



DIPLOMACY-2021

Expectations of Ukrainian society

The results
of the survey commissioned
by the New Europe Center






The research was published within the framework of the Think Tank Development Initiative for Ukraine, carried out by the International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine, the International Renaissance Foundation, and the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE).

The survey sample covers 2,029 respondents. The poll was conducted by the Info Sapiens research agency using the CAPI method (computer-assisted personal interviews). The sample is representational for the adult (aged 18 and older) population of Ukraine with regard to sex, age, size of the locality and regions of residence. The survey excludes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the poll was conducted only in the government-controlled area. The maximum theoretical error does not exceed 2.2 percent. The poll was conducted from 6 to 19 November 2020.



DIPLOMACY-2021

Expectations of Ukrainian society

The results
of the survey commissioned
by the New Europe Center

December 2020
Kyiv





TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| TOP 10 FINDINGS | 4 |
| 1. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES | 6 |
| 1.1. The priority of Ukrainian foreign policy should be... | 10 |
| 1.2. How effective is Ukraine's foreign policy in these areas? | 11 |
| 1.3. Pragmatic interests vs values-based approach in foreign policy | 12 |
| 1.4. Evaluating the importance of deepening cooperation with certain countries | 12 |
| 1.5. Which of the organizations listed below should Ukraine join? | 13 |
| 1.6. The level of trust to foreign politicians | 14 |
| 1.7. Is China a threat to Ukraine? | 15 |
| 1.8. Is the US a threat to Ukraine? | 15 |
| 1.9. In case of an American-Chinese confrontation, whom should Ukraine support? | 15 |
| 2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION | 16 |
| 2.1. Should pro-European reforms be continued even if the EU does not give Ukraine a membership prospect? | 18 |
| 2.2. What is or will be your indicator of European integration taking place in Ukraine? | 19 |
| 2.3. What should Ukraine do above all in order to become an EU member? | 20 |
| 2.4. How do you see Ukraine-EU relations in the long term? | 21 |
| 3. EXPECTATIONS FROM THE US AND THE EU | 22 |
| 3.1. What do you expect for Ukraine from the EU? | 23 |
| 3.2. What do you expect for Ukraine from the US after the presidential election? | 24 |



| | |
|--|-----------|
| 4. RUSSIAN AGGRESSION | 26 |
| 4.1. Will Russia cease its aggression if Ukraine abandons its interest in EU and NATO integration? | 29 |
| 4.2. How could the EU support Ukraine in countering Russian aggression? | 29 |
| 4.3. Which partner provides the greatest support to Ukraine in conditions of external aggression? | 30 |
| 4.4. Is it appropriate for Ukraine to promote the initiative of a UN peacekeeping mission in Donbas? | 30 |
| 4.5. Which would be the best approach to the reconstruction of Donbas? | 30 |
| 4.6. The most promising ways of regaining Crimea. | 31 |
| 4.7. When will Crimea be returned? | 31 |
| 5. UKRAINE'S SOFT POWER IN THE WORLD | 32 |
| 5.1. Can Ukraine be an example for other countries today? | 33 |
| 5.2. Why can't Ukraine be an example for others today? | 33 |
| 5.3. Why can Ukraine be an example? | 33 |
| 5.4. What is Ukraine mostly associated with in Europe? | 34 |



TOP 10 FINDINGS

1 **Economic diplomacy.** Ukrainians believe that our country's diplomacy should prioritize the issue of winning markets for Ukrainian producers. This area was identified as a priority by 45.3% percent of respondents.

2 **Values and pragmatism together.** Both the values-oriented and pragmatic approaches must be taken into account when approving foreign policy decisions. This opinion is shared by 37.7 percent of Ukrainians, with 29.6 percent of respondents supporting a pure value-oriented approach and 25.74 percent being in favor of the mercantile approach.

3 **Western orientation.** Ukrainians are mostly in favor of continuing the country's path to EU and NATO integration. Of the respondents surveyed, 44.35 percent want the country to be a member of both the EU and NATO, whereas another 22.28 and 4.07 percent prefer solely EU or NATO membership, respectively. Thus, 66.63 percent of Ukrainians are adherents of EU

membership (if to combine those who are only for the EU and those supporting both the EU and NATO). The percentage of NATO membership advocates stands at 48.42 percent of Ukrainians.

4 **Public opinion leaders.** Angela Merkel is the leader in terms of public support in Ukraine, with almost 60 percent of respondents having full or almost full trust in the German Chancellor. Among the top three, there are also Andrzej Duda (Poland) and Emmanuel Macron (France). The least trusted politician is Vladimir Putin, with a disapproval rating of 72.45 percent.

5 **European reforms even without EU membership prospects.** Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should continue its pro-European reforms, even if the EU does not give the country the prospect of membership. In general, 69 percent of respondents pointed to the importance of European reforms due to their significance, above all, to Ukraine and because of the absence of any other choice.



6 Expectations from the United States. Ukrainians expect the US to provide security guarantees after the presidential election (26.33 percent). The three most popular expectations also include «a more proactive role in negotiations with Russia to end the war in Donbas and return Crimea» (24.79 percent) and «financial support» (24.34 percent).


7 Concessions do not matter. The majority of Ukrainians (58.4 percent) do not believe that Russia will cease its aggressive policy towards Ukraine if the latter abandons its willingness to join the EU and NATO. Only one in five respondents (21.82 percent) admits this possibility.

8 Evaluation of the most important support. The United States is the partner that provides the greatest support to Ukraine in the face of external aggression. This is the opinion of 25.97 percent of respondents. The second place is occupied by the EU (17.79 percent). Germany (8.39 percent), Poland (6.3 percent) and Canada (4.42 percent) also made the top five.

9 Peacekeepers but without concessions. Of Ukrainians polled, 36.77 percent believe that Ukraine should resume vigorously promoting the idea of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission in the entire territory of Donbas. This view is supported by 22.77 percent, the

difference being that certain concessions are admitted, in particular, a permission to deploy peacekeepers only on the contact line, without access to the entire occupied territory and part of the border. Most Ukrainians, however, are opposed to concessions.

10 Being an example. Ukrainians are mostly skeptical about Ukraine's becoming an example for other countries at the moment. The absence of such opportunities is pointed by 65.14 percent of respondents. The citizens interviewed believe that other Europeans primarily associate Ukraine with three phenomena: «poverty» (18.7 percent), «war with Russia» (18.26 percent) and «corruption» (17.59 percent).



1.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES



Foreign policy priorities in 2021.

Ukrainians are of the opinion that our country's diplomacy should prioritize winning markets for Ukrainian producers. This area was identified as a priority by 45.3% percent of respondents. Therefore, economic diplomacy, adopted by the President of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enjoys high popular demand and support. It is worth noting, however, that none of the areas proposed surpassed the 50-percent mark, which may indicate, in particular, that Ukrainians single out not one or two but far more equally important areas. This poses a great challenge to

the foreign ministry, which thus has to keep under control several socially important vectors, whilst also remembering to implement solutions that, albeit less popular, are essential for Ukraine's national security (as is the case with NATO integration, selected as a foreign policy priority by only 24.5 percent of respondents). In addition to economic diplomacy, Ukrainians believe that the foreign ministry should prioritize EU integration (42.5 percent) and the development of strategic partnerships, particularly with the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and Poland (42.5 percent).



Performance assessment. Given the lack of relevant knowledge, it has not always been easy for Ukrainians to evaluate different areas of Ukraine's foreign policy. At times, more than 20 percent of respondents chose the option "difficult to say" when asked to assess a certain area (one of such complex examples was "Development of relations with Asian countries"). At the same time, Ukrainian diplomacy draws quite a clear line between economic diplomacy (which Ukrainians consider a priority for the next year) and deepening cooperation with the Asian region. Ukrainians seem to be unaware of this connection, thus requiring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exert additional communicative efforts. In general, it should be noted that Ukrainians mostly assess the effectiveness of these areas of foreign policy as deficient. For example, activities in the area "Winning markets for Ukrainian manufacturers" was recognised as ineffective by over 60 percent of respondents. The area "Development of relations with neighboring countries (excluding Russia)" won the highest appraisal of 39 percent. However, it should once again be noted that it is the highest compared to other areas, as this same area was recognized as ineffective by 48.9 percent of respondents. In Ukraine's relations with its neighbors over the last year, there are, indeed, certain positive trends (resolving the issue with Slovakia on the resumption of the functioning of "Uzhgorod" airport, change of atmosphere in Ukrainian-Polish relations,

etc.). Nonetheless, it is obvious that in general the relations with neighbors often leave much to be desired – and Ukraine is not always to blame. But it is also worth keeping in mind that ordinary citizens may be left uninformed about all the nuances of the multifaceted dialogue with neighbors.

Pragmatism vs values. In Ukrainian media, there has been much criticism of the country's diplomacy for the initial muted reaction to the post-election crisis in Belarus, one of the main arguments being that Ukraine should stand side by side with pro-democracy forces of the neighboring country and condemn election fraud. The New Europe Center has asked Ukrainians which principle should dominate foreign policy – the pragmatic one, when issues of values may take a back seat, or yet that of values, when Ukraine has to make foreign policy decisions taking into account issues of democracy and the rule of law. The largest group of respondents was formed around the answer "balance between the two is needed," which gathered 37.7 percent. The democratic approach was endorsed by 29.6 percent of Ukrainians. The smallest camp is the supporters of the mercantile principle, accounting for 25.74 percent. The regional dimension in the answers merits particular attention. Respondents from western regions are more supportive of the value-based approach, while respondents from the east root for balance (48 percent). Those from the center (30.1 percent)

voted for the pragmatic approach. In other parts of the country, this option was chosen by an average of 23 percent of respondents.

The paramount. More than 80 percent of Ukrainians believe that it is necessary to deepen cooperation with such countries as Germany, Poland, the USA, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The "second league" includes Lithuania, Turkey, Belarus, Sweden, Georgia, Hungary, China, and Japan, with more than 70 percent of Ukrainians convinced that it is important to deepen cooperation with these countries. Moldova and Romania have not qualified for the second group by just a few percent. Nearly 60 percent are in favor of deepening relations with Azerbaijan and India.

Aggressive outsider. Predictably, Russia has ranked last in the issue of the importance of deepening relations. However, the Russian vector has also turned out to be the most polarizing, with 45.6 percent of Ukrainians being in favor of deepening relations with the Russia and 43.4 percent considering such a deepening inconsequential. That said, even those 45.6 percent seeking deeper relations with the Russians is quite a high level against the background of Moscow's aggression against Ukraine – the annexation of Crimea, provoking destabilization and opposition to transformation in the state. For the record, 27.5 percent of Ukrainians also identified the area of "mending relations with Russia" as a priority (which is almost as much as in "NATO integration"). This vector is predictably chosen by those over 60 years of age. The regional dimension also comes as no surprise: In the east, it was noted as a priority by 51.7 percent of

respondents. With regard to the deepening of relations with Russia, this is more often advocated by women than men (49.2 percent vs. 41.2 percent); age differences are more visible, with seniors more often supporting this option; in the east, the number of supporters of deepening cooperation with Russia stands at almost 70 percent, twice as much as in the west with 28.1 percent.

Western orientation. Ukrainians are mostly in favor of continuing the country's path to EU and NATO integration. Of the respondents surveyed, 44.35 percent want the country to be a member of both the EU and NATO, whereas another 22.28 and 4.07 percent prefer solely EU or NATO membership, respectively. Thus, 66.63 percent of Ukrainians are adherents of EU membership (if to combine those who are only for the EU and those supporting both the EU and NATO). The Euro-Atlantic group is somewhat smaller but still impressive, standing at 48.42 percent of Ukrainians. The gender dimension has shown that Ukrainian men are more often supportive of joining both the EU and NATO than Ukrainian women (48.94 percent vs. 40.55 percent); age trends are predictable, with younger citizens being more active in promoting Ukraine's admission to Western institutions. The situation in the east is par for the course, where 39.37 percent support the EU as a whole and 22.25 percent support NATO – significantly less than the western part of the country, where 82.74 percent wish to see Ukraine in the EU and 62.75 percent in NATO. The largest group of opponents of the Western orientation comes from the east and south, where 58.93 percent and 39.94 percent, respectively, fail to see Ukraine in the EU and NATO.



A similar survey was carried out by the New Europe Center in four EU countries, and we asked respondents the following question: "In your opinion, which of the following organizations can Ukraine become a member of?" The resulting picture is pretty much the same, although with a difference of minus ten percentage points: 55 percent of respondents in France, Germany, Italy and Poland see Ukraine as a member of the EU and 38 percent as a member of NATO¹.

Trust in leaders. Angela Merkel is the leader in terms of public support in Ukraine, with almost 60 percent of respondents having full or almost full trust in the German Chancellor. Among the top three, there are also Andrzej Duda (Poland) and Emmanuel Macron (France). Alexander Lukashenko has claimed a fourth-place finish, which can be explained by his recognizability among Ukrainians rather than genuine trust. Indeed, the number of Ukrainians who do not trust Lukashenko (48.28 percent) is higher than the number of those who do (37.80 percent). In terms of distrust ranking, the former president of Belarus stands beside US President Donald Trump (50.37 percent). The least trusted leader is Vladimir Putin with 72.45 percent. According to the survey, Ukrainians do not know many world politicians.


The most recognizable are Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko (who received the lowest number of votes in the option "I don't know this politician / hard to say"). The least recognizable for Ukrainian citizens are Boris Johnson (almost 40 percent were unable to say whether he should be trusted), Joseph Biden (45.04 percent), Recep Tayyip Erdogan (46.55 percent) and Xi Jinping (58.96 percent).

Whom to choose – China or the United States?

In recent years, the confrontation between China and the United States has intensified in various areas, be it politics or economy. Though indirectly, Ukraine has also found itself in the focus of attention because of the American-Chinese conflict (due to the attempt to sell the aircraft engine manufacturer Motor Sich to Chinese companies, which led to criticism from the US). A tough policy in relation to China is likely to remain unchanged under new US President Joseph Biden, thus probably forcing Ukraine to repeatedly face a difficult choice: deepening cooperation with China or maintaining trust in relations with the United States. First of all, the New Europe Center asked whether Ukrainians felt threatened by China or the United States. More than 70 percent answered "no" in both cases. In the event of an escalation of the confrontation between the United States and China, Ukrainians prefer to support Washington by a margin of 40.65 percent to 10.79 percent. However, those who found it difficult to answer make up the largest group (48.55 percent).

¹ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?», The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. Overall, over 4,000 respondents aged between 18 and 65+ answered six questions, including one open question. Respondents represent their countries proportionally based on gender, age and regions. All the answers were collected on an internet-based survey taking place from 22 to 29 September 2020. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>


1.1. THE PRIORITY OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE:





1.2. EVALUATE ON A SCALE OF 1 TO 4 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES IN THESE AREAS.


The higher the mark, the more effective a certain area is².




² The number of respondents who chose the "hard to say" option amounted to from 7 to 23 percent, depending on the foreign policy area.

³ This area belongs to those where respondents had difficulties answering. Of Ukrainians polled, 22.39 percent admitted it was hard to find the answer.

1.3. SHOULD UKRAINE BE GUIDED IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY BY PRAGMATIC INTERESTS OR RELY ON THE VALUES-BASED APPROACH FOR DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND THE RULE OF LAW?




1.4. EVALUATE ON A SCALE OF 1 TO 4 THE IMPORTANCE OF DEEPENING COOPERATION WITH THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES. THE MORE IMPORTANT THE COOPERATION, THE HIGHER THE MARK⁴.



⁴ To facilitate the perception of information, the marks "completely unimportant / rather unimportant" and "rather important / very important" were combined, respectively. The "hard to say" option is not included in the publication. The average number of respondents who chose this option did not exceed 10 percent.




1.5. WHICH OF THE ORGANIZATIONS LISTED BELOW SHOULD UKRAINE JOIN?



FOR COMPARISON. What is the opinion of EU member states in this regard?

Which of the organizations listed below should Ukraine join?⁵


Answers given by respondents from France, Poland, Italy and Germany



FOR COMPARISON

⁵ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?», The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-sprymayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>

1.6. EVALUATE THE LEVEL OF TRUST TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL LEADERS, WITH 1 BEING "COMPLETELY UNTRUSTWORTHY," 2 - "RATHER UNTRUSTWORTHY," 3 - "RATHER TRUSTWORTHY," 4 - "COMPLETELY TRUSTWORTHY."⁶






THE MOST RECOGNIZABLE LEADERS

Which of the foreign leaders are the hardest to evaluate for Ukrainians?

(Answering the question on trust to a certain leader, respondents chose the option "I don't know this politician" or "hard to say")



⁶ Respondents also could choose the option "I don't know this person" or "hard to say." On average, this indicator fluctuated from roughly 15 percent (as in the case of Angela Merkel) to more than 50 percent (in the case of Xi Jinping).

**1.7. IS CHINA A THREAT TO UKRAINE?****1.8. IS THE US A THREAT TO UKRAINE?****1.9. IN CASE OF AN AMERICAN-CHINESE CONFRONTATION, WHOM SHOULD UKRAINE SUPPORT?**

2.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION



European reforms even without EU membership prospects. Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should continue its pro-European reforms, even if the EU does not give the country the prospect of membership. In general, 69 percent of respondents pointed to the importance of European reforms because they are needed primarily by Ukraine and due to the absence of any other choice. For 14.96 percent of Ukrainians, "European reforms" are unnecessary. Another 9.28 percent, despite all odds, hope to turn Ukraine in the direction of integration into the Eurasian Union with Russia. The New Europe Center asked Ukrainians a similar question in previous years, but respondents' views have not changed over time.

Indicators of successful European integration. The opinions of Ukrainians about the indicators of successful European integration are quite diverse. For instance, 40.66 percent of Ukrainians will believe that European integration in Ukraine is finally noticeable on condition that the economic situation improves and people's well-being increases. For 34.4 percent of respondents, it is important that the fight against corruption



brings results. The third spot is occupied by the option "new jobs are created" (29.34 percent). In general, it can be seen that there is no defining indicator that would unite the majority of Ukrainians, as opinions are quite varied. The respondents must have found the question quite difficult, but it is also possible that Ukrainians associate European integration with many spheres at once and want to see changes in several areas at the same time. Among the answers which gained more than 20 percent, there are also "oligarchic governance of the country is eliminated" (27.96 percent) and "better service in hospitals, schools and kindergartens" (20.71 percent). It is also worth noting that indicators related to anti-corruption and the fight against oligarchs are more important for respondents than "road maintenance, safe and convenient environmentally friendly public transport." This option was chosen by 14.54 percent⁷.

Anti-corruption first. Ukrainians reckon that the country must, first of all, eradicate corruption in order to become an EU member (55.19 percent). Of those surveyed, 31.8 percent are of the opinion that Ukraine should first significantly improve the economic situation. As many as 9 percent of Ukrainians consider the restoration of territorial integrity

an important argument on the path to European integration. The New Europe Center asked citizens of France, Italy, Germany, and Poland the same question. The result is similar: 43 percent of respondents consider the elimination of corruption to be the number one priority for Ukraine; besides, foreign respondents named improving the economic situation as the number two priority. The third spot went to the restoration of territorial integrity as a priority for EU membership⁸.


What happens next? The New Europe Center asked Ukrainians how they saw relations between Ukraine and the EU in the long run. Opinions are divided approximately equally between the three scenarios: "relations will be the same as now" (33.34 percent), "Ukraine will be a full-fledged member of the EU" (27.7 percent), and "Ukraine will be a close and economically integrated partner (like Norway)" (24.83 percent). We asked respondents in EU countries a similar question. The answers are even more scattered, a significant difference being that the option "Ukraine will be a full-fledged member of the EU" received the least support (16.2 percent)⁹.

⁷ In 2018, the New Europe Center asked Ukrainians a similar question, but it was related solely to the indicators of European integration, which depended, above all, on decisions of the local authorities, not the central ones. Thus, there were no questions on anti-corruption, judicial reform or deoligarchization. Consequently, the first place went to "better service in hospitals, schools and kindergartens," "improving transport infrastructure" and "new jobs are created." More details are available at: <http://neweurope.org.ua/visual-materials/nova-yevropa-yak-yiji-bachat-ukrayintsi-3/>

⁸ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?», The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>


⁹ Ibid.

2.1. IS IT IMPORTANT THAT UKRAINE CONTINUES ITS PRO-EUROPEAN REFORMS EVEN IF THE EU DOES NOT GIVE THE COUNTRY A MEMBERSHIP PROSPECT?






2.2. WHAT IS OR WILL BE YOUR INDICATOR OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TAKING PLACE IN UKRAINE?




2.3. WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO ABOVE ALL IN ORDER TO BECOME AN EU MEMBER? (Choose the most important option, from your perspective).



FOR COMPARISON. What is the opinion of EU member states in this regard?

What should Ukraine do above all in order to become an EU member?¹⁰

Answers of respondents from France, Poland, Italy and Germany




FOR COMPARISON

¹⁰ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?», The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>



2.4. HOW DO YOU SEE UKRAINE-EU RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM?




FOR COMPARISON. What is the opinion of EU member states in this regard?

How do you see EU-Ukraine relations in the long term?¹¹

Answers of respondents from France, Poland, Italy and Germany

- Ukraine as full EU member
- Close and integrated economic and political partner (e.g. Norway)
- Relations like today
- Market-based relations without political support
- Like an ordinary neighbor



FOR COMPARISON

¹¹ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?», The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>

3.

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE US AND THE EU

Expectations from the United States.

There is no consensus among Ukrainians on what Ukraine should expect from the United States after the presidential election. The top five positions with more or less equal percentages include the following: the provision of security guarantees (first place with 26.33 percent), a more active role in negotiations with Russia to end the war in Donbas and return Crimea (ranking second with 24.79 percent), financial support (which came in third with 24.34 percent), new sanctions against Russia (finished in the fourth spot with 21.66 percent), greater pressure on the Ukrainian government to conduct reforms (fifth place with 18.34 percent). The least supported are the options of the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine (9.39 percent) and granting Ukraine the status of a major non-NATO ally (13.43 percent). Two years ago, the New Europe Center asked Ukrainians a similar question. At that time, respondents also put security guarantees

to Ukraine first. The top three included expectations of new sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine's membership in NATO. In general, 16.5 percent of respondents opposed US aid, whereas this year's poll found a slightly smaller number of opponents of US support (9.39 percent).



Expectations from the EU. The first five expectations of Ukrainians from the European Union are as follows: incentivizing investments and creating jobs in Ukraine (20.59 percent); giving Ukraine the prospect of EU membership (19.68 percent); facilitating the access of Ukrainian producers to its market (18.55 percent); increasing opportunities for legal employment of Ukrainians in the EU (17.32 percent); greater influence on the Ukrainian government to carry out reforms (16.79 percent). In general, there is a dispersion of votes among the options, with none of the expectations garnering the absolute majority of above 50 percent. However, the trend is obvious if we also take into account the answers to our previous questions: Ukrainians root for economic recovery, investment inflows and job creation. European integration and other foreign policy area are primarily seen by society as tools for achieving economic welfare.

The trend is obvious if we also take into account the answers to our previous questions: Ukrainians root for economic recovery, investment inflows and job creation. European integration and other foreign policy area are primarily seen by society as tools for achieving economic welfare.




3.1. WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE EXPECT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Choose three main options.



3.2. WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE EXPECT FROM THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?






FOR COMPARISON: What did Ukrainians expect from the United States two years ago?

What do you think the United States can do for Ukraine?¹²

2018 poll



FOR COMPARISON

¹² «What Kind of Assistance do Ukrainians Expect from the EU and the US?». The answers to the questions of the New Europe Center were obtained within the framework of an opinion poll conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from August 16 to 28, 2018. 2,041 respondents have been interviewed (the marginal error is 2.3%). <http://neweurope.org.ua/analytics/na-yaku-dopomogu-ukrayintsi-ochikuyut-vid-yes-ta-ssha/>

4.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

No concessions. The majority of Ukrainians (58.4 percent) do not believe that Russia will end its aggressive policy towards Ukraine if it abandons its intention to join the EU and NATO. Only one in five respondents (21.82 percent) admits this possibility. At the same time, such skepticism about the peaceful nature of Russian policies is a characteristic of various parts of society. There are some regional differences, but even in eastern Ukraine 43.55 percent of respondents do not assume a change in the Kremlin's approaches. As little as every third representative of eastern regions (28.22 percent) believes in such a possibility. Residents of northern Ukraine are the most certain about Russia's intransigence (67.02 percent).

EU support in the fight against aggression. The EU should expand sanctions against Russia (26.7 percent) and offer Ukraine membership (22.2 percent) – such urgent measures, Ukrainians believe, should be proposed by the European Union to counter the Russian aggression. As a less important, but still significant, step, there is “to provide financial support for social and infrastructure projects” (23.2 percent consider this measure a no. 3 priority).



Less priority is attached to the provision of weapons to Ukraine (39.8 percent identified this option as a no. 4. priority). The New Europe Center asked respondents from four EU member states the same question, which resulted in a similar picture. The first place was given to sanctions and the membership offer. They are followed by financial support and, finally, the provision of weapons.

Who helps the most? The United States is the partner that provides the greatest support to Ukraine in the face of external aggression. This is the opinion of 25.97 percent of respondents. The EU comes second with 17.79 percent. The top five list also includes Germany (8.39 percent), Poland (6.3 percent) and Canada (4.42 percent). However, one third of Ukrainians found it hard to answer this question, particularly those from the east (42.87 percent). In comparison, the number of inhabitants from the west who had difficulties choosing was twice as low (15.44 percent). It seems that this trend in the eastern region is due to a different assessment of Russia's role in unleashing the aggression against Ukraine.

Peacekeepers in Donbas. Of Ukrainians polled, 36.77 percent believe that Ukraine should resume vigorously promoting the idea of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission in the entire territory of Donbas. This view is supported by 22.77 percent, the difference being that certain concessions are admitted, in particular, a permission to deploy peacekeepers only on the contact line, without access to the entire occupied territory and part of the border. As little as 16.64 percent are convinced that peacekeepers are a plan that runs

contrary to Ukrainian interests. In any case, it is obvious that concessions of the Ukrainian authorities on the issue of peacekeepers will not be applauded by a considerable number of citizens. The greatest number of threats in the deployment of the peacekeeping mission is identified by the residents of eastern regions (27.74 percent). Interestingly, the largest group of respondents who admit concessions lives in western regions and stands at 32.51 percent. For example, in the east, 18.38 percent were in favor of concessions, but it should be certainly taken into account that in this region, the idea of peacekeepers is perceived ambiguously in principle. Residents of eastern regions look divided on the peace issue: in general, 49.03 percent of respondents in this part of the country support the deployment of peacekeepers (both with and without concessions), and the total number of those who are against or who found it difficult to express an opinion amounts to 50.97 percent. The most pronounced is the position of Kyiv residents: 57.08 percent are in favor of resuming steps to promote the peacekeeping idea, 25.4 percent admit the possibility of concessions and only 11.36 percent see this as harmful to national interests. Here one also finds the lowest number of those uncertain compared to other regions (6.16 percent to, for example, 36.99 percent of those who could not answer in the south).

Reconstruction of Donbas. As many as 34.01 percent of respondents are of the opinion that Ukraine should demand a compensation from Russia for the damage in order to channel resources to the reconstruction of Donbas. Another 29.37 percent expressed the view that the reconstruction should take place at

the expense of international assistance. The number of those who believe that Ukraine should count on its own efforts stands at 24.3 percent. Younger respondents more often than older ones chose the option of reconstruction at the expense of Russian compensation: 38.29 percent (18–29 years) to 29.8 percent (those over 70). Central regions also tend to choose the option of Russian funding for reconstruction (42.06 percent). In eastern Ukraine, almost 25 percent support the idea of Russian compensation, but the prevailing approach is that Ukraine should do everything on its own (35.59 percent).

Crimean issue. There is no agreement among Ukrainians on which way is the most promising for regaining Crimea. The first place went to the option of creating a separate international negotiating platform (like the Normandy format); this idea was supported by 32.78 percent of respondents. The proposal to restore trade, economic, cultural and educational ties with the temporarily occupied Crimea (26.85 percent) does not lag far behind this idea. The options of increasing the naval presence of Ukraine and partner countries in the Azov and Black Seas as well as ensuring Ukrainian broadcasting in the entire territory of the temporarily occupied peninsula, exceeded the 20 percent mark. The use of force option is the least supported scenario (11.83 percent). In general, as can be seen, it is difficult for Ukrainians to comment on this; none of the proposals has scored 50 percent. The regional dimension has shown that every fifth representative of western Ukraine (19.51 percent) supports the use of force scenario, while in eastern regions only

3.74 percent of respondents endorse this approach.


When will we regain Crimea? As many as 32.06 percent of Ukrainians believe that it will take at least ten years to regain the occupied peninsula. Another 15.27 percent think that this can be achieved over the next decade. The span of five years was chosen by 10.94 percent of respondents, whereas 8.95 percent do not believe that Crimea will be ever regained. The older generation is more predisposed to not believing in the improbability of regaining than the younger one. Residents of the east are the most pessimistic (15.56 percent). The majority of optimists (those who believe in regaining Crimea within five years) live in Kyiv (18.65 percent), compared to only 3.9 percent in the south.






4.1. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA WILL CEASE ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE IF UKRAINE ABANDONS ITS INTENTION TO JOIN THE EU AND NATO?

■ Yes
■ No
■ Hard to say



4.2. HOW COULD THE EU SUPPORT UKRAINE IN COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION?


■ Priority no. 1 ■ Priority no. 2 ■ Priority no. 3 ■ Priority no. 4



FOR COMPARISON. What do residents of EU countries think in this regard? How could your government support Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression?¹³

Answers of respondents from France, Poland, Italy, Germany

■ Priority no. 1 ■ Priority no. 2 ■ Priority no. 3 ■ Priority no. 4 ■ Priority no. 5




* 37% respondents answered «I don't know»


FOR COMPARISON

¹³ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?» The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>


4.3. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH PARTNER PROVIDES THE GREATEST SUPPORT TO UKRAINE IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR STATE?



4.4. UNDER THE CURRENT CONDITIONS, IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR UKRAINE TO VIGOROUSLY PROMOTE THE INITIATIVE TO DEPLOY A UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN DONBAS?




4.5. WHICH, IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD BE THE BEST APPROACH TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF DONBAS?






4.6. THE MOST PROMISING WAYS OF REGAINING CRIMEA ARE:



4.7. THE RETURN OF CRIMEA WILL TAKE:



5.

UKRAINE'S SOFT POWER IN THE WORLD



Not yet a role model. Ukrainians are mostly skeptical about Ukraine's ability to become an example for other countries, with 65.14 percent of respondents not seeing opportunities for this. As many as 22.39 percent, however, are more optimistic and believe that the country can still be an example. According to only one fifth of those surveyed, original culture (29.54 percent) and experience in countering Russian aggression (27.72 percent) are the two most popular arguments that respondents believe Ukraine can use to promote its image abroad. Those who are pessimistic about Ukraine's exemplary role in the international arena believe that the perception of the state is most negatively affected by the following reasons: "corrupt politicians, all power belongs to oligarchs" (34.37 percent) and "Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe" (30.33 percent).


Three main associations. The citizens interviewed believe that other Europeans associate Ukraine primarily with three phenomena: "poverty" (18.7 percent), "war with Russia" (18.26 percent) and "corruption" (17.59 percent). The assumptions of Ukrainians generally coincide with the real picture. The New Europe Center asked respondents in France, Poland, Italy and Germany a similar question about the three main associations with Ukraine. The top three includes the following answers: "war / conflict with Russia", "poverty / unemployment", "immigration / guest workers."¹⁴ It should be noted, however, that there are many positive images in associations of Ukrainians, which are lacking in the responses of EU residents. For instance, the top ten associations of Ukrainians also include "Ukrainian cuisine," "Maidan / Euromaidan," "rich and fertile land," "hardworking people," "culture and traditions," "vyshyvanka."

¹⁴ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?» The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. <http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-spryjmayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>




5.1. CAN UKRAINE BE AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TODAY?

■ Yes
■ No
■ Hard to say



5.2. CHOOSE ONE MAIN REASON WHY UKRAINE TODAY CANNOT BE AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHERS¹⁵.




5.3. CHOOSE THE MOST COMPELLING ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY UKRAINE CAN SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE¹⁶.



¹⁵ Answers were given only by those respondents who believe that Ukraine cannot be an example for other countries.

¹⁶ Answers were given only by those respondents who believe that Ukraine can be an example for other countries.

5.4. WHAT DO YOU THINK EUROPEANS ASSOCIATE UKRAINE WITH THE MOST? NAME THREE MAIN ASSOCIATIONS.






FOR COMPARISON: What do residents of EU countries think in this regard?

Name you three main associations with Ukraine¹⁷

Answers of respondents from France, Poland, Italy, Germany



FOR COMPARISON

¹⁷ «What is Ukraine's perception in the EU?» The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center.
<http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yak-sprymayut-ukrayinu-v-krayinah-yes/>





ABOUT NEW EUROPE CENTER

The New Europe Center was founded in 2017 as an independent think-tank. Despite its new brand, it is based on a research team that has been working together since 2009, at the Institute for World Policy. The New Europe Center became recognized by offering high-quality analysis on foreign policy issues in Ukraine and regional security by combining active, effective work with advocacy.

The New Europe Center's vision is very much in line with the views of the majority of Ukrainians about the future of their country: Ukraine should be integrated into the European Union and NATO. By integration, we understand not so much formal membership as the adoption of the best standards and practices for Ukraine to properly belong to the Euroatlantic value system.

More about New Europe Center: www.neweurope.org.ua



<http://neweurope.org.ua/>
info@neweurope.org.ua
<https://www.facebook.com/NECUkraine/>
https://twitter.com/NEC_Ukraine

