HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Kyiv
2012

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INTRODUCTION

How does the post-Sovietness manifest itself in politics and public life, and how to minimize its most harmful displays for the development of a European state — these are two key questions that the IWP tried to answer in the course of the project «How to get rid of post-Sovietness?» with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of the German Marshall Fund.

Thanks to project partners from Moldova and Georgia, the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives «Viitorul» and the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, respectively — the IWP had the opportunity to consider the issue of post-Sovietness in a broader context. These three countries were selected for the study not only because all of them were part of the Soviet Union in the past, but also due to the officially declared intentions of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to become full members of the European Union in the future. Because in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia only regime changes predominantly took place unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the fall of communism was accompanied by mental changes and correction of behaviour patterns.

This study was inspired by the transformational changes that have taken place in recent years in the three countries of the region. In particular, in Ukraine, it concerns the coming into power of a team, which predominantly represents the sector which has kept Soviet traditions the best. In Georgia, personalities, who were shaped after the Soviet Union collapse, initiated radical reforms. In Moldova, meanwhile, the ruling «Alliance for European Integration», in a short period of time, has changed the perception of Moldova from the last bastion of communism in Europe to the recognized leader of the «Eastern Partnership» of the EU. In the meantime, post-Soviet attitudes, behaviours and discursive practices are still very common in all three countries and hinder their Europeanization.

The post-Sovietness in this study was defined as a kind of socio-political mutation, when old Soviet values, practices and standards get modified, combined, mixed and interlinked with Western counterparts, generating a

pretty new eclectic context. It is no longer Soviet, but to call it Western European is impossible as well. It is post-Soviet.

Sometimes post-Sovietness is pretty close to Sovietness. Sometimes it is quite new socio-political reality in which the market has a significant influence. In general, this is quite an abnormal status quo, which has to be overcomed.

The post-Sovietness is considered, in this project, as a transit period between Sovietness and Europeanness. Although it is possible that the post-Soviet conditions may appear to be much longer than it was expected after the collapse of the USSR. One of the proofs of this is the restoration of Soviet values and attitudes among young people, who were brought up or even born in already independent countries and not Soviet republics.

When talking about European values, norms and practices during the project we had the respect for individuality in mind, high levels of social trust, social solidarity, limiting status privileges of politicians, civil control over the government, moral and/or legal sanctions for public untruths; information and knowledge exchange for the common good; rejection of plagiarism; preventative benevolence; the rule of law; social, cultural, political tolerance; high social mobility based on meritocracy; the balance of horizontal and vertical communication in organizations; rejection of any kind of corruption and the misperception of propaganda in peaceful times.

The study «How to get rid of post-Sovietness?» consists of two interrelated parts «Politics» and «Society». It is based on analyses of the post-Sovietness attributes or manifestations that were identified during brainstormings involving both expert groups from the three countries and invited political scientists, sociologists and researchers of the Homo Soveticus phenomenon. The European experts, who have venerable experience of developing methodology in the framework of international projects aimed at the evaluation of the transformation processes in political management and society, were involved in the development of this research methodology. Also in the framework of the project a relevant discussion took place in the format of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, the president of the Russian Levada Center - the most recognized research institution on the phenomenon of the Soviet and post-Soviet man.[1]

These attributes were grouped as follows: attitudes, behaviour patterns and discursive practices. They were analyzed using various methods and

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[1] Lev Gudkov: 20 years after USSR's collapse the soviet man attitudes re-appear among young generations, <http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html>.

ways of collecting information: opinion polls, interviews with experts, case studies, discourses and content analysis.

Some of these groups, for example, attitudes are more applicable to Sovietness as such, due to the fact that attitudes take much longer to change than behaviour and discursive practices. As for behavioural patterns, the majority of the attributes in this group are related to the weaknesses of institutions and the situation where these institutions are substituted by personal informal ties. The analysis of discursive practices was based on politicians' statements, public debates and materials published by them etc.

In each of these groups the attributes present in the three countries were more or less defined. The overall structure, which expert groups followed during the preparation of the study in three countries, was as follows:

POLITICS

ATTITUDES

1. Total control as necessity. In post-Soviet countries the practice in which all decision makers, as well as law enforcement officers are constantly trying to set total control and punish severely even for minor

infractions has evolved. This is due, not least, to the expectations of the majority of society that believes that there must be severe punishment and permanent control. But in the post-Soviet reality, unlike the Soviet, the systems of control and punishment are ineffective, burlesque and utterly corrupt, which only devalues the post-Soviet state itself.

2. Hierarchy absolutization. It is especially inherent in the post-Soviet policy when people's merits are not determined by the level of their education, knowledge, experience and expertise, but by their standing in the hierarchy. Once a person appears in a governing position, they do not perceive others as equal and do not listen to the people that are at least slightly lower in the hierarchy.

3. Intolerance. The post-Soviet politicians can openly resort to inciting hatred rhetoric and discriminatory statements in their speeches. There are no penalties, neither moral, electoral nor legal, for intolerance.

BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS

1. The dominance of nepotism, cronyism, favoritism. Links with criminals on the one hand, and law enforcement agencies on the other hand, telephone law, cronyism and nepotism are the basic tools of lobbying and making

decisions profitable for the representatives of authorities and individuals close to them. The laws thus have only a decorative value. Personal contacts completely or partially replace formal rules.

2. Business on state functions (power as a business project). The system of the state providing services to citizens is not aimed at the service, but in the making of money using them. The quality of post-Soviet services are usually very low, and regulatory approaches are deliberately confused, creating fertile ground for corruption.

3. Prevention and elimination of uncontrolled competition. Political leaders usually choose people for their teams who cannot compete with them and challenge them. There are no prerequisites and conditions for a true meritocracy. Political opponents can be withdrawn from political life or even thrown in jail with the help of selective justice.

4. The dominance of personalization over the institutionalization. A leader, political persona, in a post-Soviet system is much more important than any institution. The latter can easily be modified or tailored to the interests of every politician.

5. No sanctions for public lies; plagiarism. A characteristic feature of the post-Soviet politician is that they can always publicly tell lies and not bear any responsibility for it. Unlike, say, in European countries, moral and formal sanctions for public deception in politics are largely absent. A revealed untruth may also not affect the electoral support of a politician.

Many post-Soviet politicians actively engage in various forms of plagiarism, again without any penalties.

6. Status privileges of politicians. Typical post-Soviet politicians try to get the maximum personal benefit from their positions and state resources, access to which is guaranteed by their position. Post-Soviet politicians desperately need ostentatious luxury and the worship of subordinates for self-affirmation. There are special country cottage towns, surrounded by high fences, special doctors and health resorts. Double security barriers are installed in front of buildings, where events involving dignitaries are held. The streets on the route of president or prime-ministers cortege get closed in advance. They without any worry allow themselves and, society allows them to ride the most expensive cars, use the VIP lounges of airports and enjoy the best service, unaffordable to most citizens.

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DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

1. Paternalism. The post-Soviet politicians like to position themselves as the masters (owners) of the country, promising to solve all issues, although in practice they rarely even solve simple problems. Most of them do not intend to establish a real partnership between government and civil society. In their opinion, the state must control and dictate its rules alone.

2. Propaganda as the basis of political rhetoric. Even the most powerful politicians, not just marginal and radical, use propaganda techniques in their daily political rhetoric. Propaganda is not seen as something extraordinary, peculiar in a country which, for example, is at war. In post-Soviet politics the verge between propaganda — incomplete or distorted information about the results of the government offices work — and political arguments is extremely subtle. The complete devaluation of words takes place in post-Soviet political reality. The primary meaning of what was said gets washed out. Words that are uttered by politicians do not have much value. The post-Soviet politicians often like to appeal to democracy, human rights, fair justice and values, without being fully aware of what they are saying.

3. Rejection of ideologies. The decline of ideologies is a worldwide trend, but in post-Soviet political culture ideologies are discredited and devalued far more and for another reason: people got oversaturated with ideology in Soviet times and today they want freedom from any political ideology and politics in general. They are more likely to support economic pragmatism or professionalism rather than any right or left ideology. And even if political parties position themselves as ideological projects, in reality they do not stick to serious ideological attitudes.

4. Critical need for enemies — internal and external. Post-Soviet politicians tend to deliberately create images of enemies — internal and external, to shift the responsibility of their own narrow-mindedness, mistakes, failures, ignorance, inability to carry out reforms and the lack of success stories onto them.

Obviously, some of the mentioned attributes are also inherent to politicians and societies in Western countries in general. The main difference lies in the degree of use of such attributes and the attitude to voters and society. Because it is clear: politicians behave the way their constituents allow them to.

SOCIETY

ATTITUDES

1. Paternalism. Post-Soviet people usually consider the state as a sacred almighty authority, which should offer solutions to all problems. The deification of the state often leads to the opposite effect: rejection of it and an attempt to circumvent all its requirements.

2. Conformism as a dominant life strategy. Post-Soviet people, when making decisions and producing plans, often resort to attitudes «What people will say?» or «I want to be like everyone else». Such a strategy in life hardly compatible with an individual choice and thinking. The egalitarian mentality, developed during the Soviet period and multiplied by the inertia of pseudo-patriarchy, is evident.

3. Belated adoption of innovations and fear of reforms. Even the younger generation accepts innovations with caution. Post-Soviet people do not often understand the meaning of reforms, do not accept them and do not like changes. They are convinced that the status quo is always better than changes, even if as a result of these changes their standard of living will be improved. Fear of reforms in the Soviet era was cultivated by collectivization and industrialization.

4. Intolerance. Despite the Soviet concept of internationalism, post-Soviet people are not always willing to understand and consciously tolerate something with a cultural, social, religious or sexual difference. Especially, if it differs from their identity and requires efforts to understand.

5. Denial of individuality. Individuality is not a value for the Soviet people. They can be rude to each other, belittle others, because the individuality and personality of another person does not significantly matter to them. Frequently, the phenomenon that they do not even appreciate the value of their own personality can be observed.

6. Social alienation. Post-Soviet people feel alienation even from their closest social and infrastructural environment. They can throw out the garbage out right where they live, spoil the walls of their apartment block elevator, feel only minimal responsibility for their environment and the level of interpersonal trust is extremely low.

7. Devaluation of talents, knowledge and success. The vast majority of Post-Soviet people do not know how to

appreciate the talents, knowledge and skills of others. They do not support them for the sake of a better future for all. They have nothing to be proud of. Accordingly, they wish the worst for others. It is a kind of compensatory mechanism for those condemned to hopeless life.

BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS

1. Trade of values. In a post-Soviet society, the values which *a priori* cannot be a subject of trade, are being sold and purchased. Ph.D. thesis, diplomas, researches and positions has become a subject of corruption and trade in the post-Soviet society.

2. Dominance of short-term over the long-term. Due to constant political and economic turmoils and uncertainty in the country and its own future, post-Soviet people have developed a habit to only plan everything in the short term and they fear having long term plans or to invest in the future by different means. They do not believe in future prospects.

3. Preventive unfriendliness. Post-Soviet people got used to being unfriendly and rude in everyday life. It is particularly acute in services and phone communication. They are not used to smiling at each other. A rough manner and aggression act as a protective shield. This is partly due to the

dissatisfaction with life as well as the uncertainty in anything and anybody.

4. Preservation of Soviet symbols in the infrastructure. Post-Soviet people do not feel the need to get rid of the tragic symbols of the past. For example many of them do not mind the demolition of the statues of Lenin and other communist figures. Even of those who are directly to blame for massive repressions and despite the fact that people are aware of these crimes. Many streets are still named after communist leaders.

5. Irrational consumption. Excessive individual consumption by post-Soviet people compensates for the historical experience of a deficit economy. The emphasis on individual economic success is needed to stand out in society, which has not defined its attitudes to traditional norms and status privileges. The idea of «a status item» is especially common among post-Soviet people, who are willing to save money on everyday things to acquire status items like a mink coat or an expensive car, which are often not cheap.

In the course of the project, it was also taken into account that certain elements of post-Sovietness are closely related to signs of a post-totalitarian society in general, or, for example, some Orthodox traditions.

This study did not intend to prove that post-Sovietness is an entirely negative phenomenon. Instead, we focused on the negative aspects, since the primary objective of the study is to identify and recommend how to get rid of post-Sovietness on the path towards the European integration of Ukraine.

The IWP believes that this study is extremely important to the conditions of the transformation processes which are nowadays taking place in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. We also hope that this study will be useful for both the representatives of the political elite and the ordinary citizens to identify and then overcome the watershed between the post-Soviet and European practices and behavioural patterns. Accordingly, it will foster the Europeanization of three countries and the European integration process of Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi.

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UKRAINE

POST-SOVIETNESS IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS

Attributes of post-Sovietness are present in Ukrainian politics both at the level of mental attitudes, and at the level of the elites' behavioural patterns. Equally, they are characteristic for public discourse as well.

It should be noted that in the early 1990's, the traditional Soviet Union process of political elite formation was interrupted in Ukraine. At this point, the political establishment at national and regional levels was formed mainly by several groups — the former Communist Party of Ukraine (CPSU) activists, Komsomol activists, bureaucratic personnel, «red directorate», security officers, dissidents, «tsehoviks» (entrepreneurs who worked illegally in Soviet time) and semi-criminals.

In the 2000's, the situation changed. «Red directors» virtually disappeared from the scene. Not as many security officers and dissidents came to power. Most of the ex-members of the Komsomol and party activists preferred business ventures instead of working in the authorities, only to return to power later (eg Serhiy Tihipko, Oleksandr Zinchenko, Oleksandr Turchynov, Mykola Martynenko and many others). There were almost no representatives of the bureaucratic personnel, inherited by Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only a cultivated strict hierarchy and bureaucracy reached us during twenty-one years of independence. But representatives of regional and financial-industrial clans came to the forefront.

The Ukrainian elite mostly consists of people who, in the early 1990's, were able either to legalize shadow capital, or to convert the power and connections into a capital, or take part in laundering so-called grey or black money[2]. Today, the oligarchy, which actually became a source of power at national and regional levels, had a great influence in forming the political establishment.

The Ukrainian establishment, which grew out from the Soviet era, is currently stuck in the transitional stage of its development. It already

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[2] Horbulin V., Lytvynenko O., «National Security: Ukrainian dimension», Kyiv, Intertechnologiya, 2008, p. 38. http://www.dsaua.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83:2010-10-25-06-34-15&catid=38:2010-09-14-11-22-47&Itemid=71&lang=uk

differs from the Soviet nomenclature, the party and state bureaucracy, there is less professionalism and more cynicism since the establishment protects personal interests.

But it also differs fundamentally from the European political elite due to the absence of real Ukrainian statehood within seventy years. The existence of the Ukrainian SSR led to the fact that, in early 1990's, there was no nation oriented elite, which would clearly be aware of goals and tasks Ukraine was facing or had a comprehensive idea of how to solve existing problems and carry out reforms.

The Ukrainian establishment also differs from the European Union and the United States in its lack of firm mechanisms for reproducing elite through competition and unhindered career development. This reproduction process in Ukraine is virtually out of societies control; largely, the career of the establishment's representatives is determined by personal loyalty while professional education and work experience are sporadically in demand.

Thus, it is no coincidence that there is any «counter-elite» system, despite the fact that opposing clans generate some semblance of political struggle that is actually waged for power, which will eventually allow taking control of financial resources. Therefore, even the Orange Revolution did not lead to a significant and substantial renewal of the establishment.

The average age of the Ukrainian political elite today is over 50. Although it is still possible to meet young faces in the parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is steadily aging. According to the Ukraine's National Agency on Civil Service, when the average age of Yulia Tymoshenko's government, in 2005, it was 45 years; in the Cabinet of Ministers of Mykola Azarov, it is 53 years.[3] Thus, in their vast majority, the current political elite of Ukraine existed under decomposing socialism for most of their adult life.

Moreover, the world-view and value system of the vast majority of modern Ukrainian politicians was formed under the USSR education system that was known as «the forge of socialist personnel.» Such Soviet educational background only strengthens post-Soviet attitudes of political leaders in Ukraine, narrowing their horizons and limiting their willingness to accept and implement reforms to a European standard. In comparison, the situation in Georgia was quite different, when most of the ministers of the government which carried out reforms, resonance for post-Soviet territories, received a western education.

[3] «Эликсир Топ-молодости»-Top theme — «Expert» #8(294) March 07, 2011.

Recently, Ukraine's southwestern neighbor, Moldova confidently caught up to Georgia concerning the quality of governmental personnel recruitment (table 1).

Table 1[4]

Ukraine	Georgia	Moldova
Viktor Yanukovych, *President of Ukraine* 1) Donetsk Polytechnic Institute Mechanical Engineer 2) Ukrainian Academy of Foreign Trade	**Mikheil Saakashvili,** *President of Georgia* 1) Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv 2) Columbia University 3) The George Washington University 4) Strasbourg University 5) Academy of European Law, Florence 6) Hague Academy of International Law	**Nicolae Timofti,** *President of Moldova* State University of Moldova, Law Faculty
Mykola Azarov, *Prime Minister of Ukraine* Lomonosov Moscow State University	**Vano Merabishvili,** *Prime Minister of Georgia* Georgian Technical University, Faculty of Mining	**Vladimir Filat,** *Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova* 1) Cooperative College of the Republic of Moldova 2) University of Alexandru Ioan Cuza in Iași — Law Department

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4   The table was composed in September 2012, before the composition of a new government in Georgia based on results of parliamentary elections in October 2012

Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy, *First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine* Taras Shevchenko Kyiv State University, Law Department	**Giorgi Baramidze,** *Vice Prime Minister, Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration* 1) Department of Chemical Technologies of the Georgian Technical University 2) George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies and Defense Economics, Germany	**Eugene Karpov,** *Deputy Prime Minister* 1) National School of Political and Administrative Studies (Bucharest)-Public Administration Department 2) State University of Moldova, Law Faculty
		Mihai Moldovanu, *Deputy Prime Minister* 1) Medical College Orhei 2) State Medical and Pharmaceutical University of Nicolae Testimitanu 3) School of Public Health Management

Raisa Bohatyriova, *Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Health* 1) Kharkiv Medical Institute 2) Law Faculty at Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University	**Zurab Tchiaberashvili,** *Minister of Health, Labour and Social Affairs* 1) Faculty of Philosophy, Tbilisi State University 2) Institute of Philosophy, Georgian National Academy of Sciences	**Andrei Usatîi,** *Minister of Health* 1) State University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Nicolae Testimitanu 2) Central Institute of Advanced Science for physicians, Moscow 3) York University 4) Michigan State Univeristy

Sergiy Tigipko, *Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Social Policy* Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute		**Valentina Buliga,** *Minister of Labour, Social Protection and Family* 1) State University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Nicolae Testimitanu 2) Academy of Public Administration of the President of the Republic of Moldova
Borys Kolesnikov *Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Infrastructure* 1) Donetsk Technical secondary school of trade 2) Donetsk State University of Management	**Ramaz Nikolaishvili,** *Minister for Regional Development and Infrastructure* 1) Georgian Technical Institute 2) Tbilisi State University 3) Tbilisi State University	**Anatol Salaru,** *Minister of Transport and Road Infrastructure* State Medical University
Petro Poroshenko, *Minister of Economic Development and Trade* Department of International Relations and International Law of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv	**Vera Kobalia,** *Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development* 1) King George Secondary School, Canada 2) British Columbia Institute of Technology (business Administration and Informational Technologies)	**Valeriu Lazăr,** *Minister of Economy* 1) State Agrarian University of Moldova, Department of Mechanization and Authomatization 2) European Institute of Public Administration (Bruges) 3) International Institute of Public Administration (Paris)

Yuriy Kolobov, *Minister of Finance*	**Dimitri Gvindadze,** *Minister of Finance*	**Veaceslav Negruta,** *Minister of Finance*
1) Dnieper State Academy of Construction and Architecture 2) V. Karazin Kharkiv State University 3) Kyiv Higher School of Finance, 4) International Business Institute	1) Tbilisi State Technical University 2) Diplomatic Academy of Paris 3) Hague International Institute of Social Studies 4) John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University 5) International Monetary Fund Institute	1) Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova 2) Joint Vienna Institute
Mykhailo Kulynyak, *Minister of Culture*	**Nika Rurua,** *Minister of Culture and Monument Protection*	**Boris Focşa,** *Minister of Culture*
1) Tchaikovsky National Academy of Music (Kyiv Conservatory) 2) International Scientific and Technical University 3) National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine	1) Faculty of TV Directing at Tbilisi State Shota Rustaveli Institute of Theatre and Film 2) Georgia State University College of Law (USA)	1) State University of Arts, Theatre Department, drama Theatre Director 2) Apprenticeship in the USA in Artistic Management 3) Academy of Public Administration of the Government of the Republic of Moldova

Dmytro Tabachnyk, *Minister of Education, Youth and Sports* History Department at Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University	**Khatia Dekanoidze,** *Minister of Education and Science* Tbilisi State University, Faculty of International Relations	**Maia Sandu,** *Minister of Education* 1) Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova 2) Academy of Public Administration of the President of the Republic of Moldova 3) The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Vitaliy Zakharchenko, *Minister of the Interior* 1) Riga Special Secondary School of Militia of Interior of the USSR 2) Riga branch of the Minsk Higher School of Interior of the USSR 3) National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine 4) Poltava Economy and Trade University	**Bachana Akhalaia,** *Minister of Internal Affairs* Tbilisi State University, Law Faculty	**Dorin Recean,** *Minister of Internal Affairs* 1) Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, International Business Management 2) Newport University Belgium branch

Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, *Minister for Foreign Affairs* Moscow State Institute of International Relations	Grigol Vashadze, *Minister of Foreign Affairs* 1) Moscow State Institute of International Relations 2) Diplomatic Academy (Tbilisi)	Iurie Leancă, *Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration* State Institute of International Relations of Moscow
Oleksandr Lavrinovich, *Minister of Justice* 1) Physics Department of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University 2) Yaroslav Mudry National Law Academy of Ukraine	Zurab Adeishvili, *Minister of Justice* 1) Faculty of Law, Tbilisi State University 2) Institute of State and Law 3) Law Faculty at University of Groningen	Oleg Efrim, *Minister of Justice* State University of Moldova, Law Faculty
Yuriy Boyko, *Minister of Energy and Coal Industry* Mendeleyev Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology	Alexander Khetaguri, *Minister of Energy* 1) Faculty of Energy (Master of Energy Management) 2) Courses on Regulation of Communal Facilities and Strategies within the framework of the World Bank program (Florida) 3) Tbilisi Business and Marketing Institute (Master of Accounting and Audit)	

Dmytro Salamatin, *Minister of Defence*	Dimitri Shashkin, *Minister of Defence*	Vitalie Marinuța, *Minister of Defence*
Mining Faculty of Karaganda Polytechnic Institute	1) Faculty of International Law at Aristotel Greek-Georgian University 2) Law Faculty at Tbilisi State University	1) Military School of Air-Borne of the city of Riazani; Military Translator (French language) 2) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth) 3) Naval Post-Graduate School of the city of Monterey, California) 4) Department of International Relations at the University of European political and economic studies
Serhiy Arbuzov, *Governor of the National Bank*	Giorgi Kadagidze, *Governor of the National Bank*	Dorin Dragutanu, *Governor of the National Bank*
Donetsk State University	1) European School of Management (Business Administration) 2) Preston University 3) Georgian Institute of Public Affairs	University of Alexandru Ioan Cuza in Iași – Finance and Bank Administration Department

A notable feature of the Ukrainian political establishment is also its conventional division into several groups. Despite the overall similarity of positions, these groups have a number of distinct characteristics, especially in behavioural patterns. American researcher Paul D'Anieri, who has been working in Ukraine for a long time, distinguishes two groups of Ukrainian politicians in this context: «Donetsk» and «Dnipropetrovsk»

Table 2

Donetsk	Dnipropetrovsk
• post-Soviet identity, which incorporates particular respect for Soviet past and commitment to the practices of the 1990's	• effective use of populism and political technologies
• understated assessment of public policy and soft power methods and values	• the ability to manipulate groups of different ethnic and cultural identities
• pragmatism, a tendency to reach agreements only with those who are «friends»	• tendency to ideological mimicry
• inability to achieve political goals using political methods	

ones (today, the specific emphasis is on the Donetsk group, because it is in power). Of course, Ukraine's political spectrum has wider regional representation, but such division is primarily determined by world-view and behavioural models (table 2).[5]

In general, it should be noted, that Soviet attitudes prevail among representatives of the «Donetsk» wing, while the «Dnipropetrovsk» wing is the embodiment of post-Sovietness. Representatives of the «Dnipropetrovsk» elites adapted faster to new realities after the collapse of the USSR, while eastern regions of Ukraine more or less continue to remain a basin of

Sovietness. And when the «Donetsk» ones tend to use hard power, blackmail and pressure, «Dnipropetrovsk group» prefers more sophisticated political techniques and manipulative methods. Representatives of the «Donetsk» group follow a definite position in their political career and do not go beyond the ideological boundaries defined by the party leadership. The «Dnipropetrovsk group» feels comfortable in any coordinates of an ideological system, depending on circumstances, and does not scorn ideological mimicry.

Unfortunately, the post-Sovietness, which was envisaged as a temporary state dragged on for many years and became a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian establishment. Post-Sovietness is an unnatural symbiosis of verbally declared commitment to

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[5]   Table based on Paul D'Anieri, ed., Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

democratic institutions and exercised undemocratic practices.[6]

This state of society is also explained by the fact that the post-Soviet political system is not able to regenerate itself. Post-Soviet institutions tend to self-reproduce, as they stimulate people to make every effort in order to get any benefit within the framework of existent system, not to change it, or break it. In Ukraine, we see young politicians who do not remember the Soviet Union but easily adopt Soviet behavioural patterns and adapt to the current situation.[7]

Thus, today, the Ukrainian establishment continues to live in its own world of impunity, irresponsibility, limited perception of the outside world and primitive in solving the internal problems of the country; in a world, where personal, corporate and regional interests prevail over national ones within governing structures.

Let's examine the post-Sovietness attributes inherent in the modern Ukrainian political establishment in more detail, focusing on features of

their formation, and possible options for their further modifications.

ATTITUDES

At the level of attitudes, post-Sovietness often attains characteristics of a classic Soviet system. This is logical, since attitudes* change much slower than behavioural patterns or discursive practices.

One of the most important attitudes functions for public consciousness is to function as a barrier. Deeprooted in the consciousness of society, the attitude simply weeds out any information that could contradict it. Thus, the Soviet way of the thinking of the political elite is often unable to accept alternative standards and principles.

Commitment to European values, loudly declared by many politicians in Ukraine is rather a tribute to modern trends than genuine conviction. Such a combination of deep Sovietness with European aplomb results in specific controversy and ambivalence natural for the attitudes of post-Soviet politicians.

In this study, we focused on the most common attributes of post-

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[6] Interview of the IWP conducted in the partnership with leading research fellow of the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Galyna Zelenko.

[7] Interview of the IWP with Paul d'Anieri

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* It should be noted that we use the term «attitude» in this context to designate internal, often even subconscious, person's tendency to react to certain situation changes in the way they are used to.

Sovietness, summarizing them according to the following categories: *need for total control; absolutization of power hierarchy and intolerance.*

Total control as necessity. According to the precepts of Vladimir Lenin, socialism is primarily accounting and control. After adding supervision of control, inspection of supervision and observation of inspection to this Soviet recipe we receive a widespread post-Soviet attitude. The post-Soviet politician seeks to control everything and always reacts, extremely painfully, to any delegation of authority.

Turbulent 1990's, years of shaping the Ukrainian political establishment, significantly contributed to the strengthening of this attitude. Ability to control everything that happens in your patrimony sometimes saved lives, but the loss of vigilance, in turn, often led to irreversible consequences. Total distrust in the surroundings, natural for Soviet leaders, is also a feature of their post-Soviet successors. The most striking example is the current President Viktor Yanukovych. For instance, at the Congress of the Party of Regions on July 30th, 2012, Viktor Yanukovych was guarded from loyal party members by more than a dozen bodyguards[8].

However, such fears, which could be attributed not only to the President Yanukovych, are caused also by the prior experience of interacting with the criminal world that almost every major political player in Ukraine has somehow faced them.[9]

In such system of coordinates, the desire to retain power is a natural impulse, dictated by the instinct of self-preservation.[10] The formula for success in this case is very simple, if one wants to hold then the one has to be able to control. It is clearly illustrated by the assertion of the second president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. In an interview before the publication of his memoirs «After Maidan», he said «Anyone, who knows the secret of Ukrainian politics, will never say that during my term the country was ruled by «oligarchic» capital. I ruled them

[8] Yanukovych had 15 bodyguards at the Congress of the Party of Regions // Press Agency: http://ipress.ua/news/na_zizdi_partii_regioniv_yanukovycha_stereglo_15_ohorontsiv_5400.html

[9] Interview of the IWP with Deputy director of programs for Russia and Eurasia at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, Matthew Rojansky

[10] Script of the video conference with Lev Gudkov, Director of Levada Center (Russia) //The Institute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

all «with a rod of iron.» I would rather agree with those who called my regime authoritarian.»[11]

Traditional Soviet methods often help to hold everyone with an «iron fist.» For example, as recognized in many departments, the Ukrainian administrative system inherited the Soviet principle where there are representatives of intelligence agencies among the top managers of each ministry. They regularly «report» to the top leadership of the country in cases of dissent or signs of disobedience in the hierarchy of power.

It should be underscored that intelligence services continue to play a particular role in the post-Soviet political systems. They are rather a tool to protect interests (including business ones) of senior officials, not law, as it is accepted in democratic countries. The vivid example is especially common phenomenon in Ukraine is «raiding» (ie takeover of companies with help of intelligence services staff on the basis of contradictory and not always legal court decisions).

In order to establish control, post-Soviet leaders often appoint particularly trusted people, mostly relatives, to key positions. This way is more reliable and safer. For example, in the appointment of Dmytro Salamatin

as Minister of Defence many experts did not see a selection of professional qualities, but rather a selection of people on the parameters of personal commitment and the willingness to fulfil any order from the President. Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Oleksandr Klymenko, the Head of the State Tax Service, are connected by a long term trusting relationship with Oleksandr Yanukovych, the eldest son of the President.[12]

The absurdity of the post-Soviet system is that such a comprehensive control practically does not involve the responsibility for decisions taken by executives. In a conversation with an expert of the Institute of World Policy, the Ukrainian official who worked within state structures for more than fifteen years stated «our post-Sovietness is primarily manifested in the fact that everyone manages and controls everyone, but no one is responsible for anything.» A former head of a Ukrainian representative office of a foreign fund, who has lived in Ukraine for a long period of time, also agrees with this. According to him, most western diplomats have the impression that people go into politics in Ukraine not to make decisions. The people in government obviously have completely different motivation, and decisions are only made

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[11] Leonid Kuchma: I ruled them all «with a rod of iron» – Rossiyskaya Gazeta №4349, 24.04.2007// http://www.rg.ru/2007/04/24/kuchma.html

[12] «The total strenghening of the family», Glavcom.ua, November 7, 2011.

when there is absolutely no chance to avoid it.[13] Moreover, the characteristic feature of post-Soviet members of the administrative staff, both in politics and in any other field, is a tendency to shift the responsibility onto the shoulders of executive officers and severely punish subordinates for the slightest mistake.

The former Latvian President, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, also discussed the sense of responsibility of post-Soviet politicians in the course of the videoconference with the Institute of World Policy «the main difference between the post-Soviet and Western politicians are their attitude to work, to the position, to the authority, which is caused by the position's duties and sense of responsibility to the people and to history.»[14]

Even the high level of legislative regulation is unable to overcome the atmosphere of permissiveness and impunity that prevails in Ukrainian politics. Commenting on the Ukrainian experience of reforms, an ideologist of Georgian reforms Kakha Bendukidze stated that it is excessive over-regulation that promotes corruption.

«Even Laozi said: «More laws — more bandits»[15]. As a result, total control actually turns into complete lack of control and chaos. This, in turn, stimulates certain electoral expectations and nostalgia for the Soviet «order,» cosy for an ordinary citizen.

The ghost of the «strong» (but always fair) hand still roams across the post-Soviet space. For example, according to the results of sociological monitoring «Ukrainian society,» the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement «Few strong leaders will be able to restore order in the country faster than making new laws and debates» increased from 52.3% in 1992 to 63.5% in 2010.[16] And the «European Values Study» survey, conducted in 2008, contained quite frightening figures about 66.8% of interviewed Ukrainians tend to perceive a strong leader in power, who is not burdened by legislative offices and elections, positively, and only 33.2% believe such phenomenon in politics to be negative.[17] Interestingly, in the same survey, 72% of respondents say that the best form of government for

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[13] Interview with a former head of representative office of an international fund in Ukraine.

[14] Vaira Vike-Freiberga. Female politicians need assistance. – The script of a video conference at the Institute of World Policy.

[15] Georgian kitchen. — «Forbes Ukraine», №6(16) June 2012.

[16] Ukrainian society 1992-2010. Social monitoring. // Institute of Sociology – Kyiv, 2011

[17] European values Study Survey,Ukraine — http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/

Ukraine is democracy.[18] This, in fact, most clearly demonstrates the duality of consciousness of a post-Soviet person.

Hierarchy absolutization. Ukrainian politicians, unlike their Western counterparts, are characterized by their anxious attitude to their official portfolios and chairs. The lucky ones, who step up in the hierarchy, almost instill their subordinates with awe, and at the same time completely lose all their importance and vanity in the offices of their own bosses. Modern Ukrainian political management is inherent in increased, sometimes deliberately underlined, respect of subordination. The experts, familiar with the internal Ukrainian political realities, off the record recall many examples when senior officials who just a couple of seconds ago reprimanded their subordinates, disregarding expressions, then cowardly and obediently were squeezed for hours in the waiting rooms of senior management.

A well-known European diplomat, who faced Ukrainian political realities, indicates that the hierarchy itself is not a problem. According to him, hierarchical management structures are quite common in the West too. The destructive role of the hierarchy in the post-Soviet context is that it is not based on competence and professionalism. In Ukraine, very often, competent people remain in the lower positions, while they are managed by very narrow-minded individuals. In Western political systems, such situation occurs rarely.[19]

Prerequisites for keeping this trend are serious. According to the «European Values Study» survey, 37,2% Ukrainian will follow the instructions of a senior management, even if they disagree with them.[20] This trend is also traced in the political sphere.

While observing the Ukrainian multi-party system, the famous dictum of the former Ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, comes to mind «whatever party we try to create we end up with the CPSU!» Faith in the wisdom of party leaders sometimes takes grotesque forms. For example, the member of the Party of Regions, Elbrus Tedeyev, in his interview with the information-analytical agency «Glavkom» stated «for me, Victor Yanukovych, literally and figuratively, is the God and the tzar. He is Ukraine's only hope, who can get us out of the economic disaster

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18   European values Study Survey, Ukraine — http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/

19   Interview of the IWP with a diplomatic representative

20   European values Study Survey, Ukraine http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/

and political chaos that was here all this time …»[21]

However, not all party members call Viktor Yanukovych the tzar. Most often the word «leader» is used regarding him. In such a form of address, political analyst, Dmytro Vydrin sees a «softening» of the political sphere, giving politicians some nicknames that is, probably, a worldwide practice, not only related to post-Sovietness.[22] Ukrainian political analyst Viktor Nebozhenko disagrees with him and considers such nicknames to be specific post-Soviet legacy. According to him, the nickname «leader» contains rather skeptical attitude. «Today, «leader» has ironic connotation. «Leader» is rather the one who cannot cope with his duties,» — the expert says. A different situation was observed under the second President of an independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, whose most popular nicknames were «Dad» or «Daddy.» The nickname «Daddy» means recognition of leadership, inherent, primarily, in mafia structures», — the analyst explains, adding that such an expression of mafia «affinity» satisfied

both businessmen and government representatives.[23]

The fact that ordinary party members are hardly involved in the development, adoption and implementation of any decisions also underline the distance between the party leaders and the latters. The most striking example is the unanimous voting in the parliament by entire factions according to the instructions of the faction leader, the party conductor. Such a practice is especially well adopted in the Party of Regions, whose representatives vote with the wave of a hand by Mikhail Chechetov. No convocation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine goes without the procedure of voting by cards for absent MPs, which was nicknamed by the people as «playing the piano.»

Duality is a distinctive feature of the post-Soviet hierarchy absolutization in politics. Besides the formal hierarchical structure, there is a «shadow» hierarchy, consisting of the leaders of large financial-industrial groups involved in the political process. Usually, they do not occupy high positions in executive authorities in order to avoid excessive publicity. These include Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, Oleksandr Yanukovych etc.

In summary, hierarchy remains to be a regular form of building political

[21] Elbrus Tedeyev: Viktor Yanukovych is the Tsar and God for me// Glavcom News Agency http://glavcom.ua/articles/2013.html

[22] Interview of the IWP with Dmytro Vydrin

[23] Interview of the IWP with Viktor Nebozhenko

relationships in Ukrainian post-Soviet politics. Hierarchical structures appeal to the post-Soviet man (and not just a politician) by its simplicity. Hierarchy for the average Ukrainian primarily represents stability and the usual order of things; hierarchy is a condition when you know to whom you have to refer, how much and to whom you must pay to ensure the solution to a problem. That's why, Ukrainians, unlike, for example, Americans, are more sluggish in terms of career growth. They are much more comfortable to stay in a usual place.[24] Indeed, a close intertwining of the political and financial components is a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian state and party hierarchy. This is a prerequisite for the emergence of complex structures, within which peculiarities of subordination are clear to a narrow range of political process actors. It seriously undermines the principle of the transparency between political actors, which is inherent in European systems and negatively affects the process of making political decisions and effectiveness of their implementation.

Intolerance. Many post-Soviet politicians in Ukraine are alien to the principles of tolerance. Is this the legacy of the post-Sovietness or a particularity of cultural development? The experience of being in the Soviet system left a significant imprint in the set of values of the political establishment. For a Post-Soviet politician it is difficult to understand the need to adopt behaviours and beliefs that differ from their own.[25]

Now, we observe the situation where political leaders, regardless of ideological beliefs, express intolerance towards political opponents and their constituents, to members of other races and nationalities, as well as representatives of sexual minorities.

Intolerance towards own people is a distinctive feature of Ukrainian post-Sovietness. The phrase uttered by Viktor Yanukovych (at that time a presidential candidate) on October 21st, 2004 at a meeting with voters in Luhansk is a landmark in this context «I believe that there are much stronger and healthier people than these jerks that hinder us to live!» The citizens of Ukraine, who supported another presidential race participant, Viktor Yushchenko, fell in the category of those who «hinder to live».[26] In this context it is relevant to mention the odious Minister of Education, Youth and Sports, Dmytro Tabachnyk, who has repeatedly indulged intolerant

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24 Interview of the IWP with Matthew Rojansky

25 Interview of the IWP with Matthew Rojansky

26 20 of the most iconic statements of Ukrainian politicians / / Comments, 25.08.2011 http://politics.comments.ua/2011/08/25/283190/20-naibolee-znakovih.html

remarks against the Galicians, citizens of Ukraine who live in the western part of Ukraine, mostly in the Lviv region. According to the theory of Dmytro Tabachnyk (by the way, he holds Ph.D. in history) a special psychotype of people was formed in western Ukraine, who are «ready to agree with their owner to his face, who are willing to praise and adore him, and at night with the same composure and thoroughness cut his throat.»[27]

Ukrainian politicians are not always politically correct in their statements concerning other nations. Repeatedly, manifestations of ethnic intolerance were expressed by Oleg Tyahnybok and his political allies of the party «Svoboda» («Freedom»), which represents the extreme right wing of Ukrainian politics.

Another issue is the discrimination against sexual minorities. According to estimates of «Nash svit» organization, representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine are the most aggressive towards homosexual citizens. Other political forces either ignore these issues, using the presence of other major problems as an excuse, or they express willingness to actively promote tolerance, but only if Ukrainian society is inclined to it. However, as confirmed by the opinion polls,

it may not happen soon: homophobic attitudes prevail in the Ukrainian society, and in recent years this trend has only intensified. According to the study, conducted in March 2011 by sociological company «TNS Ukraine,» the question if citizens of Ukraine, who have a homosexual orientation, should have the same rights as other citizens of the country, received positive response only by 36% of respondents (in 2002 — 43%, in 2007 — 34%). The option «No, there must be some limitations» was selected by 49% of respondents (in 2002 — 34%, 2007 — 47%).[28] The leader of the LGBT movement in Ukraine Svyatoslav Sheremet noted that often the ideas of rejecting gays are interlinked with the ideas of the «Ruskiy Mir» («Russian world»), annexation of Crimea to Russia, the entry into the Eurasian Union.[29]

In Ukraine, homophobia is nourished not only by religious beliefs, but also by the Soviet legacy since the mid-1930s, prosecution for homosexuality was introduced in the USSR. In the scientific and educational literature,

[27] The propaganda attack. Ukrainskiy Tygden, № 17, April 30 — May 6, 2010 / / http://www.ukrrudprom.com/digest/ Ataka_agtpropu.html

[28] Step forward and two steps back. Homophobic attitudes in the Ukrainian society // http://maidan.org.ua/2011/12/ krok-vpered-dva-nazad-homofobni-nas-troji-v-ukrajinskomu-suspilstvi/

[29] Statement of Svyatoslav Sheremet, leader of Gay-Forum, Rosbalt Ukraine, http//www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/ 2012/05/28/985979.html`

homosexuality was considered only as a mental illness, abnormality, which «not only opposes normal heterosexual sexual relations, but also the system of society's cultural and moral heritage. Therefore, it is reprehensible both as a social phenomenon and as a mental state and course of conduct of a particular person.»[30] These attitudes of scientific secularism got entrenched in the subconscious of Soviet citizens and also received religious justifications shortly after the collapse of the USSR.

One can expect that the situation will not change soon, even taking into consideration the European integration aspirations of Ukraine. In matters of tolerance, Ukrainian politicians hold double standards while supporting initiatives against discrimination at the international level, the government ignores these problems within the country. Undoubtedly, intolerance exists in Western societies too, but the post-Soviet terrain often lacks effective mechanisms to combat its manifestations. For example, the Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine «Violation of equality of citizens based on their race, nationality or religion» is rarely applied.[31] And new anti-discrimination legislation that is under consideration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is assessed by many lawyers as superficial and ineffective.

BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS

Prevalence of string-pulling, nepotism, cronyism. A distinctive feature of Ukrainian politics has long been nepotism and cronyism. The latter was especially true for the period of Viktor Yushchenko's presidency, which even resulted in the appearance of an expression marking the repulsive specifics of Ukrainian politics: «dear friends».

Among them there were Petro Poroshenko (in 2005, the Secretary of the National Security Council), Mykola Martynenko (the Head of the parliamentary faction «Nasha Ukrayina»), Oleksandr Tretyakov (then the First Assistant, Director of the Cabinet of the President of Ukraine) and others.

They were part of the President's entourage, occupying high state positions. And often their activity gave reason for politicians, experts and journalists to say that «dear friends» were using their positions for selfish ends.[32]

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[30] I.S. Kon «Blue and pink» — http://re-ocities.com/westhollywood/2118/kon.html

[31] Racism and xenophobia in Ukraine: an overview. — http://library.khpg.org/files/docs/1242226191.pdf

[32] Zinchenko also accuses Poroshenko, Tretyakov and Martynenko of corruption. Poroshenko visited his press conference/ Ukrayinska pravda, 5.09.2005, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/09/5/3012997/;

But these phenomena, dangerous for any state, did not make Viktor Yushchenko respond accordingly. This, in particular, was one of the causes of the political crisis in autumn 2005, which eventually led to the resignation of Yulia Tymoshenko's government and the group of «dear friends».

But, since Viktor Yanukovych has come to power, the growing influence of the Head of the state family has become a distinctive feature of Ukrainian political life, in which the eldest son of the president, Oleksandr, plays the first fiddle. In two and half years, he became one of the wealthiest (with capital of 99 million US dollars) most influential men in Ukraine, among those, who surround the Head of the state.[33]

Today, in the Ukrainian political establishment, the leading role is played by representatives of the Donetsk clan, headed by Viktor Yanukovych, and not only in the capital of Ukraine. For example, after the death of the Head of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Vasyl Dzharty, who established a rigid chain of command on the peninsula and supported by representatives of

the Donetsk clan, (to be more specific residents of Makiyevka), Yanukovych appointed for this position the former Interior Minister Anatoly Mogylyov, another representative of Makiyivka. This appointment was perceived as an endeavor to strengthen «Makiyivka» vertical power structure established on the peninsula by Vasyl Dzharty.[34]

That is why a large number of jokes dedicated to the influx of people from the Donetsk region within the government agencies were created by Ukrainians. For example, Yanukovych is asked whether he could govern China. He takes a calculator, does long calculations, and finally says: «No, I cannot, I do not have enough Donetsk people...»[35]

The story of Mykola Korovitsyn, the son of the Ukrainian President's adviser, Hanna Herman, is a vivid example of nepotism in recent years. His mother lobbied him for the position of Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations.[36]

The youngest son of Yanukovych, Victor, at the age of 24, was elected to the Parliament using the quota of his

[33] 100 Ukraine's rich men: debut of Yanukovich's son and Pinchuk's triumph / Bigmir.net, 10.04.2012, http://finance. bigmir.net/news/economics/14296-100-bogachej-Ukrainy--debjut-syna-Janukovicha-i-triumf-Pinchuka

[34] Dear friends of Oleksandr Yanukovych / Sehiy Leshchenko, Ukrayinska Pravda, 07.11.2011, http://www.pravda.com. ua/rus/articles/2011/11/7/6738086/

[35] Political anecdotes: // http://politiko. ua/groups/talk_topic?id=1999

[36] Hanna Herman: last spurt, Serhiy Leshchenko, Ukrayinska Pravda, 27.03.2012, http://www.pravda.com. ua/articles/2012/03/27/6961557/

father. He again appeared in the Party of Regions list for the 2012 parliamentary elections, at the 22nd place that guaranteed him the seat in Verkhovna Rada with the quota of the President. And, a son of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, Oleksiy, received a chance to be a candidate in the last parliamentary election at a 'pass-through' majoritarian, in the electoral district of Slov'yansk, in the Donetsk region; despite the fact that he has never lived there.

In the case of Ukraine, personal contacts completely replace formal rules. Therefore, the «telephone law» is widely used to solve problems. That is even admitted by representatives of the Party of Regions that currently hold power. The former Prosecutor General, Svyatoslav Piskun asserted «unfortunately, we observe a situation today when judges are called and told in whose favor they must make a decision.»[37]

Business on state functions. In contrast to today's Georgia, in Ukraine, the system of providing public services is targeted not at serving citizens but on making money. The quality of

public services is usually very low, and regulatory approaches are especially complicated, which creates favorable ground for corruption. Those, who have used the services of Technical Inventory Bureaus, State Land Cadaster and other government agencies in Ukraine have faced it many times. Often these organizations are interlinked with private companies which are controlled by officials from specialized agencies.[38]

Post-Soviet politicians are known for their special attitude to money and are interested in the possibilities of enrichment and personal gain. One of the reasons for the intertwining of money and politics is that money as a tangible thing is a new phenomenon for post-Soviet countries, and attitude to it was formed in 1990's. For the vast majority of the Ukrainian establishment, money makes it possible to get into power, and power provides access to cash flows.

Politicians demonstrate their belief in that money talks even by imitating democratic institutions. In Ukraine, for example, the phenomenon of «paid-for meetings» is widely spread; people go to protests and meetings as if to the office, and they are paid hourly for this. Particularly

[37] Former Prosecutor General: courts problem is in 'telephone law', Levyi bereh, 31.03.2011, http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/31/90776_bivshiy_genprokuror_problema_v_s.html»>http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/31/90776_bivshiy_genprokuror_problema_v_s.html

[38] «Dzerkalo tyzhnya. Ukraine», №36, 07.10.2011, http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/sergey_timchenko_kazhdyy_den_prostoya__eto_ne_odin,_a_tri_shaga_nazad-89219.html

active citizens, willing to make money, manage to participate in both 'pro-power» and «pro-opposition» protests in one day.

Prevention and elimination of competition in the political environment. Classical political parties have not been formed in the country after twenty-one years of an independent Ukrainian state. There are political projects, with all the necessary attributes of a party, but they are made for certain politicians: the party «Batkivshchyna» (Yulia Tymoshenko), the Party of Regions (Viktor Yanukovych), «Front zmin» (Arseniy Yatsenyuk), «UDAR» (Vitalii Klitschko), «Svoboda» (Oleg Tyahnybok) and others. Accordingly, there is no struggle between political parties but there is an intense confrontation of party leaders.

Strong commitment to the leaders results in the lack of connection of the party with the society; hence there is no possibility to mobilize their supporters. It was demonstrated during the trial of the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko when only a few thousand people gathered in front of the court building. And the announcement of her sentence caused a sluggish response in the country where 11,5 million people voted for Tymoshenko. The case of Tymoshenko is a striking example when the politician was artificially removed from active political life (in this case by using methods of selective justice) to get rid of competition in the next election.

Status privileges of politicians. Similar to post-Soviet politicians in Russia, the Ukrainian establishment of 1990's-2000's seeks to maximize personal gains from their positions and access to public resources. And demonstrative luxury (prestigious foreign cars, expensive real estate, use of VIP-lounges, etc.) and worship from subordinates are essential as means of self-affirmation.

Double, even triple security barriers are installed in front of buildings, where events involving dignitaries are held. The streets on the route of the president or prime-ministers cortege get closed. High-ranking officials are ostentatiously separated from people by security barriers. It only deepens mistrust between authorities and citizens.

Former President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk stated that today, «any footman who has just laid his hands on power, drives around with flashers and ambulances. I always say, if you need to be accompanied by an ambulance, then stay at home, why do you go to work?!»[39]

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[39] Kravchuk about corteges: if you are accompanied by resuscitation ambulance, for which hell do you go to work?», Ukrayinsla Pravda, 26.07.2012, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/07/26/6969580/

There are special country cottage towns, surrounded by high fences and barbed wire, special hospitals and health resorts. It includes, first of all suburbs of Kyiv, Koncha-Zaspa, where state summer houses are provided to presidents, prime ministers, ministers, MPs and regional state administration executives. Meanwhile, politicians tend to keep these state summer houses for their personal use (using lifetime usage rights, by purchase or long-term lease) after they vacate their government position, that provided premises for granting them accommodations out of the city. For instance, former President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, despite the fact that he had not been the head of state for 3 years, and postponed moving out from the state summer house in Koncha-Zaspa to his house in Bezradychi village near Kyiv.

In contrast, Viktor Yanukovych turned a state summer house «Mezhyhirya» near Kyiv into his own residence. Unprecedented scale and luxury of the house, where the current president lives, is a constant object of attention of public activists and journalists.

The desire to get all attributes of a successful representative of Ukrainian society such as degree, honors and other personal distinctions (eg, the title «Hero of Ukraine»), a prestigious foreign car, summer house in Koncha-Zaspa has become a feature of the Ukrainian establishment. This sacred attitude of Ukrainian politicians and businessmen to titles leads to the devaluation of personal distinctions, because titles and academic degrees are often not obtained by real merit, but by money and connections. Plagiarism is one of the symptoms of this «cargo cult.»[40]

This is typical not only of Ukraine. But if in developed democracies politicians accused of plagiarism resign (and that means the end for his political career like in the case of Hungarian President Pal Schmitt and German Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg) in Ukraine, the one continues to occupy the post. The Speaker of the Parliament Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, the President Viktor Yanukovych, the Minister of Health Raisa Bohatyryova, the MP Viktor Yanukovych Jr. often were in the midst of scandals over misappropriation of intellectual property, but did not consider it necessary to apologize for such behaviour.

Plagiarism is a blow to the trust and the reputation of an individual politician as well as trust from the citizens.[41] But the instances of plagia-

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40 Cult Cargo implies blind copy of the source without awareness of internal processes as well as formal compliance with rules and regulations without understanding of its essence.

41 Interview of the IWP with the Doctor of Philosophy Mikhail Minakov

rism is primarily possible in a country with a poorly developed civil society and politicians who have got a blurred sense of responsibility and duty.

The occasions when a politician or an official simply buys a graduate degree are not rare. There are solitary cases of resignations of officials when such facts become publicly known. The most notorious of them is one of employee of Viktor Yushchenko's Presidential Secretariat, the former deputy head of the Security Service of Ukraine Andriy Kyslynsky. In 2009, the fact, that Mr. Kyslynsky did not study at the historical faculty of Kyiv University. As a result, the official was removed from the position of the deputy head of the SBU. But this decision was indeed caused by the weakened position of Mr. Kyslynsky in the power structures and the absence of allies among high ranking officials who could «cover up» the former official by confirming the legality of his documents on higher education. However, in May 2010, when the Party of Regions was firmly in power, the Pechersk Court in Kyiv closed the criminal case against Andriy Kyslynsky in which he was charged with forgery of higher education documents.[42]

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Post-Sovietness is present in the Ukrainian political discourse as well. Political discourse can be defined as interrelated texts, conversations and practices associated with political actors and objects. Critical discourse analysis is employed to determine how language is used for political manipulation. Discourse is also useful to understand who benefits from certain rhetoric, which, in turn, gives an idea of some of the social models of society and their further development. Mastering the latest techniques of oratory and successful public speaking, with the assistance of political technologists, Ukrainian politicians are paying too little attention to the actual content of their speeches.[43]

Generally, in Ukraine, politicians treat journalists in a very peculiar manner. If in Europe every politician is eager to talk to reporters, and is personally interested in being interviewed in Ukraine, on contrary, it is very difficult to reach out to ministers or even some MPs. Whenever they, after long negotiations, do agree to an interview, it seems that they do a huge favor.[44]

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[42] Moscal is confident that the Party of Regions paid Kyslynskyi// Ukrainska Pravda 06.05.2010http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2010/05/6/5012554

[43] Interview of the IWP with an observer of a English-language publication

[44] Interview of the IWP with the journalist of English-language publication in Ukraine

Foreign journalists are also surprised with the common practice of interview «proofreading» in Ukraine. In the West, the material is sent for the reconciliation of facts and mentioned data (dates, numbers). In Ukraine, the post-Soviet approach prevails when verbal spills from senior officials (sometimes quite incoherent) are made to look favorable and, sometimes get «embellished» or completely rewritten by press service officers. Editors may decide to publish non-edited interviews, but they should be ready for sanctions. For example, a great resonance of a scandal was the interview with Agrarian Policy Minister, Mykola Prysyazhnyuk, in a KyivPost edition, in 2011.[45]

Now, let's focus on the most important, in our view, attributes of post-Sovietness in Ukrainian political discourse.

Paternalism. An ordinary post-Soviet Ukrainian still hopes that the state will provide him with all one needs and will undertake the lion's share of solving his problems and concerns. Since the common post-Soviet citizens form the Ukrainian electorate, politicians actively exploit paternalistic language in public discourse.

Intensification of their usage is usually observed during election campaigns. Before elections, members of the political process compete in the sophistication of promises, ensuring the solution of number of socioeconomic issues in the case of their victory. Examples of such promises can be found in the program of any candidate and any political party. Typical expressions of Viktor Yushchenko such as «My nation …», «My people» indicate to certain extent his paternalistic beliefs.[46]

Election programs of political forces are rather formal texts, prepared at the request of the Central Election Commission, and they rarely differ from each other. However, content analysis of programs of five political forces that entered Verkhovna Rada as the result of the parliamentary elections of 2012 allows making some noteworthy conclusions.

Lists of the most frequently used words in political programs are as follows (table 3)[47].

The programs of political parties are full of promises to raise wages, and the frequency of use of the epithet «state» indicates the appeal to nostalgic sentiments of the society. And, the appeal to the past, as a «golden

[45] Bonner will be reinstated as Kyiv Post chief editor: http://www.mediabusiness.com.ua/?option=com_content&task=view&id=23664&Itemid=59

[46] Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr Fesenko

[47] Khomenko S. Parties' programs: the tongue ever turns to the aching tooth. — http://glavcom.ua/articles/7833.html

Table 3

Party of Regions	Batkivshchyna	UDAR	CPU	Svoboda
Ukraine – 14 hryvnia – 10 region – 9 country – 9 person – 8 construction – 7 citizen – 7 state – 7 affordable – 7 new – 7	power – 11 law – 8 right – 8 Yanukovych – 6 pension – 6 salary – 6 Ukrainian – 6 state – 6 create – 6	citizen – 13 provide – 12 system – 11 taxes – 10 Ukraine – 9 local – 9 state – 8 introduce (implement) – 8 enterprise – 7 right – 7 year – 7	state – 29 provision – 12 social – 9 supply – 8 society – 7 Ukraine – 7 institution – 6 status – 6	state – 19 Ukrainian – 11 introduce (implement) – 11 property – 10 entrepreneurship – 9 state – 8 Ukraine – 7 tax – 7 power – 7 provide – 7

era» is typical of post-Soviet countries. In the West, political discourse often aims at the future.[48]

It should be noted that the Communists referred the theme of «past» golden days most aptly in their 2012 election campaign. Such slogans as «Luxury tax!», «We will return the country to its people!», «Oligarchs to jail!» helped Communists to double their number of voters.[49] It is interesting, that the expressions, identical to those present in the program of the Communists, were actively used by the right wing party «Svoboda». They include the nationalization of major industries, deoligarchization, revision of privatization results, the fight against big capital, and the ban on land sales and on the development of

foreign banks and so on. Thus, about 20% or even more of «Svoboda»'s proposals are identical to the program of the Communist Party.[50]

Such political statements, despite the extremely low probability of their subsequent implementation, cause sympathy among the disappointed, nostalgic for the Soviet past population. These sentiments are skillfully used by post-Soviet political technologists. To declare promises which disregard the economic situation and the state budget is typical post-Sovietness. It is indicative that post-Soviet politicians place the state at first place (Ukraine should become a strong, developed country, etc.) while Western

[48] Interview of the IWP with Mathew Rojanski

[49] Berdinskih K. Red heat. – Korrespondent №28(516), July 20, 2012.

[50] 20% of Svoboda's proposals are identical with the Communistparty– Censor.net http://censor.net.ua/news/215127/20_ili_bolee_predlojeniyi_svobody_identichny_programme_kompartii_ekspert

politicians in their public statements primarily oriented at society.[51]

Despite that pre-election promises are in most cases not fulfilled and the level of trust in public institutions, in Ukraine, is one of the lowest in Europe, paternalistic expressions remain an effective tool to achieve political goals. A politician who promises state support in all areas is much more likely to succeed in the elections than his opponent, who calls voters to take the initiative themselves, improving the quality of life on their own and using the support of the state for this.

Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov explains this trend by the profound essence of the post-Soviet person, who is formed under the restrictive system and used to adapting to these restrictions. This person is afraid of everything new, unknown, they are endowed with many phobias, already do not believe propaganda and have no idea about the future. They perceive government as a paternalistic power, which should ensure their very modest existence and guarantees for the future, but, meanwhile, they treat this government with great suspicion,

because they do not believe in the fulfillment of its promises.[52]

Post-Soviet person also tends to believe that reforms should take place as soon as possible. However, they believe that such reforms should be carried out by the authorities, while post-Soviet citizens themselves remain passive observers. Perhaps, the Orange Revolution became the only exception in the post-Soviet history of Ukraine when President Viktor Yushchenko received unprecedented public trust and confidence that he could transform the country. This did not happen, which was followed by the effect of frustration and a return to waiting for better times.

Thus, paternalistic rhetoric is a lullaby for society when politicians are convincing post-Soviet people, who are extremely dependent on the state, that the rules remain the same, and the government will continue to pretend that it deals with social issues. By voting for politicians, the citizens signal in turn that they agree to further simulate the trust in the state and a respect for the government. This seriously undermines the effectiveness of the institute of elections, which in a situation of such a kind turns into

[51] Interview with a former head of an international fund's Ukrainian representative office

[52] Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

a regular ritual of negative social energy release, rather than a real mechanism for the people's declaration of will and legitimization of power.

Absence of sanctions for lies and fraud. In post-Soviet Ukraine, public lie and propaganda are still integral elements of political discourse. Virtually all Ukrainian politicians apply propaganda techniques in their daily rhetoric. The effectiveness of using this tool is explained, in particular, by the fact that some of the social strata of post-Soviet society still tend to accept propaganda better than complex political arguments.

Under propaganda, in this context, we mean the deliberate spreading of incomplete or distorted information about the results of the governments performance, activities of political forces, etc. Every government of Ukraine reports on their progress and often uses exaggerated or incomplete statistics. The news line on the unified web portal of the executive bodies of Ukraine could be an illustration of this.

Official information, the Ukrainian government essentially reports on the success and dizzying «improvement» of standards of life from now on, which is very similar to the communist slogan of Stalin era, «life has become better, life has become more fun!»

The monitoring of the contemporary political discourse in Ukraine allows us to state that a lot of Soviet propaganda structures are preserved in the rhetoric of current politicians, experiencing minor changes. For example, the image of a brighter future remained in the political discourse. Only the construction of world communism (the USSR) has given way for the construction of a democratic state and a market economy. Instead of talking about the implementation of a five-year plan for the economy in three/four years, post-Soviet politicians tend to think about joining the EU in record time (five/ten years), the abolition of the visa regime with the European Union or record GDP growth in the coming years. The purpose is different, but the lines are still less realistic.

Another problem of political communication is the devaluation of many terms and general tendency to washing out of the essence of certain words and hence society does not accept their intrinsic meaning.[53] Today Ukrainians, both politicians and ordinary citizens do not tend to treat such words as «democracy,» «freedom,» and «human rights» seriously and thoughtfully. Their frequent use, not supported by practical actions, actually depreciated these terms which negatively affects political discourse.

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[53] Focus-group at the Insitute of World Policy

Furthermore, «newspeak» is also actively cultivated in Ukraine as a specific language of the modern political elite. It is based on a vocabulary especially popular in 1990's. Slang phrases and the use of indecent language have become common in the Ukrainian public discourse. [54]

Ideologies devaluation. Today the world political thought returns to the question of the role and importance of ideology in political processes. Similar trends have allowed American political scientist John Jost to name the current stage the «the end of the end of ideologies»[55]. What is happening in Ukraine? In Ukraine, we observe not the death of ideologies, but their utter devaluation.[56]

Indeed, the ideological postulates do not have any value for the post-Soviet political forces in Ukraine. One of the explanations is the lack of interest of Ukrainians in the development of ideological political projects and the rejection of ideology as such[57]. It is difficult to classify the current political forces in Ukraine according to ideological grounds.[58]

The Communist Party of Ukraine, without a doubt, bears the palm in divergence of the party ideology and practice. Ideological fighters against oligarchs did not consider it shameful to enter into a government coalition with the party of big business — the Party of Regions.

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[57] Sambros A., Ukrainska pravda// http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/ 2010/09/17/5379709/

[58] Myklashchuk I. M. Ideological principles of political parties of Ukraine (according to pre-elections documents of 2006–2007.) – Strategic priorities, №3(12), 2009. – p.85

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[54] Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr Fesenko

[55] The End of the End of the Ideology // John Jost http://www.uky.edu/AS/PoliSci/Peffley/pdf/Jost%20 2006%20The%20End%20of%20 the%20End%20of%20Ideology_ American%20Psychologist.pdf

[56] Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr Fesenko

POST-SOVIETNESS IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

The consciousness of a post-Soviet man is «ambiguous» with mutually exclusive features; for example, post-Soviet people may say «yes» to democracy and liberal values, but not to say «goodbye» to authoritarian methods of rule. Ambivalent consciousness often cannot rationally evaluate various alternatives and scenarios of events and processes: post-Soviet people either uncritically accept political alternative or completely reject it.

The tragedy of the Ukrainian post-Soviet society is that it tried to turn collectivism into atomized individualism, which denies the establishment of civil connections.[59] Thus, 83.6% of Ukrainians in 2010 did not belong to any political or social organization. In addition, the consciousness of the Ukrainian people was dominated by the feeling that they live in a social space, in which no matter what you do nothing positive will be achieved.

Mentally and philosophically they remain entirely in the (neo) Soviet geo-cultural space. So, 61.4% of respondents «positively» answered the question about the possibility of the accession of Ukraine to the Union of Belarus and Russia, in 2010, posed by the Institute of Sociology of NAS, in Ukraine, and only 22.1% — answered «negatively». The number of those who support such a geopolitical project is the same today as in 1998, despite the fact that in 2000 it dropped to 40.8%. However, the country has not been reformed or refreshed and society has returned back to the old attitudes. However, a positive attitude about the idea of joining the European Union was shown by 45.5%. Thus, the conflicting geopolitical strategies are supported by a relative or absolute majority of respondents. This is another manifestation of the ambivalence of the post-Soviet consciousness.

8% of Ukrainians still consider themselves above all «Soviet» people, 26% just «people» and 57% — citizens of their country. People living in Donbas most often answer the question «who am I?» with «just a person», among the representatives of different regions of the country. This data was collected by the sociological group «Rating» in 2010. «Ordinary people» and «Soviet people» are those whose identity, since the independence of Ukraine, either did not change largely or did not change at all, or changed slightly.

The distinctive feature of a post-Soviet person is hypocrisy, which was totally and undividedly inherited from

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59 Interview of the IWP with Yevkhen Golovakha

the post-Soviet system. The post-Soviet man adapted as well as learned to coexist with a repressive state and government and determined survival to be his or her life strategy.[60] A post-Soviet person, the same as the Soviet one before, is ready to compete for secondary things that don't have much use, like a beautiful business-card, which does not entail any real achievements or status, however, will never fight for something as important or essential as changing the rules of the game, the resolution of some long-standing problems at the system level, values and professional ideals. A post-Soviet person does not have a developed intuition as to the constructive and long-term values, things and perspectives. However, researchers do not recommend considering it as infantilism. This is a completely rational choice and rational strategy of consumption in a particular historical and institutional context. The following part will discuss the characteristics of this life strategy.

ATTITUDES

Paternalism. Paternalism is inherent in the post-Soviet mentality. It, actually, just inertly flowed into the post-Soviet mentality from the Soviet one. If a government is generous in giving social benefits, many are ready to support it, even though it is evident that there are no economic resources for this. The fact that the budget cannot guarantee allocating social benefits, the economy of the country is in crisis and the foreign policy, culture, education, all of the strategic sectors of state's development are either failing or chronically stagnant, are weaker arguments then offering of «Yulia's» or « Vityna's thousand of hryvnias.»[61]

In March 2012, President Viktor Yanukovych announced his decision to resume the payment of the devalued deposits of Sberbank to their owners in the amount of one thousand hryvnia. Prior to this, such payments were carried out by the government of Yulia Tymoshenko. According to data received from the survey of the Razumkov Center, as of January 1, 2012, the rating of the Party of Regions, the party represented by the President, had 14% support. In April 2012, after the implementation of these payments, the support went up to 19.5%, and on the 1st July 2012 did it reached 21.5%.

Who isn't familiar with the image of the usual grandmother «babysia»

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60 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

61 «Yulina» and «Vityna thousand of hryvnias» are phrases that denote payments for people who kept their savings in the Soviet Sberbank.

Chart 1. What should be the role of government in regulating the economy?

- The role of the government has to be minimized – the market will regulate everything
- Governmental control has to be united with market control
- Planned economy has to be back with total government control
- Hard to say
- No answer

(grandmother) in lines, in the corridors of state committee of Ukraine on land resources or of polyclinics, which insists that nowadays there is noone to complain to. During Soviet times, the common belief that problems had to be dealt with, not through self-organization or creation of civil organizations, but through directly approaching the ruling powers, was formed and established. It is precisely the big boss, who has to deal and rule out all of the social, economic and household problems. This is an extremely ineffective social model. [62]

According to the information provided by the international sociological survey, Life in Transition, around 36% of Ukrainians supported a market economy in 2010. In comparison: in Belarus, where such an economy does not exist, more than 50% of respondents showed their support for

this idea and in Lithuania, where it actually functions, only 30%.

According to the survey of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, in 2010, a third of Ukrainians supported a return to a planned economy with full governmental control. Only 5.3% supported the minimalization of governmental interference in the economy. In addition 61.3% showed a negative attitude towards the privatization of large enterprises.

30.6% of Ukrainians, in 2010, voiced their readiness to have their own private business, however 28.4% said they would never do this. 28.3% of Ukrainians would not agree to work for a private company however 21.6% would be happy to find a job in such a way. From these numbers it is evident that the amount of Ukrainians ready to work in the corporate sector or to open their own business is close to the number of those who are not ready for this. In regions, especially in little towns, many believe that it is better to work in government-funded

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[62] Interview of the IWP with the deputy head of the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Center Mychailo Mishchenko

institutions, because it is stable and there are certain social guarantees and protection. Working for the owners of private firms sometimes turns out to be moral and even physical workloads when employees are not properly registered at their jobs, forced to work overtime. The less economically developed and the more «third world» like province of the country is, the more paternalism blossoms there. Precisely, it is province of post-Soviet countries that could be regarded as the reservoir of «soveitness».

Conformism as a dominant life strategy. Ukrainians, in general, do not give the impression of hopeless conformists. There is even the tendency that they are against their government in power.[63] In fact, all parliamentary elections in Ukraine over the past decade (2002, 2006, 2007) led to a change of government.

It is interesting to note, that the question posed by the Razumkov Center what is better to suffer from financial difficulties in order to preserve order in the country or, in the case of a significant deterioration of living conditions, go to the streets and protest — 52% of Ukrainians answered that they would rather protest and 23.3% considered order more important than protest. What people in a post-Soviet system often consider order to be, is the «conservation of the *status quo*» according to the principle «as long as things do not get worse».

78.4% of Ukrainians are certain that there is no equality amongst citizens before the law in their country, either completely or on the whole (according to the survey of the «Democratic Initiatives» Fund, held in May-June 2012). A post-Soviet person in Ukraine does not believe in the possibility of a true social or political justice. In order to survive, the only thing left is integrate into the existing unjust system and adapt to it, without taking the initiative to change it. In this way, the system reproduces itself. Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can trace how the young generation reproduces the attitudes of a Soviet person[64].

The same thing has been noted by Herve Bourdon (a French restaurateur and chef working in Ukraine for the past ten years). He took part in the opening of ten Ukrainian restaurants, one of which is the restaurant in Donetsk owned by the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Ahmetov. «A decade ago I saw 20-23 friendly Ukrainians who, it seemed, would change everything. Today, looking at the same

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63 Interview of the IWP with the vice-director of the law consulting department of the Konrad-Adenauer Fund

64 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

Chart 2. Do you belong to a particular religious community?

- Is not a religious person — 11,7%
- Christian Orthodox church — 76,7%
- Catholic church — 0,8%
- Greek-Catholic church — 7,4%
- Protestant confession — 0,9%
- Islam — 1%
- Judaism — 1%
- Other — 0,1%
- No answer — 0,6%

people ten years on it is clear that they have become just as Soviet as everyone else.»[65]

It is interesting to trace whether there is a connection between religious confessions and conformism as the main strategy of life. Is there a kind of orthodox conformism? Christianity, in particular Orthodox Christianity, teaches humility in difficult circumstances. This orthodox value can easily be manipulated, for example a religious person can be convinced that he ought to be humble before the power, before those who are stronger, and that all the hardships of earthly life and its poverty, are inevitable challenges. Thus one's will and ability to fight and seek a better life is withered away. At the same time, a minority of those who accept such an interpretation of humility not as seriously

and uncritically, benefit at the cost of those who are «humble» and show «humility» since they use their votes in elections, exploit them at work by setting very low salaries, do not provide proper working conditions and finally call them to the rescue of the «Rus» and «faith» from their opponents and competitors.

On the other hand, by appealing to God's will, people can legitimize anything. If you combine the cultivation of these virtues with the out-of-date views on social life (the intolerant attitude towards a religious or cultural Other), it is possible to create an environment in which it is possible to conserve a post-Soviet culture. Religious scholars believe that when approaching the question of the relationship between orthodox Christianity and post-Sovietness, one ought to look at it through an institutional lens, examining particular churches. If we are talking about the Ukrainian

[65]   Interview of the IWP with restaurateur Herve Bourdon

Orthodox Church (UOC) of Moscow Patriarchate, then the dependence on (neo) soviet power, non-modernization of own social doctrines and the lack of reforms are all increasingly usual properties of the church just as they are for the Russian Orthodox Church. In the case of other Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, they are more open to change although they remain conservative due to their nature.

For Greek-Catholics, it is easier to be modern as they do not depend on a repressive secular government. They work together with Ukrainian diasporas across the world and try to give their priests, more importantly their hierarchs, a modern education of international standards.[66] It is interesting to note that a large number of those who were hard-line communists and atheists during USSR, became conscientious believers after its collapse. However, it is important to talk about the problem of declarative religiousness and declarative orthodox Christianity, since religion in a post-Soviet society is only a social attribute and an element of identity [67], not a world outlook.

Delayed adoptions of innovations and fear of reforms. In the Ukrainian post-Soviet system, a clear tendency can be traced. Even though, the rules of the game seem to change as a consequence of the reforms, the people do not. On the one hand, the question whether the internally corrupt government can reform the system arises. On the other, the question whether the social agent which would be able to understand, support and help realize reforms exists? Post-Soviet Ukrainians are often afraid of any changes. The historical memories of the Holodomor, Soviet collectivization, industrialization, and the economic difficulties of 1990s, although not yet fully reflected upon, are still alive.

The reforms, which every new Ukrainian government talks about, in reality are never carried out. There have to be social forces, which would have the will to implement these reforms. The majority, however, is interested in guarding their own positions, just so that they would remain untouched.[68] In addition, in a post-Soviet system it is very hard to accomplish any reform and put a logical full stop at the end. The system, somehow, seems to always be doomed to half-implementation of any reform. For example, in 2012 Korean high-speed trains Hyundai were implemented

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[66] Interview of the IWP with the member of the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies Anna Tregub

[67] Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

[68] Interview of the IWP with the vice-president of the Razumkov Center for sociology Mykhaylo Mishchenko

between the capital of Ukraine and the host-cities of Euro 2012. They can reach a speed of 160 km/h. For Ukrainian train tracks a speed of lower than 100 km/h could be too high. Therefore, Ukraine had to inevitably change the tracks across the country to ensure the security of the trains. This, however, did not happen, and the Hyundai trains were put on the rails. Therefore some Ukrainians are still reluctant to risk taking these trains. This is because people do not see such an institutional and economic surrounding in which any reform would actually represent any progress or be accomplished.

However, the psychological aspect in the case of the trains is also important. In particular, Ukrainians turned out not to be ready for such a drastic change: instead of taking the usual trains from the Soviet times in which they are used to certain rituals (from the traditional 'feast' with previously packed food, changing into a track suit and a frank conversation with a random companion, who often acts as a kind of therapist) to taking the modern ones.

77% of Ukrainians, according to the survey carried out by the Research and Branding Group, have never travelled outside of Ukraine. According to the results of the International Sociological Institute in Kyiv survey, 36% of Ukrainians have never travelled outside their own region. As a result, it is hard for a person in a post-Soviet country to compare the realities of their life with those of others, and therefore it is hard for them to understand the necessity and value of reforms. When a person travels extensively and receives a large baggage of experience and knowledge, he or she begins to compare different societies and thinks more critically. Therefore, the person becomes more independent, nonconformist and individualistic. In a post-Soviet society, for the majority, these windows of opportunity are closed shut due to poverty and visa limitations. Ukraine holds the 110th place in the 2011 global rating assessing the freedom of travel to different countries. In comparison: Moldova holds the 124th, Georgia — 125th. This assessment takes into consideration the amount of countries to which citizens of the participating countries can enter without visas, the amount of countries these citizens receive their visa right on the border, according to a simplified procedure and how many states trust them as much as to accept all documents in an electronic format.

Another big problem, due to which new technology is accepted and understood very slowly or even generally not implemented at all, is the outdated material and technological base of colleges and universities. On the other hand, due to total corruption and a lack of the culture of fast diffusion of innovations (which is well developed in say, the USA or Germany), available funds to update the material and

technical basis for all technical educational institutions in the country cannot be realized. The only possibility is if sponsors will help or if the institution will be lucky with its governance and they will win a grant from abroad. However, this does not neutralize the backwardness of the entire system.

Intolerance. According to the results of the sociological survey of the Razumkov Center, in December 2011 32.3% of Ukrainians were ready to go out on the streets to take part in lawful protests if they did not receive their wages, 38.1% if they saw a sharp rise in the price of necessities, 20.4% — would protest against the highhandedness of local governments and only 5% would protest against racial or ethnic discrimination. The problem of discrimination, in all its forms, turned out to be the least significant and important for Ukrainians.

Sociologists measure the level of tolerance of Ukrainians towards other nationalities by questioning how willing they are to admit the representatives of these nationalities to different social roles. Therefore, an interesting indicator is the amount of Ukrainians who are ready to accept these representatives as citizens of Ukraine (%).

The respondents chose this option for an answer from the following list: family members, close friends, neighbors, colleagues, citizens of Ukraine, tourists and «would not allow them to enter Ukraine». This is measured according to the Bogardus social distance scale (table 4).

As seen above the citizens of Moldova are the most welcomed in Ukraine. Ukrainians are also ready to accept Jews, Russians and Belarusians as

Table 4.
Integral Index of National Distancing

National distancing between Ukrainians and other nationalities:	2002	2010
Azerbaijanians	9.7	11.8
Americans	9.7	7.9
Arabs	10.4	5.1
Afghans	6.4	5.8
Belarusians	21.5	21.9
Hungarians	14.3	15.4
Georgians	13.3	14.1
Jews	21.2	23.8
Chinese	8.8	7.1
Moldovans	21.8	24.2
Africans	8.9	6.8
Germans	12.2	12.1
Poles	15.4	17.7
Russians	20.3	20.3
Slovaks	14.2	16.4
Gypsies	19.2	19.1
Chechens	5.6	4.9

citizens or residents of their own country. However, Africans, Arabs, Chechens and Chinese do not fit into the Ukrainian picture of their world. However it is still hard to judge the level of tolerance from the results provided above. In order to avoid false judgment it is important to look at the following results of the same survey: 51.1% of Ukrainians would not let Chechens into their country if they could, 44.8% said the same about Gypsies and 34.1% about Afghans (table 5).

The Ukrainian society can be characterized by a kind of tolerance, which is a continuation of Soviet internationalism. This kind of tolerance comes in an 'isolated' form, meaning that many agree that «we don't care about others, as long as they don't touch us». People also think that it is better not to show interest in others so that there would be no problems in the future[69]. It is also evident that unlike western Europeans, people from post-Soviet countries are not actively interested in the cultural Others.

Let's imagine the Egyptian resort destination of Sharm el-Sheikh. Whilst tourists from Germany and Great Britain delightfully chat to employees of their hotel in cafes and next to the pool about situations in their country and, about where the workers

studied, how they like their jobs and which political party they support, post-Soviet tourists teach their children to «stay away from those foreigners» and they themselves do not talk to the Egyptians about anything but their massages, drinks and in the best case scenario the salaries of the employees. The interest in the culture of others and the others themselves, who

Table 5. The amount of Ukrainians who would not let representatives of certain nations in Ukraine (%)

Nationalities:	2002	2010
Azerbaijanis	32.9	22.7
Americans	17.2	10.4
Arabs	41.3	27.4
Afghans	47.6	34.1
Belarusians	6.4	3.1
Hungarians	13.2	7.6
Georgians	22.1	18.6
Jews	16.5	12.7
Chinese	25.3	19.4
Moldovans	16.3	11.3
Africans	29.2	19.3
Germans	13.6	7.8
Poles	10.0	5.9
Russians	3.9	2.9
Slovaks	11.3	6.6
Gypsies	42.9	44.8
Chechens	56.3	51.1

Source: *Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine, Yevhen Golovakha, Natalya Panina, Olena Parakhonska (2011). Ukrainian society 1992-2010: social monitoring.*

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69 Interview of the IWP with the vice-director of the Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Yevhen Golovakha

Chart 3. The level of tolerance towards different ethnic groups (February 2010)

■ As citizens of Ukraine

Source: *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011.*

are different, is embedded in European communication traditions. This is what active tolerance is. A post-Soviet person, therefore, can be characterized by passive tolerance, which can be considered as a synonym to indifference. Apart from that, talking to a stranger and asking how he or she is, is often considered as an expression of inadequacy: someone isn't minding their own business, or if it is a conversation between a man and a woman, they are trying to flirt.

It is for this reason that when a post-Soviet person visits the U.S. for the first time, traditionally he or

Chart 4. Dynamics of tolerance towards Jews.

Tolerance towards Jews

Chart 5. Anti-semitism and xenophibia in Ukraine by age category

Source: *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2006.*

she feels confused and puzzled when someone says «Hi! How are you?». Some Ukrainians openly do not understand why, all of a sudden, a stranger in a shop or on the street would ask how they are. A majority also do not understand why it is important to say «hi» in hotels and shops, or engage in «small talk». This is yet again not a usual thing for a post-Soviet person when they find themselves in an unfamiliar environment.

In 2011 the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, using the Bogardus social distance scale, received results that illustrate that the level of tolerance in the attitude towards Germans, French and Romanians was somewhat the same, as well as towards Gypsies and Chechens, whom Ukrainians are not extremely happy to see in their country (see chart 3).

KIIS noted a decline in the attitude towards Jews over the years following the independence of Ukraine. From 1994 till 2010, the level of tolerance towards Jews declined by almost by 10% from 74 to 63% (see chart 4).

It is interesting to note that anti-semitism is more prevalent amongst young people whereas xenophobia is more prevalent amongst those of an

Chart 6. «Do you think that Ukrainian citizens who are homosexual should have the same rights as other citizens of our country?»

Source: *«Our World» Center, 2011.*

older age, those who were born and socialised in the USSR.

The attitude towards representatives of sexual minorities is less indicative, when we talk about a post-Soviet mentality. This is illustrated by the following question in the survey: «Do you think that Ukrainian citizens who are homosexual have the same rights as other citizens of our country?»

From the graph above, it is evident that over the past decade the number of those who do not consider that members of the LGBT community should have equal rights has grown: 49% of respondents answered the question above with 'no'. Intolerance

to members of sexual and certain ethnic minorities ans certain ethnic in independent Ukraine can be explained by the fact that they do not fit into the Soviet picture of the world[70]. If 20 years after independence the general picture of the world in foundation remains Soviet, then those who are considered to be outcasts since the USSR cannot integrate into it.

The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, in 2011, found out whether Ukrainians would vote for a presidential candidate who was Jewish or

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[70] Interview with the deputy of the Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Yevhen Golovakha

Table 6. If a party, which you trusted, would have chosen a well-qualified candidate who was either black or Jewish, would you vote for him/her?

Category	Ukraine- 2011	USA — 2003
Jewish	36	89
Black politician	18	92

Source: *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011.*

black. The question was formulated as follows: if a party, which you trusted, would have chosen a well-qualified candidate who was either black or Jewish, would you vote for him/her?

The percentage of those who answered 'yes' is compared to similar information from a survey in the USA (see chart 6).

It is interesting to note that 70% of Ukrainians and 87% of Americans would vote for a qualified female candidate. Longitudinally sociological surveys of a group of young Ukrainians explicated that at the age of 20 they were tolerant, at the age of 40 they were no longer so. This means that at a young age people are more open to the world and think positively, whereas when they are older, after going through a secondary socialization in a post-Soviet society, they become intolerant in their attitudes towards the Other.[71]

Social Exclusion. Social exclusion has at least two aspects: first, is distrust towards other people and second, the exclusion from their everyday environment, in particular the infrastructure for the condition of which, a person does not feel responsible.

«At first I was very puzzled as to why Ukrainians were not bothered about the condition of the common area of their apartment blocks, the road across from their block and their yards. How can you throw cigarette buds right outside doors?» — these were the impressions of a German filmmaker who worked in Ukraine from 2011-2012. From Soviet times, Ukrainians have inherited the exclusion from their closest environment and habitat, which together with the fear of reform gives a synergetic effect: people could dislike the state of their environment, but they do nothing about it.

Thus, experts recognize that people in Ukraine massively oppose the creation of apartment building owners associations. Altogether this inhibits the development of housing

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[71] Interview with the deputy of the Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Yevhen Golovakha

Chart 7. Level of trust towards closest social surroundings

Source: *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011.*

and further reduces the quality of life. People do not get enough information, they believe that they will be deceived and they will lose money. It is hard for them to imagine that money they give for maintenance of their apartment buildings and surrounding territory will not be collected by housing office but by someone who lives in their house.[72]

However it is interesting to note that as soon as they see the success story of a neighboring apartment block, where people had the will to change things, they note the cleanliness of their entrances, courtyards and playgrounds that contrast with their building, and also begin to act. As soon as people look carefully into the details of spending on the maintenance of their building, and actually perceive that 50-60% of these spendings go towards the maintenance and not the needs of the housing office they start thinking. However again and again the fear comes back. If we create apartment building owners associations, elect its head, he will definitely steal our money. The post-Soviet society, just like it needs air, needs a success story, leaders who will act honestly in any situation.

The comfort zone, where trust dominates distrust, in a Soviet,

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[72] Interview of the IWP with the experet of UNDP Leonid Tulowskiy.

person remains limited or even minimal. Such a person only depends on him/herself, the circle of their values is very narrow: family values, relatives and friend. And, when it comes to government and other institutions the person demonstrates loyalty, a higher declarative feeling of trust, takes part in social rituals and elections, although they do not see any point in this.[73]

At first it seems that the sociological information is very encouraging: around 40-50% of Ukrainians trust their fellow-citizens, neighbors and colleagues. However when you look at the amount of those who distrust more than trust, those who fully distrust and those for whom it is hard to say whether it is hard to trust surrounding peoples, the added numbers equal 45-50%. It is exactly this amount of people that do not feel real trust towards others in their social surroundings. 49.6% of Ukrainians in 2010 agreed that the most

dangerous thing in life is to trust no one. 56.1% said that the majority of people do not want to have the burden of helping others.

Sociologists study the phenomenon of social exclusion, in particular, through the index of anomie of demoralization. They determine anomie as a state of disorder and conflict between social expectations and goals versus legitimate institutional mechanisms for their achievement. In other words, they are talking about a situation when people wait for and hope for one thing, but get something totally different. As a result, mass social exclusion occurs as a way to run, escape and fence off from the world. The compensating mechanism in this case is the disrespect and refusal to support the achievements and talents of others. This brings about the principle «if I am feeling bad so should everyone else». As a result, a post-Soviet society loses the feeling of a common good. People exclude themselves from one another. 45.7% of Ukrainians in the survey of the Institute of Sociology NAS of Ukraine admitted that people feel as though they are not in «their place» in society.

In Ukraine in the years between 1992-2010 the index of anomie of

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[73] Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/569.html

Table 7. Index of anomie of demoralization

1992	1999	2000	2001	2005	2006	2008	2010
13.6	14.0	13.8	13.8	12.4	12.7	13.1	12.9

Source: *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011.*

demoralization was consistently above average (scale of 1 to 18) (table 7).

Devaluation of talents, knowledge, success, and disappointment in own abilities. In a post-Soviet society, there is high number of losers, who do not understand that defeat is just a step on the way, not a disaster. A totally corrupt, intellectually weak, nepotic government, that does not have a clear view of the future is interested in; that society remains consisting of losers. Such a society is easily manipulated, you can buy a loser's vote, and it is easy to guarantee his loyalty. However, the most dangerous part in this is that losers, when there is a lot of them in a certain community, can pull all those who are consciously or unconsciously different — being non-losers, those who could bring change, down with them.

Apart from that, in a post-Soviet system, individual achievements come into conflict with an ineffective and unsuccessful system. A majority is certain that in such a system it is impossible to honestly achieve success. Everyday life provides many reasons for such ideas. However, due to such a preventative and negative attitude, people get in the way of real success stories. Here is an example of the village Tyenyste in the Bakhchsarai

Chart 8. What does your life depend on?

- Largely on external circumstances
- Somewhat on me but largely on external circumstances
- Equally on me and external circumstances
- More on me than external circumstances
- Mostly on me
- No answer

Source: *Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine, 2011.*

region of Crimea. Local residents of the village created a civil association for the organization of water supply. The case was assigned to a local entrepreneur, who was able to organize, and even provide the technical component of the case. He also developed the technology to remotely control the water supply, which made it possible to turn the pump on and off from a distance. However, this innovative idea did not last long. The villagers grew suspicious of the fact that the entrepreneur had some unheard of and therefore illegal profits, they thought that he had stolen their money. The UNDP was involved in this project to ensure the transparency of the documentation, formulation of the wages of the workers and tariffs. However the villagers did not trust the UN officials, the entrepreneur or their own eyes. The businessman refused to cooperate with them and therefore the system of water supply was frozen. In another village of Sevastianivka the situation was similar: people came to meetings and asserted a system which paid a person who managed the water system. The person did this effectively. However, they soon began to complain that the person was stealing, though there was no evidence of this.

Generally, as explained by social psychologists and sociologists, many post-Soviet people are ashamed to be happy. If they still feel so they are afraid to share their happiness with others, «not to be jinxed» or «not to be envied.»

It is clear from the graph that in 2010, the number of those who considered that everything or to large extent in their life depends more on their own efforts than on external circumstances altogether in 2000 and 2010 made up about 20%. Thus, compared to 1992, this number increased by only 2-3%.

In an unfavorable institutional environment of a post-Soviet mutated system, which kept the worst legacy of the Soviet regime and combined it with new ineffective democratic and market rules and procedures, young people became quickly disillusioned as to their own ability to change something through their own knowledge, work and persistence. External factors begin to dominate over people's personalities.

One of the most phenomenal attributes of post-Sovietness is the trade in valuables which *apriori*, cannot be an object of trade such as Ph.D. and masters dissertations, medical documents, working places, places in universities, participation in protests or protests in support of political parties and votes in elections. In a post-Soviet society it is possible to buy or sell any of the above.

For example, due to the chronic unemployment in a depressive Ukrainian province, the practice of giving a bribe for getting hired, even for a low-paid job, has become commonplace. In the town of Dybno,

Rivne region, in order to get a job one has to pay from $200 to $2000 as you can find out from the locals. For example, for the job of a nurse in one of the hospitals in Rivne, one has to pay $2000. For the job of a secondary school teacher, one has to pay through an intermediary. From the data from the Unified Public Register of Court Decisions we can find out about the existence of much larger bribes for jobs: $ 200 thousand, $ 30 thousand, $ 14 thousand. A post-Soviet person is often ready to pay for a job in a public institution, because there they will receive a guaranteed income.

In 2012, 18% of the members of parliament of the German Bundestag had doctorate degrees in various fields. In comparison: in the Verkhovna Rada of the 6th convocation, 32% of the members of parliament had a doctorate degree. In 2011, according to information provided by the State Statistics Committee, 23,655 candidates and 5,469 doctors worked in the economy of Ukraine.

The vast majority of Ukrainian parliamentarians defended their dissertations in the spheres of economics or jurisprudence. In informal talks about academic affairs, people say that because of such popularity among the establishment for these scientific specializations, one has to pay and have connections in order to defend their thesis as well as for everything to run smoothly.

However, absolutely every ordinary post-graduate student has to either pay or in a similar way to «please» their reviewer and two (for candidates) or three (doctors) of his or her opponents. The student has to pay for the publication of his work in Ukrainian journals and organize a feast once they defend their dissertation. Altogether this may cost from 5 000 hryvnia to a couple of thousand dollars. Those, who employ real, but poor professionals, or firms who specialise in writing dissertations, have to pay significantly more for the satisfaction of seeing «Dr.» instead of «Mr./Ms.» in front of their name on a business card. «Essays, dissertations etc.» — you can see such advertizing in the subway in Kyiv, on advertising pillars and also on the internet. This is all absurdity if you look from the European culture and educational/scientific tradition point of view.

A large separate scenario is the trade in diplomas of secondary and higher education. Foreign employers who need to hire low-qualified workers (mechanics, waiters, couriers) for their businesses gladly tell what the consequences such a trade are: people come with their secondary or higher education diplomas, however they do not know anything or know how to do certain jobs even if they require a low-qualification level. It seems,

Ukrainian employers are not surprised by this since they have already gotten used to this.

The purchase of votes during elections and the payment for participation in mass demonstrations — is the talk of tongue in Ukrainian political life. During the demonstrations for the Party of Regions, as told by the participants, you can receive around 40 to 150 hryvnia. Some members of parliament and those who want to become members hand out food parcels and money to potential voters before elections. The voters gratefully accept them.

Such rigorous trade in things that in reality cannot be sold or bought is a consequence of the loss of many values in the transformational period and is a consequence of poverty. In the situation of a chronic state of hopelessness, poverty and backwardness; people degrade and adapt to the unacceptable social practices and behaviour. Thus people begin to sell those things, that priori cannot be objects of trade. Therefore, market mechanisms mutate under the influence of the post-Soviet uncertainty and lack a clear system of values.

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

Short-term planning. In 2010 in a survey of the Eurasian Monitor 64% of Ukrainians said that they are dissatisfied with their life, 32% were happy with it. In sociology, this is the indicator of the degree of people's social adaptation. Post-Soviet people adapt to society in such a way that they can survive in it, but then do not feel happy. They are not sure about the future, thus, think mostly in short-term categories and, consider and plan everything in their life from such a perspective. The most striking example of it is the attitude to of customers in the service industry. If a customer does not like something it is often regarded as his problem, and not that of the service provider. The fact that a customer who is unhappy with the quality of service will never come back again, is not a matter of concern.

Significant part of their lives, a post-Soviet people spend following meaningless, not directed at achieving constructive outcome, institutions of the state bureacracy. First of all it includes long hours standing in queues at passport offices, state land administrations, state tax inspections, at railway stations and public clinics. Even if there is a chance to avoid this queue, post-Soviet people will not believe that it is real. For example, railway ticket offices which serve the privileged category of citizens, can usually also sell tickets to ordinary citizens. However, these citizens do not use them, reflexively seeking long lines at other offices,

Table 8. Society's reaction to the overall situation in the country

Optimism, hope for the best	16,8 %
Sadness	22,5 %
Must be patient and wait for better times	16,9 %
Feelings of shame and guilt	11,2 %
The desire to run protest actions	20,8 %
Indifference	10,7 %
Everything is fine	4,8 %
Political leaders deceived us	39,3 %
The people are also to blame for the current situation	16,2 %
Hard to say	7,2 %

Source: *Opinion of Ukraine's citizens on the situation in the country, assessment of authorities actions, electoral orientations. Results of 2011/Razumkov Center, 2011.*

because it is right and standard thing to do. As a result, you can observe a situation where there is no one at the booking-office for privileged people, and the other ones are overcrowded. A Post-Soviet man does not trust the option to book tickets online and prefers queues. Another example of inefficient bureaucracy is medical examinations when you enter college or get employed. They are purely formal, just done by 'tick-box' approach, examination by various doctors with no individual differentiation or proper modern diagnostics. These examinations convert into endless running around at the offices of physicians and collecting health certificates.

Life in a system built on such regulatory procedures can lead to complete dependence on the circumstances and futility. So, people live day by day and year by year with their small problems. Their horizon of consciousness narrows to a minimum. They have no vision of the future, and have only one wish for their children — to go abroad, away from this absurdity. Only the prospect of emigration gives the inspiration to think in long-term categories.

According to a survey by the Razumkov Center, in 2011, 67.3% of Ukrainians believed that events in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction. For example, in the survey by the Razumkov Center, Ukrainians described society's reaction to the overall situation in the country as follows (respondents could select multiple answers) (table 8).

Among Ukrainians the feelings of shame, sadness and humility dominate over optimism and a protesting

mood. Under such chronic psychological pressure people cannot believe that anything can have medium or long term prospects.

Poor practices of knowledge and information sharing. More dynamic, innovative and developed a society is, more open are the people to sharing information, knowledge and technology and vice versa. The post-Soviet society consistently lags behind the West in technological development; it lacks the resources to upgrade their approaches in different areas. As a result, a post-Soviet person is also more closed and 'greedy' when it comes to a proposal or a need to share their knowledge. In the post-Soviet system, it is so difficult to achieve a certain result that people are not really motivated to share it with others. Thereby, a vicious circle is formed, moving on to the country not being able to make any information and intellectual breakthroughs.

There is a striking example of this statement. Specialists, who conduct training for lecturers of journalism, noted the existence of the problem when they explain to their audience that the curriculum of courses taught should be uploaded to the universities' web sites, they hear the response that it cannot be done, because someone can simply 'steal' it. Lecturers, who, indeed, should prepare representatives of the most open and focused on the exchange of information

profession, complain that their ideas can be picked up by someone else or use the list of references, which was prepared with enormous efforts. We can assume that representatives of other academic disciplines think almost the same. For lecturers of western universities it is not a problem to publish curricula, because, firstly, they update them very often, having favorable working conditions and resources to do so, and secondly, it is mentally important for them to spread their achievements across the academic community.

Thus, the main barrier to information is not the threat that somebody will steal it, but the mental standoff triggered by the entire system in which the person exists.

Preventive unfriendliness. Preventive unfriendliness is rudeness, just a frown from a post-Soviet person is the norm, and the inability to smile stranger on the street, especially if he addresses to you. The former Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga (1999-2007) defined such a difference between the Western and post-Soviet man: the Western man is first of all a polite man, and the post-Soviet — rude.

One British journalist who worked in Ukraine as a stationed reporter for Western publications, says, that, in his opinion, this preventive hostility, in other words, the rudeness and intolerance of some Ukrainians is a

consequence of a sense of weakness and vulnerability: «Even when I observed this unfriendliness towards myself, I understood that it was generated in people by a particular social context where nobody trusts anyone. In fact, it is very difficult to live when you think that you cannot trust anyone at all».

In general, you can often hear a complaint from foreigners that Ukrainians smile little. In Ukraine, a smile to a stranger is often interpreted as a manifestation or strangeness, or as flirting.

However, those foreigners who have visited Russia and Belarus, occasionally remark that, compared with people over there, Ukrainians are «incredibly kind and friendly». Also, they admit: Ukrainians are actually mostly friendly and willing to help, but the problem is that in post-Soviet culture it is not accepted to transfer your natural kindness to your profession, communication with strangers in the street and broader social communication. People, as if they have a switch: as soon as they appear in a professional role, for example, of a seller or a waiter: they must 'bark' and be strict.

Psychologists also talk about the lack of emotional intelligence of Ukrainians. Children are taught that they should be restrained and not to laugh out loud in public, because people may think that «you are like a fool» and «what people will think of you?». As a result, people are trained to suppress their positive emotions.

Preventative unfriendliness does not always provide outright rudeness. It may manifest itself, for example, in the style of writing e-mails. One of the organizers of the Summer School of Jewish History and Culture, that takes place in Lviv, shared an interesting observation. She has to communicate via e-mail with students and young scientists from all over Ukraine. They, according to her experience, mostly, do not have a European culture of communication, which, in turn, implies a polite appeal in the beginning of a letter, thanking for anything and polite wishes at the end.

It is also not accepted in European culture to send letters with requests in the imperative mood or e-mails with attached files without a brief cover letter. Failure to comply with these rules is perceived as a manifestation of ill will and bad tact. Instead, a letter without a polite salutation or a thanks-giving ending and with the «I need» context is a usual thing in communication with young educated Ukrainians.

The Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine found, through its surveys in 1995-2006, if Ukrainian's feel a lack of kindness from people around them: on average one third of Ukrainian lacked it, and another third found it difficult to answer this question.

Table 9. What is the least European in Ukraine?

People	8 %
Good quality	30 %
Services quality	27 %
Culture, mentality, legacy	19 %
Cities infrastructure	28 %
Leisure facilities (restaurants, cafes, clubs, cinemas, exhibitions, etc.)	19 %
Stadiums	14 %
Transport	30 %
Shops	21 %
Hotels, accommodation	31 %
Government	47 %
Security	29 %
Knowledge of English and other EU languages	41 %
Other	0,48 %
Nothing	18 %

A European social survey public poll in 2009 revealed that Ukrainians, on a scale of ten, assessed their readiness to help other people as 3.6 points (0 — people care only about themselves and do not help others, 10 — people really try to help each other). This is one of the lowest rates among the 32 countries surveyed. This indicator received even a lower value in Greece, Poland and Slovakia. And, the highest was in Ireland (6.24).

Ukraine also received one of the lowest rates on the same ten-point scale — 4.64 — among 32 European countries for the indicator of fair treatment of people towards each other: respondents answered the question «Would other people try to get some benefit from you, when they have a chance to do so, or will they be fair in their attitude?». Only in Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, this indicator was lower.

30.53% of EU visitors of the Euro 2012 recognized hotels and accommodation in Ukraine as the least European, 26.53% — quality of service, 19.47% — leisure facilities (restaurants, cafes, clubs, cinemas, etc), 18.7% — the culture and mentality. This is the data from the 1st Euro exit poll conducted by the Institute of World Policy in cooperation with GfK Ukraine. That is about a third of Europeans critically evaluated the Ukrainian service sector, where much depends on the human factor: how

tourists are met, greeted, how their wishes for the service are fulfilled, how those, who primarily are to do it (hotel staff, waiters, taxi drivers), help them in a strange country.

In the ranking of tourist attractiveness of the World Economic Forum in 2011, Ukraine finds itself at the very bottom: out of 42 European countries it was ranked the 39th, being ahead of only Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova; out of 139 countries around the world – 85th. The tourist attractiveness of a particular country is based on many indicators, combined in fourteen categories. By the attitude of local people towards foreigners Ukraine is rated 127th (!) in the world, by police reliability — 122nd, by openness to tourism – 52nd.

«According to my observations, all that has changed in Ukraine since the fall of communism is the color of the flag. Internally, Ukraine remains 200% Soviet,»[74] — Hervé Bourdon says. He believes that the phenomenon of «preventive unfriendliness» in the service sector, particularly in restaurants and cafes, is triggered by various factors. Firstly, the stereotype that the job related to serving someone puts a person in a lower position before a client dominates in Ukraine. As a result, rudeness and disrespect towards that client is a protective re-

action and certain psychological compensatory mechanism.

Secondly, for example, «waiter» is not considered a profession in Ukraine while in other European countries this profession is taught and treated with the same respect as any other. Thirdly, even if the Ukrainian youth gets some training or education in the field of tourism and restaurant business. Still, they to a great extent are trained to work in a Soviet canteen but not in a modern European restaurant. And these young workers should not only be taught from scratch but re-trained. It takes months and even years.[75]

Preservation of Soviet symbols in the infrastructure. The Soviet legacy in Ukraine remains, primarily, in infrastructure and symbols. Journalists of the online edition texty.ua conducted research: they counted which sort of names prevail in the names of downtown streets, in 20 000 Ukrainian settlements listed in the directory, of the administrative structure of Ukraine — Soviet, neutral or related to independence. It turned out that amount of names in Ukraine associated with the Soviet period and the figures of the totalitarian era is 20 times more than of those related to the history and the period of independence: 52% of the names were of Soviet

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74 Interview of the IWP with Hervé Bourdon

75 Interview of the IWP with Hervé Bourdon

genealogy, 45% — neutral content, and only 2,4% — related somehow to an independent Ukraine. The leaders of Soviet urbanomics were Kirovograd, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia regions.

Anatoly Bondarenko, one of the study's authors, explains «there was no consensus in Ukrainian society on what to do with the previous 70 years of Soviet rule. And this is a problem that would not be resolved on its own. Ukrainians actually continue to live in the Soviet Union. Minor mechanisms, which reproduce the Sovietness, continue to operate. Streets' names are not the biggest problem, but it is a very clear indicator.» The main arguments of those, who believe that it is possible to keep everything like it is and that there is no harm in this symbolic state of urban culture, are: firstly, it costs money, because maps must be changed and documents of any institutions registered to addresses in these streets must be amended. Currently, the biggest achievement is renaming of some cities: Donetsk instead of Stalino, Mariupol instead of Zhdanov, Luhansk instead of Voroshilovgrad, and Radivyliv instead of Chervonoarmyisk. The most popular Soviet urban street names, according to this study, are: Lenin, Soviet, Peace, October, Gagarin, Victory along with Central, School and Youth. But in Cherkasy and Kherson there are still Chekists streets.

Chart 9. Ukraine-2012: names of main streets

On the map, for each settlement, only streets with local authorities are marked with color.

Source: *www.texty.ua.*

65

Table 10. The ratio between streets named after Taras Shevchenko and Vladimir Lenin, on which local authorities are located in Ukraine.

Regions	«Shevchenko»	«Lenin»
AR of Crimea	3	65
Vinnytsia Oblast	22	279
Zakarpattia Oblast	21	25
Kyiv Oblast	46	176
Luhansk Oblast	5	92
Lviv Oblast	26	0
Kharkiv Oblast	4	72
Chernivtsi Oblast	9	2

Source: *Public Initiative «Bureau of Popular Research», Crimea Development Fund*

The Public Initiative, the «Bureau of Popular Research», counted the ratio between streets named after Taras Shevchenko and Vladimir Lenin, on which local authorities are located in Ukraine. And, this is what they got (data is provided for some regions, full survey included all oblasts of Ukraine):

Thousands of letters from citizens go to these state and local authority addresses every day, which are the venues for a variety of events that somehow or other involve state and local authorities.

The brand new statues of Lenin perhaps surprise even more than the old Soviet names of the central streets in Ukraine. In 2011, the Ukrainian communists reported that they restored and opened (!) 80 statues of Lenin across Ukraine over the past few years. The recent one was opened in Tairovo village, the Ovidiopolskiy district of Odessa Oblast, in November 2011. Yevgen Tsar'kov, a communist MP, called the children, brought to that event by grandmothers, «the youth that came at their souls' behest». But if Lenin statues remain unnoticed and, a marginal phenomenon, the erection of Stalin's statue in the yard of the local regional committee of the Communist Party, in Zaporizhia, in May 2010, caused a real resonance in Ukraine. The bust was blown up at night by unknown persons. After that there was a wave of arrests of NGO «Tryzub» members, and, ultimately, the Zhovtnevy District Court sentenced eight young «Tryzub» members to probation for two or three years for damaging the bust of the

totalitarian regime leader, who organized the Holodomor (famine) and other crimes against humanity.

During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko there were attempts to somehow deal with the monuments of totalitarianism in Ukraine. A registry of totalitarianism era monuments and memorials in Ukraine was compiled. It totaled 2,700 units and it was planned to eliminate them. President Yushchenko issued several decrees calling to intensify efforts to dismantle the monuments of the 1932-1933 Holodomor and political repression instigators and executors. MPs Ivan Zayets and Jaroslav Dzhodzhik submitted a bill to parliament in 2009 to ban the Communist ideology and eliminate totalitarian and communist regimes symbols. However, it failed to even be put on the agenda of the current parliamentary session, and voting for it was not even mentioned.

And if the «Orange» politicians did not take any practical steps to eliminate or give new interpretations of the communism monuments, with the advent of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, starting in 2010, there was sporadic return to the totalitarianism era symbols and heroes. The monument to Stalin became the most resonant example. But there are others, less evident ones. In the summer of 2012, Rivne SBU department laid flowers at the monument to those NKVD members who died during the Second World War in a battle with

the Wehrmacht, in the village Pantaliya, in the Dubno district of Rivne Oblast. According to historians, those NKVD members participated in the mass murder of the local population before the Soviet army retreated. In June 2012, St. George ribbon images, which had already been forgotten before the arrival to power of the Party of Regions, appeared on infrastructure and on billboards in cities. In May 2012, a 15 km long ribbon, which once was used for decorating military awards in the USSR, was stretched in Luhansk.

Ukraine's authorities today do not raise the question of that old totalitarianism monuments should necessarily be destroyed, but also interpreted in a new way. The museum «Prison at Lontsky» located in the former NKVD prison in Lviv is so far the only example of a new interpretation of the historical totalitarianism sites in Ukraine. Instead, the central SBU office of independent Ukraine, for example, is located in the same building on 33 Volodymyrska Street, where the KGB was stationed in Soviet times. The building of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine is situated in the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR.

The industrial sector is another powerful reservoir of Soviet symbols and Soviet mentality. It is the industriality, not only as a kind of material culture, but also as a world-viewing

system of norms and values preserving Sovietness[76]. It is not a coincidence that Eastern Ukraine is called the «reservation of Sovietness».[77] Although, Sovietness can be both of philistine and peasant kind.

Irrational consumption (demonstrative luxury). A life experience in a country, where you had to stand in long queues to buy sausage and a coat, and where many products simply could not be obtained, Post-Soviet people compensate with an irrational consumption in a wild capitalism. The Post-Soviet man demonstrates his status and achievements through golden toilets and the most expensive Italian tiles. Having gained a large fortune by fraud, he builds zoos for ostriches and other exotic animals, buys the most expensive cars and wears the most expensive watches. And this is a feature not of only post-Soviet politicians, but also all those who laid their hands on the 'sinecure'.

The so-called phenomenon of «status items» is noteworthy. It is when, for example, young people with their last money buy a «Lexus»on credit, while living in a tiny apartment in a non-prestigious suburb; or, when young women use a large share of

their income to buy an expensive fur-coat. Many Ukrainian businessmen (politicians), at the beginning of their careers, primarily, buy Swiss watches, Brioni suits, and golden cufflinks with the first money they earn.

A post-Soviet man cannot boast about essential results such as significant achievements in their field, quality and honesty in their business, winning in a tough fair market competition, modern education and confidence in the future. Post-Soviet people cannot change the circumstances of their life, but they can buy some, in contrast, and get pleasure from it. They do not reflect upon the infantilism of this behavioural pattern. It becomes a kind of compensatory mechanism of self-realization that parents transmit to children. And so the post-Soviet attitudes regenerate.

Meanwhile, quite a peculiar attitude to the external attributes of luxury and wealth is cultivated amongst the poor in a post-Soviet society. For example, a foreign journalist, who worked for a long time in Ukraine, said with surprise that he saw a girl in a restaurant in Luhansk who was looking through a glass window at a «Bentley» on the street with admiration and endorsement. «Isn't it clear that such an expensive car in such a poor country is the result of corruption? How Ukrainians can condemn corruption and adore others' «Bentleys»?»- many guests who come to Ukraine form much wealthier and richer countries,

[76] From Volodymyr Fesenko's speech at expert panel / IWP.

[77] Video conference with Lev Gudkov/ IWP.

where, still, a «Bentley» next to a restaurant is a rare happening, ask this rhetorical question.

It is interesting that VIP-services have become the fashion in post-Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainians have got accustomed to the presence of VIP-lounges in airports, VIP-boxes at stadiums and VIP-halls in restaurants. It exists in more developed and democratic countries as well, but the Ukrainian VIP- segregation sometimes takes surprising shapes. For example, you can be offered a VIP-ticket instead of a standard one at the Semiyiz (Crimea) aqua park. Municipal officials have arranged a VIP-lane for themselves on the one way Lenin Street in Dnipropetrovsk with the opposite to rules to the direction of the traffic, and it causes traffic jams. Meanwhile, traffic police are imposing fines upon 'non-VIP' drivers, who dare to use this lane in rush-hour.

Indeed, the tradition of nomenclature 'members-only outlets' is preserved. It took on new forms, labels and codes of admission. Earlier, status was the code, now — first of all, money. Such a system is dominated by the belief that everything can be bought: comfort, good attitude and a sense of security. There is no understanding that if the socio-political and economic systems as a whole do not work accordingly to the schemes that guarantee these values for the majority then the VIP-minority will not get desired benefits in full even with their money. String-pulling and connections may help when dealing with the State Tax Administration. But at the same time jeeps that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, are doomed to ride from the luxury state summer houses in Pushcha-Vodytsa, a resort in the northwestern part of the Kyiv city, to the center on destroyed roads, covered with holes and cracks in a part of the village, where ordinary people, mostly retirees, live. It is not always possible to construct a VIP bypasses. Another example: there is a sewer on an expensive VIP-hotel's beach at one Crimean resort. This fact is not even known by the wealthy clients, who so much desire to dissociate themselves from the mainstream of Soviet Crimean service.

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

POST-SOVIETNESS IN MOLDOVAN POLITICS

ATTITUDES

The Republic of Moldova was the first country from the Community of Independent States to become a member of the Council of Europe; it has developed an institutionalized governmental dialogue with the European Union and negotiates its political association and economic integration with the EU. The Republic of Moldova is the sole ex-Soviet state connected to Balkan integration structures. It finds itself within a joint neighborhood framework with the European Union, alongside Ukraine, Georgia and another three post-Soviet states. It also benefits from the financial assistance and instruments of the main democratic transformer in the region, destined for Europeanization/ Westernization. Nevertheless, the democratic transition is a difficult process in these societies and a cultural resistance exists in all social sectors. The Republic of Moldova is the only state in Europe where the Communist party — The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM),

proclaiming itself as the successor to the Soviet Union's Communist Party, which included the re-forming of the Soviet Union in its agenda until 2008, democratically came to power and had two consecutive mandates. This civic conduct of citizens cannot be attributed only to «ideological misunderstandings» or Soviet nostalgia, but should be approached in a more comprehensive context. Thus, «the institutional determinism», suggested by Lev Gudkov and his colleagues from the Levada Center for elucidating the political features of post-Sovietness should be anchored in a larger civilization perspective. Two classical civilization prospects which have developed in the last decades (the material one promoted by Alvin Toffler, and the spiritual one updated by Samuel Huntington) urge us to consider the economic development and spiritual values within a cultural «screening» exercise.

All-embracing control as a necessity. The material world in which a new cultural archetype is developing

Chart 1. Moldovan citizens' doctrinaire affection.

- Communist
- Liberal
- Christian-Democratic
- Social-Democratic
- Nationalist
- Do not know/Do not answer
- None

Source: *IMAS. Social-political barometer, November 2009, p. 26.*

Table 1. Human development index 2011.

	Human development index (HDI) Value	Life expectancy from birth (years)	Mean years of schooling (years)	Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (US Dollars)
Georgia	0,733	73,7	12,1	4,780
Moldova	0,649	69,3	9,7	3,058
Ukraine	0,729	68,5	11,3	6,175
Europe and Central Asia	0,751	71,3	9,7	12,004
World	0,682	69,8	7,4	10,082

Source: *Adapted by author according to: United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report 2011.*

is important for detecting the qualities of post-Sovietness, representing the environment which feeds and predisposes a certain political behaviour. Living conditions are part of this material world, determining, to a great extent, the political attitudes for which the Human Development Index (HDI) and other indicators of the Human Development Report represent an incomplete but relevant synthesis.

Human development, implicitly the population's standard of living, is a compulsory component of consolidating democracy in terms of Western values and freedoms[78], and the reality which exists at present in the

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[78] Linz J., Stepan A. Drumul spre o democratie consolidată. / Diamond L. s.a. Cum se consolidează democratia. Iasi: Polirom, 2004, p. 51-67.

Table 2. Key findings (%, weighted).

	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine	Average Transition region	Average Western Europe
Satisfied with life	25	30	30	43	72
Trust in each other	29	41	49	34	42
Perceive less corruption than four years ago	78	13	10	21	9
Support both a market economy and democracy	38	52	26	34	42

Source: *The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Life in Transition.*

three states hinders such consolidation. Authentic democracy is impossible without a participative political culture, but a participative culture is created depending on private property and welfare. The Moldovan society, for half a century, lived without any guarantee of private property and for two decades of independence without sustainable development, but it was condemned to poverty. At the same time, the poverty of the majority of the population makes it more vulnerable to manipulation regularly used by politicians, when they appear to be provident, promising social packages without funds, or distributing «electoral gifts.» The data exposed in the Table 2 denotes a position over the world average for HDI, but is far below the level of Western liberal democracies, as well as a much lower income per capita as compared to the world average, especially in the case of the Republic of Moldova. It is true that the surveys conducted under the research «Life in Transition» do not necessarily convey a causative liaison between the standard of living and the support for democracy and a market economy, particularly in the case of the Republic of Moldova. Although being the citizens with the lowest income per capita in Europe, 52% of Moldovan respondents support democracy and market economy, while the West-European average constitutes 42%.

The spiritual component for determining political attitudes is not at all irrelevant. The absolute majority of the population of the three countries is Christian-Orthodox: 83.7% of Ukrainians, 83.9% of Georgians and 98% of Moldovans[79]. Through

[79]   CIA. The World Factbook, 2012.

religion, the three societies inherited a Byzantine tradition, which foresaw an intimate association between the Orthodox state and the Orthodox Church (Byzantine symphony) into a single state-ecclesiastical body, although, practically, this meant the supremacy of the secular power over church power. The idea of an almighty country stemmed directly from this state-church relationship existing under the Russian empire, which dominated the region both territorially and ecclesiastically. The totalitarian Soviet regime and its own Communist religion definitely led this absolute control over politics in extreme proportions. At present, the religious institution continues to play an essential role in nurturing a parochial culture and interpreting «the almightiness» of public authorities. Especially post-Soviet politicians, those from the Republic of Moldova implicitly have a habit of taking part in religious services surrounded by video cameras, praying in public and frequently mentioning God in their public discourse. In such a way, they associate themselves with the institution which mostly enjoys the trust of society — Church.

Furthermore, here, the attempts to detach from Soviet totalitarianism, as well as from Russian intellectual traditions, which ruled the region's cultural life, persisted in history until the national intelligentsia of the XIXth century; the latter grounding the aesthetic tradition in the age of European nationalism. Most frequently, however, nationalism had a conservative formula, which rejected Western liberalism and supported the supremacy of society's elite. In this context, Mihai Eminescu claimed: «The elite are liable both for the rise and decline of people and man himself»[80].

Therefore, the need for absolute control over politics is not only a quality of post-Sovietness, but also an intrinsic component of the evolution of national spiritual life, even if state institutions do not enjoy an increased trust from citizens. Thus, according to the recent Public Opinion Barometer (POB) from the Republic of Moldova, the main state institutions enjoy a low level of trust of the population: Head of the state — 28%, Parliament — 25%, Government — 30%, political parties — 20%[81]. Simultaneously, the majority perceives the state as an almighty responsible for the life of society, predisposing, thus, the political class to absolute control attempts. Each second grown-up from the Republic of Moldova claims it would be better if the country were governed by a

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80 Apud Bădescu I., Dungaciu D., Baltasiu R. *Istoria sociologiei — teorii contemporane*. Bucureti: Editura Eminescu, 1996, p. 558.

81 Barometrul Opiniei Publice, aprilie-mai 2012.

single party[82]. Finally, the tendency of absolute control is only a cultural trance, as, in reality, politicians are incapable of supplying society with vital services. Moreover, for example, economic crimes and organized crime registered a boom in Republic of Moldova lately, whereas the public authorities seem to be distant from the actual situation.

In day-to-day life, the necessity for an all-embraced control of power is often seen in small details that are not evident to everyone, but could be observed by those who are dealing with the system. One can often hear in Moldova that one or another person in a certain ministry or institution is a representative of the Intelligence service (or informator), which sometimes places their «agents» in order to ensure that the state controls everything. Of course the degree of control depends from one leader to another. Just a few years ago, when the Communist party was in office, in Moldova one could observe a heavy footprint of the presidency in the life of all institutions. Many changes were decided by the president and only formalized by the government, in order to comply with the laws. When, for instance, a minister was fired, without even consulting the Prime Minister and everyone was asking why, the answer was quite simple — «the First wants this». The institutional set-up

was also creating the necessary incentives for overall control: a single party has the majority and is governing but also the President of Moldova was the president of the party.

It is difficult to say that nowadays the willingness of politicians to control everything is lower, but the environment is not all that permissive. A coalition government formed by three parties (formerly four) is creating natural checks and balances between the players participating in the governing process. In addition to this, a strong opposition leaves small room for manoeuvre. Despite this, given the Moldovan context when many rich people (often called oligarchs) often pay too much attention to economic assets that they would like to control rather than control issues where they see little personal gains.

The post-Soviet behaviour of many public servants could be also observed when interacting with third parties, i.e. NGOs or journalists. There are many examples when certain information, which is by default public, is not published and when an organization or a journalist asks for it, the public servant needs the approval of the minister or the head of the institution to deliver this or that information. The fear of public servants is generated by the fact that nothing should be delivered without

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[82] Ibidem.

the consent of the head of the institution, even if this is not classified information.

Absolutization of hierarchy. Over the last two decades, the Republic of Moldova has developed a vicious axiological hierarchy. Due to the lack of an efficient mechanism for selecting values, political elites are the ones that foster the absolutization of hierarchy in this society. The events that took place in April 2009 (during the so-called Twitter Revolution) represent the most illustrative case of blind subordination to higher authorities, when, in the night of April 7 to April 8, enforcement bodies were hunting for young people on the street, arresting and maltreating them, and organizing trials in police stations during the night. Most of these actions were illegal, as police officers and judges are aware of legal norms, but they were blindly executing orders coming from superior staff.

However, in terms of hierarchy, Moldova is slightly different from other countries, like Ukraine or some other European states. In European states, especially within the EU institutions, a clear hierarchy exists to the same extent as in non-EU countries, confesses an employee of one of the EU institutions, but in contrast to the EU, in Ukraine or other post-Soviet countries, the rules for access to the hierarchy «peak» is different in different institutions, personal contacts being more important than the functional task of the those who demand meetings. Given Moldova's size and also the fact that many in the current government were formerly working in NGOs, newspapers or other entities that imply a high degree of socialization, the hierarchy is not protected by a fence. People could more or less easily engage in discussion, drop a message on Facebook, send a tweet or just meet them. Thus, one can assume that the abolutization of hierarchy is a matter of the human factor and size of the apparatus of the minister in question.

Intolerance. Political intolerance, warlike rhetoric and discriminatory statements represent the realities of the political process in the Republic of Moldova. Moldovan politicians scored the counter-performance to profoundly divide society on ethnical, religious, age, and professional principles, only for the sake of political gain and votes. The actual political context was widely sieged by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), immediately after April 5th, 2009 elections, when its leader, Vladimir Voronin, Head of the party in office, declared he had nothing to negotiate with «liberal doggies», i.e. the anti-Communist opposition which stood for half

of the country's population. From here on, a real war of statements commenced, insults and mutual accusations, absolutely inconsistent with a liberal democracy. All these nourished the political instability which has ruled Moldovan society for almost three years. The lack of a communication culture and discursive democracy furthermore antagonizes the political forces of the Republic of Moldova and, as a result, society on the whole. The statements that showed intolerance and inadequate behaviour to different categories of society became usual business for politicians and officials in Moldova. One can remember when the former president said in parliament that the current minister of transport is 'faggot'. It is important to notice the observations of political analysts in Moldova, who believe that the intolerant behaviour of the politicians was rooted in the Soviet times and is a conscious behaviour.

One particular dimension of the intolerance phenomenon in Moldova and other post-Soviet countries is the lack of reaction from the population. The fact that society is reacting poorly to such inadequate behaviour, in fact, encourages these officials to continue making statements containing intolerant rhetoric, this is not the case in other European countries.

Of course, one can say that there are cases of intolerant behaviour in the EU countries, but one should also pay attention to the repercussions of these statements, which usually end up with a request for dismissal.

The (in)tolerance of politicians from different groups is often observed during the debates of new laws. One of these laws was the Anti-discrimination law. Moldova took the responsibility to adopt this law within the Action Plan of Visa Liberalization with the EU, given the fact that many minorities, as well as people with disabilities were being discriminated against. In the end, the law was adopted, though, under a different name (law on equal chances) but it was indeed an interesting debate to follow. First of all, the law was returned to government after protests by religious groups that were arguing that the anti-discrimination law is not complying with the Christian tradition of Moldova. After having another round of consultations the law was sent to parliament and voted by the coalition parties. In fact, most of the politicians were not against this law. However, the unstable political situation marked by the inability to elect the President for almost three years was a time bomb able to generate early elections at any moment, that is why parties were carefully delaying the vote on the anti-discrimination law, because in light of possible elections, the parties which would have voted in favor would be punished by

their electorate, which was supposedly reluctant in this regard. As soon as a president was elected by parliament, the law was adopted and apparently things are moving on the right track.

A pretty similar situation was the registration of the Muslim League in Moldova. A decision over their registration was pending and Moldova was warned several times by different international institutions that the registration should proceed without any arguments, especially taking into account that the legislation in place allowed such step.

Both examples above show that the population in Moldova still fears alterations and especially changes that are bringing differences to their normal daily lives. The church proves to be a conservative institution that is trying to keep the homogeneity and delay the effects of the Europeanization, which in this case means to accept diversity. One should remember that the motto of the EU is «United in diversity». Certainly the inability to accept «others», whether it be sexual or religious minorities it is not only proper for post-Soviet countries. Countries in the EU like Poland are also known for their resistance against minorities, even if the roots of Polish attitudes lie on Catholic traditions and not necessarily inherited Soviet behaviour (when being a satellite of the Soviet Union).

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

Political string-pulling over law, nepotism and favoritism. The establishment of a hierarchy in the Moldovan political process does not only represent a reality of state institutions, but is also the current practice of political parties. Too much party discipline and the interests of some financial groups (or, frankly speaking, criminal groups) which control some parties, have personalized the Moldovan political process to a large extent and are depriving the state institutions of power. Numerous public institutions are paralyzed by such practices; the phenomenon of nepotism obstructs the structural reforms and political modernization of the country, while justice is very frequently powerless and trapped in political games and financial interests. Throughout the last two decades, the alternation of the government in the Republic of Moldova was accompanied by massive re-recruitment in the public sector, where even the technical staff within ministries (porters, drivers etc.) are replaced as soon as a new minister undertakes a position.

The most common occurrence of nepotism, favoritism, etc. in Moldova, is related to the sons and daughters of officials. If you had asked someone 4 years ago who the most successful business man in Moldova was, you would have most probably heard that it

was the son of the president Vladimir Voronin — Oleg Voronin. People who were closely observing the political life of independent Moldova know that Oleg Voronin had a startup business before his father became the president, however, the biggest increase in his assets was exactly during Voronin's presidency **(2001-2009)**. Both the president and his son were denying the fact that the business was growing. Only in December 2009, when the newspaper «Timpul» published an investigative article with copies of bank account statements for last 1,5 years, where Oleg Voronin spent about 16 million dollars, out of which 6 million was only on Louis Vuiton and other expensive brands. One would say that it is nothing exceptional for a businessman to spend so much money, however the declaration of income showed a way smaller income than the amount actually spent.

Another area where favoritism is clearly evident is in public tenders. Although many efforts are made to conduct tenders more transparently and fairly, these are still being questioned by watchdog organizations. In some cases, as the research on corruption practices prove[83], tenders are not organized at all, even if the law provides that all purchases should

be made through tenders. Moreover, the reports of the Court of Accounts that audited state institutions show an enormous amount of money was spent illegally and purchases which were not tendered for. There are cases of fake tenders in EU countries as well, but the difference is that justice is served and those who abused their position are punished, while in Moldova one can observe exceptions.

Business on state functions. Although remuneration in the public sector is not necessarily tempting, such an interest in politics and public jobs is not accidental. Politics and public jobs have become one of the most lucrative businesses in the Republic of Moldova, which, after investing initially (the financing of election campaigns becomes more expensive, public jobs are frequently bought with money), bring guaranteed profit and are not hostages of economic cycles. Therefore, all services provided by public authorities are either of low quality or «against unofficial payments», corruption being one of the most serious problems in the Republic of Moldova. The dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index furnished by Transparency International represents one of the strongest arguments for the above thesis.

Thus, the public sector of the Republic of Moldova is one of the most corrupt in Europe, being overrun only

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[83] Lilia Carasciuc, Coruptia in Moldova: Impactul macroeconomic, http://www.transparency.md/Docs/Coruptia1_pp221-383.pdf

Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index.

Country/ Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Georgia	-	2,4	1,8	2,0	2,3	2,8	3,4	3,9	4,1	3,8	4,1
Moldova	3,1	2,1	2,4	2,3	2,9	3,2	2,8	2,9	3,3	2,9	2,9
Ukraine	2,1	2,4	2,3	2,2	2,6	2,8	2,7	2,5	2,2	2,4	2,3

Source: *Adapted by author according to Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2001-2011.*

Chart 2. % of respondents who believe that irregular payments are used, by category.

Source: *The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Life in Transition, p. 91.*

by Ukraine, while more than 20% of Moldovan respondents believe that people use irregular payments in relation to public authorities[84]. Citizens' perception is exposed in Chart 2 in detail.

The recent history of the Republic of Moldova is full of examples where officials and public servants are involved in corrupt affairs. The cases of the so-called «raider attacks», when the assets of several banks and companies were illegally taken by firms from offshore zones, with the support of court decisions. Given the immediate actions taken by the authorities, the assets were returned and the public servants involved in these actions are being prosecuted. However, there were many cases when companies were taken illegally and no action from law enforcement agencies was observed, which might

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[84] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Life in Transition, p. 91.

also mean that the authorities knew about this or were paid to give their «consent».

Prevention of political competition. The prevention and annihilation of uncontrolled competition is one of the major concerns of Moldovan politicians, the entire political class is very attentive to its own image and rankings of politicians which are regularly issued in various surveys. The most recent example was the candidacy of the Head of state which had been sought for three years. The institution of the president these days is very limited in action, due to the fact that in reality the president Nicolai Timofti was elected mainly to overcome the political deadlock, despite the fact that the majority of people are willing to see a strong head of state. The Parliamentary majority agreed to elect a President lacking political experience just to avoid potential competion with a strong and active political figure. As a matter of fact, the behaviour and the popularity of the fourth President confirm the expectations of the Parliamentary majority, since he enjoys the trust of only 4.1% of citizens so far[85].

Nevertheless, fierce political competition is found in any corner of the world, including the US, but the rules are different from one country to another. It happens that in post-Soviet countries political competition involves instruments that are beyond the rules. These kinds of instruments are usually selective justice, political prosecution, mass use of administrative resources and a lot of black PR. Moldova witnessed pretty much all of these instruments. Just before the end of the communist rule in 2009, the current prime minister (formerly one of the main leaders of the opposition) was prosecuted in three criminal cases, which were later dropped. In general, in countries where political culture is low and no tradition established, the «ping-pong» with political prosecution is quite difficult to assess. It often happens that a certain opposition leader is/was indeed involved in illegal affairs and once the prosecution is started, the opposition leaders are quickly labeling the actions of the law enforcement authorities as political persecution.

The same goes for black PR., Moldovan electoral campaigns are full of black PR artifice. The latest one was held at the elections in 2011 (local general elections) when unknown polit-technologists (as the image-makers are called in the post-Soviet states) were publishing fake newspapers of important media brands (Timpul, Capitala) with declarations of certain politicians (especially the current mayor of Chisinau — Dorin Chirtoaca) which they never made. The

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[85] Barometrul Opiniei Publice, aprilie-mai 2012.

confusion was indeed very strong, given the fact that those who did this kept the same layout and font as the original newspaper.

A relatively recent example, which was considered as a political prosecution by the opposition, was the shutting down of the NIT tv channel which was the main media tool of the Communist party. NIT was warned several times that its news content was not reflecting events impartially. Following these warnings, the Audiovisual Council decided to suspend their license to broadcast. The action was immediately labeled as a political prosecution of the free media and of the opposition. Reactions also came from EU which asked for a just treatment of the NIT case.

However, one can say that in Moldova political competition is becoming more and more in line with international rules, even if there are exceptions. But looking at the last OSCE reports and those of other organizations, it seems that the situation is improving every year.

Absence of sanctions for lies. Lying is a «fundamental institution» of politics in the ex-Soviet area, and the Republic of Moldova is no exception to that. The difference between the ex-union republics and the Republic of Moldova resides in the proportion of the phenomenon, as well as the lack of any moral or political punishment for lies. Politicians lie every day in front of video cameras, in plenary sessions of parliament and during press conferences or «work on site». The lie constitutes as one of the most common definitions of politics in Moldovan society, the latter being a subject of such an exercise for two decades already. The citizens feel cheated, beginning with promises of a real sovereignty and a decent standard of living, but, practically, they unconsciously vote for the same politicians. And politicians again lie since they do not bear any responsibility and are hardly punished from the electoral point of view, whether it is the case of patrimonial bonds and privatization, periodically re-writing history in accordance with the preferences of alternating governments, or the everlasting justice reform. In 2001, in the election campaign, the PCRM promised that Republic of Moldova would join the Russia-Belarus Union and the two-ruble sausage, and the population voted believing that a party from the Republic of Moldova could reanimate the Soviet Union by feeding it with cheap sausage. After the two mandates of the Communist regime, the Republic of Moldova became the poorest state in Europe, and some Moldovan communists became very rich. It is true that at present the PCRM is in opposition (an aggressive one), however it remains the largest Moldovan political party.

In the same context, it is important to take note of another example when the electorate punished a politician for not respecting their promises. Iurie Rosca had been a top politician for many years leading the Christian Democratic Peoples Party. He was the one that always fought against the Communist Party, but in 2005 he unofficially entered into a coalition with communists, being appointed the vice-speaker of parliament and a few years later the vice-prime minister responsible for law-enforcement agencies. This step made the party electorate furious and during the elections of 2009, Rosca's party did not pass the threshold.

In the light of the above examples, one has to say that politicians in Moldova are being punished for their behaviour from time to time and a certain degree of awareness is being made, the only drawback is that the punishment happens quite rarely, at least once in four years.

Status privileges. Of course, in such a tolerant and permissive social context, determined by the amorphous mechanism of the circulation of the elite, the latter has become a specific caste of people, loaded with opportunities and privileges.

Citizens feel totally insecure in the Republic of Moldova, but the political elite is constantly surrounded by public and private guards, they block the streets and drive with flashing lights from parliament to the Presidency and backwards, although the two buildings are merely several hundred meters apart. Moldovan citizens work abroad to build or buy a house, while the Moldovan political elite dwell in luxurious villas with underground parking for their entire car collection. Moldovan citizens queue at Consular offices and crowd bus stations and Chisinau airport, while the political class travels with diplomatic passports and take private flights through Europe, negotiating the liberalization of the visa regime with the European Union. Moldovan citizens face serious problems in the health system and bribe the unjust doctors, while Moldovan politicians benefit from the services of private doctors and unfold periodical medical treatments at the best sanatoriums in the world. Finally, Moldovan citizens endure the consequences of a chronically-sub-financed educational system, whereas Moldovan politicians send their children to study in the best private schools and European universities. Despite this, Moldova is a poor state as far as resources are concerned and does not have the ability to provide too many opportunities for politicians this is why the politicians create opportunities for themselves.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Paternalism. In the Republic of Moldova, the model of the European politician alternates with Soviet or Oriental party models, or even with the model of a strong and divine politician governing in the ex-metropolis. Each time Moldovan politicians attempt to appear as absolute masters of the country's fate, capable of sorting out all society's problems within a single mandate, competing with dry promises in all election campaigns. The evolution of events proves that Moldovan politicians are incompetent and cannot even solve a part of their assumed tasks; the financial stability and economic growth are ensured by foreign donors and Moldovan citizens who work abroad and send money home; agriculture is dependent upon nature; public officials and road police are charging citizens unofficially, while judges remain immune in front of all threats to reform justice. The government is definitely engaged in implementing structural reforms and modernizing the country, otherwise the European Commission and other foreign donors would not transfer money to the country; but many processes develop their own course, while other reforms are purposefully delayed.

Propaganda-based political rhetoric. Political manipulation and propaganda, covering the incapacity of a radical and efficient intervention in society or the failures of governmental policies, remain the actual utensils for preserving the image of divinity and for discrediting political opponents. During the last period in the Republic of Moldova, alongside the liberalization of the mass-media, propaganda and manipulation are also being liberalized, unlike other post-Soviet societies. The main political forces possess their own propaganda strategies and institutions, by which they «legalize» all warlike actions conducted against political opponents. It is interesting to notice that pretty much all the important political players have their own media resources that «voice» the ideas of certain political parties. Thus, the media in Moldova have undergone a process of «berloscunization» which seems to create a sort of balance between the media sources.

Corruption charges to disqualify political opponents. Corruption accusations made to political opponents are the most frequently used propaganda mechanisms. Moldovan politicians mutually accuse themselves of corrupt acts and misappropriation of public funds, beginning with the first government since the country's independence. In 2001 the PCRM came to power, throwing accusations at previous democratic governments and invoking massive fraud since privatization, as

well as the misappropriation of tens of millions of US dollars given by the World Bank. The democratic opposition accused the Communist government of economic monopolization and fraud in tax management, illegal enrichment as well as the many family properties that helped Voronin to build his main electoral message in 2009. Regarding the opposition, the PCRM accused the Government, the Alliance for European Integration of fraud in customs and tax management, smuggling and maintenance of monopolist schemes which suffocated the economy. More than that, the coalition partners from the Parliamentary majority periodically accuse each other of corruption, smuggling or raider attacks. The accusations grow during election campaigns, when many politicians present all kinds of proof, figures and pictures with land parcels and luxurious cars. The paradox lies in the fact that few politicians were ever taken to court and none of them were condemned for anything. The ghosts of some files, closed or hidden for being revealed upon necessity, has been haunting the Republic of Moldova for a long time, but any attempt by civil society to debate specific corruption cases are rejected by politicians, as the latter always request evidence. Since they are the ones who hold the evidence, the accusations remain the prerogative of politicians only.

External and internal enemy. Another political propaganda component represents the identification of internal and external enemies, who conspire against the state of the Republic of Moldova and, as a result, block any of the country's development efforts. Apart from the propaganda instruments and the habit of disclosing «the country's enemy», the phobia of an external enemy is not only a quality of a failed state or a trace of the Soviet regime. Such a small state as the Republic of Moldova, which has no political tradition and which fought the 14th Army of the Russian Federation to maintain its territorial integrity and which, unwillingly, has foreign military bases on its territory, is somehow rightful to accuse Russia for many of its failures. Russian troops and munitions from the east of the country, as well as the secessionist regime Russia protects, are one of the main reasons for the Republic of Moldova's under-development and insecurity of its European future. Certainly, with regards to internal political fights, accusations were also thrown at neighboring states, especially Romania, which was called the last empire from Europe by Moldova's third president.

Death of ideologies. Finally, the ideological support of the Moldovan political process represents one of the main features of this hybrid

civilization. The ideologies mostly created in the XIXth century are not actual in the XXIst century any more and while basing on a political culture different from the one which existed two centuries ago, the growing interdependence of the modern world frequently imposes policies which are not necessarily related to the doctrines or programs of the governing parties. The European left-wing media vehemently criticized the policies of the French socialists or the British labourists, for instance — for continuing the predecessors' conservative policies, while the actual economic crisis imposes the reduction of salaries and social packages regardless of governing party's ideologies or doctrines. A serious academic debate in relation to the ideological support of the modern world exists, which is most frequently nourished by left-wing intellectuals. Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the greatest modern sociologists and (neo)Marxists claims that liberalism stood for an ideological centrist synthesis which has dominated politics for more than a hundred years (since 1848), whereas the XXIst century steps into a «post-liberal» stage, generated by an ideological re-organization within the world system[86].

The Moldovan academic world is not seriously concerned with the ideological basis at present, while politicians associate and load their party programs with all kinds of ideological fragments, hardly classifiable according to classical types. Another «ideological paradox» of Moldovan political life is the frequent implication of businessmen in politics, most of whom institute or become members of left-wing parties. Regarding legislative initiatives or governmental policies, this ideological disability has several weird expressions. During its governance, the PCRM came forth in 2007 with three neo-liberal economic initiatives: the fiscal amnesty, legalization of capital and quota zero for re-invested profit. On the other side, the Liberal Party, which comprises of the actual Parliamentary majority forwards all types of conservative initiatives such as: chemical castration of pedophiles, fines for those who make use of prostitute's services etc. Not forgetting, in this context, the support that Moldova Metropolis provided to a political party during the 2010 election campaign, and not to a simple party, but to a humanist party, regardless of the fact that since the Renaissance, humanism advocated for reducing the influence of church.

Conclusions. In his later works, Samuel Hungtinton warns against

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[86] Валлерстайн И. После либерализма. Москва: УРСС, 2003.

the possibility of a democratic recession in the world, where the democratization wave produced only electoral democracies, and the two alternatives to Western liberal democracies — Islamism and Asian authoritarianism. If post-Sovietness represented a distinct and consolidated civilization form, it could produce a third alternative to Western liberal democracy. Obviously, a «Soviet man» existed, just as obvious are some of the cultural and political features of the ex-Soviet area, nourished by a series of symbols, glorious memories and institutions which are very difficult to be transformed. There are similar political attitudes, behaviours and speeches in ex-Soviet republics as well, but it is hard to explain their «post-Soviet exclusivism». They are rather the effects of a delayed transition, typical of other regions in the world. Finally, other cultural peculiarities are foreshadowed in the ex-Soviet area, forerunning the Soviet Union or the Tsarist Empire. Apart from those similarities in the characteristics of the ex-Soviet area, it becomes much more difficult to compare press freedom in the Republic of Moldova with press freedom in Belarus, the fondness for Western values in Ukraine and Turkmenistan, or the perception of corruption in Georgia and Tajikistan.

Seemingly, post-Sovietness is a transitory phase, a moment of parting, after which: a part of the ex-Soviet countries will turn to Asian authoritarianism, probably combined with Islamism; the second part will join the Western liberal democracy, although not easily; and the third part will try together with Russia under the name of «sovereign democracy» to shape a distinct cultural profile, supported by stronger institutions within a Euro-Asian integration project. It might happen that the failure of such a Euro-Asian integration project would lead to their closeness, separation or the formation of a common bloc by choosing one of the two big options — liberal democracy or Asian authoritarianism. The Republic of Moldova, alongside Ukraine and Georgia, have a serious development alternative in European integration, the latter, if well negotiated and implemented, might approach the three societies to Western liberal democracies.

These are three countries under the Eastern Partnership that are taking the European integration process seriously and are negotiating the political association and economic integration with the European Commission, whose laws, norms and related standards are able to articulate new institutions likely to shape a new society. If

the institutions maintain their post-Sovietness and the politicians that get into power continue to conserve the institutions by which they had been educated, then the solution of getting out of this vicious circle could be the implementation of European institutions, norms and ways of development.

Meanwhile an important precondition for creating a prosperous European future and a democratic political system with accountable and responsible politicians is the adoption of legal norms. Condemnation of communism and forbidding communist symbols in the Republic of Moldova are also a part of the measures to leave the soviet past behind. It is also important to adopt a lustration law, it is not necessary to adopt a radical Polish model that will help in selecting Moldovan politicians. Finally, the input of young people that have studied and been active in the West could accelerate the institutional modernization and transition to the liberal democracy.

POST-SOVIETNESS IN MOLDOVAN SOCIETY

The behaviour of the post-Soviet man in the Republic of Moldova is a unique blend of traditional and patriarchal reactions, dictated by rural education and quite a close contact with nature, Soviet habits like listening to the speech of the country's president on December 31st with a glass of champagne in hand and newer acquired habits, inspired by the wild capitalistic sphere. Plunged into the social domain, the Moldovan is fagged out, subject to major contradiction — been used in Soviet times to knowing that his particular problems will find a collective response, today he is forced to find his own solutions to daily challenges, while preserving the nostalgia of lost social unity. These patterns of behaviour derive from what is called a fundamental contradiction between strictly individual solutions that the post Soviet man can apply and structural problems that society still creates for people. In other words, society produces further problems such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, over which individuals have no influence but, within contemporary Moldovan society, individuals are forced to find personal recipes to adapt and solve these problems. The state assists citizens only in a highly selective and symbolic manner. Therefore, individually used recipes are largely determined by previous experiences and the role of the Soviet way of life is often crucial.

Even after twenty years since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we can

realize that many of the codes of behaviour rooted in that period have remained valid, they are defining for a large part of the population. Many people begin their working day by listening to the news on the radio installed in their kitchen. Then, the day goes on in public transport, which, largely, keeps the Soviet «standards» of crowding and the rudeness of drivers. Exclamations like «Hello, boss, you do not carry sacks of potatoes (or wood)» or «Do not get in, the transport is not of rubber» remain in use, even if the political system seems to have changed. At work, we often see the same old bad habit of the skiving of employees, a tradition seconded by an old fashioned trend of employing more people than are needed at an enterprise (particularly the case of state enterprises). The relationship between employer and employee is built on the well-known principle «point one — the employer is always right, if the employer is not right, see point one.» Holidays and weekends are dominated by departures to country houses where the main interest is to grow vegetables, which is determined not so much by the shortage of markets or financial difficulties of campers or «fazendas owners» but by the habit of being self-reliant under conditions when you always expect crises or wars. Therefore, housewives continue to preserve and put the sealed food jars on the table with

pomp in front of guests, even though it is much more reasonable to purchase canned products from supermarkets. Men's parties imply drinking significant amounts of alcohol although this way of «removing stress» does not take the grotesque form of the famous Soviet principle of «split the bottle three ways» when three people meet on the street, chip in one ruble each and together buy a bottle of vodka (which then cost three rubles).

However, Soviet behaviour codes were heavily diluted by postmodern lifestyles, borrowed from the western patterns so that pure Sovietism may only be found in the form of reminiscences, a phenomenon that is now called the post-Sovietness. The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly altered the behaviour and attitudes of people in the Republic of Moldova, by ruining, first of all, the perception of unity that used to create bonds of solidarity across the USSR. People in Moldova vividly experienced this jolt which took the form of a civil war, called the Transnistrian war and experienced willy-nilly divisions and separations based on the criterion of identity. Nationalist discourse and idiosyncrasies were revived, surprisingly overlapping and even replacing Soviet behaviour. Revision of history textbooks, changing the name of the state language, less frequent use of the Russian language especially in education, identity quarrels in urban

transport and the kitchen and reconfiguration of urban space by creating new symbolic centers have caused a profound change in the set of habits of Moldovans, while cultivating a widespread aversion to the way of being Soviet implying a tendency of its eradication.

In a short period of time, the merchantability process of public space started, with citizens of Moldova discovering a taste for money and reconsidering the importance of profit in daily life. The merchantability of Moldovans' lives are carried out on two interchangeable levels. First, there has been a criminalization of social lives, criminal groups taking over certain powers of the state by — collecting taxes, ensure security, etc. This trend of criminalization evolved at the beginning of this century and transformed gradually passing to the oligarchy structure, which has great implications for political life. Secondly, there was «marketization» of the life of ordinary citizens; they are increasingly being attracted by the possibility of obtaining considerable incomes. In the 1990s, citizens of Moldova left in droves to nearby countries to sell and buy goods in demand in the markets of these countries, thus solving the huge deficit problem. Later, after the exhaustion of these opportunities, Moldovans migrated heavily to the East and the West, looking for sources of earning more significant money than those living in Moldova, becoming what is called gastarbeiters in the current language.

Gastarbeiters are people who are not yet Westerners and are no longer Soviet. It is a transitional state of mind, characterized by a high degree of flexibility and adaptability, openness to new modes of behaviour and an exceptional capacity to mimic Westerners, sometimes to the point of totally confusing them with local people. They take over their traditional customs, attitudes, behaviour, ways of speaking and try to be more Catholic than the Pope in their host countries. Gastarbeiters are also characterized by a vivid and incurable contempt for their past and the life in Moldova, considering it as something outdated and unworthy of wasting time on. At the same time, they frequently go back to Moldova and behave in the same way as people who don't migrate. The old habits reappear instantly, being a cogent proof that the process of mimicry is very superficial and doesn't touch the cultural hard core.

Another important type of Moldovan man who was subjected to the process of ethnicization and merchantability is the so called Transnistrian man, i.e. the persons who are living in the secessionist region, on the left bank of the Dnester river. This kind of person was obviously romanticized, being considered as a never dying fortress of Slavism against the

predatory forces of Westernization and a capitalist economy. The Transnistrian man is imagining himself as a true cosmopolitan in the Soviet style paying due respect to all nations living on the territory and not discriminating among them, at the same time nurturing a fierce hate against Romanianism, which is considered by them as the basic identity feature on the right bank of Dnester river. Additionally, he is cultivating a kind of personal glory as a Russian soldier who is constantly fighting the advent of capitalism which could erode the nobility and chastity of a population that lives on a plot of land being surrounded by very rich enemies eager to ruin it. This cultural repudiation of capitalist wealth is going hand in hand with an active economic life in the region, where new oligarchs concentrate power and affluence in their hands, living according to the capitalist precepts.

The Merchantability and ethnicization of social life had a huge impact on Soviet behaviour codes, often changing them to total disfigurement. Much of the population whose political and electoral behaviour is influenced largely by the ethnic element still have Soviet features imbued in everyday life. Many of them continue to watch the news in a Russian broadcast by ORT (being, at the same time, advocates of pro-European and pro-Romanian options), read books in Russian and use slang and

jargon from the Soviet period. The Merchantability of social life created some paradoxical combinations of contradictory behaviour. The population rushed into lucrative economic ventures that created a huge inequality between different social segments. Meanwhile, the categorization of the poor and disadvantaged often proved impossible due to the existence of huge gaps between officially declared and undeclared income. Thus, social policies aimed at specific target groups fail miserably because the economic activity of citizens is confined to the informal sphere, which allows the channelling of some social aid towards people with real incomes above the levels reported.

Also, the merchantability of social life has created subcultures unknown until recently. In particular the life of plenty and social prestige are worshiped by promoting a VIP culture. Such an attitude to spotlight the ostentatious luxury and glamorous lifestyle was a stinging reply to the idea of a celebrity from the Soviet time when people worthy of respect were considered the heroes of socialist labor, writers and intellectuals. Thus, society has not given up the idea of fame but found other items worthy of being imitated and glorified.

The post-Soviet man reinterpreted the idea of poverty. During Soviet times, there was a collective repudiation of poverty as a financial

situation, the state having the responsibility not to allow too a large gap in living standards. At the same time, the poor man as an individual was not despised like the rich one, poverty being acceptable if it referred to many people. On the contrary, in our today's mercantile society, there is a collective refusal to assume the status of poverty as an individual state although it is admitted at a society level. The shame of poverty as personal status is also seconded by an inherited contempt of individual riches, accompanied simultaneously with a feeling of undisguised envy of the rich.

Thus, the post-Soviet man is an oxymoron, made from a very few associated elements. He is greedy and eager to gain wealth but detests those who were more efficient and more fortunate than him and have accumulated wealth that he cannot match. Therefore, the modern man is an egalitarian under the factual conditions who wishes, at the same time, to stand out of the uniform crowd and get into the VIP groups. The post-Soviet man hates poverty and does not accept it in any way as a personal status, although he is often forced to face it as a real state but never confessed in public. The post-Soviet man is becoming progressively more mercantile and at the rank of virtue begins to harbor the idea of a consumer society but continues to use discourse notions instilled with humanistic values in public, specifically about the educational system of the former regime. He is still attached to the idea of rupture and split, perceiving society as a cluster of groups on a collision course but obstinately uses concepts and principles that refer to consensus and unity.

As inevitable consequences of such a duplication of the post-Soviet man in the Republic of Moldova, we may consider the individual hypocrisy separately displayed by each individual and the organized duplicity in the community accepting the multitude of individual bigotries, finding universally acceptable codes to decipher them. Individual hypocrisy is inevitable, deriving from the contradictory behaviour elucidated above. In more direct terms one can state that the post-Soviet man can talk for hours about honesty and honor but to be eminently corruptible. Or, one can organize lavish weddings with hundreds of guests but be poor. One can be an ex-communist and ask with serenity to condemn communism without recognizing his own role in committing crimes, considering himself absolved of punishment because of his participation in the abyss of nationalist movements. Or, one can vehemently blame Moldovan oligarchs of the contemporary period and at the same time make secret plans of a takeover, by abuse, of lands owned by neighbors.

Society does not record these little tricks and individual deceits, treating them with understanding, making everyone a part of this process in the whole society. The lamentations of university professors and high school teachers (like those of doctors or judges) regarding small salaries are treated with indulgence and allowed without ever seeing teachers receive the required salaries. The international community is promptly assured that in Moldova, society will fight intensely against corruption without providing any real support to this intention and without at least one lawsuit against the so called «gangsters of transition». All social subsystems operate under the perverse logic of compensatory mechanisms, using informal practices, on a large scale, to make the system functional but trying to present the system as being completely focused on formal and legal practices.

This hypocrisy in all structures conditions Jesuit behaviour, very similar to the way people talked in Soviet times. And then as now, they practiced duplication, saying one thing at work and another in the kitchen. The difference however is in areas affected by imposture. During Soviet times, the lie mainly included political and economic spheres. In the current period, the social sector suffers the most because of the real withdrawal of the state from these areas, but it is still

keeping an egalitarian discourse, with a strong social connotation.

ATTITUDES

Paternalism. In general, paternalism is a constant feature of the citizens of Moldova. The solution to all problems depends largely on the state's efforts, the citizen does not realize that he also has a say in this regard. For example, to the question — To improve people's lives, what should be done first? — about 33% of respondents answered that the state should create well-paid jobs in 2011. The share of these responses is three times higher than the percentage of the response in the second place, which shows citizens' concern for the way the state acts in the social field and they pin all their hopes eminently on the ruling role of the state. Also, people are tempted to put responsibility for the problems and crises in society on political parties which are often seen as the expression of state. Thus, about 55% of respondents have considered the ruling political parties responsible for the difficult situation the country is going through. Another 23% believe that the political class is in general responsible for this predicament.[87]

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[87] www.viitorul.org, National survey: «The European Union — the great challenge of Moldova II», September 2011,

However in contrast to paternalism, the citizen of the Republic of Moldova also has an acute sense of detachment from the affairs of society and the state, feeling isolated and not involved in social life. For example, only 20% of citizens believe that the state takes into account their view which contrasts sharply with 51% of positive responses referring to direct involvement of citizens in community life and 82% — in family life. Thus, the more distant the group is to which the citizen belongs the less he thinks that this group will ask him for a specific contribution (except for tax payments). [88]

Thus, on the one hand, citizens consider that the state has the task to solve society's problems and, on the other hand, the same citizens feel isolated and unwanted, with no impact on government policy. In these conditions, a new attitude is born to react to the impossibility to change state policies — going abroad, which is the opposite of paternalism and demonstrates the awakening of the active spirit which obliges the citizen to seek means of survival on his own. Such an attitude, however, representing the opposite of paternalism, is not able to create solidarity capable of strengthening Moldovan society but rather

a kind of selfishness such as «manage by yourself at any price without taking your relatives into consideration.» Thus, paternalism gradually dilutes into the opposite, without ever seeing new attitudes to contribute to setting society on a solid foundation.

And yet, Moldovan society still remains much attached to the Soviet past. This is demonstrated by a survey conducted in November 2009 by the IMAS for Public Policies Institute. The results are surprising given that 18 years had passed since the collapse of the USSR. 48.6 percent of respondents regret the disappearance of the USSR compared to 32.4% which have no regrets. The situation is even worse if one takes into account the difference in perception of living standards — 56.9 percent believe that living standards in the former USSR were higher compared to 18.8 percent who believe that now it is better. And in terms of housing conditions (51.1 vs. 18.7), health system (55 vs. 17.9), education (52.1 vs. 18.8), order (55.4 vs. 12), etc. the differences are visible and clearly in favor of the USSR period. The largest gap exists in terms of job creation — 68 percent of citizens consider that during the Soviet times the situation was better compared to 9.9 percent who have a good opinion of the current period. Only in terms of access to information (23.2 to 42.1), the freedom to travel (34.0 to 37.3)

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88 www.viitorul.org, National survey: «The European Union — the great challenge of Moldova I», March-April 2011.

and freedom of expression (19.9 to 44.6) the situation is reversed. Surprisingly, the field of the respect of human rights was evaluated by citizens in favor of the USSR period, 36.5 percent deeming the USSR better in this aspect and only 23.9 percent giving preference to the current period. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that to the question whether the Moldovan citizens would like to see the reestablishment of the socialist system, 40.3% reply in favor of this and 32.2 are against this. And to the question — If next Sunday a referendum were held and you were asked to vote for Moldova to again become a part of the USSR restored totally or partially — 43.7 percent of respondents replied that they would vote for and 29.9 would vote against.[89]

On closer scrutiny, we see that the preference for the lifestyle of the former USSR is dictated by economic considerations, such as living conditions, availability of jobs, affordable prices while the sympathy for the current period derives more from the protection of human rights — freedom of expression, access to information, freedom to travel. In these conditions, only a small part of the population — about one fifth of those who admit that living standards in the USSR were higher — give preference to values reflecting human freedom.[90] Together with another 20% who categorically believe that the current period is preferable to the past one (responding consistently in favor of the regime after 1991). The rest are attached to the egalitarian values of socialism and wish a return to the stability the past used to offer them.

Conformism as a dominant life strategy. Although the preeminence of egalitarian values seems to be overwhelming, we note that the post-Soviet man changes his habits and no longer entirely obeys the collectivist norms, often being compelled to act on their own, assuming risks and going against the tide. This is due to the mass migration of people from villages to cities and abroad. Ending up in fast-paced urban societies with a hectic rhythm of life, post-Soviet people cannot allow the luxury to remain slaves of the collective judgments; being tempted to take actions that may be negatively perceived at home but due to the new environment in which they will not be subjected to severe judgments. Thus, the conformity of

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[89] http://www.ipp.md/public/files/ Barometru/2009/final_bop_noiem- brie_2009_recap.pdf, BOP November 2009

[90] The figure of one fifth is approximate and stems from the difference between the 50 percent supporting the USSR period on the economic grounds and the 40 percent that, ultimately, would vote in the referendum to restore the Soviet regime.

the past gives way to an open-minded individualistic behaviour, often characterized by lack of scruples and obtaining personal benefits as the ultimate goal. Society is no longer able to suppress dissident individual behaviours that are lost in a multitude of individual actions driven by purely selfish motivations.

Delayed diffusions of innovations and fear of reforms. Such an individual dynamism is backed up by a preference for a social status quo. Negatively assessing the reforms in the early 90's. Individuals in Moldovan society have a tendency to look, with eyebrows raised, at any innovation and change which may bring, in their opinion, only unpleasant surprises. These negative expectations arise from answers to the question — What impact did the collapse of the USSR have on the development of Moldova? Over 51 percent believe that the USSR's collapse had a negative and very negative impact and only 23 percent consider the same impact as positive and very positive. Such predispositions are not at all favorable to positively perceive the reforms and induce a pessimistic mood that discourages reforms. For example, citizens consider that things are going in the wrong direction more often than vice versa.

Table 4. Question. «Do you think our country is moving in the right or the wrong direction?» [91]

	April 2008	October 2008	March 2009	June 2009	November 2009	May 2010	November 2010	May 2011	November 2011	May 2012
Wrong direction	26,1	27,9	29,2	19,6	29,1	21,8	24,5	19,0	10,7	24,0
Right direction	59,7	50,5	58,8	67,4	54,6	64,2	60,4	65,0	83,5	69,0

[91] http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_05.2012_anexe_dinamica.pdf, BOP May2012

Table 5. Question: I think first of all I am...?

Identity	Moldovans/ Romanians	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Moldovan / Russian / Ukrainian / Bulgarian/Gagauz	81%	58%	71%	81%	79%
Citizen of the Republic of Moldova	57%	68%	64%	46%	55%
European	6%	7%	3%	6%	10%

This discontent caused by a positive valuation of the past in relation to the present and future causes hostile reactions towards people from different groups. Individuals lose touch with the state and seek affiliation and identification with smaller and «warmer» groups like ethnicity and nation. In the Ethno barometer realized by the Institute for Public Policies in 2005, Moldovan citizens did not completely identify themselves with the state, preferring national identity. [92]

Intolerance. These responses show that ethnic identity is the most valued among citizens of the Republic of Moldova, the least ethnicized being paradoxically the Russians. The same study showed that the climate is characterized by ethnic tensions between ethnic Moldovans and Russians. However, the post-Soviet man seems to be able to gradually overcome the intolerance towards «others». The same study concludes that the relationship of Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians with Moldovans is perceived more as improving; yet it has a specific: in the row of the relationship with Moldovans we find a significant share of those who consider that this relationship was better before 1990. Meanwhile, the relations between Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians are generally perceived in the direction of an apparent improvement.

Negation of individuality. For this reason, we may believe that the tendency of the merchantability of the post-Soviet man gradually weakens ethnic tensions and «normalizes» life, pushing it into the area of civilized coexistence. Ethnic tensions are not cancelled and stereotypes are

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[92] http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Etnobar ometru/Prezentare_a_rezultatelor_Etnobarometru.pdf, Etnobarometru 2005

not eliminated, but people manage to find a modus vivendi in common without going on the path of conflict escalation. Only politics can awaken this dormant rivalry and it does this by means of the radical parties that wave the national symbols and call people to continue the ethnicization of social life.

Social alienation. The level of trust between these groups is not very high even though it usually exceeds 50 percent. In particular, the Moldovan stands out as the dominant group — that are not always inclined to treat other groups with trust.

This tendency of the dominant group to look carefully and through ethnic lenses at the other ethnic groups is a sign that individuals do not see stronger social bonds than those ethnicities which are the only able to provide certainty. Thus, in Moldova the post-Soviet man has abandoned the communist dogma and replaced it, but not in full measure, with a nationalist principle. He is not entirely socially alienated, because he shares the same beliefs and ideas with his peers of the same ethnic group, thus having a common space for dialogue, but is isolated from the other groups which he does not understand and accept.

Table 6. Question: How much do you trust ...? [93] (% for a lot of trust and very much trust)

	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians
Citizens of the Republic of Moldova	58	69	75	66	68
Moldovans in the RM	63	71	73	65	70
Russians in the RM	36	78	75	76	77
Ukrainians in the RM	31	70	80	67	68
Gagauz in the RM	18	56	43	78	63
Bulgarians in the RM	21	58	45	67	81
Romanians in the RM	42	52	44	38	47

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[93] Idem

The «marketization» trend of social life has however, a significant dilution impact on this ethnicization because it creates connections between people that transcend ethnic fracture lines through material interests.

Devaluation of talents, **knowledge**, **success**. In a society that has become highly competitive, with a retired and even absent state even if still proclaimed by the majority of citizens with quite fragile social ties (except for those ethnic), envy and the depreciation of genuine qualities are defining elements for many Moldovans. The drama of these post-Soviet individuals who are solicited to make special efforts to exit ubiquitous poverty, while knowing that success is not the result of personal efforts generally determined by an inefficient system, but simply the consequence of throwing a dice, is the inability to exit the systemic contradiction between the individual need to act alone and many insoluble problems that society creates, far beyond the individual's ability to find solutions to them.

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

The behaviour of the post-Soviet man in the Republic of Moldova is determined by the constant tendency to find and populate the well-known, secure areas, out of which «the other», i.e. strangers, members of other groups are expelled. Unlike people in the West, learning to accept and tolerate diversity — immigrants, people with disabilities, sexual minorities, etc., the post Soviet man practices old habits, is extremely reluctant to adopt new practices of behaviour and therefore isolate themselves with like-minded individuals, by locking in some dogmas of their own manufacturing — «suitcase, railway station and go to Russia», «down with the Communists», «no man is born from a homosexual», «money defeats evil» — these and many other beliefs condition defensive, sectarian and enclave behaviours.

At the same time, an opening, due to an entry into a new phase of development with access to the capitalist world, tested the flexibility of Moldovans' behaviour. Even if within their country, Moldovans show stiffness and are reluctant to make major changes in lifestyles, while abroad they demonstrate amazing capacity to adapt to foreign living conditions by being flexible and adopting behavioural patterns that are totally strange to them. This versatility indicates a huge potential for change that post Soviet people have and certifies that the myth about the indestructibility of the Soviet heritage can be easily shattered.

Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of Sovietism in the behaviour of the post-Soviet man in the

Republic of Moldova is the daily slang used by most Moldovans. The everyday language of Moldovans is far from respecting the canons of literary speech and inherits from the Soviet period a bizarre mixture of Russian words with Moldovan endings or the hallucinating insertion of Russian words in sentences spoken in the Moldovan language. This way of speaking was transmitted from the Soviet period and suffered contextual enrichment by introducing new Russian words borrowed mainly from the underworld speech. And yet, even this mode of expression, experienced substantial changes, with a different purpose than that of the Soviet period. If during the Soviet period this speech was natural, having a crucial role in expressing ideas in the absence of the required number of Moldovan words, in the current situation it rather has the function to make the discourse more «esthetic», by finding word combinations able to shock and to give more flavor to their speech. Although this way of speech is strongly opposed by linguists, the «theatrical» way of expression can be seen as a compensatory element creating a new reality thus allowing the speaker to get access in the imaginary area and cyberspace, escaping the pressure of the «tough» and «solid» reality. In fact, we witness a phenomenon of making speech more fluid that gets rid of constraints and rules and develops by its own paradigms, cancelling the dictatorship of philologists and linguists. This is also an example of post-modernism in the life of the post-Soviet Moldova.

Recently, the presence of communist monuments in different parts of the country reactivated the battle of history, dividing society, on the one hand, into the camp of those who want the removal and relocation of monuments in places away from public sight and, on the other hand, the camp of those who wish, at all costs, to protect these remnants of the past. This «politicization» of the topic of communist monuments, seems to be a little bit artificial, it is being caused by the inability of parties to find more exciting topics to attract votes. The local elites install or demolish Lenin's monuments in district centres, depending on the political coloration they have (like it happened in Riscani raion, where Lenin's monument was demolished then installed). In itself, the monuments no longer provoke fanatical adherence and only rarely provoke numerous manifestations, like the celebration of May 9th 2011, they had a rather festive commemoration role. The presence of these monuments does not have a major educational role and are not, in any way, a revenge of the past as some right-wing parties want to present it (even if at first they may

have had this role). Being novel elements of decor, they have acquired the role of an attraction pole for tourists in locations which generally do not boast any fascinating sights. Any person visiting these places takes pictures in front of these monuments to signal their presence near these statues whose value is precisely the fact that they belong irreversibly to the past, as mere museum pieces. And here we are witnessing an aestheticization of social life through a theatrical «recovery» of the past that is installed in a paradoxical way outdated and obsolete symbols in the center of cities. And only the political interest is able to reinvest with the real sense these relics and turn them into targets of special-stakes political fights. Beyond politics, however, the monuments from the communist period have a pleasant presence and do not provoke violence aimed at their demolition.

Concurrently, the politicians addicted to the past, feel that the communist symbols are not enough to create political thrills in the hearts of the electorate. For that reason, in 2012 they started to invent new patriotic symbols, like bicolor flags of Stephen the Great, which, as they pretend, were very popular in the 15th century, in this way trying to silently replace or diminish the importance of the official tricolor Moldovan flag. In this way, the battle for history

(medieval one) is becoming more important than the attempts to reclaim the Soviet past.

At the same time, informal practices are rampant in the post Soviet society and they represent compensatory mechanisms that „regulate» the „normal» way of life established by official rules and principles. These practices can be likened to the Soviet experience of boiling «samogon — a kind of homemade distilled spirit (moonshine)» in times of shortages of alcoholic beverages or purchasing deficit goods «on the black market». The general feeling is that the area of informal practices during the post-Soviet period expanded enormously and this is due, primarily, to the state's inability to control and monitor social life; while at the same time, an entity giving rules and promulgating values. Therefore the education, judiciary, police, health systems and the mass media, etc. function according to principles other than those stated in the law, which contributes to the spread of corruption. The state does not offer rewards necessary for the sacrifices it asks of its citizens (pay taxes, low paid jobs) which pushes the former Soviet citizens into fraudulent practices.

At the same time, different rules apply to climbing the social ladder than those of Soviet times. The role of family ties and nepotism is often crucial; individuals trying to create

groups of people as faithful as possible around them, which forces them to promote their relatives. This phenomenon of nepotism (called «cumatrism») clans of Asian societies do not have, being much more subtle, the links between people are much harder to discern. Nevertheless, the trust of the employer is often granted to those of a certain kinship and not based on an objective assessment of the skills of the applicant for the job.

«Cumatrism» is an interesting phenomenon which describes a situation when people who were invited to baptize a child, starts to be very close friends to that family, entering into a kind of kinship relationship. These people enjoy help and special deference and could be promoted to different positions by the father of the baptized child. This phenomenon was also present during the Soviet times but it was much less important as an instrument of climbing up the hierarchical ladder, having a familiar character (during Soviet times, the party membership and person's origins were much more important routes for ascending the social hierarchy). Today, people resort to cumatrism, attempting to build loyalties around them in conditions of a very insecure and uncertain environment. It could be mentioned that cumatrism is wider than clan relationship, because any member of the society could enter this kind of kinship and there are no

predetermined borders which could forbid access to such kind of groups based on cumatrism. In fact, cumatrism is a kind of formalized friendship.

At the same time, the role of diplomas and certificates decreases drastically, they are still needed to rise further. Being important but, at the same time, affordable, university diplomas have become an object of trade between the student and the university, obtaining them most often requires greater financial effort than intellectual effort. Under these conditions, everything becomes marketable and possible to buy, which further increases the propensity for corruption.

One of the basic features of Post-Sovietness is considered to be «preventive impoliteness» when people by default are not smiling, not polite, etc, unlike in the west. This preventive rudeness is common for Moldova too, but it was not proper in Soviet times. It could be explained by the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and the difficult transition undergone by these people. This unwillingness to establish links and contacts is a form of preserving the status quo in a situation when the person in front of you could happen to be a potential enemy (a person of another identity, a criminal, a thief or an oligarch). Nevertheless, this quality will slowly vanish due to the increasing standards of life and forgetting past confrontations.

The post-Soviet man's behaviour is, for these reasons, influenced by the desire to escape from state custody while the state does not have much to offer. Therefore, individuals evade paying taxes, receive salaries in envelopes, transfer money from abroad «in stockings», buy diplomas and exams, pay doctors and police officers secretly, and get their own justice by bribing judges. At the same time, each of these individuals maintains a good image of themselves, considering the obvious wrongdoings the commit don't matter since «everybody does it like this.» Thus, the organized hypocrisy of Moldovan society grows and all efforts to reduce the negative phenomena noted above creates solidarity and surprising alliances, as in the summer of 2012, when parents and students joined with politicians to combat the efforts of the Ministry of Education to stop cheating during baccalaureate education.

The Republic of Moldova has undergone a process of transformation from a soviet society and culture to a western model of behaviour and values. No matter how experts assess the progress recorded in Moldova in recent years, the transformation process still goes on and Moldovan society remains largely tainted by Soviet reminiscences, which became known as post-Soviet.

The stagnation, or slow progress of transformations, requires hardiness and willingness. Therefore, Moldova should continue on its European demarche which will help it to get rid of its post-Sovietness.

In this respect, it is important that Moldova continues to «purify» the political elites. This process already started with adopting a law in 2012 on condemnation of communism, which bans the propaganda of communist symbols and crimes of the Soviet communist regime.

Furthermore, it would be recommended that Parliament adopts the Lustration Law, which would allow «new blood» to take key positions in different institutions. Even though the law on lustration was supposed to be adopted right after Moldova got its independence, this did not happen. As the former head of the Moldovan Intelligence Service put it back in the 90s — «if the lustration law will be adopted, Moldovan parliament might remain without MPs».

GEORGIA

POST-SOVIETNESS IN GEORGIAN POLITICS

ATTITUDES

While Georgia's achievements in economic development are recognized by independent studies[94], in other areas old legacies are still hindering the state's progress. This heritage has a fundamental impact on all aspects of public life, having influenced not only modern political reality, but also the social and cultural aspects of Georgia's post-Soviet existence. The current situation in Georgia is characterised by high volatility and unpredictability. Equally uncertain is the geopolitical environment. The heritage of the Soviet past in the form of underdeveloped democratic institutions and political culture along with scars of authoritarian suppression, civil wars and ethnic conflicts, still continues to haunt political processes and building civil society, narrowing the space for political and social discourse.

There are many traces and scars inherited by Georgia's inhabitants, their way of thinking and their personalities left from the Soviet past. In the first place, there is a deep distrust and fear felt toward any state agency, political institution or ideology, compensated or replaced by relying on traditional kinship and personal networks of friends and relatives, or paternalistic hierarchies; by caution and social passivity, internal censorship and lack of critical thinking or evidence-based analysis, weak democratic culture and values, and dichotomous division into black and white, us and them and friends and enemies. Ironically, distrust toward the state is mixed with a strong dependency on the state itself, and expectations for its paternalistic support in many aspects of public life.

Still, political events that took place during the last 20-25 years appeared to be of enormous importance for the re-formation of values, attitudes, and orientations of Georgia's

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94 For example, according to the World Bank/IFC's 'Ease of Doing Business' rankings for 2010, Georgia has risen from 112th to 12th in the world since 2003. See also: Л.А. Буракова. Почему у Грузии получилось. Москва: «Юнайтед Пресс», 2011. — 271 стр. Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia's Reforms. The World Bank, 2012. 108 p.

population. Changes in popular attitudes by actually served as the main factor of the dramatic political transition. It is evident from the results of a number of surveys (partly presented further on in the text) that there was an increase in the readiness for and confidence in civil participation, optimism, self-confidence, pro-democracy and pro-Western orientation of the population, although this is mixed with social conservatism, lack of democratic skills, and the ability to understand complex political and social processes developing in society.

One of the most important aspects of Georgia's political reality is the system of governance. One may speak of the 'post-Soviet governance contagion,' when post-Soviet elites borrow various models and approaches from one another, especially related to a way of strenghtening the power of the ruling party and weakening the opposition. This, in the first place refers to the presidential model as the one dominating the post-Soviet space, even though some states initially tried a parliamentary model as well, and Georgia has currently moved to a more mixed model with a relatively strong Prime-Minister's position post (its initiation is delayed, however, until the incumbent president is replaced after 2013 presidential elections).

Another characteristic feature is the absolute dominance of the executive branch of power, essentially the presidential power, over other branches, and the particular weakness of a subservient judiciary system, which to a great extent serves and legitimizes decisions made by the executive. Parliament is mostly dominated by the executive and used as a symbolic agency for rubber-stamping the decisions parachuted from above.

In a paradoxical and maybe even ironic sense, once popular concept of the 'end of history' voiced by Francis Fukuyama, is found all over the post-Soviet South, including Georgia, — a spectacular though somewhat specific illustration of the phenomenon — while the advent of Western-style liberal democracy is still a remote possibility, governments have learned to imitate, although with different skills, the formal aspects of democratic institutions, and the leaders just love to talk about democracy and the rule of law, most probably interpreting those concepts in their own surreptitious way. Such imitational democracy, to some extent is rooted in the old Soviet tradition of organizing fake elections with a single candidate and no competition but also no real power wielded by elected officials, although the pattern can be discovered in transitional societies beyond the post-Soviet space. As a result, imitations replace real democratic

Chart 1. Is Georgia a democracy now?

institutions, presenting empty façades with little, if any democratic content.

Often group loyalties are much more important than state patriotism, professional ethics or sense of responsibility. This, in turn, leads to anti-meritocratic personnel policies and the ineffectiveness of governance. The leader's personality plays a very important role, and correspondingly politics is personality-centred, politicians becoming more important than any formal political ideology, agenda, or declared values. These, in turn, lead to the even more imitational nature of institutions borrowed from the Western models, and bring about more political cynicism and opportunism.

Chart 2. What does democracy mean to you?

Despite the above-mentioned short-comings, there is still certain and increasing public optimism about the condition of democracy in the country[95]. One of the evidences is the parliamentary elections in October, 2012 which were recognized by OSCE/ODIHR as free and fair. A lot of Georgian citizens also assessed their country as democratic one (38% in June, 2012; 49% in February, 2012; see charts 1 and 2).

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

Political string-pulling over law, nepotism, favoritism. Actually, among these three phenomena, nepotism was not as widely spread in the Soviet reality taking into consideration the full historical period of its existence from 1917 until 1991. But since Georgia declared independence, after a short period of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's presidency Post-Soviet phenomena swept across Georgian politics. They were observed on two levels.

The first wave began when Eduard Shevardnadze started establishing a state system. At this stage, nepotism, favouritism, and cronyism were visible and used as technology to fill out

the government apparatus with employees. At that time, there were two sources of manpower known to Eduard Shevardnadze (and maybe objectively existing): former high-ranking Communist party leaders (headed in Georgia by Shevardnadze during the Soviet period) and family members and the people close to these families. Just few examples Otar Patsatsia, who served as the country's Prime Minister in the mid 90-s, was a former Communist bureaucrat and an enterprise manager. Vazha Lortkipanidze the former Prime Minister of Georgia and the Ambassador of Georgia to Russia was second and then first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Komsomol during Eduard Shevardnadze's tenure as the First Secretary of the Georgian SSR.

Another interesting phenomenon in Georgia is the fact that criminals played a significant role during Shevardnadze leadership and presidency. Mr. Jaba Ioseliani, who spent 17 years in Soviet jails, was given a position in government and was Shevardnadze's deputy. Thief-in-law Tariel Oniani also was in tough contacts with the Georgian government. Despite the fight against criminals Shevardnadze failed to eradicate evil-doers. Mikheil Saakashvili carried out an extremely ferocious battle with them which ended up with the

[95] Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012. // <http://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-NDI-survey-update-June2012-ENG.pdf>.

complete liquidation of the«thief-in-law» institute in Georgia[96].

The second stage began after the Rose Revolution on 23rd November, 2003, when newly elected President Mikheil Saakashvili decided to fundamentally change the government machine. He only invited young people, who had received education abroad, to take high positions in the Government. «Don't take bribes and don't give jobs to your relatives,» was Mr. Saakashvili's first advice to his new team[97]. At that time, string-pulling, nepotism, and favoritism were not widespread. For instance, Vladimer «Lado» Gurgenidze a successful banker in Georgia and abroad was appointed as the Prime Minister of Georgia in November 2007 to stabilize the financial system of Georgia and bring investments to the Georgian economy. Grigol Vashadze — upon his return to Georgia from Russia in 2005 was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Kakha Bendukidze left Russia, sold his huge interest in a company and accepted Saakashvili's offer to take the positions of the Minister for Economics

of Georgia and then, the Minister for Reform Coordination.

Good example that string-pulling over law has changed in Georgia is Sandro Girgviliani case. On January 27th, 2006, the dead body of Sandro Girgvliani was found on the outskirts of Tbilisi, with overt signs of torture. According to Girgvliani's family, he had been murdered after an altercation with close associates of the powerful interior minister (later the Prime Minister) Mr. Vano Merabishvili. Four officers from the Interior Ministry's Department for the Constitutional Security were arrested on March 8th, 2006 in connection with the murder. The courts found the accused guilty on all charges but one, and sentenced one of them, the first deputy director of constitutional security of the Ministry of Interior, to seven-and-a-half years imprisonment, and the other three to six and a half years in prison. Following a presidential pardon in November 2008, their remaining sentences were reduced by one half. In this case, we can see that even omnipotence of the Interior minister did not save the four men from prison. On the other hand, we can see that the President pardoned them, but this is his right and nobody could officially blame him for doing so. Appointments in the Government of Georgia in July 2012, when Vano Merabishvili became the Prime Minister had nothing to do

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96 Interview with Alexander Rondeli, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

97 Shevardnadze son-in-law arrested, BBC News, 20.02.2004. // <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3505833.stm>.

with string-pulling, nepotism or favoritism. This was purely a strategic political decision by the President aimed at:

1. Keeping the course of the reforms, which started after the Rose Revolution, under the initiative of the President.

2. Strengthening the existing dominant political party prior to the parliamentary election in 2012 and Presidential elections in 2013[98].

Saakashvili's proposal to relocate the Parliament of Georgia to Kutaisi and the Supreme Court to Batumi is considered as a significant feature, which could exemplify the decentralization of power in the post-Soviet country. Moreover, this initiative was launched to recover the economically and socially depressed Western parts of Georgia like Kutaisi. The political elite understands this challenge and obviously has no objections. The fact that nearly 500 out of 735 parliament employees might be left without a job[99] could be considered as a positive fact — the population from the second biggest city in Georgia suffering from unemployment would receive more work places. Some experts express their doubts regarding the real reasons for moving the Parliament to Kutaisi. A Senior fellow of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Professor Vladimer Papava says that with possible complications related to the 2012 parliamentary elections and the 2013 presidential election, authorities would prefer to keep protesting people far away from the center of the capital city[100].

The Government that was formed after the parliamentary elections of 2012 has caused concern about its ability to continue the reforms initiated by the President Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution. For instance, the *Financial Times* stressed that «even Ivanishvili's critics have little to say against the appointment of Irakli Alasania, a highly-regarded former diplomat, as defense minister» (served as Georgia's ambassador to the UN from 2006 until December 2008). At the same time, the article notes that the appointment of the former AC Milan player, Kakha Kaladze as the Minister of Energy «smacks of blatant

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[98] Interview with Alexander Rondeli, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

[99] Gabekhadze G., Move to new Kutaisi creates unforeseen challenges for many parliament employees, The Messanger Online. July 19, 2012. // <http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2653_july_19_2012/2653_gvanca.html>.

[100] Interview with Professor Vladimer Papava, Senior Fellow of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

populism.»[101] Moreover, Transparency International Georgia drew attention to the conflict of interests related to Kakha Kaladze who allegedely aquired shares in energy sphere[102]. The Georgian media also drew attention to the fact that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Maya Panjikidze, is a relative (wife's sister) of Irakli Alasania, may also be regarded as a manifestation of nepotism.[103]

Business on state functions. During the Soviet time only the Communist party's structures were undertaking important decisions and the Soviet Government was the only implementing body. Since private property that could foster income generation was outlawed in the Soviet economic system, the triad: Communist Party — Soviet Government — Business was the only known and existing form of management.

Nowadays, political parties do not play any role in a direct influence on the economy. They are only the instruments of promoting and moving their leaders to power. Here again we can distinguish between two periods in the independence of Georgia — during Shevardnadze presidency the majority of high ranking Governmental staff were involved in different corrupt activities which were quite simple — just demanding bribes from citizens. For instance, the artificially increased (in order to scale down unemployment) police contingent was provided with scanty and irregularly paid salaries and advised to go to the city streets to find additional «income»[104]. Since official services and tax rates were higher than those asked by government racketeers, the population used to pay the bribes not thinking about the general consequences and was quite comfortable with this. Large enterprises were gradually owned by criminals and people close to Government and, were free of common corruption schemes just generating wealth for their owners and their associated «families». This resulted in complete deterioration of industry and agricultural assets, country

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[101] Wagstyl S., Georgia waiting for Ivanishvili, Financial Times, October 16, 2012. // <http://blogs.ft.com/beyondbrics/2012/10/16/georgia-waiting-for-ivanishvili/#axzz29YY0YWpt>.

[102] Possible conflict of interests of Kakha Kaladze, 22 October 2012. // <http://transparency.ge/en/post/general-announcement/possible-conflict-interests-kakha-kaladze>.

[103] Maya Panjikidze: Georgia will restore relations with Russia, Georgia Times, October 8, 2012. // <http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/news/81516.html>.

[104] Georgian example shows that police can actually be reformed, Georgian Daily, February 20, 2012. // <http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22159&Itemid=133>.

infrastructure, social, education and healthcare and other vital sectors of the economy and social life.

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the situation has drastically changed. Public services (e.g. Police, Civil Registry, Pubic Registry, courts, etc.) serve Georgian citizens quite well and in an efficient way. However, the fee of some of them is not relevant to the average income in the country, or in other words services are currently quite expensive. Government having no legal leverage to deal with the large enterprise' owners (they were not members of the newly set up government anymore and have turned into rich entrepreneurs) who privatized huge state properties through «loopholes» in old legislation and direct bribing for scanty sum of money, just forced them to give back some money; the amount of which was calculated by relevant governmental bodies. These, in fact, expropriated amounts were transferred to extra-budgetary funds which were out of civil societies control. Society despite a few cases such as 15.5 mln USD bail to free Shevardnadze's son-in-low Gia Jokhtaberidze from jail[105], Georgian Railways Director Akaki Chkhaidze

reportedly paid 1.49 million USD to the state budget, knows very little about amount withdrawn from these actions. Nowadays, all SMEs in Georgia are registered, must have a cash register and, government officials and tax services do not bother them if they do not break the law and regulations.

On the other hand, there are many signs that large scale enterprises are the targets of the keen interest of the Chamber of Control of Georgia and fiscal authorities[106]. For instance, Civil Georgia, informed in June 2012 that Georgian authorities had impounded the shares of the leader of the Georgian Dream opposition coalition, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in two Tbilisi-based banks following his refusal to pay a multi-million fine imposed on the billionaire politician, which seems to correspond with existing Georgian legislation. We are not in the position to judge whether these kind of decisions are legal or not but it is clear that large scale businesses in some circumstances could be treated as sources of state treasury replenishment. And it is not clear if Georgian legislation is

105 Shevardnadze's daughter pays $15.5 mln for release of husband, Pravda.ru, April 26, 2004. // <http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/26-04-2004/56813-0/>.

106 Papava V., On the Privatization Georgian Railway, InterPressNews, May 17, 2012.

equally applied to all parties[107]. The main characteristic of Soviet legislation was its selectivity.

Corruption at a citizens' level is actually weeded out[108]. According to the sociological survey executed by the TNS and presented in July 2012:

- *99% of Georgian citizens were never asked to pay a bribe last year. With this result Georgia ranks 1st among European countries.*

- *Among NATO-aspirant states in Europe, Georgia stands as the most successful country both in terms of the fight against corruption and the accessibility of public services.*

- *77% of Georgians consider that the Government has been effective in fighting corruption.*

Georgia is ranked the fourth cleanest country in terms of corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (behind Turkey, Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia). And this is the main difference between the «Shevardnadze» time and after «Rose Revolution» period (since 2003).

In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, Georgia was able to achieve that holding power is no longer associated with personal enrichment. There are many reasons to believe that many officials actually live on their wages, which by Georgian standards are quite decent, and those who came to power with exceptional incomes, do not use it as a source of personal enrichment. Furthermore, there is a bonus system that further motivates Georgian ministers. For example, the Minister of Economy and Development of Georgia receives substantial bonuses for the growth of direct foreign investment or the number of tourists visiting the country.[109]

Table 1 presents the high level of government official's asset income declaration reported for 2009 (USD)[110]. One can find that they differ from ministry to ministry, from position to position, but they are rather high. Of course, the population perceived these salaries as rather high in comparison with average rate of salaries existing in the country. We can assume that in 2012 they

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[107] Interview with Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Security Expert, July 2012.

[108] Interview with Kakha Gogolashvili, Director of EU Studies at the GFSIS.

[109] Interview with Vera Kobalia, ex-Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development.

[110] Ryan C., and Khotivari R., Tracking top-level ministry officials' income and bonuses, Transparency International Georgia, February 1, 2011 // <http://transparency.ge/en/node/1091>.

Table 1. The high-level Government official's asset income declaration reported for 2009 (USD)

Position	2009 Income (USD)
Minister of Foreign Affairs	51754.49
Minister of Energy	50990.2
Minister of Agriculture	45508.98
Minister of Internal Affairs	27968.86
Minister of Justice	25437.13

Chart 3. Net worth in USD bln. Aslan Abashidze — the leader (until 2004) of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic. David Bezhuashvili, a former member of the Parliament of Georgia from the ruling United National Movement party and brother of the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Gela Bezhuashvili. Irakli Okruashvili — had served in various important posts in the Government of Georgia, including being the Minister of Defense. Valery Gelashvili — a former member of Parliament. Vano Chkhartishvili — a former Deputy of State, a former member of the Parliament and the former Minister of Economics. Pridon Injia a former minister of Communications. Zurab Noghaideli a former minister of Finance and a former Prime Minister.

are even higher than they were in 2009.

However, as in all post-Soviet states, Georgia has politicians that were allowed either to keep or to accrue their fortune in the public service. The following civil servants and political leaders are incredibly rich (see chart 3). All of these persons gained their wealth in Georgia (in comparison with some other Georgian billionaires (B. Patarkatsishvili, B. Ivanishvili and some others) who became rich abroad (mainly in Russia). There is a common view in public discourse that all of these people utilized their positions in government to do business.

It is indicative that the young generation inherited some negative post-Soviet habits such as ostentatious magnificence, constructing country cottages surrounded by high fences, driving extremely expensive cars, buying huge plots of land which they actually do not cultivate but access to these plots is forbidden to shepherds and farmers who need grassland to feed their cattle.

Zurab Nogaideli was 46 years old when he was appointed to the capacity of the Minister of Finance. He was considered a member of a political team of young reformists headed by Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili since 2003 and at the same time

his estimated wealth assume by experts was 75 mln USD.

Personalization vs. institutionalization. Prior to the parliamentary elections in Georgia on October 1st 2012, there were few influential leaders (Michael Saakashvili, Vano Merabishvili — Prime Minister, Zurab Adeishvili — Minister of Justice — Prosecutor General of Georgia, Giga Bokeria — Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia). One of the main principles promoted by the Government was to develop strong and sustainable institutions that will have frequent personnel rotation in order to avoid corruption, creation of personal relations networks and getting unneeded political weight. To prove the above mentioned just recall that Georgia has enjoyed 14 ministers of defense, 14 ministers of Justice and 12 ministers of Health since 1991[111].

President Saakashvili, as a leader, is charismatic, dynamic, and enormously energetic with a high level of personalization which, in fact, gives him the possibility to make real reforms in the country. Of course, Mr. Saakashvili possesses the Western style of behaviour but with Georgian national patterns

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111 Election Profile for Georgia. <http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=1412>.

of private life. For instance, to address middle level and high level people use «batono» Mikheil, or «batono» President. Representatives of government call him just «Misha». And, vice versa, he uses «batono» or «kalbatono» (to address women) to speak to his ministers and common people. Even ordinary aged persons such as workers, peasants could greet the president in more informal manner, which does not exist in English, but in Russian it is known as «ty» and is absolutely acceptable in Georgian society. He drives his car, a Toyota Prius, by himself; though, one could see him using more special means of transportation like helicopters or diving in the Black Sea, etc.

Absence of sanctions for lies and fraud. Nowadays, politicians in Georgia are smart enough not to use blatant lies. Unrealistic future plans are more frequently used. For instance, Georgian politicians during the pre-election campaign promised voters to double the amount of pensions, cut down gas, electricity, petrol, medicine and consumer prices etc. These kinds of promises can influence a certain pool of the population especially the older generation, who still think that prices could be sufficiently regulated in cabinet regardless of real economic trends.

Another vivid example of lies of a social nature was made couple years ago by the authorities (Mikheil Saakashvili) to secure 100 USD pensions by 2012. Actually pensions had been increased but not to that extent. It is difficult to conclude if this in fact actually constitutes a «lie» since the situation is constantly changing, and couple years ago nobody was speaking about world economic crisis, but still promises were being proclaimed and, of course, nobody was punished or lost their job for this.

There is another kind of lie related to misrepresentation of opponent's plans, actions and activities results. For instance, former Head of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze said at an opposition rally that the Government plans to host 3 million foreign tourists per year is impossible, in general, since Georgia's population is about 4 mln and in case of implementation, it will pull down Georgian identity. Of course, it was easy for Mrs. Burjanadze just to take a look at relevant web-sites on the Internet and find out that Spain with 47 mln population receives about 60 million foreign tourists annually, and the Spaniards have not lost their identity, but she preferred to use spurious facts in order to blame the Government for planning the wrong economic policy. And there are no facts known to the interviewed experts of punishing politicians for their lies to the population

(e.g. not being reelected, losing their rankings, etc.).

These lies or incorrectnesses might be disclosed later on but the «word» was said and there are no sanctions being imposed. It is impossible to apply sanctions as this is the prerogative of the courts only, which lack the relevant article of law. But there is another way to reveal the truth with the help of civil society organizations and the mass-media. But NGOs are inherently weak and very few are really independent. Journalists are either politically motivated or amateurish.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Death of ideologies. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, communist and socialist ideas definitely vanished in Georgia. In the 1990s, due to the political maneuvers of the President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the nationalistic ideology substituted idealistic communistic ideology and had been spreading widely across Georgian society including Government officials[112]. The genie of war, blood and hatred was freed from the bottle.

Future political leaders were more thoughtful in this regard. President Saakashvili declared a broad social consensus through tolerance and civic integration[113]. The Georgian Government not only stated but also elaborated and adopted judicial grounds[114] for a new ideology of reconciliation related to people who currently consider each other as enemies — Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians[115]. Some experts criticize different parts of the proposed program[116] but nobody says that it is not needed at all.

It is true that nowadays Georgians are fed up with political ideologies. Tiredness of ideology spawned indifference to politics in general. This could be seen from chart 4 which shows that people are reluctant to

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[112] Keith D., and Grzymała-busse, A., The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse, World Politics, 2006, Vol. 59 (1), p. 109.

[113] On the development of the National Concept and Action Plan for Tolerance and Civic Integration, №639, August 8, 2005.

[114] State Strategy on Occupied Territories, Engagement through Cooperation, January 27, 2010. <http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc204.pdf>.

[115] Interview with Kakha Demetrahsvili, Consultant at Chancellery of the Government of Georgia; SMR.

[116] Interview with Giorgi Katcharava, independent expert.

Chart 4. How often politics is discussed by common citizens?

discuss politics anywhere[117]. People do not speak about politics, not out of fear, but because they are tired of numerous meetings and political rallies which actually, in their view, have led to unemployment, misery and political and economical instability[118].

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[117] Georgian get-togethers: Private Problems versus Politics, Social Science in the Caucasus, April 12, 2012. <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2012/04/georgian-get-togethers-private-problems.html>.

[118] Perceived Poverty in Georgia: Results of the 2011 Caucasus Barometer, Social Science in the Caucasus, July 13, 2012. <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2012/07/perceived-poverty-in-georgia-results-of.html>.

The ideological vacuum in Georgia was partially filled with the growing role of religion and the church in the lives of Georgians: a total of more than 80% of Georgians perceive faith to be an important or very important part in everyday life (see chart 5)

External and internal enemy. Pointing out the existence of and the naming of external and internal enemies is an important part of policy in Georgia. On the one hand, it helps to consolidate the population against a potential threat through increasing the support of the existing political power. On the other hand, it gives authorities a wide sphere of action against the opposition since quite frequently

Chart 5. How important are your own religious beliefs in making decisions in daily life?

they could be labeled as «agents» of external enemies (just recall Soviet litigations related to «agents of foreign intelligence services»). The threat of an internal and external enemy could sometimes be regarded as an interconnected phenomena. Like the Ivanishvili case who is considered as a pro-Russian politician and who got his wealth from his enrichment in the post-Soviet Russia[119] (external enemy) and now is declaring to gain political weight in Georgia (internal enemy). There was an incident during the 2012 election campaign when people were chanting toward Ivanishvili: «Russian agent, go away.»

As always, the external enemy factor could be sorted out in three ways, as fully proven, solid evidence and unproven. A very important example of creating external enemies for the strengthening of own positions and leverages is the case of Russia as an eminent threat, targeting the national security and sovereignty of Georgia. The Russian factor can explain many negative events that happened in Georgia during the last 20 years. What could be said about the fully proven facts of considering Russia as an external enemy?

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[119] Bidzina Ivanishvili: The odd Franco-Russian oligarch out to conquer the Georgian Parliament, May 4, 2012. <http://www.wespeaknews.com/world/bidzina-ivanishvili-the-odd-franco-russian-oligarch-out-to-conquer-the-georgian-parliament-52569.html>.

1. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 that took place on the territory of the sovereign state of Georgia.

2. Internationally recognized occupation of 20% of Georgian territory[120].

3. Announcing of two breakaway Georgian territories as independent states.

4. The 2006 Russian import ban on Georgian wines.

5. Forced deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia[121].

However, in the case of Georgia, it is important to note that the creation of an enemy is not happening on the principles of post-Sovietness, when an enemy is located in the West («decaying West,» «American imperialism», «NATO boot»). Even more, in the Georgian context, fighting against an external enemy is to some extent fighting with post-Sovietness.

Mixture of the Russian-national language in political rhetoric. In Georgia, the Russian language has lost its importance and influence. The post-revolution period and the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 facilitated and completed this shift. Pro-Russian politicians are no longer attractive to the Georgian electorate. For instance, Mrs. Nino Burjanadze with her old nomenklatura family has lost political dividends[122]. 2011 Caucasus Barometer demonstrates this attitude of the population of Georgia. According to the survey, 69% believe that English should be a mandatory language in schools, while only 14% give this preference to Russian (see chart 6)[123]. Therefore, the new generation of political elite prefers English.

«We are not against the Russian language,» Saakashvili said in April 2011. «If tomorrow Russian becomes a universal language for communication and the Chinese, Norwegians, Americans will need Russian to succeed in social and political life, we will have to study it as well.»[124]

Corruption charges to disqualify political opponents. Abuse of corruption

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[120] European Commission for Democracy Through Law, (Venice Commission). Law on Occupied Territories Of Georgia. <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)004-e.asp>.

[121] Russian Official: 'Thousands of Georgians are in Russia Illegally', June 13, 2012. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24887>.

[122] Why did Saakashvili win? Despite numerous efforts, Burjanadze failed to turn into a charismatic leader, Georgia Today, June 9, 2011. <http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=9147>.

[123] Education in Georgia: Results of the 2011 Caucasus Barometer, <http://www.crrc.ge/caucasusbarometer/overview/>.

[124] Saakashvili closes down Russian schools in Georgia, RT, July 1, 2001, <http://rt.com/politics/saakashvili-russian-schools-education/>.

Chart 6. Which language should be mandatory at schools in Georgia?

is one of the main instruments to disqualify political opponents or to dismiss some colleagues who are out of favour is a frequently used political technology in Georgia, like in most developing countries. Many high ranked Georgian politicians were blamed for corruption and ended in jail or fled away from Georgia. Here could be mentioned Aslan Abashidze,[125] the leader (until 2004) of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic, former MP and the businessman Levan Pirveli[126], Irakli Okruashvili[127] who had served in various important posts in the Government of Georgia, David Mirtskhulava,[128] the former minister of Energy of Georgia and many other political figures.

[125] Aslan Abashidze buys chocolate factory in Abkhazia, The Messenger Online, August 9, 2010. <http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2166_august_9_2010/2166_press_scanner.html>.

[126] Fugitive MP, businessman Levan Pirveli plans to return to active politics, The Georgian Times, May 14, 2010. <http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?newsid=21613>.

[127] France Grants Asylum to Okruashvili, Civil.ge, April 23, 2008. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17670>.

[128] David Mirtskhulava Confident of his Innocence, June 1, 2005, Media News. <http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=8976&lang=eng>.

Here, it is important to note that there were two kinds of charges of corruption. In the first one was a group of high-level officials who were charged almost immediately after the change in power (Rose Revolution for instance). They were arrested on the spot or managed to flee. [129]

Freedom House announced, «Over the course of 2004, a number of officials accused of corruption or embezzlement during the Shevardnadze era have been arrested. In a number of these instances, these former officials have paid substantial fines as part of the adjudication of their cases. More than $50 million is believed to have been collected in this fashion. This approach has raised questions about the soundness of a process by which lump-sum contributions paid by a suspect can simply be transferred to the Georgian treasury, or if criminal charges can actually be dropped on the basis of this sort of payment.»[130]

The second group consists of high-level officials who worked with the existing government over a significant period of time. A striking example is Irakli Okruashvili's case. The Prosecutor General's Office announced that it was going to charge him with a number of corruption-related crimes.[131] Irakli Okruashvili created the political Movement for a United Georgia and then, in 2007, he left Georgia and was granted political asylum in France. In March 2008, he was sentenced in absentia to serve an 11-year prison term in Georgia . In October 2010, he, remaining in France, joined Sozar Subari, Levan Gachechiladze (Georgian businessman, millionaire) and Erosi Kitsmarishvili (Georgian businessman, millionaire) in a new Georgian Party and warned President Saakashvili about his political comeback.

[129] Ex-Adjarian Leader Sentenced to Prison in Absentia // Civil.Ge, 22 January 2007 <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14486>.

[130] Freedom House, Georgia (2005 Report). <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/georgia>.

[131] M. Saakashvili: «I've fought corruption all my life», RT, September 29, 2007. <http://rt.com/news/saakashvili-ive-fought-corruption-all-my-life/>.

POST-SOVIETNESS IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY

ATTITUDES

Post-Sovietness inculcated for many Georgians a habit of relying on the care and the omnipotence of the political elite that generates a lack of initiative and limited social activity. A paternalistic model of power relations and civil rights in Georgia was a relatively stable trend, which remains essentially unaltered despite the arrival of new political leaders. However, the citizens of Georgia are also very susceptible to abuse by authorities: more than half (52%) of Georgians believe that «a good citizen» should take part in protests, 66% of the population believe that «a good citizen» should be critical to the government. Perhaps, the coincidence of such sentiments allowed Georgia to convey the democratic Rose Revolution; such a protest fervor occasionally compels citizens to go en masse to the main square of Tbilisi to defend democracy and human rights in the country. Georgian society was tired of any ideologies, it was critical to the Soviet past, and new ideologies did not find any fertile ground (the vacuum was occupied by religion; the church plays an important role in the daily lives of Georgians). In general, apathy towards politics did not lead to the loss of interpersonal trust among Georgians and in public institutions. This significantly distinguishes Georgia from many post-Soviet countries, because the police, the army and the administration of the President have a high credit of trust in this country. Georgians appreciate the democratic development of the country and believe in the need for further reform. What priorities does Georgian society have? The most important issue for Georgians is unemployment (for 78% of the citizens), poverty (47%), territorial integrity (28%), inflation (38%). To examine in more see the table 2.[132]

Paternalism and conformism as a life strategy. Two decades after the dissolution of the USSR, large segments of the population still expect the state to deal with the majority of their problems, which, on the one hand, hinders individual initiative and innovation expressed by ordinary people, maintaining what can be called 'public infantilism', but, on the other hand, promotes paternalist attitudes, arrogance and lack of responsibility among decision makers who are

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[132] Attitudes towards the judicial system in Georgia. CRRC, Tbilisi, January 24, 2012. <http:// www.ewmi-jilep.org/ download/21>.

Table 2. Which problem do you think is currently the most important in Georgia? (%)

|	
1. NATO membership	5
2. Corruption	2
3.Low pensions	18
4. Relations with Russia	11
5. Protection of property rights	1
6. Fairness of elections	3
7. Unemployment	78
8. Independence of courts	3
9. Freedom of speech	2
10. Protection of human rights	6
11.Poverty	47
12.Territorial integrity	28
13. Rising prices	38
14. Affordability of healthcare	14
15. Low wages	11
16. Independence of journalists	0
17. Quality of education	6
18. EU Membership	0
19. Political stability in Georgia	6
20.Other	4

supposed to be public servants, and their disinterestedness in public participation or involving the actors of civil society in decision making process [133].

Infantilism comes in many guises such as naivety, believing the pre-electoral promises of populist politicians but quickly forgetting them soon after elections. Another illustration of the personality-centred politics in Georgia, is that many political parties would not really care to present a consistent and thought-through

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[133] «Public officials often fail to see the benefit of involving a wide range of stakeholders in the policy formulation process, since non-profit organizations are often considered interest-driven and biased...» David Aphrasidze. Nations in Transit 2012: Georgia. Freedom House, 2012.

Chart 7. When deciding who you want as your Majoritarian MP, what is important for you? – Name up to three.

Category	Value
Ability to assist me with solving my problems	48
Their qualifications (education, profession)	38
Their honesty	35
Their connection to my district	24
Their experience in politics	23
The party / bloc that nominates them	15
Their past	12
The promises candidates make	12
Their family	2
Their age	1
Their gender	0
Other	2
DK	8

political programme or agenda, if any at all[134].

A striking example is Bidzina Ivanishvili. A lot of people voted for him because he is very rich and will share with everyone. It is such a belief in the father-breadwinner. In fact, for the half of Georgians, the main criteria for determining the ideal deputy was the «ability to help in solving my problems»[135] (see chart 7).

To fight paternalism in a political system, which did not give the opportunity to develop democratic political institutions was one of the messages of Rose Revolution. «Georgian society expects order from above. Consequently, the authority understands

[134] Georgian National Study, International Republican Institute, Tbilisi, October 27-November 11, 2011. <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012% 20 January% 205% 20Survey% 20of% 20 Georgian% 20Public% 20Opinion,% 20 October% 2027-November% 2011,% 20 2011.pdf>.

[135] Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012. <http://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Survey-Results-0212.pdf>.

'order' as maximum control which is masked under paternalism. Sometimes society protests against that, but the state cannot offer any alternative.»[136]

Traditionally, there is a notion of a Georgian people whose will could be expressed by the actions of one political leader. In this regard, we recall Georgia's permanent aspiration to seek for the leader who might save the country. And the first President of Georgia — Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was much more an intellectual than a politician,[137] is a good example of an important political figure who used to bare political rhetoric in order to reach popularity and to change the country through it[138]. For instance, he declared the Ossetian separatists to be «direct agents of the Kremlin, its tools and terrorists,»[139] which was also political propaganda attempting to solve Ossetian separatism problem.

While having generally a positive outlook with regards to the developments in the country, at the same time, people ascribe quite a significant importance to public activism, being non-conformist i.e. critical toward the government and participating in protest, even if protecting traditions (although the question seems to be somewhat vague) is still the highest priority[140] (see chart 8).

It is interesting to note a not too uncommon fact is that mostly the supporters of the Saakashvili party (about 20% of respondents, largely representing rural and less educated groups of the population) who tend to be more conformist. Also, the biggest part of the National Movements supporters, i.e. respondents who evaluate democracy in the most positive way, does not consider the participation of people in decision-making process as necessary. Only 40.1% of this group thinks that any person or organization has the right to organize protest action against state initiatives.

136 Interview with Emzar Jgerenaia, Sociologist

137 Mikhail Saakashvili: new romantic or modern realist?, Open Democracy, December 11, 2003. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/article_1637.jsp>.

138 Nodia G., Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in: Bruno Coppieters (ed., 1996), Contested Borders in the Caucasus. Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press.

139 Briefing Paper : They're Divvying Up the Soviet Humpty-Dumpty, Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1991. <http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-03/news/wr-2099_1_soviet-communist-party>.

140 Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia. CRRC, December 2011.

Chart 8. To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to...? (%)

		Very important	Rather important	Rather not important	Not important at all	DK	RA
Protect traditions	2011	79	16	2	1	1	1
	2009	77	18	3	1	2	0
Support people who are worse off	2011	77	20	1	0	1	0
	2009	76	21	1	1	1	0
Pay taxes	2011	72	23	2	1	1	1
Obey laws	2011	70	24	2	1	2	1
	2009	64	27	4	1	3	1
Form own opinions	2011	68	24	2	0	5	1
	2009	51	32	6	1	9	0
Vote in elections	2011	67	25	3	1	3	1
	2009	60	26	7	2	4	1
Be critical towards government	2011	31	35	14	5	14	1
	2009	25	27	21	8	17	2
Participate in protests	2011	31	24	19	11	14	2
	2009	12	18	27	19	22	2
Work as a volunteer	2011	26	31	21	7	13	1
	2009	21	27	19	12	19	1

Delayed diffusion of innovations and fear of reforms. During the last decade, Georgia has undergone rapid reforms in various areas of public life such as police and penal reform, taxation, healthcare, education, social welfare, local governance, and so on.

While during the first years in power the Saakashvili government enjoyed a high level of public trust and support that enabled reforms, one should note that while its popularity has to some extent eroded, especially after the crisis of 2008, the general attitude towards the reforms and the direction in which Georgia develops is positive, as demonstrated by

Chart 9. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the current government is making the changes that matter to you?

the diagrams [141] (see chart 9). This, in turn, means that, in general, public attitude toward innovation and reform is positive, unless these are followed by the dramatic worsening of the socio-economic conditions of life.

Some surveys demonstrate the success of certain Georgian reforms. In particular, after the successful reform of law enforcement agencies, the level of police support reached 90%. Interestingly, the Georgians generally began to treat public institutions, including the administration of the President, with higher level of trust, which significantly distinguishes Georgia, from such countries as Ukraine.

According to the survey[142], 71% residents expressed their trust in the administration of the President of Georgia, 69% — to the Parliament, 68% — to the government. This is the result of a sociological survey conducted across the country in March-April 2012 by the U.S. International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Gallup Institute with the funding from the USAID.

One of the most prominent innovations initiated in Georgia was the opening of the Public Service Halls. This is an unprecedented example on the post-Soviet terrain when the country has taken specific steps in order to break up with the typical attributes of post-Sovietness — powerful and

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141 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012.

142 In Georgia, 90% of citizens trust police and military, Georgia Times, 2012. <http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/news/75640.html>.

inefficient bureaucracy, long queues and the impolite treatment of citizens. The Public Service Hall provides various services — including the Civil Registry Agency, the National Agency of Public Registry, the National Archives, the National Bureau of Enforcement and the Notary Chamber of Georgia. The Chief Public Service Hall in Tbilisi provides up to 300 services.

Even such 'exotic' innovations as building a new city on the Black Sea, called Lazika, rather unexpectedly announced by the President Saakashvili in winter 2011-2012, without any clear concept or justification, is welcomed by population, which is, however, reluctant to accept the allocation of huge resources that need to be spent to implement the project. Georgians who know about this initiative are supporting it, despite the fact that only the first phase of the construction of the dream-city will cost 1.5 billion lari (around $ 900 millions).[143]

However, not all innovations that the population expect from the government are equally welcomed. So, the idea of President Saakashvili becoming the Prime Minister after the presidential elections in 2013 *a la* Putin-Medvedev castling, is not well accepted in Georgian society, showing that even legally possible motions may be disliked and are as distasteful as opposing the spirit of democratic transition. According to recent opinion poll, only 33% of Georgians support such a scenario while 36% are strongly against this idea[144].

Still, the list of the most desirable reforms demonstrates how much the population expects to be done, and in which exact spheres (see chart 10). Because Saakashvili's government had not successfully carried out the top priority reforms for people (namely: healthcare reform), is one of the explanations for the loss of his party at the parliamentary elections in October 2012.

Intolerance. The highest level of the underdeveloped tolerance or conservatism in Georgia is observed on the issues of non-traditional religious denominations and sexual minorities.

Religious practices of other confessional denominations is one of the areas where public tolerance is rather limited, particularly with regards to so called non-traditional confessions (such as e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses). Still, in general the tolerance to other than the Georgian orthodox denomination is low. Polls showed that only

143 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012.

144 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012.

Chart 10. Which three reforms do you think would be most important for Georgia/which do you expect to see achieved during the next 6 months?

Reform	Most important	Most likely to be achieved during the next 6 months
Healthcare reform	58	25
Agricultural reform	42	16
Pension reform	33	26
Education reform	28	15
Electoral reform	22	16
Judicial reform	18	5
Tax reform	18	6
Business environment reform	11	4
Property rights reform	8	3
Media reform	6	2
None	0	15
DK	9	29
RA	0	0

■ Most important
■ Most likely to be achieved during the next **6** months

Source: *Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012*

23.7% of respondents would think that other religions should have the same rights as the Georgian Orthodox church[145]. All generations demonstrate more of a readiness to permit religious activities to followers of the main religions, such as Muslims, Armenian Gregorians, or Catholics.

At the same time, while Georgians, the absolute majority of them being Eastern Orthodox by self-definition, do not demonstrate great zeal in observing religious practices; religious affiliation is an important dimension of their identity, and it is still believed to be the sole 'true' religion.

However, it is not the representatives of other confessions that rank the highest on the intolerance scale, but homosexuals, as elevated homophobia is a persistent characteristic of Georgian society, especially among the older generations — unlike

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[145] Sumbadze, N. Generations and Values, Institute for Policy Studies, 2012.

Chart 11. Lack of desire to have members of different out-groups as neighbors.

Group	Value
Homosexual persons	51
Drug addicts	45
Persons with mental problems	40
Alcoholics	38
Criminals	33
Persons with HIV	27
Representatives of other religions	12
Foreigners	5

Source: *Nana Sumbadze. Generations and Values. Institute for Policy Studies, 2012.*

religious intolerance, more visible among the younger cohorts, in general due to their higher religiosity (see chart 11).

However, the number of people who consider homosexuality unjustifiable remains unchanged at the level of 90%, at the same time, there is a gradually more relaxing attitude towards such social phenomena as extramarital sex. The number of people who think that it is never justified for a woman to have sex outside of marriage has decreased from 78% to 64% during the last two years alone, while the number of people who think it is never justified for a woman to give birth outside of marriage has decreased from 63% to 50%.[146]

Social alienation. While Soviet policies have to a great extent weakened interpersonal trust and caused the alienation of individuals, in Georgia strong family and kinship ties were able to resist such pressures, although a specific pattern of intra-societal connections have been developed. Social capital is considered as a concept reflecting such connections and interpersonal trust. Georgia has been frequently characterized as a society with high «bonding» social capital, but low «bridging» social

[146] *Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia*. CRRC, December 2011.

capital, i.e. strong in-group solidarity and out-group mistrust, revealed in weak civic engagement, low rates of group membership and participation in public events. Indeed, according to the 2007 Caucasus Barometer survey, only 0.7% of Georgians had attended a meeting of any sort of club or civic organization in the six months prior to the survey (compared to 1.7% of Azerbaijanis and 2.4% of Armenians); less than 5% of the Georgian population have attended a meeting organized by an NGO, participated in an NGO training, or visited the office of an NGO over the last two years. Moreover, just 1.7% of the population reported belonging to a political party, 1.0% of the population report membership in an officially recognized NGO or professional union, and only 0.77% say that they belong to a cultural or sports club or union.

The Caucasus Research Resource Centers Social Capital Report (2011) identified the four key obstacles increasing the bridging of social capital in Georgia as: 1) apathy toward collaboration, 2) distrust of social entrepreneurs, 3) a challenging socio-economic environment, and 4) the reluctance to institutionalize cooperative efforts.[147] However, despite the public's low level of formal participation in the civil society sector, widespread norms of openness and altruism seem to underlie the vibrant forms of bridging social capital.[148] Respectively, the generalized social trust (i.e. predisposition to trust people in general), considered a manifestation of social capital and social cohesion, shows significant growth in Georgia, particularly when comparing with neighbouring Caucasian societies[149].

Trust in people is among the other things that is positively correlated with economic well-being[150], and will probably continue to grow with economic development. (In the CRRC survey (see chart 12), 24% of respond-

[147] Social Capital in Georgia: Final Report and Recommendations. CRRC, Tbilisi, 2011. <http://www.crrc.ge/store/downloads/projects/CRRC_Social%20Capital%20Final%20Report.pdf>.

[148] Hough L., Social Capital in Georgia. Caucasus Analytica Digest #31. http://www.ge.boell.org/web/126-1125.html.

[149] Paturyan Y., *(Dis)Trusting People and Political Institutions in Armenia*. Caucasus Analytica Digest #31. <http://www.ge.boell.org/web/126-1125.html>.

[150] Mestvirishvili N., Social Exclusion in Georgia: Perceived Poverty, Participation and Psycho-Social Wellbeing. Caucasus Analytica Digest #40. <http://www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/.../Files/ISN/.../CaucasusAnalyticalDigest40.pdf>.

Chart 12. Trust in people.

ents rated their households' economic condition as poor or very poor, 68% saw it is fair, and 8% rated it as good or very good).

Lack of respect for property rights. As already mentioned above, the Georgian state claims to have created a free market economy in the country. However, this cannot be achieved at least if the state guarantees the respect of property rights, the courts are fair and capable of protecting citizens if their property rights are violated, and the respect toward private property is universally acknowledged and adopted by both the state officials and the general public. However, this is not yet the case, and the violations

of property rights are increasingly numerous, frequently disguised by formally voluntary relinquishing of these rights by owners, or taken over under the pretext of national interests.

In some cases, even assistance from Western countries would serve as a trigger to depriving households of their properties, as a digital database is created with Western assistance often was prone to conflict with already existent ownership documents on paper, or even enabled officials to manipulate such rights. Such cases were particularly frequent when the state has decided to develop important tourist or port sites (e.g. newly developed resort and port of Anaklia), or

when local developers were supported by local officials. Seizures and demolition of private property had peaked in late 2006 and early 2007 and have galvanised public concern about this issue, however, new waves of expropriations and property losses continued[151]. A number of NGOs in Georgia were quite instrumental in monitoring and reporting property rights violations, but the trend is still on the rise[152].

One should note that neglect towards property rights is quite common among the general public as well, although in this case it is more

directed toward authorship rights and piracy, as capturing real estate is not so easy for common people. As copyright was virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union, people, including publishers and producers of musical records, have difficulty in getting used to the necessity to pay when they want to reproduce some work of art or literature. Still another manifestation of this difficulty is the ever too frequent reliance on plagiarism by students when preparing their essays or dissertations (though a worldwide trend, it is still too conspicuous here), often without due acknowledgement of borrowing the work of other people.

Trade with PhD dissertations, research findings is relatively popular in Georgia for two reasons: there are certain salary bonuses for PhD holders (in medicine, education sector) and there is an advanced possibility to get a position under vacanct position competition; for instance, a professor of University which automatically leads to higher salary.

There are two instances of fabrication and selling of fake diplomas in Georgia during recent years. Tbilisi State University three staff members fabricated and sold two fake higher education diplomas for 10000 USD[153]. For the same reason 4 top managers (founder, rector, vice rector, and

[151] Property Rights in Post-Revolutionary Georgia. Transparency International, Georgia, March, 2012. <http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Property%20Rights%20in%20Post-Revolution%20Georgia.pdf>; Erickson A., The Case of Georgia's Disappearing Property Deeds, The Atlantic Cities, May 10, 2012. <http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2012/05/case-georgias-disappearing-property-deeds/1981/>; Patsuria N., Property Rights Infringement Practice Is Rampant in Tourist Zones, Georgian Journal. April 18, 2012. <http://www.georgianjournal.ge/index.php/economy/8876-property-rights-infringement-practice-is-rampant-in-tourist-zones->.

[152] Transparency International Georgia investigates property rights violations near the Red Bridge border crossing. May 18, 2012. <http://transparency.ge/en/post/general-announcement/transparency-international-georgia-investigates-property-rights-violations>.

[153] In Georgian. February 18, 2011. <http://www.heretifm.com/?2/1680/=1>.

study manager) of Georgian International Tourism Academy were detained and prosecuted in 2011[154].

This practice is absolutely out of interest and practice for politicians since most of them graduated from well-known universities abroad. They simply do not need such forgery. Incidentally, it is very easy to check up on the validity of diplomas.

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

Preservation of Soviet symbols in infrastructure. All Soviet and communist symbols were actually destroyed in Georgia in the early 1990s with full support of the population. Public holidays related to that epoch were also abandoned, except one — May 9th, The Day of Victory over Fascism. Nobody is even discussing, even opposition parties, the possibility of the restoration of former Soviet holidays. Georgian lawmakers passed a law on May 31st, 2011, prohibiting Soviet symbols, and banning former high-ranking Soviet officials from occupying high state posts. The law, entitled the Freedom Charter, unites two bills: one restricts the rights of former Soviet special services and top Communist party officials, and the other bans Soviet symbols in public places and

introduces additional measures aimed at fighting against terrorism[155].

And what is important is that these changes are not directed at Russian cultural heritage — Aleksandr Pushkin bust still stands in the center of Tbilisi, like Mikhail Lermontov, Aleksandr Griboedov monuments, Lev Tolstoy, Georgiy Tovstonogov streets. It is very interesting that the statue of Jospeh Stalin that stood in Gori (his birthplace) outside the Town Hall, until being moved to Joseph Stalin Museum, disregarding the Georgian Communist party, Russian Communist party and some other parties objections in 2010 as part of the country's de-Sovietisation process. What is important Mr. I. Alasania, appointed as Minister of Defense after the 2012 parliamentary elections, announced earlier that if they come into power they would ask the population of Gori whether they want to restore Stalin monument and would act accordingly[156]. This means that sometimes important Soviet symbols could be instruments of a political struggle. It was proposed to reorganize and rename the Joseph Stalin Museum to Stalinism Museum: then Culture

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154 In Georgian. <http://www.newsline. ge/?p=26647>.

155 Georgian parliament bans Soviet symbols, former Soviet officials from high posts, RiaNovosti, May 31, 2011. <http://en.rian.ru/ world/20110531/164345949.html>.

156 Prime Time Georgia, May 28, 2012.

Minister Nikoloz Rurua presented the initiative on April 9, 2012 while visiting the museum in Gori.

Irrational consumerism. Some Georgians who have gotten rich during last two decades really demonstrate excessive private consumption. Huge houses with swimming pools, dachas with high fences, luxury and extremely expensive cars, houses abroad — this is what these people and their parents lacked and dreamed about in the former Soviet Union (FSU).

For instance, Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder of «Georgian Dream coalition» ownes Glass House, a $50 million complex designed by the futuristic Japanese architect Shin Takamatsu on a hillside above the Georgian capital of Tbilisi[157]. Priceless sculptures by Henry Moore, Damien Hirst and others occupy the gardens, while copies from an art collection worth $1bn, including works by Picasso, adorn the walls.

The problem is that Georgia is a poor country where pensions are about 80 USD per month and the average salary is 426 USD per month[158] and such behaviour of certain part of population results in internal social protest by the rest of people who are below poverty line. This is the source of political and social unrest, recollection from «glorious chapters» of Soviet history and some post-Soviet patterns in such people's behaviour.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Intolerance to critique and need for idols. Post-Soviet people are able to wholeheartedly adore something or somebody or to hate. They accept either pathos or negation. The constructive critique in-between is perceived as an offense. Saakashvili asks diplomats to listen to debates after his State of Nation Address «In order to avoid incorrect criticism — though we will always accept constructive criticism.»[159]. But at the same time some authors note that Mikheil

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[157] 'Welcome to the James Bond house': The £30m palace of the world's richest politician. November 27, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2066855/Bidzina-Ivanishvili-Inside-30m-palace-worlds-richest-politician.html>.

[158] In Georgian. April 5, 2012. <http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=3&id_artc=9980>.

[159] Saakashvili Asks Diplomats to Listen Debates After his State of Nation Address, Civil Georgia, February 11, 2011. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23134>.

Saakashvili could not accept criticism and does not like public debates[160].

Georgians, especially of middle aged and aged categories, like people from other FSU states still need idols. For instance, despite nationalistic ideas Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as the President in the election of May 26th, 1991 with 86.5% per cent of the vote with a turnout of over 83% which clearly points out that people needed a leader, an idol whose personality was cloaked with the mystery of a fighter with the Soviet machine rather than a professional politician who would be able to solve social, economic and political problems which were destroying the newly established republic. Very soon, Zviad Gamsakhurdia despite his despair appeal to the population to support him[161] had to flee from Georgia. The idol had fallen. Then another idol had come — Eduard Shevardnadze and the population of Georgia again had hopes that he would manage to lead them to better future and again his rating was very high — when the

Presidency was restored in November 1995, he was elected by 70% of the vote. Soon he was accused (2003) by many Georgians of shielding corrupt supporters and using his powers of patronage to shore up his own position and idol has fallen by young and ambitious politician Mikheil Saakashvili — On 4 January 2004 he won the presidential elections in Georgia with more than 96% of the votes cast (!) and a new idol had born. It is difficult to predict Mikheil Saakashvili's political career from now but, apparently, he will not participate in presidential elections 2013 and maybe a new idol will emerge. Post-Soviet Georgians need idols, since they embody their hopes for better future.

It seems that all high level Georgian politicians tend to establish an authoritarian style of management Zviad Gamsakhurdia was «widely criticized for what was perceived to be an erratic and authoritarian style of government»[162], and «Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Communist Party boss in Georgia, who crushed the Georgian human rights movement and oversaw Mr. Gamsakhurdia's

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[160] Papava V., But the end of the year, by parliamentary elections we should anticipate high level inflation. (In Georgian). <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23134>.

[161] Georgian Crowds Step Up Pressure to Oust Leader, The New York Times. September 22, 1991. <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/22/world/georgian-crowds-step-up-pressure-to-oust-leader.html>.

[162] The History of Georgia. Post-communist Georgia, (1990-2003).<http://georgianamerica.com/eng/information2/art_and_sport/postcommunist_georgia_19>.

imprisonment,»[163] and then «Mikheil Saakashvili who led the Rose Revolution against the authoritarian President Eduard Shevardnadze»[164] and Saakashvili was blamed for the authoritarian style of governance in 2012[165].

But in the course of the parliamentary elections in October 2012, he knocked this trump out of hands of his opponents when ensured a democratic transfer of power to the winner of the race through elections.

[163] Shipler, D. K., Democracy Is a System, Not a Man, The New York. January 09, 1992. <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/09/opinion/democracy-is-a-system-not-a-man.html>.

[164] Georgia Imposes Emergency Rule, Spiegel, August 11, 2007. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-rose-revolution-wilts-georgia-imposes-emergency-rule-a-516144.html>.

[165] Authoritarian President Saakashvili coming to DC, The Peace and Collaborative Development Network, January 27, 2012. <http://www.international-peaceandconflict.org/forum/topics/authoritarian-president-saakashvili-coming-to-dc?xg_source=activity>.

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS

In preparation of the study, experts came across some similarities of post-Sovietness in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. However, some achievements have been singled out in certain countries, their success stories, which could be helpful in the process of overcoming post-Sovietness in those states. On the basis of these factors, the Institute of World Policy has developed ten recommendations:

- **Europeanization and socialization.**
- **Demythologization of the Soviet legacy.**
- **Active civil society.**
- **The key role of media.**
- **Implementation of e-governance.**
- **Exchange programs between regions.**
- **Contests for public offices.**
- **The fight against corruption.**
- **Debureaucratization.**
- **Improving educational standards.**

EUROPEANIZATION AND SOCIALIZATION. Seen as a crucial process, Europeanization is able to produce qualitative change in governance and social life. The process itself involves two-dimensional approach to be implemented: the institutional Europeanization and the socialization.

The institutional Europeanization, which is mainly focused on government and its institutions, is based on a normative approach by adopting the *aquis communitaire* of the European Union in the countries that are willing to become the EU members. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have already started to adopt EU legislation in different areas, given their commitments taken in order to implement conditions for visa liberalization, a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement and, the association process overall. It is important to benefit, to a higher degree, from the instruments that are offered by the EU in order to strengthen the institutional

capacity and to align specific institutions to European standards. These instruments vary from the Comprehensive Institution Building program that was designed within the Eastern Partnership and is aimed at cooperation in areas important for EU-EaP countries, reform of the executive body system, increase institutional capacity and incorporate cross-cutting issues like staff training and e-governance, to other instruments. Alongside the CIB, better use should be made of more traditional instruments like Twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA and CBC that may cover all the institutions and areas willing to reform and Europeanize.

At the same time, socialization is one of the most important tools in understanding the nature of the reforms that lead to Europeanization and the changing of behavioural patterns. The most common understanding of socialization is seen as the process of "inducing behavioural and identity change through interaction with a partner at any or on all levels (e.g. government, business, civil society and students), which results in social learning, model emulation and lessons drawn, etc"[166]. In the case of

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, socialization is done through programs like Erasmus, Youth in Action, programs designed to study visits to officials, EUBAM and others. However, nothing could be more powerful in terms of boosting socialization than visa-free travel to the EU (of course together with the implementation of conditions) and the investment in people to people contacts that would lead to a takeover of the European behavioural patterns and would generate a spill-over effect in society.

In the overall process of Europeanization, an important role should be played by civil society that has to be both, an example and a source of Europeanization. The process of Europeanization does not guarantee the exclusion of post-Soviet patterns, but in combination with other instruments, like, for example, introducing e-governance and technology, could become the most powerful tool to uproot the habits and manners which were inherited from Soviet times.

DEMYTHOLOGIZATION OF THE SO-VIET LEGACY. In order to effectively uproot post-Sovietness, the process of demythologization of Soviet norms of behaviour, phenomena, and symbols should take place. Sanctification of what is considered as "Soviet" is a notable trend, especially in Ukraine, and to a certain extent in

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[166] Emerson M., Noutcheva G., From Barcelona process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues, CEPS Working Document No 220, Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2005.

Moldova. At the same time, Georgia has advanced the most in the process of demythologization. For example, in Ukraine, more than 50% of street names have Soviet genealogy. Nearly all towns preserve monuments dedicated to the notable Charts of the Soviet era; the most common, in this regard, are the monuments of Vladimir Lenin. Meanwhile, in Georgia, Soviet symbols were destroyed in the early 1990's. In May 2011, the Georgian parliament passed a law on the banishment of Soviet symbols. In July 2012, a similar law was adopted in Moldova. The desecration of "Sovietness" depends on how long societies in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova will remain at the stage of post-Sovietness, preserving its fundamental attributes: either paternalism, or interpersonal distrust, or intolerance. Demythologization could occur through prohibition, which was adopted by Georgia and Moldova, and by debunking the cult of the "Soviet" through extensive discussions (involving the media) that would provide citizens with essential sources for the assessment of the past. In Ukraine, on the contrary, there is a boom in the consecration of Soviet life that is expressed at the entrances of various institutions with slogans such as "Tasty as in the USSR," "Available as in the Soviet Union," "Bolshevik", etc. Demythologization of the Soviet heritage is necessary in the cultural field as well and could be executed by gradually reducing the number of film productions, which reproduce or exalt discursive practices of post-Sovietness.

ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY. An important element of the transformational path is the willingness of citizens to self-organize and to manifest civic engagement at a local level. A major challenge of post-Sovietness is paternalism, that is, the belief in the omnipotence of the state and that it is the state, which has to solve citizens' problems. Such civic passivity, consequently, allows administrative bodies to play on these paternalistic inclinations of voters (politicians can easily "bribe" people with their promises). This indifference engenders stagnation, lack of reforms or their weak implementation. The active participation of citizens in the pursuit of their own interests will make politicians more responsible. Furthermore, a high level of activity within civil society will strengthen its democratic traditions. In liberal democracies, there is a noticeable tendency in the shift of decision-making power towards regions and the empowerment of citizens. The policy of conditionality that was practiced towards Central European countries did not always yield successful results. And, sometimes the EU suffered criticism regarding its paternalistic policies

(when the judgment of the countries from the former socialist camp was made according to the policy of "stick and carrot" and, after becoming a member of the EU, certain countries violated their commitments). This, in turn, led to the fact that the EU is focusing on the self-manifestation of initiatives on the part of other countries to undertake Europeanization, not through orders from Brussels, but through their awareness of the great importance of implemented changes. In the last decade, the EU focused its attention on the participation of the general population in the decision-making process (in such a way, the EU seeks to overcome the "deficit of democracy"). Here are some examples of the manifestation of civic engagement in the EU:

- Comédie (France). The program was established in 2000 by two associations (Geyser and AFIP). They have implemented nearly 400 projects in the environmental field.

- The Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe (Germany) is a non-profit association that coordinates the cooperation of leading experts in the field of democratic theory. Their goal is to conduct research and disseminate knowledge about the best practices of a modern direct democracy. The Institute was among the advisers and compilers of the Lisbon Treaty. One of its key achievements was the creation of the European citizens' initiative (it was launched on April 1st, 2012). Under this project, EU citizens will be able to make decisions at the same level as the European Parliament.

- Urban Lab (Estonia). Among their goals is working on new solutions for the improvement and diversification of urban life. To execute their projects, they attract scientific, social and artistic methods. One example of their activity is the transformation of a tunnel for pedestrians, on Viru Street, in Tallinn, into an art gallery.

THE KEY ROLE OF MEDIA. The media has the opportunity and tools to expose the basic elements of post-Sovietness: cronyism, nepotism and intolerance, etc. In countries that had to struggle with corruption, intolerance, and other manifestations of dishonesty in political or social behaviour, the media played a crucial role. In this case, representatives of the media have truly become *muckrakers*, a term applied to a group of American journalists in the early twentieth century, who actively investigated corruption scandals implicating manifestations of nepotism and the government's abuse of power in the United States. Moreover, it is muckrakers who laid the foundation for today's *watchdog journalism*,

when a journalist takes the role and responsibility for criticizing the authorities. The journalist, in this case, truly becomes the "watchdog" of society. The effect of investigative journalism on social and political life in the West is very significant; media activity fosters alterations in government circles and institutional practices that are associated with the exposure of the dishonesty of politicians. For example, in 2009, a group of British journalists from the *The Daily Telegraph* published materials that indicated the misuse of public funds by members of the Parliament of Great Britain. The publication of this information has led to a large number of resignations, dismissals, public apologies and compensation of costs. Moreover, the Parliament initiated a series of political reforms that were aimed to change legislation for implementing tighter control over the use of public funds. Another example is the resonant case against the former French President Jacques Chirac, connected to his 18-year term as the mayor of Paris. He was accused of embezzling public funds and abuse of office. Most of the materials for the investigation were presented by journalists who carried out the investigation of Mr. Chirac's violations during his political career.

It is the media that is able to detect the main manifestations of post-Sovietness and send signals to civil society and to the authorities on the need for institutional changes and discursive practices in order to eliminate these elements. In 2011, a Group of eminent persons from the Council of Europe (it included Joschka Fischer, Javier Solana and others) prepared a report aimed at fighting the challenges, which are connected with increasing intolerance and discrimination[167]. They also emphasize the key role of mass media to combat such negative trends, «we encourage journalists and media professionals to exercise special care not to disseminate myths and stereotypes about members of a particular ethnic or religious group.» The document calls on governments to ensure that media literacy programmes are included as a core element in school curricula, and that children and young people are alerted to the expressions motivated by racist, xenophobic and antisemitic or other related bias.

The citizens of states on post-Soviet terrain have a high level of confidence in the media. For instance, in Ukraine, 46% of citizens expressed their trust in the media.[168] In

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167 Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, 2011. <http://book.coe.int/ftp/3667.pdf>.

168 Когут I., Ресурс недовіри, Известия, 21 березня 2011 року. <http://izvestia.com.ua/ru/article/3769>.

Moldova, 16% stated that they highly trust journalists and 59% generally trust media representatives.[169] Strength of the media could be explicitly perceived in a scandal that occurred in September 2012 in Georgia. Georgian media showed footage, which recorded instances of violence in the penitentiary system of the country. This event became one of the major reasons that led to the defeat of the ruling party «United National Movement» in parliamentary elections.

IMPLEMENTATION OF E-GOVERNANCE. Electronic Governance (e-Government) is an effective mechanism for resolving a range of problems that exist in the post-Soviet countries. The use of the Internet to provide citizens with information and services in the public sector (that is the definition of e-government provided by the UN) allows the reduction of extensive bureaucracy, inherited from the Soviet system, while significantly increasing the quality, efficiency and the speed of the service from public authorities. With e-governance, citizens can quickly obtain or submit necessary certificates and other documents to state institutions without wasting time in lines

and dizzily running around endless offices.

Another important advantage of online communications is the ability to reduce personal contact with officials; most of whom, by using their official position, establish unofficial rates on certain services in the public sector. It should also be noted that the transfer of the government sector to a virtual space enhances its transparency because this concept involves continuous interactive communication between citizens (consumers of public services) and government. The latter is constantly reporting to visitors of government web resources about its successes and failures and responding to public requests, etc. For post-Soviet states, there is another significant advantage of e-governance, since it prevents manipulation of facts and statistics by state authorities that are often abused by Ukrainian officials.

Undoubtedly, Estonia is the leader in the use of advanced communications in the public sector on the post-Soviet terrain. Back in 1998, the country approved the foundational document "*Principles of Estonian Information Policy*", which was updated in 2004. In 2007, "*Estonian Information Society Strategy. 2013*" came into force. In addition, the Estonian Parliament adopted several laws concerning information technology security and the protection of personal data. The Estonian

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169 Barometer of Public Opinion, Institute of Public Policy, April 2012, Chisinau, p. 36. <http://www.ipp.md/libview. php?l=en&idc=156&id=610>.

leadership undertook such consistent and robust steps in order to implement Internet technologies in various areas of social and political life and these efforts yielded substantial results. According to the UN report "*E-Government Survey 2012*: *E-Government for the People*," Estonia was ranked among the top 20 countries on the dynamics of developing e-governance. Recently, there has been progress in implementing elements of e-governance in Moldova and Georgia. In the aforementioned UN report, in 2012, Moldova was placed on the 69th position compared to the 80th in 2010. Even a better trend in the application of information technology in the public sphere is demonstrated by Georgia. In 2010 it was ranked 100th position, in 2012 it went up to 72nd position. Ukraine, on the contrary, showed the opposite trend, by losing 14 positions in the ranking and moved down from 54th to 68th position.

So, e-government is an effective tool for optimizing the quantity of bureaucracy, which, besides providing free public access and information services, also allows the overcoming of corruption schemes in the public sector. With the introduction of e-government, officials will lose their privileged position, which they had acquired in Soviet times, while citizens get access to necessary public services without bureaucratic hurdles. For e-government to be truly effective, it is also necessary to expand the audience of Internet users. For example, the European experience of creating Wi-Fi cities could be useful for post-Soviet states. This idea would be particularly relevant in cities where there is large number of youth communities. The younger generation is more open to innovation, and hence the electronic access to government agencies could be in special demand.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS BETWEEN REGIONS. In Soviet times, the mobility of labor and social resources, in a wide area of the USSR, was quite high. Ukrainian farmers took part in the Virgin lands campaign in the Central Asia, Russian engineers had been working in Ukraine and Moldovan soldiers served in the Far East. With the collapse of the Union, this type of social communication became extinct along with the state, and the crisis of the 1990s induced the alienation of the population even within specific nation states. The Soviet Man had lost his "grandiose and omnipotent" homeland. The post-Soviet Man has not obtained his homeland yet and confined himself to the narrow limits of the local world. Today, social mobility is limited to flows of migrant workers from different villages and towns to larger cities, particularly in recent years, rapidly growing Kyiv. And to "unload", over-populated by Georgian standards,

Tbilisi, President Saakashvili initiated the transfer of Parliament to Kutaisi. However, the level of interregional contacts in the post-Soviet states is rather low.

Lack of experience in personal communication with compatriots from other regions of the country opens a space for information manipulation and imposing stereotypes that are freely used by many political forces. This gives grounds to speak about the current division between, for example, West and East (in the case of Ukraine), and fuel adversary attitudes in areas that exist in the stage of 'frozen conflicts' (Georgia and Moldova). For example, the ordinary Ukrainian from the Eastern region of the country imagines Lviv as a city where the streets are filled with Banderas (developed by Soviet propaganda notion referring to the extremist followers of the Ukrainian far-right ideologist Stepan Bandera), and many Moldovans traditionally call Transnistrians at best 'separatists.'

To find common ground between citizens, who are trapped in stereotypes, is extremely difficult and social exclusion as well as interpersonal distrust hinders national development and consolidation of society.

Stimulating interpersonal contacts will assist in overcoming these post-Soviet phenomena. Frequent trips outside their own villages (town, region) could drastically change the imagery of their country. Particular attention should be given to the most mobile populations, whose consciousness has not come from the influence of an information cliche yet. First of all, they are represented by children and students. The exchange programs between universities, internships, study trips, summer schools, tourist travel are simple but effective steps that could assist in overcoming post-Soviet distrust and bias towards compatriots.

Gradually, the understanding of the necessity of interregional integration is spreading within post-Soviet states. Mikheil Saakashvili has repeatedly emphasized that the return of Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia starts at the level of interpersonal contacts, through which the common people of the breakaway regions will impartially examine the practical achievements of the reforms in Georgia and lobby returning under the jurisdiction of Tbilisi. In Moldova, the 'bottom-up solution' for solving the Transnistrian conflict, i.e. raising the level of interpersonal communication has been recently proposed by experts Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra.[170] In Ukraine, highly politicized division between East and West has

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[170] Litra L., and Popescu N., Transnistria: A bottom-up solution, ECFR-IDIS, 2012. <http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/transnistria_a_bottom_up_solution>.

only exacerbated in recent years. The adoption of a controversial law on regional languages substantially contributed to the exacerbation of the issue. In solving the problems of the consolidation of Ukrainian society and overcoming social exclusion, one should count more on civil society, and interpersonal communication rather than on a balanced state policy.

CONTEST FOR PUBLIC OFFICES. The criteria in selecting a person for a particular official position should be a professional qualification and quality rather than family ties. This principle, which is widely accepted in European democracies, encounters insurmountable hindrances in taking roots on the post-Soviet terrain. Nepotism is common in government and almost impossible to eradicate and, typical for post-Soviet countries cronyism is based on informal friendly relations, unlike family ties, even impossible to prove with formal legal evidence.

However, while eradicating entire dynasties of government officials, including the executive branch, a balance should be maintained between punishment for malpractice and evaluation of real merit of those who might be in the chair of civil servants due to family or other connections. Thus, the only effective mechanism, in this context, is an open and transparent competition

for vacant positions in state and local government.

European practices applicable to the process of competing for a position in the public service are quite simple. The document, issued by the Civil Service Commission of Great Britain, proposed the following principles of selection for public office: the selection should take place in an open and fair competition on the merit-based principle. Competition for vacancies in the civil service should be declared in the media, with the widest possible audience. The practice of commission for selection of candidates is noted for its transparency and openness. And a principle of selection ensures that only the candidate who performs the proposed work in the best way will receive the position.

In the former Soviet republics, these simple principles for hiring civil servants are still regarded as mere formalities. For instance, Georgia has demonstrated certain advancement by substantially increasing the number of young professionals, who were recruited through competitive selection, in the government. In Moldova, as a part of tender committees to select candidates for vacancies within the executive branch usually must be at least one independent expert and representative of civil society. For example, in autumn 2012, the traffic police attestation took place in Moldova and the certification

committee included representative from the civil sector (resulting in 50% of employees have not passed certification; only 10% were certified, 40% left on probation).

In Ukraine, the new law "On Civil Service", adopted by Parliament on the 17th November 2011, asserts that the commissions may include public servants and experts with appropriate specializations. But most of the activities of competitive commissions and principles of decision-making remain a mystery under seven seals.

One of the reasons for rampant nepotism on the post-Soviet terrain is the fact that civil servants are perceived as a privileged caste, who can get away from any persecution. However, in European countries, government officials are employees of public institutions that are called to work in the interest of citizens to meet their needs.

Openness and transparency in public service, clear principles for the selection of civil servants, fair competition for vacancies with the assistance of independent experts are essential elements that will further assist in transformation of post-Soviet bureaucratic systems in accordance with European norms and practices.

FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION. Bribery is one of the main challenges that post-Soviet countries have to face on their way to transformation. According to the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International), Georgia is currently ranked 64th (this is noticeable progress of the country if to compare that in 2010, it was ranked at 68th position). This is not true of Moldova, which in 2010 held 105th position and, in 2011, slipped to 112th. Even more impressive are the trends in the perception of corruption in Ukraine, in 2010, the state was at 134th position, and in 2011 went down to 152nd position[171]. Thus, only Georgia has showed some progress in the field of fighting against corruption. For instance, in 2010, Georgia held the first place on the level of relative reduction of corruption according to the Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer. In 2012, the World Bank placed Georgia on the 12th place in the rating "Doing Business" (in 2005, the country was on the 112th position). The experience of Georgia is especially important because this country has destroyed the common myth about the impossibility of eradicating corruption on the

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[171] Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, 2011, 2010, <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>.

post-Soviet terrain, and that corruption has become part of the regional culture or even mentality. The World Bank has identified ten factors that allowed Georgia to end corruption (they could be useful for Ukraine and Moldova on their struggle with this phenomenon)[172]:

- *Exercise strong political will.* "Georgia without corruption" was one of the major slogans of Mikheil Saakashvili in 2003;
- *Establish credibility early.* The Georgian government has set a goal to demonstrate results of fighting with corruption in eight months (to use the so-called window of opportunity);
- *Launch a frontal assault on corruption.* Georgia decided not to fight against corruption gradually and within specific sectors but fast and on all fronts through a kind of *blitzkrieg*;
- *Attract new staff.* The Georgian government launched a search for young educated people with high ethical grounds that would not have connections to the previous government;

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[172] Fighting Corruption in Public Service. Chronicling of Georgia's Reforms, The World Bank, Washington, 2012. <http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821394755?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true>.

- *Limit the role of the state.* The strategy of the Georgian anti-corruption struggle is based on the understanding of the following principle: the higher the intervention of government in the economy, the higher the level of corruption;
- *Adopt unconventional solutions.* For instance, officials who were accused of corruption had to pay big fines to the budget to avoid imprisonment. Another method was the use of extra-budgetary funds to increase salaries and the total dismissal of employees of the traffic police;
- *Develop a unity of purpose and coordinate closely.* The crucial element that ensured the component of the success of reforms in Georgia was the ability of the President Saakashvili to create the team that shared a common goal and the same understanding of the need to eradicate corruption;
- *Tailor international experience to local conditions.* In particular, the government of the President Saakashvili took into account the positive experience of the USA and Italy. Moreover, reformers have investigated the causes that led to the failure of fighting against corruption in the post-Soviet states. At the same time, Georgian officials emphasized

that these methods have been also adapted to local conditions;

- *Harness technology*. Technologies have reduced the number of direct contact between citizens and civil servants;

- *Use communications strategically*. Georgian officials understood that institutional standards are insufficient to eradicate corruption, it was important that ordinary Georgians believed in the effectiveness of this struggle. Therefore, the arrests of high-ranking officials were covered by broadcasters regularly.

DEBUREAUCRATIZATION. Large-scale debureaucratization seems to be reasonable as an effective tool to fight corruption on the post-Soviet terrain, which is reducing the number of officials and facilitating procedures for receiving certain documents in government offices. A striking example is that of Georgia, a recognized leader in the fight against corruption among the former Soviet republics. The Georgian government implemented maximum simplification of procedures in receiving certificates, driver's licenses, registration and other state services and hence changed the public perception of bureaucratic institutions and, even more, deprived many officials of sources of illegal income. The Public Service Hall (Justice House) in Georgia could be considered as the symbol of debureaucratization. The institution gathered under its roof such public agencies as the Notary Chamber of Georgia, National Agency of Public Registry, National Agency of Public Registry, the National Archives of Georgia and the National Enforcement Bureau. Here, people can quickly and comfortably receive more than 300 services.

But, it has to be emphasized that reducing the number of officials must be followed by a number of other significant measures. In particular, private initiatives and the development of small and medium businesses have to be encouraged. For the post-Soviet man, it is hard to find confidence in his capabilities and initiate his own business. If bureaucracy promotes the private initiative instead of suppressing it and if all relevant procedures are transparent and open; the public service will gradually lose its appeal to the public. And, those officials who are forced to cease doing business while holding state positions, will seek new areas of employment with the same level of income. The process of debureaucratization in the post-Soviet states has to become the main task in order to ensure the spread of liberal values, to fight against corruption and to cease the trading of positions in public office.

IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS. The process of rooting out elements of post-Sovietness is impossible without changes in the systems of science and education. Recommendations in this area could be summarized in three main points: the decentralization of higher education, strict punishment of any form of plagiarism at university level, and the involvement of employees with Western education and knowledge of foreign languages (especially English) in public administration.

Decentralizing higher education and providing a broader autonomy of universities will allow them to raise the level of self-organization that is the antithesis of paternalism, one of the main characteristics of post-Sovietness. Moreover, academic, organizational and financial independence of universities from the Ministry of Education and Science will ensure better implementation of the Bologna system of education.

Participation in the Bologna process, in turn, will allow universities to enter the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), which adopted a single system of degrees and academic qualifications, a high level of mobility and exchanges between educational institutions to accelerate a process of Europeanization and socialization. It should be noted that one of cornerstone of participation in the Bologna system of education is the introduction of penalties for plagiarism at the university level.

Moreover, among the effective methods in combating the manifestations of post-Sovietness is training civil servants on basis of international education. A recent Georgian experience is a vivid example of the successful implementation of this practice where representatives of the younger generation who received an education in Western universities entered the government after the Rose Revolution. Along with this recommendation, the need of government officials to learn English has to be emphasized. English could be considered modern lingua franca in communication on the international arena, especially on issues of the European integration of post-Soviet countries. In this context, it is necessary that civil servants and parliamentarians involved in process of the European integration of their countries, take the appropriate test on their knowledge of English within the internationally recognized systems of examination (IELTS, TOEFL, etc.).