the major players in the region – China, Japan, Australia and the USA – albeit with differing levels of status. Particularly interesting is the ARF format (ASEAN Regional Forum), which, as the name suggests, is a regional forum which brings to the same table leaders

of northern and southern parts of Asia.¹⁴³ This forum created the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, which is an implementation format for track II diplomacy, bringing together experts and researchers from different participating countries to develop common security concepts and development of the region. This format promotes the notion of “cooperative security,” which means the promoting of standards of peaceful coexistence in the region and the development of collaboration in different aspects.¹⁴⁴ Another type of collaboration designed to build trust between nations and enhance shared responsibility for the region is the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) as the highest level of consultation and collaboration within the organization in the field of security.¹⁴⁵

The experience of building ASEAN can be used in the further institutional development of GUAM. In particular, attention needs to be paid to how ASEAN has created partnerships with other organizations and countries to form partnership dialogues, known as the “plus” format. Also in the short term, it is important to initiate contacts between ASEAN and GUAM, which will facilitate the entry of GUAM into the strategically

¹⁴³ 27 nations take part, among them 10 Member States of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), 10 dialogue partners (Austria, the EU, India, Canada, China, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the US and Japan), ASEAN observers – Papua-New Guinea, also North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

¹⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, *Ole Waever...*, p. 160.

¹⁴⁵ For more details see: ASEAN Political-security community blueprint, <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/5187-18.pdf>

important market¹⁴⁶ of ASEAN, strengthening its international visibility and gaining experience of cooperation not just with individual countries but with regional organizations (which will also contribute to finding a common platform for GUAM members). In developing a serviceable plan for cooperation, the many years of experience of cooperation between ASEAN and the EU¹⁴⁷ will need to be taken into account. The decision to establish a free trade zone between the Eurasian Union and ASEAN has to be also considered in order to help determine implementation options created by a separate research team in 2016.¹⁴⁸

Given the fact that a constituent part of ASEAN relations with third countries is sectoral cooperation, joint work in tourism could be a pilot project for collaboration by these organizations. Kyiv¹⁴⁹ could become involved by initiating a working group of experts from GUAM countries to study opportunities for collaboration between GUAM and ASEAN.

Another objective is to activate a GUAM+2 format, similar to the cooperation of Japan and

the US in Southeast Asia.¹⁵⁰ It is also very necessary to take into account developments in Japan,¹⁵¹ particularly in its key policy of “proactive pacifism.” Tokyo initiated the “Japan-GUAM Dialogue” that has become an important platform for debate, which involved both researchers and diplomats, and that GUAM wishes to

¹⁴⁶ Today the ASEAN is the 7th largest economy in the world, with prospects of attaining 4th position.

¹⁴⁷ ASEAN, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/> ; About the EU mission to ASEAN, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/905/about-the-eu-mission-to-asean_en

¹⁴⁸ Decision on a free-trade zone 5/08/2016, http://forbes.kz/news/2016/08/05/newsid_117484

¹⁴⁹ Of critical importance to Kyiv is strengthening bilateral cooperation with Asian countries. Dialogue intensified by Petro Poroshenko during the President's visit to Indonesia and Malaysia in August 2016 to continue cooperation with ASEAN countries and the obtaining of membership of the Europe-Asia Forum

¹⁵⁰ see: Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Global and Regional Cooperation, 25/04/2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/fact-sheet-us-japan-global-and-regional-cooperation>

¹⁵¹ Bilateral dialogue with Australia, trilateral cooperation (TSD) with Japan, USA Australia; Joint political Declaration Japan-NATO, resolution on “historical disputes” in relations with South Korea, military and technical cooperation with ASEAN countries, development of relation with India in the Asian Democratic Arc format and influence by the Chinese factor on the involvement of India on the trilateral cooperation with TSD. Thus the experience of Japan may be useful for GUAM countries and Ukraine in terms of improving relations with neighbouring countries with which there were conflicts in the past, and in the search for potential allies, and in developing a joint format for deterrence of the leading country of the region, and for continual development of relations with most friendly countries. The experience also proves that strengthening security means collaboration with many players. More detail: Brad Glosserman, Peak Japan and its implications for regional security. Special Report. March 2016, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196438/Peak%20Japan%20and%20its%20implications%20for%20regional%20securit.pdf>; The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Regional Multilateralism / ed. by T. Inoguchi, G.J. Ikenberry, Y. Sato. — NY, 2011.

continue to develop.¹⁵² The importance of this format for events is that it is not only designed to exchange views but also indicate GUAM positioning outside the region. In particular, it seeks answers to questions about the attractiveness of the region, the opportunity to be a common market for third countries to attract Japanese commercial drives and investment to the region, and so on¹⁵³. This generally suits the Japanese approach, which it applies in different regions by involving the region, and not an individual country in dialogue, by initiating a range of workshops and activities.

What may be very interesting at this point is looking at the experience of creating an economic system by using the “flying geese paradigm” model, (a Japanese model of successive overtaking which involves cycling the three stages of a particular industry: imports, followed

by its own production, and then export). Regionalism, underpinned by private capital and investments, may be the key to peace in our region. After all, every post-Soviet nation, except Russia, agree that a stable military and political situation is the key to economic development and will serve as a legitimization of power. Russia stands out because it has shown that the state can go to war, which nullifies economic prosperity in pursuit of status clear only to itself. Thus, for Ukraine it is not only important to examine the concept of Japanese regional policy, but to use it in its own foreign policy (given the “flying geese” paradigm and its political use). It is also important to develop relations with Tokyo, realizing that Japan is building relations with GUAM and the Black Sea region as a whole, not only to maintain international order, but also to strengthen relations with the EU according to the formula: “The more Japan is involved in Europe, the louder the voice of Japan will be in Asia.”¹⁵⁴ With an ambitious goal – to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council – the country of the Rising Sun already wants to show the world its ability to support international security in different parts of the world, unlike Russia, with participation in peacekeeping operations as a part of the plan. Effective cooperation with Ukraine in regional formats can facilitate this.

¹⁵² There is an opinion that the war in eastern Ukraine may negatively influence the development of relations between Japan and GUAM. In particular, insufficient support of GUAM by Japan in the context of relations with Russia may damage bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, excessive support of GUAM countries by Japan may direct Russia into China's embrace. At the same time, the economic crisis in Ukraine drives a search for investment by China and options for strengthening military and technical cooperation with Beijing which may be negatively perceived by Tokyo. Thus, to preserve relations, the GUAM countries must avoid collaborating with China in the areas sensitive to Japan. see.: Anno Tadashi, Challenges for Japan's GUAM Policy: Liberal Principles vs. Realist Calculus? / The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue: The Japan-GUAM Relationship in the Changing World, Conference Papers, 2015, http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20150717_cp.pdf

¹⁵³ For more details see: The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue: The Japan-GUAM Relationship in the Changing World, Conference Papers, 2015, http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20150717_cp.pdf

¹⁵⁴ Shiegeo Mutsushika, Why the Black Sea Area Is Important Now – Towards an Extension of Japan's Diplomatic Horizon, Keynote speech of the Symposium, “The Black Sea Area in a Changing World—Old Issues in a New Bottle,” University of Shizuoka, 29-30 October 2011, Shizuoka, Japan, <http://werc.u-shizuoka-ken.ac.jp/attach.php/656e676c6973685f353376634f4f634d/save/0/0/Keynote%20speech.pdf>

Besides using ASEAN as an example of peaceful integration into regional unity in an area of potential conflict, our diplomacy should look to the development of relations in other parts of Asia. In this frame there is cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as the transformation of India to the status of major player in and out Asia. An important here is finding a unified format of cooperation within the UN. Such cooperation cannot be limited only to General Assembly Resolutions, but also should include cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM.¹⁵⁵

4.5. ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMPLEX

In an environment of regional cooperation with countries in the region that have become part of the EU and NATO, Ukraine is demonstrating a lack of its own future initiatives. The aforementioned have stated their readiness to support Kyiv within currently existing formats, but there are no current examples of a proactive position and the desire to go to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with concrete proposals. In addition there is also a lack of understanding of the signals that are coming from Western partners. For example, the offer by Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, to enhance regional cooperation in December 2015 went unnoticed. Currently, there are also doubts that the speech by Andrzej Duda was heard at the Ambassadors Meeting on August 24th, (year?) in Kiev. It also discussed interests, threats and challenges common to the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe. After all, this was a speech outlining the implementation of a new model of cooperation in the region – the free nations of Central and Eastern Europe – which once used to be called “communist” Eastern Europe, sandwiched between Russia and Germany. Now, for greater clarity, the region is being named the Trymoryam (Three Seas) region to include nations that are located between the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Sea. It is very important that the region potentially includes Ukraine, which historically belongs to it. Another important fact is that in terms of format, the region is seeking political identity as a part of, and not as an alternative to, the Euro-Atlantic

¹⁵⁵ Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 April 2015 – 69/271. Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM, <http://www.guam-organization.org/attach/res02042015en.pdf>

community as part of the EU and NATO.¹⁵⁶ However, the main idea of a new format of cooperation is down to changing the status of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in the 21st century from being peripheral.

The Trymorya form of cooperation announced by Duda is based on three components (you have 4 here): security – a military environment building its own defence capabilities in the region, while the development of transatlantic relations and multilateral cooperation between individual countries takes place, such as the creation of a “Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine Brigade”(Lytpolukrbryh); energy – an energy environment for developing cooperation in this sector and independence to allow disengagement from possible energy blackmail by Russia; infrastructure – especially for the development of a transport network for better accessibility throughout the region, which will contribute to, and attract new investment; social – development of history dialogue to reduce the impact of historical factors in the development of contemporary relationships. In his speech, the President of Poland gave a clear signal to Kyiv that Warsaw is ready for cooperation in all these dimensions of bilateral relations and will gladly welcome Ukraine’s contribution to the development of the CEE region, stressing that “your future will be determined by the fact of who you want to unite with and build alliances with.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP w Akademii Dyplomatycznej w Kijowie, 24/08/2016, <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/art,67,wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-w-akademii-dyplomatycznej-w-kijowie.html>

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

The fundamental step towards the realization of this initiative was the forum in Dubrovnik on August 25th, 2016 with the participation of Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers of 12 countries in the region: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The result of the meeting was the declaration that the participants “supported the Trymorya as an informal platform, which should serve as obtaining political support and organization of specific activities relating to the identified macro-regional and cross-border projects that are of strategic importance for the countries involved in the energy and transport sectors in digital communications and the economy.”¹⁵⁸

The next meeting of the leaders of these nations is to be held in June 2017 in Wrocław. The Declaration noted openness to initiatives from other participants, so we can only hope that by June next year, Ukrainian diplomats will determine their proposals for the format of accession by Ukraine.

Although the official communiqué made no references to discussion of a common defence policy in Dubrovnik, or later in Warsaw, we need to carefully study the closer military cooperation that has begun in the eastern flank of NATO. Particular attention should be given to models of a common defence policy, which involves those nations that are not members of NATO. The best example here might be NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Cooperation).

¹⁵⁸ Wspólna deklaracja w sprawie Inicjatywy Trójmorza, 25/08/2016, <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,105,wspolna-deklaracja-w-sprawie-inicjatywy-trojmorza.html>

In the first instance, because in their collaboration, the Northern European countries, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, have shown promising military cooperation in the format of “smart defence” by avoiding duplication of functions, specialization, and joint procurement savings in finance. Secondly, they have illustrated that such cooperation requires careful preparation and a well-developed plan of action. Thirdly, this defence alliance is being developed within the legal framework of NATO, which has a North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, and the EU, which has article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, allowing participating countries to guarantee protection in the event of an attack on by a third party.

NORDEFECO was established in 2009.¹⁵⁹ The main aim of cooperation is the strengthening of the defence sectors of the participating countries and establishing close liaison in order to coordinate joint actions and joint decisions. Realization of this goal was facilitated by such factors as the experience of years of mutual cooperation, a common culture and identity, a clear organizational structure, and popularity among

the citizens of the region.¹⁶⁰ Since 2014 they have developed cooperation with a third party – the Baltic Nations – in terms of weapons, military training, veterans,¹⁶¹ planning, and security sector reform. It is assumed that by 2020, the association will not only achieve synergies in the security and defence sector, but also be able to offer the international community its capabilities in constructing development in such cooperation.

Without waiting for 2020, Ukraine can already draw upon the experience of setting up military cooperation. This would involve comparisons of national plans in all areas of cooperation, and the identification of those activities that can be strengthened as a result of cooperation. The exchange of observation should be introduced to improve situational response. Early harmonization of military requirements will facilitate better and more effective cooperation in the purchase of weapons. Ultimately, this part of the collaboration is the most difficult to implement. Therefore, Ukraine, if it has not already done so, should study the experience of Scandinavia and develop a plan of cooperation in purchase of necessary weapons within at least

¹⁵⁹ A significant part of the success of this project was ensured by the presence of a clear concept of cooperation of the Nordic countries in security and defence. This concept was developed by Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of Norway. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy. Proposals presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009, <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf>

¹⁶⁰ Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski, The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFECO and the V4, PISM: Policy Paper, No. 25(127), August 2015, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20209_p.7

¹⁶¹ In September the third NORDEFECO Veteran Conference, that studied the experience of nations in resolving the issues posed by veterans. Given the importance of this issue to Ukraine it is advisable to look more closely at the abovementioned experience of the Scandinavian countries as well as initiate participation of Ukrainians in the following events: <http://www.nordefco.org/files/program-nordefco-conference-2016.PDF>

bilateral agreements, and work out options for integration of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex into NATO. It should be borne in mind that the military-technical cooperation of NATO Member States is not limited to the fundamental treaties. The plan for the procurement of arms should not, however, forget that member states may transfer/sell Ukraine arms only of their own production and not those purchased elsewhere.¹⁶²

To improve skills and competencies it is necessary to immediately develop a common education space for military training and education.¹⁶³ In this context, Ukraine would have to harmonize the curricula of its military universities with the curricula of the military academies of NATO and the EU, and to insist on the creation of a joint NATO training centre (such as Georgia).

In addition, options need to be found for access to the Norwegian Computer Training Network and the Finnish Small Arms Indoor Training Simulators format of training exercises. The development of such types of cooperation requires careful study of the approaches of the

Scandinavian nations to the definition of cooperation areas – COPA – and developing a clear plan for each of them (capabilities; armaments; human resources and education; training and exercise; operations). In particular, cooperation in implementing joint training and exercises developed for five years (Combined Joint Nordic Baltic Exercise Plan).¹⁶⁴

The example of military cooperation between the Scandinavian countries is often compared with similar development in cooperation within the Visegrad Group, but not in favour of the latter. The causes are believed to be several: insufficient institutionalization of V4, which makes all integration projects dependent on the nation holding presidency, and a different attitude to Russia.¹⁶⁵ For multilateral military cooperation to successfully develop shared interests are essential. This is also noted by the group of experts which developed possibilities of military cooperation for the Visegrad Group in 2011-2012.

Thus, this group the necessary criteria for effective cooperation in the field of defence and security: similarity of cultures; trust and solidarity; the quantity and quality of the armed forces; and clarity of intent. Ukraine also appears in their studies in the context of an intention of closer cooperation of NATO with

¹⁶² Instead, certain limitations were provided for cooperation with Russia by the Bill H.R. 5094 entitled "Support for stability and Democracy in Ukraine, ratified by the House of Representatives and Congress in the USA at the end of September 2016: "Use of U.S. influence to seek North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adoption of a policy that opposes the transfer of defence articles and services to Russia while Russia occupies the territory of Ukraine or of a NATO member, and direct appropriate U.S. agencies to monitor and identify transfers by NATO members of defence articles and services to Russia." – <https://www.congress.gov/bil/114th-congress/house-bill/5094>

¹⁶³ The NORDEF MCC Action Plan 2015-2018, http://www.nordefco.org/files/141211_NORDEF%20MCC%20AP2015-18_final.pdf

¹⁶⁴ NORDEFECO: Annual Report, 2014, http://www.nordefco.org/Files/NORDEFECO_arsrapport_2014.pdf, p.34

¹⁶⁵ Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski, The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFECO and the V4, PISM: Policy Paper, No. 25(127), August 2015, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20209

non-members¹⁶⁶ through the implementation of specific projects that do not necessarily imply the participation of all members of the group and allows other nations to engage bilaterally (experience of the joint Polish-Ukrainian peace-keeping battalion; the participation of Ukraine in the V4 BG; and here we can also recall the Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine Brigade). As in NORDEFECO, significant importance is also given to joint military exercises and educational projects.

Russian aggression has affected the implementation of plans to deepen military cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Specifically, during the meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group in December 2014, decisions were adopted in the Bratislava Declaration that proclaimed deepened defence cooperation.¹⁶⁷ As a result a military group from the Visegrad Group, in which Ukraine took part in in the first half of 2016 (using the mechanisms of the EU CFSP), was created. Visegrad and the participation of Ukraine in the first half of 2016 (). Given the fact that the aforementioned declaration also provides for permanent SH forces to support the NATO Response Force and the EU, **it would be appropriate to study involvement**

in the formation by Ukrainian troops, particularly as consultants in the development of operational plans. After all, Ukrainian soldiers today know best the combat tactics of Russian armed forces. On the other hand, it is important to work with the Visegrad group partners to work through options for joint use of military infrastructure, as Russia and Belarus do, but also like Denmark and Sweden.

In addition to the formats, there is collaboration developing between NATO member states. This includes the so-called Bucharest format of nine countries: Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose leaders in November 2015 signed a joint declaration on "Allied Solidarity and Shared Responsibility," aimed at strengthening the capabilities on the eastern flank of NATO,¹⁶⁸ For Ukraine, this declaration was important not only because it declared readiness to cooperate with neighbouring countries under NATO's open door policy and a tough and unanimous condemnation of Russian aggression, but also because of the emergence of a new format of cooperation of neighbouring NATO member states. Some discussion of its development also took place during the Summit in Warsaw. In particular, the creation of a tripartite brigade was announced for the participation of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. Another form of cooperation was established between Poland, Romania and Turkey under the Warsaw

¹⁶⁶ DAV4 Full Report. Towards a deeper Visegrad Defence Partnership / ed. by Tomas Valasek, http://www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/files/attachments/dav4_full_report_0.pdf

¹⁶⁷ Bratislava Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads of Government on the Deepening V4 Defence Cooperation, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/bratislava-declaration>

¹⁶⁸ 9 Central European countries sign joint declaration on Allies Solidarity and Shared Responsibility, 4/11/2015, <http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/9-central-european-countries-sign-joint-declaration-on-allied-solidarity-and-shared-responsibility.d?id=69479594> ;for the text of the declaration see: <https://nato.mae.ro/en/local-news/904>

initiative. The first trilateral meeting was held in June 2016 in Warsaw and was devoted to the issues of strengthening the eastern flank of NATO. The second was in Ankara in August 2016; its goal was to probe the politics of Turkey after the failed coup and reconciliation between Erdogan and Putin.¹⁶⁹ **Given the importance of the Black Sea to Ukraine's security, it would have been desirable for an active position to be taken by Ukrainian diplomats for closer cooperation with NATO countries in all formats, including strengthening the position of NATO in South-eastern Europe.**

In addition to synergy in military cooperation, Ukraine should also look closely at the initiatives of Western countries on updating the Vienna Document (on which NATO insists first of all¹⁷⁰) and the Open Skies Treaty within the OSCE.¹⁷¹ Given the fact that Ukraine suffers most from the breach of the two agreements by Russia, Kyiv needs to involve itself more actively in these discussions on the renewal of negotiations on effective arms control exercised by OSCE.

¹⁶⁹ W czwartek w Ankarze spotkanie szefów MSZ Polski, Turcji i Rumunii, 24/08/2016, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/w_czwartek_w_ankarze_spotkanie_szefow_msz_polski_turcji_i_rumunii

¹⁷⁰ Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 2/09/2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_134549.htm ; Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the OSCE Security Days, 3/10/2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_135530.htm

¹⁷¹ Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the OSCE, 1/10/2015, <http://www.osce.org/networks/188176?download=true> ;

4.6. OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

In order to change the balance of power on the European continent, it is necessary to significantly limit any Russian leverage of the situation in the EU. This can be achieved by improving the legal framework of the member states, which will then make it impossible to register any organizations such as the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” in the EU, as was done in the Czech Republic in late August 2016 with registration through a pseudo-consulate of these unrecognized “republics”; an effective information policy; and the restriction of Kremlin agents in the EU (of course, liberal democracy can not adopt an equivalent law on “foreign agents”, but since the activities of such groups are designed to weaken the member states and the EU as a whole, we can consider it as a key threat to national security). Equally important is an effective solution to the migration problem. Europeans must understand that an EU absorbed by internal problems is not a major player on the international scene. In addition, the EU being marginalized across the world helps Russia with its foreign policy.

Russia has today lost the confidence of key players in the international community. The attitude to it can be described as follows: “If there is anything learned in recent years, it is that attempts to predict the behaviour of Russia will be in vain. From its rapid invasion and annexation of Crimea to unexpected military intervention in Syria – all that can be expected by the West with even a slight chance of probability is that Russia prefers the element of surprise in

its actions.”¹⁷² The use of “guessing game” as a method of knowing Russia has been exhausted. Instead, we have come to understand that Russia is guided by principles different from any Western foreign policy implementation “Obviously, the West found it difficult to accept the fact that Russia’s foreign policy is often based on prestige and status, not on any material or economic premises. In the perception of the West, economics and trade relations matter more in the management of foreign policy, and so countries expected that Russia will not act against its own economic interests.”¹⁷³

Therefore, the analysis of foreign policy of Russia by western analysts must now take into account the “status factor,” noting that in the collective mind of Moscow, preserving a “super-state” identity is crucial for the survival of Russia as a political entity. There is also an understanding that dominance in the region through weapons remains part of its policy to preserve this status. Thus, in the rhetoric of Moscow we continue to hear its dictations of its own requirements and that Russian weapons will be used to strengthen it- both in Ukraine and in other parts of the world, including Syria. Proof of this is found in the texts of Russian internationalists close to the Kremlin. They emphasize the success of foreign policy in which “through brilliant

diplomacy and evil military policy, things are moving well.”¹⁷⁴

Therefore, Russia today proves the persuasive efficiency of “coercive diplomacy” policy, pointing out the weakness of the policy of containment. By its constant manoeuvres and training, as well as militant rhetoric, Moscow is forcing the West to seek effective methods of deterrence under conditions of lost time and lost position. In particular, only at the summit in Wales were there at least some elements of protection plans for the eastern reaches of NATO. Also delayed was the development of measures of opposition to Russian propaganda under the Stratcom format. But still, in spite of extensive collaboration between the Scandinavian countries, the Baltics and Poland, there has still not been worked out a common format for defence cooperation for all the countries in the region. Given the new versions of bilateral agreements that are already signed or are ready to be signed between Sweden and Finland with the United States and Britain respectively (but without the inclusion in their clauses on protection areas), the involvement in strengthening defence via two key military giants remains an effective mechanism for strengthening the military potential of non-NATO nations.

Although the war in Ukraine has now continued for over two years, the European capitals have not offered any other political formula regarding the attitude toward Russia other than

¹⁷² Julianne Smith, Jerry Hendrix, Assured resolve: testing possible challenges to Baltic Security, 07/04/2016, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/assured-resolve-testing-possible-challenges-to-baltic-security>, p.12.

¹⁷³ Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, Russia and Hybrid Warfare – going beyond the label // Papers Aleksanteri, 1/2016, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf, p. 15.

¹⁷⁴ Aleksei Peskov, Sergei Kruganov: Fundamental Russian Commodity is Security, 6/04/2016, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/30074>; Gleb Strunnikov, Fedor Lukyanov: «Putin is not even a tactician – he is a fatalist», 22/08/2016, <https://discours.io/articles/social/fedor-lukyanov-putin-dazhe-ne-taktik-on-fatalist>

the one that was written by Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, in 1967 in his “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.” Offered in what is now known as the Harmel Report was an approach that formed the basis of NATO policy, that was down to two principles: deterrence and dialogue. This is the formula still used today by NATO. In the recently published White Paper: 2016, Berlin condemned the aggressive policy of Moscow and its violation of international order, while proclaiming that a balance in relations with Russia was found. “It is much more important in our relations with Russia to find not only the right balance between collective defence and increased resilience on one hand, and approaches to security cooperation and sectoral cooperation on the other hand.”¹⁷⁵ In addition, the German government assumes the task of promoting this dual approach in NATO to Russia. Using Harmel’s formula, which was proposed in peacetime, as a base fails to consider the fact that this formula was proposed at a time when Eastern Europe had been unconditionally committed to Moscow after the interference of the West in the Hungarian events of 1956. And this is also the weakness of the concept of deterrence – to prove its effectiveness in practice is almost impossible, because it is extremely difficult to prove whether

it worked or other factors influenced developments in the situation.¹⁷⁶

Therefore, at this stage Ukraine needs to understand the origin of the German policy toward Russia. Berlin will cooperate with Russia where it considers it necessary and possible, and will condemn unacceptable behaviour by Moscow. The playing field for such cooperation is not currently taken by Ukraine since this niche has for a longer time been taken by Syria (although non-fulfilment by Russia of agreements on Syria can change the situation) and the other “frozen conflict” zones in the post-Soviet area¹⁷⁷. Instead, Kyiv should have paid more attention to other statements from Germany – the desire to Europeanize defence policy on the continent and create a European Security and Defence Union. Although plans to create such a union trace their history from the distant 1950s, the activity of German diplomacy and of Chancellor Angela Merkel in discussions on the eve of the summit in Bratislava for plans to create a European army with different groups of EU Member States may indicate the resolve of Berlin to this time bring the matter to its logical conclusion. In addition, Germany taking the role of regional leader in guaranteeing security on the continent opens additional opportunities for Kyiv to strengthen military cooperation with Germany within the framework of strengthening the eastern flank of NATO.

¹⁷⁵ White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, <http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4847754/Daten/6718448/160713weibuchEN.pdf>, p.32

¹⁷⁶ For more details see: Antulio J. Echevarria II, How should we think about “Gray-Zone” Wars? // Hybrid Warfare, op.cit., http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf, pp.33-39.

¹⁷⁷ Initiatives of Steinmayer regarding Transdnierster within the OSCE

Ukraine may deter aggression by Russia by using asymmetric methods (hybrid) proven by Russia itself in a war that involves the use of both military and non-military methods. **Kyiv has the duty of using Russia's strengths (a modernized army and diplomacy) against itself, in the same way as Russia uses the strengths of democracy (rule of law and freedom of speech) against Western democracies, by subverting them from the inside.** In particular, it is important for the Ukrainian side to continue to inform the public in Western countries about the realities of war in Donbas, particularly war crimes, and human rights violations in Crimea, and strongly stress these subjects within the UN. In addition, it requires a separate analysis of the participation by Russia in conflict resolution in the post-Soviet Union Space (including rhetoric by Volodymyr Yelchenko, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, which compared the actions of Russia in Aleppo to Grozny and can be heard not only during sessions of the UN Security Council). Using the examples of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia, Transnistria and the Donbas, it can be proved that the participation of Russia in the role of mediator is destructive. Instead, in the settlement of conflicts in which it is not involved, there is a positive trend. Such examples are the ones that question the success of Russian diplomacy and point to the fact that Russia is satisfying its own interests. Despite this all being a commonly-known fact, it is necessary to deliver this information to the societies of Western countries that are not informed of this situation and are consequently easily influenced by Russian propaganda.

An important factor in enhancing the containment of Russia in the region is by using the UN platform. In particular, Ukraine needs to take an active role in the discussions to progress reform of the UN Security Council and the principles of the right of veto. This issue is further exacerbated by Syria, which demonstrated the failure of the UN Security Council to prevent in time a humanitarian catastrophe and crimes against humanity. These discussions have been taking place for years, and Ukraine can strengthen the positions of Germany and Japan.¹⁷⁸ Such cooperation at an international level will allow diplomatic cooperation in the region to strengthen.

Implementation of the above named steps involves deciding specific policy concerning Russia. Ukraine must have a clear plan of action, taking into account different scenarios, as is customary with operational planning in the General Staff. In this respect, Minister Klimkin called Ukrainian diplomacy the diplomatic front-line of Ukraine, so it is time for Ukrainian diplomats to earn this status.

But the main weapon Ukraine can use against Russia is that of successful reforms. It is important that all our leaders not only function at the level of rhetoric, but that this also move

¹⁷⁸ See: Takako Ueta // Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EUGS_Expert_Opinions.pdf, pp. 35-36; UN Security Council reform: High level meeting at the Federal Foreign Office, 27/02/2015, http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/new-yorkvn/en/_pr/press-releases/2015/20150227-un-security-council-reform-high-level-meeting-berlin.html?archive=2984628; Germany seeks UN Security Council seat again, 28/06/2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-seeks-un-security-council-seat-again/a-19361160>

on to become a daily routine of implementation. As already noted, identity is one of the key facets of the regional institution-building process. In addition, only reform and economic development can drag Ukraine from the mire it has found itself in – backward, an unstable neighbouring country which is not trustworthy and has a poor international reputation. Ukrainian authorities in their spectrum of activities today effectively help Russia in propounding abroad such an image of Ukraine. In this way Kyiv itself precipitates the moment when the West will cease to support Kyiv and Ukraine will fall back into Moscow's sphere of influence.¹⁷⁹

Successful containment of Russia demands proactive Ukrainian diplomacy and military policy, using all possible configurations of regional political and military cooperation, effective implementation of reforms, and thorough planning activities in the international arena at both regional and global levels. Successful completion of these tasks requires thorough daily monitoring and analysis of the situation in Russia concerning changes in domestic policy across to the new initiatives of Russia in various parts of the world. **Due to a lack of an adequate number of experts in Ukraine, it is desirable to use the aforementioned Asian experience of institutionalization of single-format *track II* diplomacy to create a common platform to analyse Russian foreign and domestic policy.** This platform can provide a means to discuss common challenges to the security situation and develop appropriate solutions that can be adapted at the level of *track I* diplomacy.

¹⁷⁹ Variations of this scenario are already being written about by western experts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To strengthen Ukraine's position in the post-soviet space and to reduce the influence of Russia, Kyiv must necessarily actively develop bilateral and multilateral security, defence and sectoral cooperation with EU Member States and NATO by taking advantage of the Trymorya format, NORDEFECO, EU Battle Groups, the Lithuania-Poland-Ukraine Brigade, peacekeeping operations, etc. and weigh up the prospects for the revitalization of GUAM.
2. In the event that a decision is taken to further develop GUAM, there should first be initiated promotion of the idea in the international arena as well as in the region. Therefore Ukraine should take the initiative for the development of a "GUAM+" format with the US and Japan and GUAM cooperation with ASEAN. It is also necessary to develop an information campaign for GUAM, which should include not only the organization of visits of journalists and experts, but also joint representation stands at prestigious industry exhibition venues. An important step in strengthening institutional cooperation will be the creation of the GUAM Regional Cooperation Fund, similar to the Visegrad Fund where the annual budget in 2014 was 8m. euros.¹⁸⁰ Its aim should be to promote regional collaboration between non-governmental organizations, young people, experts, and academics.
3. The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine should establish a working group to analyze

¹⁸⁰ About the Fund: <http://visegradfund.org/about/>

the format of closer military cooperation with groups of Member States in NATO and the EU. This analysis should be based on an assessment of common interests, risks, and opportunities for Ukrainian involvement in military cooperation under the auspices of the concept of “Smart Defence.” More specifically, there needs to be a close look at Ukraine’s participation in a range of projects: NORDEFECO (at an observer level of status and participation in education and training in collaboration with the military-industrial complex); the Bucharest Nine for collaboration with the countries of the eastern flank of NATO; military cooperation within the Visegrad Group, continuing involvement with V4 EU BG, joint exercises and operational development plans. The fundamental aim of this cooperation is maximum integration in the military and security space of the EU and NATO, without actual NATO membership for Ukraine in the short and medium term.

4. Implementation of NATO standards and a shift to the European Security Space requires urgent change in approaches to the curricula of military training establishments in Ukraine and military training in general. Military training and modern military education is a mandatory component in establishing regional cooperation in existing and newly-initiated projects in defence, and particularly in NORDEFECO. That is why Ukraine should not only learn from the experience of European countries, but also make efforts to create a common educational space for Ukrainian and European troops. In particular, Kyiv could propose the creation of a NATO

training centre in Ukraine, which in the short terms could comprise simulation training centres or founding a regional military academy similar to the one in Tartu, Estonia,¹⁸¹ This can be discussed with the Visegrad Group, which has included the establishment of such an educational centre as part of their development of the defence collaboration.

5. Successful implementation of the opportunities offered by a regional security model requires proactive activity from Ukrainian diplomacy. From the point of view of the initial phase of cooperation in the framework of the Three Seas Trymorya (Intermarium/ABC), it is essential that Ukrainian embassies in the region strengthen the idea of Ukraine belonging to the region and initiate the involvement of Ukraine in various projects of regional cooperation, as provided for under this format. Kyiv has all the arguments to prove that the prosperity of the region without Ukraine cannot be achieved – as a regional energy and transport hub, and an important trading partner. It should also take into account the principle that cooperation need not involve the participation of all the countries in the region in the implementation of a project; Projects can be many, and the number of participants may vary.
6. Given that the regional security of Ukraine depends on Russia, it is important for Kyiv to initiate the creation of a format of track II diplomacy which will form an intellectual hub to research Russia. This will also be a

¹⁸¹ Estonian National Defense College, <http://www.ksk.edu.ee/en/>

platform for cooperation between analytical centres that would analyze not only hybrid war, but the different forms of regional collaboration, both geopolitical and geo-economic. The dynamics of change in different parts of the world that affect Russia's position not only requires constant monitoring, but timely development of necessary action plans for the leadership of the nation. The initiator can be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the donors – Western partners.

7. A necessary element for strengthening regional security of Ukraine is also an active use of the opportunities presented by the OSCE and the UN. Strengthening GUAM's position within the UN, support initiatives to reform the UN Security Council, and insistence on modernization contracts of arms control in the OSCE (Vienna Document and the Open Skies Agreement) comprise the minimum set of existing initiatives, in their consideration of which the voice of Kyiv should be strengthened. The task of Ukrainian diplomacy is to inform the world about the destructive role of Russia in the settlement of conflicts and continue to expose its aggression against Ukraine and other former Soviet countries.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

Strengths of regional cooperation	Weaknesses of regional cooperation
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="172 434 795 535">1. The necessary clear strategic plan that takes into account the regional and global position of Ukraine in the world.<li data-bbox="172 576 795 786">2. Regional cooperation is a conceptual foundation for building up collaboration in the region and beyond; an asymmetric security model, bilateral cooperation with the USA and the development of collaboration with NATO – are all instruments of the implementation of the regional security model.<li data-bbox="172 828 795 1071">3. Allows Ukraine to initiate the strengthening of the existing regional organization – GUAM – as well as proceeding with formats for cooperation projects between Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, which will promote the deepening of regional cooperation, reduce dependence on Russia and the strengthening of the three countries in the Eastern Partnership<li data-bbox="172 1113 795 1357">4. Ukraine has mechanisms for adding to existing regional initiatives that have coming into existence or are being developed in the EU Member States and NATO, in the military, security, economics, and the infrastructure. As a result, Ukraine will be able to integrate into the right areas even without membership of the EU and NATO.<li data-bbox="172 1399 795 1498">5. The development of horizontal relations between the countries of the region is being promoted and contacts increased between people.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="817 434 1227 500">1. Will give effective results only in the medium and long term<li data-bbox="817 542 1227 649">2. Dependent on the use of the Ukrainian factor in the internal political struggle in the region.<li data-bbox="817 691 1227 757">3. Sensitive to the historical policies of neighbouring countries.<li data-bbox="817 799 1227 866">4. Regional cooperation is being influenced by Russia.

5. NEUTRALITY

INTRODUCTION

Historically, neutrality was defined as the non-participation of a state in an armed conflict. However, over time the concept of neutrality began to acquire wider significance. On the one hand, the notion of “permanent neutrality” has emerged; it is an improved version of the temporary/war-time neutrality.¹⁸² This model means having respective rights and obligations for a state both in peacetime and in wartime under the Conventions V and XIII of the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, and the Paris Declaration of 1956.

It should be noted that “permanent neutrality” is often a result of an agreement of the great powers of the international system that is fixed in the Constitution and guaranteed by major states. Such agreements are intended to prevent control of one of the great powers over a strategically important country, which thus would undermine the balance of power and interests between major countries and would make international relations more volatile. This practice became widespread in Europe during the period of the Concert of Europe in the 19 century as a form of maintaining the balance of power and interests between the five major powers of the system of international relations.¹⁸³ As a result, this model was used to declare the perma-

nent neutrality of Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg. In 1955, the great powers agreed by consensus to transform Austria to a permanently neutral state. Austria’s model was implemented using a “permanent neutrality in exchange for territorial integrity” scheme.

The case of Sweden during the 19-20 centuries¹⁸⁴ should be considered an example of classic neutrality. The neutrality of this state was the result of the course independently selected by the national establishment in specific historical conditions, and thus was not imposed by the great powers of the international system. Also, the neutrality of Sweden was not fixed in any national document, and was based solely on political declarations that were made during the exacerbation of conflicts. Today, Sweden’s neutrality is declared in policy documents and statements of each new government.

In any case, regardless of its type neutrality is understood as commitments by the state that declares such policy.¹⁸⁵ First, it means a refusal to join military blocs. However, a possible condition for the preservation of neutrality in its broader political sense may be a refusal to join economic associations – which is why Austria, Finland, and Sweden during the Cold War

¹⁸² Agius C. ‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ / C. Agius, K. Devine. // *Cooperation and Conflict*. – 2011. – №46. – P. 265–284.

¹⁸³ Kissinger H. *World Order* / Henry Kissinger. – New York: Penguin Press, 2014. – 432 p. – (1st edition), page 67

¹⁸⁴ Agius C. ‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ / C. Agius, K. Devine. // *Cooperation and Conflict*. – 2011. – №46. – P.268-269

¹⁸⁵ *Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)* [Online]. – 1907. – Available: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague05.asp.

refused to join the European Economic Community (EEC), despite the wishes of the political elite and the population. Secondly, if a state conducts a policy of neutrality, it cannot place other states' military bases on its territory, excluding contingents of UN peacekeepers. Thirdly, in case of war the neutral state can continue to interact with all warring parties, but using non-discriminatory approach.

On the other hand, the great powers (especially when it comes to permanent neutrality on the basis of an agreement between them) undertake to respect the position of the country which has declared a neutrality policy. It means the prevention of aggression against that country.

The historical experience and practice of a number of European countries have not suggested the existence of a single model of neutrality. The implementation of this model can be a result of an actually imposed consensus between the great powers or a unilateral decision of an individual state and not provide any specific external guarantees. In the latter case, neutrality is similar, but not identical (!) to the policy of non-alignment, which Ukraine tried to implement in 2010-2014. Kyiv was conducting a policy unique in the world practice of international relations – it deliberately limited its right to conduct an independent foreign policy in terms of the possibility to choose military-political alliances without obtaining guarantees that are inherent to neutrality (in particular, the willingness to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity or non-placement of military bases).

5.1. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATE

Neutrality policy in peacetime and wartime is aimed at hindering involvement of the country in a war between third parties and thereby to prevent its transformation into a battleground, thus avoiding material losses and casualties. **In the conditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine the course towards neutrality is impossible – the object of aggression in this case is Ukraine, not a third party.**

Since Ukraine's independence, in the academic discourse and in practical proposals neutrality has been considered to be one of security guarantee models, along with integration to NATO/EU and non-alignment. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (1990) stated the need to transform Ukraine into a permanently neutral state in the future. Likewise, in 2004, 2005 and 2007 bills on Ukraine's transformation to a neutral state were introduced into Parliament. During this discussion neutrality was considered as a hardly possible model, given Ukraine's particular importance in the international relations of the region, the need to spend a larger share of its GDP than Ukraine is used to on defence (neutral countries spend 7-8%, and Ukraine, before the war, spent only 0.8-0.9%). But eventually Ukraine chose the model of non-alignment, which functioned during 2010-2014.

5.2. BEST EXAMPLES OF THE MODEL'S IMPLEMENTATION

Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland are considered to be indicative examples of conducting neutrality policy in Europe in the 19-21 centuries. The examples of Sweden and Switzerland are salient in terms of the great experience of conducting the policy of neutrality in different historical circumstances, while the example of Finland is interesting for Ukraine with regard to the similar geographical proximity to Russia.

Switzerland is considered to be the first permanently neutral state, the status of which had been fixed in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna and confirmed in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles. Also, this country is considered to be the first who introduced the principle of “armed neutrality” in its modern sense. In other words, **Switzerland in its foreign and defence policy did not rely solely on the external guarantees of the great powers concerning respect for its neutral status.** Switzerland considered its armed forces, which created the necessary deterrence effect, as the main guarantee of its international political status. As a result, it helped the country in 1870 to avoid indirect involvement in the Franco-Prussian war and also to remain neutral during the First World War, mobilizing more than 500 thousand soldiers. However, it was World War II which helped the most to popularize the idea of the effectiveness of this armed sovereignty policy.¹⁸⁶ In 1940, against the background of the Third Reich's military successes and possi-

ble plans to invade the country, Switzerland carried out its own army mobilization and clearly warned about the willingness to fight and cause unacceptable losses to the enemy. During the Cold War Switzerland continued to pursue its policy of armed neutrality – their armed forces comprised 640,000 soldiers with a population of 6.3 million, and spending on defence accounted for 20.2% of the total budget expenditures.¹⁸⁷

Sweden proclaimed the policy of neutrality after the Napoleonic Wars as a result of significant casualties and territorial losses.¹⁸⁸ With the outbreak of World War I Sweden in 1914 published a declaration of permanent neutrality. This made it possible to prevent involvement in the war, as well as for neighbouring Denmark and Norway. However, during the 1930s Stockholm began to shift to a policy of “armed neutrality.” In 1939, at the beginning of World War II, these three Scandinavian countries declared neutrality. However, already in 1940, Denmark and Norway became targets of aggression by the Third Reich. This step by Berlin was aimed at ensuring access for their own navy (especially submarines) to the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, as well as an uninterrupted supply of strategically important Swedish iron ore through the Norwegian port of Narvik in the event of a pos-

¹⁸⁶ DeVore M. From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century / M. DeVore, A. Stahli. // *Swiss Political Science Review*. – 2011. – №17(1). – P. 4.

¹⁸⁷ Martin D. Armed Neutrality – Australia's Alternative [Online] / David Martin // *Peace Dossier*. – 1984. – Available: https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/Armed-Neutrality_David-Martin.pdf ., P. 3.

¹⁸⁸ BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN'S CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BERGEN BASSETT // *College of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign*. – 2012. – Available: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1 ., P. 10-12.

sible landing of British troops there. Unlike its neighbours, Sweden managed to maintain its neutrality during World War II. Therefore, it is clear **that a proclamation of neutrality by itself does not guarantee the prevention of aggression if the aggressor state possesses necessary resources and is interested in control or use of geostrategically important areas.**

During the Cold War, Sweden continued to pursue its policy of “armed neutrality.” The country had an advanced Air Force based on its own production (330 units of Saab 37 Viggen jet fighters) while the fleet consisted of 34 surface ships and 12 submarines Swedish make.^{189,190} The total size of the army was 800,000 persons with a population of 8.3 million people. Defence spending accounted for 8% of the total budget.¹⁹¹

Finland is a special case of the policy of armed neutrality. According to the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 1948 with the USSR, Finland had to prevent possible aggression against the Soviet Union through its own territory. For this purpose, if necessary, the USSR could, after consultations,

provide appropriate assistance to Finland.¹⁹² As a consequence, the armed forces of the country indirectly contributed to the neutrality of Finland. Effective armed forces of Finland would guarantee the prevention of the use of its territory or airspace for aggression against the USSR, thereby preventing the appearance of the Soviet armed forces on their own territory. To do this, Finland in the 1960s bought, using Soviet loans, interceptor aircrafts MiG-23. In addition, the agreement of 1948 provided for the non-participation of the parties in alliances directed against each other.¹⁹³

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the military naval base of Porkkala-Udd in 1956 strengthened the neutrality of Finland, since it meant that Finland’s territory would not be used as a platform for possible Soviet aggression against NATO countries, thereby indirectly involving Finland in a hypothetical confrontation.

In the conditions of the ended bipolar confrontation in Europe, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland actually began to abandon implementing the classic policy of neutrality or to upgrade it in accordance with the new conditions. First of all it was demonstrated by the accession of Finland, Sweden, and Austria to the EU in 1995 and Switzerland to the UN in 2002, plus the participation of these three countries in the Partnership for Peace and provision of their own troops

¹⁸⁹ The SAAB 37 Viggen [Online] – Available: <http://www.airvectors.net/avvig.html>.

¹⁹⁰ Eckstein M. U.S., Sweden Sign Agreement To Collaborate On Anti-Sub, Anti-Air R&D, Exercises [Online] / Megan Eckstein // USNI. – 2016. – Available: https://news.usni.org/2016/06/08/sweden_us_agreement.

¹⁹¹ Martin D. Armed Neutrality – Australia’s Alternative [Online] / David Martin // Peace Dossier. – 1984. – Available: https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/Armed-Neutrality_David-Martin.pdf, p. 3.

¹⁹² The Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and The Republic of Finland [Online] – Available: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/246_004.

¹⁹³ Visuri P. Evolution of Finnish military doctrine [Online] / Pekka Visuri // War College. – 1990. – Available: <https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/119958/FDS%201%20OCR.pdf?sequence=2>, p. 45-46

for NATO operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan). Such a shift from the classic neutrality policy was defined by the extension of the range of threats to national security of these countries, opposition to which demanded increased cooperation with intergovernmental international organizations and bodies.¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ In the case of Sweden one can talk more and more about a policy of non-alignment, not neutrality as such. Because, in fact, non-alignment and Sweden's neutrality mean a unilateral declaration of intent; it does not exclude the possibility of direct or indirect involvement in military operations. Meanwhile, Switzerland, starting in the 1990s, moved to a model of "*differentiated neutrality*." In practice, it meant a willingness to support economic sanctions against an aggressor state, but to refrain from providing military troops.

In the conditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, countries like Sweden and Finland officially started to strengthen their cooperation with the US and NATO. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the two countries signed an agreement with the Alliance on providing to the latter access to their airfields in the case of

war.¹⁹⁶ During the NATO BALTOPS 2016 exercise a NATO contingent for the first time carried out a landing in Finland.

On June 8, 2016 the defence ministers of Sweden and the United States signed a statement of intent to strengthen military cooperation. This document, among other things, provides for joint military exercises and training, the exchange of information, and cooperation in air force and anti-submarine combat areas. The document clearly states that the agreement is aimed against "regional states that test the limits of endurance."¹⁹⁷ To date, Finland is negotiating a similar agreement with the United States.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ DeVore M. From Armed Neutrality to External Dependence: Swiss Security in the 21st Century / M. DeVore, A. Stahli. // *Swiss Political Science Review*. – 2011. – №17(1). – P. 1–26.

¹⁹⁵ BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN'S CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BERGEN BASSETT // College of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. – 2012. – Available: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1.

¹⁹⁶ FREEDBERG S. Fear of Russia drives Sweden closer to NATO [Online] / SYDNEY FREEDBERG // *Breaking Defense*. – 2016. – Available: <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/fear-of-russia-drives-sweden-closer-to-nato/>.

¹⁹⁷ Eckstein M. U.S., Sweden Sign Agreement To Collaborate On Anti-Sub, Anti-Air R&D, Exercises [Online] / Megan Eckstein // USNI. – 2016. – Available: https://news.usni.org/2016/06/08/sweden_us_agreement.

¹⁹⁸ Militarily neutral Finland in talks with U.S. on closer defense collaboration; minister [Online] // *Reuters*. – 2016. – Available: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-usa-defence-idUSKCN10X1AA>.

5.3. DISADVANTAGES OF THE ARMED NEUTRALITY MODEL

Despite the formal effectiveness of **the armed neutrality model**, researchers cite **three conditions for its successful implementation**:

- creating a strong deterrent effect;
- useful effect of neutrality for the international system;
- recognition of the neutral status by the great powers.

In Switzerland a culture of readiness for military service among the population was shaped already in the 13 century¹⁹⁹, which in practice was implemented through constant training. Today Switzerland uses the model of territorial defense, which means that weapons are directly in the hands of soldiers. On the other hand, the factor that the great powers received benefits of this military-political status of Switzerland helped to maintain Switzerland's neutrality. This country during two world wars acted as platforms for informal contacts between warring states and for providing humanitarian assistance to victims of war and refugees. As a result, this led to the fact that **the neutrality of Switzerland began to be perceived as an integral part of any international order in Europe during the XIX-XX centuries**.

However, it should be noted that even these factors may not be enough for a successful implementation of the policy of armed

neutrality.²⁰⁰ The historical experience of several other European countries clearly demonstrates this. Thus, Belgium during the outbreak of World War II proclaimed a policy of armed neutrality, but it did not save the country from German aggression. The same applies to Denmark, Holland, Norway, and Finland during World War II. In other words, actually, the first and foremost criterion that determines the possibility for success of the policy of armed neutrality is the geo-strategic importance of the country for the state that is conducting aggressive (revisionist) policy. Therefore, **even if a country declares and pursues a policy of armed neutrality, this policy will not help her to avoid aggression if this country is in the area of geo-strategic interests of a great power**.

In fact, even the successful experience of Switzerland and Sweden during World War II confirms this fact by contradiction. The geo-strategic position of these countries was secondary for the Third Reich for implementation of their plans to establish dominance in Europe. So they were not of particular interest to Berlin, which would justify the war. Meanwhile, in the conditions of actual dominance of the Third Reich in Europe in 1940-1943, both **Switzerland and Sweden were forced to modify their foreign policy to take Berlin's interests into account, thus literally breaking commitments of classic neutral countries**.²⁰¹ First of all it concerned concessions in the economic sphere. During this period

¹⁹⁹ Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. – 2014. – №15(3). – P.73-82

²⁰⁰ Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. – 2014. – №15(3). P.69-72

²⁰¹ Dreyer J. Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? / J. Dreyer, N. Jesse. // Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. – 2014. – №15(3). P.66

Sweden had a clear understanding that the success of the policy of armed neutrality, above all, was determined by the fact that they were not the main subject of this aggression.²⁰² In other words, if the Third Reich had complete domination over Europe, the possibility of a direct aggression against Switzerland and Sweden would significantly increase if they refused to conduct the policy according to Berlin's interests.

The Cold War also proved that the geostrategic position of the country is the main condition for the possibility of an effective implementation of the policy of armed neutrality. The example of Sweden is more revealing; unlike Switzerland this country during the Cold War was on the front line between the two rival blocs.

Therefore, already in the 1950s, a Swedish Prime Minister, Erlander Tahe, decided to strengthen cooperation with the US and NATO, knowing that in the event of war Sweden would not survive if a real policy of armed neutrality was conducted.²⁰³ In the end of 1950s Sweden decided to allow American submarines with nuclear weapons to enter its own territorial waters. In exchange, the US helped Sweden to create the above-mentioned Saab 37 Viggen aircraft, which was equipped with the American

CK37 computer. The Americans did this in hopes that in case of total war the air force of Sweden could oppose Soviet ASW aircrafts that would be directed against US submarines. Thus we can say that the US assistance to Sweden on building its military capabilities, which promoted the policy of armed neutrality, was determined by its real interest to strengthen the defence capacity of their own and allied armed forces in case of total war. Finally, in 1960, an informal agreement on assistance from the West in case of USSR aggression against Sweden was reached.²⁰⁴ So, one can say that **during the Cold War, Sweden, actually, shifted from its policy of armed neutrality.**

Furthermore, according to the USSR'S plans, especially before the 1960s, in case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Sweden was likely to become an object of aggression. This is directly related to the geostrategic importance of the country itself. In case of war, it was important for the USSR to gain control over the Atlantic coast of Norway, which would allow avoiding the blockade of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At the same time, Sweden was situated in the way of the Soviet Union to Norway, which is why in a fight for the Atlantic coast of the Scandinavian Peninsula Sweden would most likely become an object of aggression of the USSR.²⁰⁵ Actually, Sven Anderson, former Defence Minister of Sweden, also confirms this in his memoirs.

²⁰² BASSETT B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SWEDEN'S CHANGING STANCE ON NEUTRALITY [Online] / BERGEN BASSETT // College of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. – 2012. – Available: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1, P.12

²⁰³ BERGER S. THE GREAT PARADOX OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY IN THE COLD WAR AND TODAY [Online] / SUSANNE BERGER // War on Rocks. – 2015. – Available: <http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-great-paradox-of-swedish-neutrality-in-the-cold-war-and-today/>.

²⁰⁴ Pond E. Secrets of the Baltic: Swedish Cold War Neutrality Revisited [Online] / Elizabeth Pond // World policy blog. – 2012. – Available: <http://www.world-policy.org/blog/2012/09/26/secrets-baltic-swedish-cold-war-neutrality-revisited>.

²⁰⁵ Sweden: Cold War sites [Online] // The Baltic initiative and network – Available: <http://coldwarsites.net/country/sweden>.

During a visit to Moscow in 1971 and a meeting with military leaders of the USSR, they made it clear that in case of a wide-scale war in Europe, the Kremlin would not respect the neutrality of Sweden, as well as the fact that Sweden did not have enough resources for its defence.²⁰⁶

Thus, we can speak about a formation after the Second World War of a myth about the effectiveness of the policy of armed neutrality in conditions of active revision of the international order by individual states. The historical experience of European countries clearly demonstrates that the main condition for the effectiveness of such policy is the absence of a significant geostrategic interest of revisionist states in regard to the countries that pursue a policy of armed neutrality. The success of the policy of armed neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland during World War II is, indeed, an exception that proves the complexity of conducting this policy.

When reviewing and analyzing the experience of the neutrality as a model for Ukraine one should also keep in mind the examples of two former Soviet Union countries Moldova and Turkmenistan. Moldova not only unilaterally declared permanent neutrality, but cemented this position in its constitution. This position was fixed in order to force Russia to withdraw its troops and weapons from Transnistria. But the Kremlin, despite these concessions and unilateral steps of Chisinau, actually continues to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova. In the late 2000s Chisinau even proposed to fix the permanent neutrality of Moldova through international recognition of this

status. However, the Russian Federation refused this offer using unofficial channels. **The example of Moldova clearly confirms that the permanent neutrality cannot neither prevent nor reverse the effects of aggressive actions of another state if the revisionist state has other plans.**

The example of Turkmenistan can be considered another unique case; this country at first fixed permanent neutrality in their national legislation, and in December 1995 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which recognized and supported the country's new international political status.²⁰⁷ In addition, this resolution contained a call for other UN member states to respect and support Turkmenistan's neutral status. But this practice of neutral status recognition through a resolution of the UN has become a unique phenomenon. The resolution of the UN GA does not create effective mechanisms to guarantee the neutral status of Turkmenistan.

Initially, the vision of the neutrality policy objective was reduced to turning the country into a place for resolving regional disputes and then as a way for the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov to maximally protect the country from external influence. Ashgabat managed to maintain the status of a neutral state despite the agreement with the United States in 2002 on the use of the country's airspace and the capital's airport for the transit of goods to Afghanistan.

However, the growing destabilization in neighbouring Afghanistan, which is manifested

²⁰⁶ Take Gotland in 6 hours – <http://www.svoboda.org/a/28010697.html>

²⁰⁷ Maintenance of international security – A Permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan – http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/50/80&Lang=E

by Taliban raids to Turkmenistan, is an indirect challenge to that policy. In October 2015, during a visit to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan's President, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, raised the question of getting Tashkent's assistance to combat the growing threat from the Taliban. At the same time, the Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan was visiting the US; they also raised the issue of getting US assistance to enhance the security of the country. After that, the Russian Defence Minister, Sergey Shoygu, during his visit to Turkmenistan, on June 8, 2016 proposed to assist Ashgabat in order to strengthen defence capacity against the Taliban. Later, the Russian media wrote that Ashgabat accepted Moscow's offer of cooperation. Turkmenistan is trying to continue to downplay the threat from the Taliban and relies on the Turkmen paramilitary units in Afghanistan. But, **eventually, against the background of increasing destabilization in Afghanistan, Ashgabat will face the need to attract external actors to counter the threat of the Taliban. This, in turn, will question the ability of Turkmenistan to continue to conduct a positive neutrality policy.** This is especially important in light of the fact that the Russian Federation is usually inclined to exchange assistance in one area for concessions in another which take into account Russia's national interests.

5.4. HOW THE MODEL MAY HELP TO DETER THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION?

The armed neutrality model was not profitable for Ukraine both before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, nor during it; because this model does not allow the realization of national state interests which are based, among other things, on the right to freely choose the vector of political and economic integration for creation of economic and political conditions for the sustainable development of the country.

On the one hand, one could assume that an agreement between the US and Russia on Ukraine's transformation into a neutral state, along with the implementation of Barack Obama's administration's policy of a "reset" of relations with Russia in 2009-2010, would allow the prevention of the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine. However, it should be recalled that the issue of Ukraine's place in the military security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region was closed in 2010 when the policy of non-alignment was proclaimed through the adoption of the Law on Domestic and Foreign Policy by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 1, 2010.

But even a possible agreement between the major powers on the declaration of Ukraine as a neutral state would, most probably, not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Thus the real cause of Russia's aggression was the loss of non-military tools of influence on Ukraine, given the actual loss in confrontation with the EU in terms of Ukraine's choice to integrate. Therefore, even a possible agreement on neutrality, which would be certainly better than the unilateral declaration of non-alignment made by Kyiv, since it would provide for the need to remove

the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine, certainly would not save Ukraine from the aggression.

The cause of the Russian Federation's aggression was not the question of Ukraine's military orientation (in any case this issue was closed after the adoption of the aforementioned law of July 1, 2010), but rather its economic integration, which is not controlled by a policy of armed neutrality. It is known that the national debate on the need to reject the non-alignment started in Ukraine only during the active Russian aggression against our country in 2014. Only in December 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted for the rejection of non-alignment. This step was a result of Russia's aggression. Meanwhile, back in March 2014, high-level Ukrainian authorities were ready to guarantee to the Kremlin the absence of Euro-Atlantic integration plans. Thus, in March 2014, the then-Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, clearly stated during his first visit to the United States that Ukraine did not intend to declare a course towards the Euro-Atlantic integration.²⁰⁸ The then-Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Andrii Deshchytsia, made similar statements.²⁰⁹ As a result, Ukraine had already become an object of Russian aggression before the review of its approach to the military-political positioning

in the regional security system. That is why the idea that Russian aggression was a result of Kyiv's declaration concerning a move towards NATO, as well as the fact that a possible agreement on neutrality will resolve all contradictions, are not confirmed. The aggression was launched by the Kremlin in the absence of Kyiv's declared intentions to become a full member of NATO, and hence a possible agreement on neutrality, which would remove, first of all, the question of the Ukrainian-Russian relations from the agenda, does not guarantee that the Kremlin abandons the aggression against Ukraine.

A state cannot implement a neutrality policy while being an object of aggression. Moreover, such a policy makes quite impossible cooperation with both individual partner countries like the United States, and with NATO to enhance Ukraine's defence capability in the conditions of aggression through bilateral and multinational exercises in Ukraine. Thus, **in the current context the introduction of the policy of armed neutrality makes an effective response to Russia impossible, which is, among other things, based on international assistance.**

Meanwhile, among researchers that represent the realist school of international relations the belief about the possibility of turning Ukraine into a neutral state between Russia and Western institutions, which would resolve

²⁰⁸ Yatsenyuk says that Ukraine does not discuss the prospects of NATO membership [Online] // Zerkalo Nedeli. – 2014. – Available: http://zn.ua/POLITICS/yatsenyuk-zayavil-cto-ukraina-ne-obsuzhdaet-perspektivy-chlenstva-v-nato-140560_.html.

²⁰⁹ Deshchytsia: No document says that Ukraine must become a member of NATO [Online] // Den. – 2014. – Available: <http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/190314-deshchicya-v-zhodnomu-dokumenty-ne-napisano-shcho-ukrayina-maie-stati-chlenom-nato>.

the conflict and end the war, is widespread.²¹⁰ In current circumstances after 2.5 years of war a modified Austrian scenario of 1955 is proposed to Ukraine; this scenario actually means maintaining Russia's control over de facto and de jure occupied territories and a guarantee of non-aggression against Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine's refusal of Euro-Atlantic integration.²¹¹ However, these proposals do not take into consideration the underlying driving force of Moscow's policy towards Ukraine: Russia not only aims to achieve the guaranteed non-participation of Ukraine in military-political organizations, but to get at least a proper level of control over those processes related to Ukraine. Hence, the implementation in the case of Ukraine of the Austrian scenario ("territorial integrity in exchange for neutrality") is doubtful. In the case of Ukraine the Kremlin is interested not only in neutral status, but in the actual mechanisms guaranteeing this status – namely, the conservation, de facto or de jure, of control over the occupied Crimea and ORDLO, and through them over the rest of Ukraine.

Earlier, Russia had tried to implement this through the involvement of Ukraine in their economic integration organizations; after realizing the failure to realize this maximum goal in 2014 Russia shifted to aggression as a last form of maintaining control over Ukraine. Therefore, **in the present circumstances a hypothetical declaration of Ukraine's neutrality according to a modified Austrian scenario has every chance to repeat the fate of the Budapest Memorandum.** Such an agreement will allow Russia to avoid responsibility for its aggression. Ukraine's declaration and conduction of the policy of armed neutrality will only increase the risks to our country – it does not take into account the historical experience that this policy can be successful if it concerns a country, which is of a secondary or tertiary interest for the revisionist state.

²¹⁰ Michael O. How to Save Ukraine [Online] / O'Hanlon Michael // 2015 – Available: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/a-way-forward-for-the-west-on-ukraine-and-russia-118471>. Mearsheimer J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault [Online] / John Mearsheimer // Foreign Affairs. – 2014. – Available: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>. Walt S. Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea [Online] / Stephen Walt // Foreign Policy. – 2015. – Available: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/how-not-to-save-ukraine-arming-kiev-is-a-bad-idea/>.

²¹¹ MACGREGOR D. The Ukrainian State Treaty: An Offer Putin Can't Refuse [Online] / DOUGLAS MACGREGOR // Foreign Policy. – 2016. – Available: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/01/the-ukrainian-state-treaty-an-offer-putin-cant-refuse-russia-nato-ukraine/>


5.5. PROBABILITY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMED NEUTRALITY MODEL

The case of the armed neutrality and the possibility of its implementation by Ukraine face a paradoxical situation. As long as the current perception of Ukraine as a country that is a part of their sphere of influence and actually devoid of international subjectivity prevails in Russia, the implementation of the model of armed neutrality is impossible.²¹² Meanwhile, **in case Russia gives this position up, there will be no**

need and relevance to introduce an armed neutrality policy, because the question of Ukraine's military-political or economic integration vector will not be essential for the Kremlin.

However, in this context, the results of a survey carried out by TNS and commissioned by the Institute of World Policy (in 2016) deserve special attention. In general, 24.7% of respondents support the neutrality as a priority of Ukraine's foreign policy.²¹³ The idea of turning Ukraine into a neutral state is considered attractive particularly in the east – it was supported by 32.9%

Graf. 4. What should be the main priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy?



²¹² D. Trenin. Russia and the World in the 21st century / Dmitriy Trenin. – Moscow: Exmo, 2015. – 384 p. – (Special edition), «Russia and the sovereignty of other countries»

²¹³ What do Ukrainians think about foreign policy priorities? [Online] // Institute of World Policy. – 2015. – Available: <http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/2116.html>.

of respondents there. In the west the idea is supported by only 9.9% of respondents. In Kyiv – 22.2%, in the north – 17.9%, in the center – 25.2%, in the south – 23.5%. It should be emphasized that Ukrainians refer to Switzerland as a model by which Ukraine could be guided in choosing and implementing a policy of armed neutrality.

This can be explained primarily by the lack of a clear understanding of the causality of the events of 2013-2014 associated with the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. One can also talk about the lack of understanding among the population of causes that determined the success of the policy of armed neutrality in Switzerland. On the other hand, such sentiments can be used by supporters of turning Ukraine into a neutral state; it gives a different task – active work with the public to create real understanding of the neutrality mechanism. Otherwise, the sociology data on the attitudes among the population can be used to implement plans that are contrary to the national interests of Ukraine, and as a way to justify and promote the idea of the external imposing of the neutrality model.

After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of the war of Russia against Ukraine a consensus on the need to abandon the policy of non-alignment and instead recover Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration course began to form among the leading national political parties. Only the position of the Opposition bloc may be considered an exception; in their program in September 2014, it was noted that they supported the idea of Ukraine's non-alignment and neutrality. In contrast, the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna) during

the campaign for parliament elections voiced the idea of a referendum if they entered the Parliament on Ukraine's membership in NATO. But political forces, which formed the ruling coalition after the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, declared in the agreement that one of the priorities of their work is to return to an Euro-Atlantic integration course.

However, to date, after reformatting the current coalition one can talk about changing the approaches of a number of political forces on the positioning of Ukraine as compared to 2014. First of all, in August 2016 the leader of the Radical Party, Oleh Lyashko, expressed his opinion that the best model for Ukraine would be neutrality. After they entered the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna) did not raise the issue of a referendum on Ukraine's membership in NATO. At the same time, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, People's Front and Samopomich Union continue to support the idea of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, thus not considering the possibility of turning Ukraine into a neutral state. However, it should be noted that overstated expectations concerning the possibility of rapid Euro-Atlantic integration can cause frustration among the population.

5.6. HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE MODEL?

In case a possible agreement on the neutral status of Ukraine is discussed, Kyiv should start the negotiations with strong demands. It includes restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity to where it was as of February 1, 2014 in exchange for Ukraine's refusal of the right to freely choose the direction of the military-political integration – in other words the rejection of NATO membership. Meanwhile, Ukraine's relations with the EU should not be negotiable given that issues of economic integration vector by their nature are not related to neutrality status, which concerns the military and political positioning of a country. Such an approach is necessary, because confrontation in terms of the foreign economic orientation of Ukraine in late 2013 early 2014 became the background against which Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine. However, it is difficult to imagine the implementation of such a maximalist position of Ukraine – not for the least reason the legitimacy of the current Russian political regime is related to the annexation of Crimea, and aggression. Similarly, the model of de facto and de jure recognition of the controlled territories of Ukraine (ORDLO, Crimea) as Russian, with a guarantee of Ukraine's non-participation in NATO in exchange for security guarantees from the Russian Federation for Ukraine, ignores two fundamentally important issues. First of all, the Kremlin is not interested in those ORDLO territories that it controls today. Russia's interest was and still is control over Ukraine. In the present circumstances, the Kremlin would like to get real guarantees of control over the foreign policy of Ukraine through reintegration on its own

terms of ORDLO into Ukraine. Another question is how Ukraine after the experience of the Budapest Memorandum can rely on any guarantees provided by the Russian Federation. Thus, advocates of Ukraine's neutrality through the actual recognition of the present state ignore the fact that Russia in its current worldview is interested in control over Ukraine. An agreement on neutrality should be able to guarantee such control only under the condition of the proper reintegration of ORDLO. This, if realised, is likely to undermine the political stability in the rest of Ukraine through the de-legitimisation of a regime that would accept the implementation of the Russian scenario of the actual neutralization of Ukraine. This neutralization would take place through the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Besides, a possible agreement on neutrality will not solve the issue of Ukraine's position in an actually grey area of security in Europe given the impossibility of obtaining real security guarantees – in fact Ukraine will continue to rely on themselves above all in national defence matters. Thus, a possible agreement on neutrality without modification of the Russian attitude towards Ukraine would not resolve the current situation. On the contrary, this decision would meet, above all, the interests of Russia, to a lesser extent of the EU and the US, but would be fully inconsistent with Ukraine's interests, which consist of maintaining maximum freedom to choose the vector of economic and political integration and thus ensuring all the conditions for sustainable development of our country. Thus, any agreement on neutrality in the present situation, especially with appropriate guarantees through reintegration of the ORDLO on Russia's

terms may repeat the fate of non-alignment. In other words, it would strengthen, not weaken, the risks to national security and defence in today's conditions. So, as it has been clearly demonstrated, even armed neutrality policy might not work when the country that conducts it is a main target of aggression. The Kremlin's current foreign policy identity, which denies any subjectivity of post-Soviet states, will stimulate Russia, in one way or another, to take aggressive steps against Ukraine as the last form of control. In such circumstances neutrality would increase, not decrease, the possibility of extending Russian aggression policy against Ukraine.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Based on the above analyzed experience of a number of countries and on the features of the interaction between Kyiv and Moscow, at the current stage Ukraine's transformation into a neutral state, provided a policy of armed neutrality is conducted, will not fully guarantee the national interests and security. A declaration of such course should be avoided.
2. If there are attempts from external actors to impose a model of neutral state on Ukraine in the regional security system, official Kyiv has to set a number of conditions. They include the restoration of Ukraine's borders to where they were as of 1 February 2014 (de-occupation of Crimea, along with the complete withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and de-occupation of the ORDLO), withdrawal of Russian troops from the border of Ukraine with a parallel deployment of a permanent OSCE monitoring mission to confirm the absence of military threats to Ukraine, strict guarantees of military assistance from countries-signatories of the agreement on Ukraine's neutrality in case of violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, such a hypothetical large agreement cannot concern the strengthening of economic and political relations of Ukraine with the EU. Otherwise, any agreement on the neutral status of Ukraine may repeat the fate of the Budapest Memorandum.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL

Advantages of the neutral status of Ukraine	Disadvantages of the neutral status of Ukraine
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="172 472 686 643">1. It will allow the countries in Europe and the US to remove the Ukrainian issue from the agenda of relations with Russia and thereby reduce the degree of tension in collaboration with Moscow.<li data-bbox="172 681 686 820">2. May partly reduce the polarization in Ukrainian society – especially in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, who still do not accept integration to NATO.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="713 472 1228 573">1. Ukraine will remain in a gray area of security, not being a member of effective security guarantee mechanisms.<li data-bbox="713 611 1228 782">2. May exacerbate political instability in Ukraine. A part of the society will perceive that decision as a betrayal of national interests and a decisive capitulation to Russia.<li data-bbox="713 820 1228 896">3. Requires significant resources, while the possibility to get foreign aid will be limited.<li data-bbox="713 934 1228 1212">4. Given the revision and correction of the neutrality model by other countries, which actually shows its inability to respond to all security challenges of our time, Ukraine's decision will not be in accordance with global trends to shift from hard neutrality to various forms of active cooperation with military alliances.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Institute would like to extend sincere gratitude to its colleagues in other think-tanks, both in Ukraine and abroad, to individuals representing various government agencies in Ukraine, and to international diplomats and politicians, all of whom have made their contributions to this study but preferred to remain unnamed. Specific thanks for their interest in this paper go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. We are also grateful for the support offered by the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, the Office of Reforms under MoD, the Office of the Vice Premier for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, and NATO headquarters. The Institute thanks *Oleksiy Semeniuk*, who supported the study with analytical know-how at every stage. Immeasurable assistance was also provided by *John Herbst*, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasian Center at the Atlantic Council (Washington) and former US Ambassador to Ukraine (2003-2006); *Arkady Moshes*, Director of the EU's Eastern Neighborhood and Russia research program at the Finnish Institute of International Relations (Helsinki); and *Bruno Lete*, analyst from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Brussels). IWP also thanks its long-time partner, *Serhiy Sydorenko*, editor-in-chief of *Yevropeiska Pravda*, for communicational support. All the best ideas in this report are the result of the IWP analytical team interacting with these specialists in security issues. Any errors are the exclusive responsibility of the authors of this report.

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