



SECURITY FORMULA 'NATO PLUS'

ANALYSIS OF THE MOST DISCUSSED
SECURITY MODELS FOR UKRAINE





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DISCUSSION PAPER

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INTRODUCTION




One of the inalienable elements of sustainable peace in Ukraine and Europe is ensuring the sustainable security of Ukraine. In Ukraine itself, a political and social consensus has been formed that such security can be ensured only through Ukraine's NATO membership, and support for joining NATO remains at a very high level in Ukrainian society (at around 80%).¹ Moreover, the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens consider NATO membership to be more important than EU accession.² Despite vigorous discussions and even some attempts to implement various security models in practice, Ukrainians consider NATO to be the most reliable security model for Ukraine.

At the same time, the lack of alternatives to NATO membership does not imply the impossibility of discussion, let alone the inclusion of certain elements of other security models at the stage preceding accession to the Alliance and even after joining it. In this case, we can discuss the development of the «NATO Plus» model for Ukraine.

In its new analytical discussion paper on security options for Ukraine, the New Europe Center is aiming to answer several questions at once:

- Why does Ukraine remain so committed to the idea of NATO membership as the most reliable or even the non-alternative security model?
- What is the basis of Ukraine's conviction that the issue of invitation to join NATO and developing an algorithm for Ukraine's



¹ «Rating», 'Dynamics of Ukrainians' Attitudes to International Unions', November 22–23, 2023: https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dvadcyat_piyate_zagalnonacionalne_opituvanny_dinamska_stavlennya_ukrainciv_do_mizhnarodnih_soyuziv.html


² Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 'For what matters Ukraine's EU membership, the priority of joining the EU or NATO, and the perception of Russia as part of Europe', the results of a telephone survey conducted on September 29 — October 9, 2023: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1303&page=1>

accession to it should be the agenda of its dialogue with the Alliance even in the conditions of an ongoing war?

- What elements of other security models can Ukraine “borrow” before or even after joining NATO?

In order to answer these questions in a more comprehensive manner, our experts have carried out an in-depth analysis of several security models that are most often brought up in international discourse — both at the level of the political establishment and in the media. Some of these models are considered in individual NATO member states as a security model that can substitute Ukraine's NATO membership, whereas others are viewed as an intermediate stage before joining the Alliance. As a rule, proposals in the context of these models come down to describing the advantage of a certain scenario and dismissing the rest as irrelevant. We sought to analyse and evaluate both the disadvantages and, no less importantly, the advantages of each of them.

More specifically, we have analysed at length four security models, to wit: South Korean, Israeli, Taiwanese, and West German (gradual NATO accession). We believe that the conclusions proposed by our expert group will be useful during the ongoing discussions as part of the work on the implementation of President Zelenskyy's *Peace Formula*³ (particularly point 9 on the prevention of future aggression and “security guarantees” for Ukraine) and within the framework of preparations for the anniversary of the inaugural NATO summit in Washington, where the issue of Ukraine's future membership in the Alliance will be on the agenda one way or another. The conclusions of our research will be equally useful when prerequisites for a genuine political settlement — capable of leading to sustainable peace, not another fragile truce — emerge.



³ *Plan for achieving peace in 10 steps, or Ukraine's Peace Formula* (speech by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the G20 summit), 15 November 2022: <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yakshorosy-79141>

SUMMARY



An extensive analysis of the models (the South Korean, the Israeli, the Western German, the Taiwanese) confirms once again that Ukraine could and has already de facto begun to “borrow” certain elements of these models. In particular, this is taking place through concluding agreements on security commitments with the US and other international partners, which to some extent resemble the relevant framework agreements that Washington has with Israel and Taiwan.

Ukraine could well borrow — at least until it becomes a NATO member — other useful elements from different models, a kind of mix of the most valuable elements of each. For example, the Israeli model could be used as a tool for ten-year Memoranda of Understanding with clear amounts of annual support for each year. From the Taiwanese model, until Ukraine is granted NATO membership, it would be appropriate to borrow the element of “strategic uncertainty” as to whether the US, based on the bilateral document currently being developed within the framework of the G7 Joint Declaration of Support, will help defend Ukraine instead of simply providing support.

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The issue, however, lies in the fact that, in the case of Ukraine, discussions are currently fo-

cused on incomplete, «trimmed,» or abbreviated versions of the most potentially interesting models—without precisely addressing the most valuable aspects for ensuring our security and deterring the next round of aggressive elements. For instance, the Korean model would be acceptable for Ukraine only in the event of signing a bilateral agreement with the United States, which would provide real security guarantees and, in the future, the deployment of U.S. military components or elements of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, as was the case with South Korea. Currently, the South Korean model is discussed in the context of the political willingness to timely «recognize» and acknowledge the deadlock in a military sense, followed by «freezing» the conflict without recognizing the failure of either side (forgetting, in the process, that in the Korean case, the status quo regarding the demarcation line was preserved, while in the Ukrainian case, since the full-scale invasion, new occupied territories have emerged).

Hence, the ongoing discussions do not offer sufficient basis to conclude that even a well-«mixed» model would be more reliable and financially balanced than Ukraine's membership in NATO. This is why we regard the «NATO plus» model as the most optimal security framework for Ukraine—a model that could isolate and absorb the most beneficial elements from other security frameworks while also addressing the algorithm for Ukraine's accession to NATO at this stage.

Is it worth discussing NATO membership in the first place as long as part of the territories remain occupied and the war rages on? In our

view, it is both worthwhile and necessary. The time has come to fundamentally change Putin's strategic calculation: as long as the war persists, there are no chances for Ukraine to join the Alliance, so the war must continue. This can be done only by sending a clear political signal—regardless of the situation on the battlefield and the percentage of Russian-occupied territories, NATO is considering the possibility of inviting Ukraine to join the Alliance and initiating the accession process with the corresponding application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, at least for the part under Kyiv's control. Among all available security options, this variant—NATO membership even through gradual accession—is recognized as the most optimal for Ukrainian society, as evidenced by the results of an opinion poll conducted on behalf of the New Europe Center (see key findings).

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Furthermore, the mere existence of a historical precedent, wherein a country with some occupied territories—West Germany—was able to join the Alliance, provides a basis for seriously considering the option of a gradual accession for Ukraine. It is essential to emphasise that this pertains specifically to a *gradual accession* to NATO, not *partial accession*, which is currently the focus of debates by those considering it as a potential, albeit imperfect, Plan B or even Plan C for Ukraine. An invitation and accession to NATO with all the de-occupied territories surely remains Plan A.

The emphasis should be on considering a *gradual accession* to NATO, not *partial accession*, which is currently the focus of debates.



KEY FINDINGS



Proceeding from a detailed analysis of the four security models, which are most frequently discussed with respect to the most optimal options for ending the war and ensuring security for Ukraine, we offer the following conclusions:



All the existing security models are closely linked to the United States, but the US did not immediately agree to them. Most of the models analysed demonstrate that it took time and incredible diplomatic efforts to convince Washington to implement models that today, many decades after their launch, look quite natural or even initiated by Washington.

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In the case of, say, South Korea, which since 1953 has had a bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, it was not immediately possible to persuade the US to sign such a document. Two months prior to its approval, the United States actively proposed various forms of security commitments that did not provide actual guarantees, such as the "Greater Sanctions Statement," signed by 16 participating

countries within the framework of the United Nations, which President Truman of the United States considered, '*under present circumstances, clearly preferable from standpoint Republic of Korea security to bilateral defence treaty with US*'; an agreement on major US military assistance; a promise to hold a political conference to achieve Korean unification and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the peninsula; US support for the army of the Republic of Korea. President Syngman Rhee, for whom it was a matter of principle to secure a bilateral treaty on security guarantees, even resorted to a kind of blackmail and released thousands of non-repatriated Korean prisoners of war in order to disrupt the armistice talks. In the end, the US decided to sign the treaty on mutual defence.

As for the rather popular in Ukraine Israeli model, it should be remembered that it was also born in political debates in the US and without much initial enthusiasm from the White House. During most of the first two decades of Israel's independence, Washington did not provide significant financial or military assistance. The Six-Day War of 1967 served as some sort of a trigger for the rapid development of cooperation between the two countries, when Israel quickly defeated the hostile coalition of Arab states. For the US, whose troops were bogged down in the Vietnam War, Israel became an attractive ally capable of solving problems quickly on its own. It was not until 1962 that Israel received the first substantial arms shipment from the United States, when John F. Kennedy

agreed to sell HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Tel Aviv (the Department of State opposed this decision, but the White House was concerned about the Soviet supply of bombers to Egypt). Meanwhile, heated debates over arms sales to the US continued. It was only in 1999 that the US and Israel began to sign ten-year Memoranda of Understanding, which provided for clearly specified amounts of aid for each of the ten-year periods.

In the case of West Germany's NATO accession, the US also objected to this option for a long time. Instead, the White House advocated the inclusion of West Germany in the newly created European Defense Community (EDC), initiated by France. At one point, Washington even threatened to cut aid to Bonn if it continued to resist joining the EDC. However, for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, agreements that would provide for security guarantees from the US were of fundamental importance. In the end, the process of joining the EDC was blocked by the UK and, surprisingly, not supported by the National Assembly of France, which had, in fact, formally initiated the Community. Only after that, the US agreed to admit West Germany to NATO.



Moscow was always against it, but fear did not overcome Washington. Many

security models were put into practice in conditions of stiff opposition from the Kremlin, but the White House and other Western capitals summoned enough courage to implement a decisive policy. Quite counterintuitively, today's Russia is much weaker than the USSR was back in the day and is not even perceived as a direct threat to the US national interests (although it is classified as the most significant and direct threat to NATO in its Strategic Concept), but the fear of it in Wash-

ington and some European capitals (especially Berlin) is far bigger than it used to be. For instance, in the case of West Germany, the Soviet Union made it clear that the future unification of Germany was possible only on condition of a neutral model like the one introduced in Austria. However, in 1955 — the year when Austria declared neutrality — West Germany, led by Chancellor Adenauer and supported by the US and other NATO founding states, took a different path and joined NATO. It's interesting that the decision to join the Alliance was formalised in the Final Act of the London Conference in October 1954, while the actual accession took place in May 1955. This means there was a gap of over six months between the political decision and the actual joining of the Alliance, yet it did not provoke a new escalation from Moscow. Moreover, just a month after joining the Alliance, in June 1955, the USSR sent a letter to Bonn proposing the normalisation of relations and inviting Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow.⁴

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The key in the decision-making process regarding a particular model, such as the West German one, should be the development of a route to membership, starting from the ultimate goal — Ukraine's membership in NATO, rather than fixating on the obstacles that Moscow may create along this path.⁵

⁴ Note from the Soviet Government to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, June 7, 1955 (page 58): <https://www.kas.de/documents/278107/8229059/Визит+Канцлера+Аденауэра+в+Москву+8-14+сентября+1955+г.+Документы+и+материалы.pdf/3fe18172-9c6d-df90-65e6-d5ab650607a6?version=1.0&t=1609241871655>

⁵ Interview with a French security expert, November 10, 2023.



Ukraine is offered "defective" models.

When Western politicians, diplomats or experts discuss one of these models as the most relevant for Ukraine and even as an alternative to NATO, they usually offer a modified version of the model — its pared-down or shortened version. For example, when the Korean model is discussed, the focus is on freezing the conflict along a defined line (despite the absence of the 38th parallel in Ukraine) and the potential non-recognition by either party of their defeat with the probable absence or non-signing of a peace agreement by one of the parties. However, the issue of Ukraine signing a bilateral Treaty on security guarantees with the United States is deliberately ignored. Additionally, the fact that South Korea still holds the third position in the world in terms of the number of U.S. military personnel (28,500 individuals) on its territory, following Japan and Germany, is overlooked. South Korea is also home to the largest overseas U.S. military base, «Camp Humphreys». Moreover, from 1958 to 1991, the US stationed its tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

With respect to the Israeli model, the fact that the US actually turned a blind eye to Israel's development of its own nuclear program and did not prohibit striking targets deep inside the enemy's territory is often disregarded. Ten-year memoranda are also not taken into account, in which a specific amount of aid is determined for each ten-year period. In comparison, in the case of Ukraine, the allocation of permanent financial aid by the US Congress for two years in the conditions of the most unprecedented war in Europe since World War II has become problematic. Besides, additional financial support to Israel is also not taken for granted in the US today, which gives grounds to talk about some failures in the financial implementation of even the "full-fledged" Israeli model.

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If to talk about applying to Ukraine an approach such as that provided for by the US-Taiwan agreement (Taiwan Relations Act) — without security guarantees, but with an obligation in the event of the use of force by China to provide Taipei with '*defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability*' — for some reason, the element of "strategic uncertainty" laid down in it is often overlooked. Put otherwise, there is no clear answer to the question of whether the US will defend Taiwan in the event of a potential attack by China. At the same time, in the case of Ukraine, the position of the White House, voiced repeatedly by President Biden, is quite clear and is considered one of Washington's first "red lines"⁶ in respect of Ukraine: '*No boots on the ground*' — i.e., no American troops on Ukrainian soil.

As for the West German model, which is being mentioned increasingly often both as a result of closed-door negotiations and in the media, it is mainly presented in the form of partial NATO accession⁷ — on condition that Ukraine renounces the occupied territories. Although it is, in fact, about a gradual NATO membership — first for Kyiv-controlled territories, later for occupied — once the corresponding political window of opportunity appears. The prerequisite for the accession of West Germany, recorded in the Final Act of the London Conference of October 1954, was not the rejection of East Germany, but Bonn's commitment not to seek the de-occupation of East Germany and the unification

⁶ 'Trial by combat. Jake Sullivan and the White House's battle to keep Ukraine in the fight,' Susan B. Glasser, New Yorker, October 6, 2023: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/trial-by-combat>

⁷ 'Ex-NATO chief proposes Ukraine joins without Russian-occupied territories,' Patrick Wintour, The Guardian, November 11, 2023: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/11/ex-nato-chief-proposes-ukraine-joins-without-russian-occupied-territories>

of the country by force — only through political and diplomatic means.



Own army and military industry. Despite the security guarantees from the US (in the case of South Korea), NATO membership or the de facto allied nature of security cooperation (Israel and Taiwan), each of the countries concentrated on building up its own army and military-industrial complex (MIP), particularly thanks to financial support of the US and economic development, which coincided — apparently, not by chance — with the improvement of the security environment. An important internal component of Taiwan's security model is that Taiwan has developed and manufactures a significant share of its weapons independently, relying on its own military-industrial complex (and with the help of partners' technologies). This applies to the country's own air defence systems, anti-missile systems, anti-ship missiles, medium-range surface-to-surface missiles, warships, small arms, etc. Some of the weapons Taiwan does not produce for some reason are provided by the United States, Taiwan's main security donor. In particular, the US supplied Taiwan with F-16 fighter jets, combat helicopters of various types, MQ-9B strategic UAVs, Harpoon anti-ship systems and Patriot anti-missile systems.

A systematic and growing US support has been of tremendous help in developing Israel's own production capability. Today, there are few types of weapons or equipment that the country cannot produce. The exception may be the F-16 and F-35 fighters, but even parts of these aircraft are currently manufactured in Israel.

South Korea embarked on large-scale and systematic defence industrialization in 1974. To this end, the Special Law on the Promotion of the Defense Industry was adopted, which

provided a legal basis for the development of the defence industry, gave financial and tax incentives, and accorded land concessions and other administrative support. Since then, the country has developed its production capacity so much that by 2022 it became the world's ninth largest arms exporter. Germany, on the other hand, is currently ranked⁸ fifth globally.



Price matters. The introduction or enhancement of each security model in the United States (and its allies) has been largely driven by financial considerations — evaluating the cost of a particular model and finding ways to optimise it without compromising its effectiveness.

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In the case of South Korea, for example, there was an agreement from the beginning that the U.S. would bear the costs of maintaining its military personnel, while South Korea would cover expenses related to equipment, workforce maintenance, necessary construction work, and utility services. In addition to direct financial support, the Republic of Korea provides indirect support by waiving rent for land and facilities used by U.S. military forces, as well as exemption from taxes. In the case of West Germany, one of the important arguments in favour of Bonn's NATO accession in Washington was the financial one: NATO membership is a priori cheaper than the obligation of providing constant support at the bilateral level. Unlike Israel, South Korea, or even Taiwan (a partially recognized country), Ukraine is also locat-

⁸ Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022, SIPRI, March 2023: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2022>

ed in the Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, it has every right to aspire to NATO membership, particularly from the perspective of the most financially balanced proposal, which plays an increasingly important role in the heated debates in the United States regarding the allocation of foreign aid to international partners in general.

the most valuable practical element of this model for us is that the ten-year long-term support memoranda did not exist until 1999. In the case of the Taiwan model, it is constantly being upgraded in terms of exactly what means Taiwan needs to contain China more effectively.




Models are mostly not static. Most of the models examined did not emerge immediately in the form we know them today — they were mostly modified and changed over time. For instance, in the case of the Korean model, certain elements appeared or, conversely, waned over a period of time. If the Mutual Defence Treaty was signed immediately within the framework of the armistice (1953), the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed only in 1966. The agreement on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons was concluded in 1957, but effectively ceased to exist in 1991, when the weapons left the territory of the Korean Peninsula. In the case of Israel,



Israel is good, but NATO is better. A nationwide opinion poll conducted by *Info Sapiens* on behalf of the *New Europe Center*⁹ in November 2023 showed that Ukrainians, among all proposed security models, have the most favourable attitude towards NATO, even if the protection under Article 5 is gradually extended (essentially referring to the Western German model). The Israeli model, formulated as the 'Agreement and/or U.S. law on security assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of weapons but without the deployment of its troops,' took the third place in this ranking.


What do you consider the best security guarantee for Ukraine?¹⁰



⁹ New Europe Center, 'Preconditions for Negotiations, "Security Guarantees," and Trust in Foreign Leaders — opinion poll', December 5, 2023: <http://neweurope.org.ua/analytics/pro-peredumovy-dlya-peregovoriv-bezpekovi-garantiji-i-doviru-dozakordonnyh-lideriv-opytuvannya/>

¹⁰ Under the condition that membership of the entire territory of Ukraine in NATO is impossible due to the occupied territories.

THE SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY MODEL



The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), formed during the Korean War of 1950–1953 and enshrined in the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty,¹¹ is the key pillar of peace and security in the Korean Peninsula.

Over the past seventy years, the Alliance has evolved from unilateral economic assistance and security guarantees from the United States to a global comprehensive strategic partnership.



BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL.¹²

The war in the Korean Peninsula, in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

fought with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) against the ROK, supported by 15 states led by the United States under the UN banner, ended in an armistice without a victory for either side. South Korean President Syngman Rhee demanded that the war be fought to a victorious end, but the United States managed to persuade him to agree to the armistice by promising to sign a mutual defence treaty immediately afterwards. The Korean War ended with the Korean Peninsula Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953.¹³ However, Syngman Rhee refused to sign it. It was signed by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and General Nam Il, representative of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Peng Dehuai, and US Army Lieutenant General William Harrison Jr. and General Mark Wayne Clark, who represented the United Nations Command (UNC). The Agreement led to the cessation of active hostilities between North and South Korea and created a demilitarised security zone along the 38th parallel in the Korean Peninsula. A formal peace treaty was never signed, so the two countries are formally still at war. The Korean War has been frozen for 70 years, reducing the chances for not only peaceful reunification (as stated in documents and at the diplomatic level), but also peaceful coexistence in the Korean Peninsula.

¹¹ 'Mutual Defence Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea'; October 1, 1953: https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/H_Mutual%20Defense%20Treaty_1953.pdf

¹² The comprehensive list of questions can be found at the end of this document in Appendix 1.

¹³ 'The Korean War Armistice Agreement'; Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953: https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf

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The US-ROK Security Alliance was created as a direct response to the demands of the time, namely, to prevent a new attack by the DPRK and to counter the expansion of communist ideology to the South, given the outbreak of the Cold War. Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has maintained a military presence in the Republic of Korea, with 28,500 troops currently based there—a number which is bigger only in Japan and Germany¹⁴ — as well as the largest US overseas military base, Camp Humphreys. In addition to US military presence, South Korea is part of the US nuclear umbrella, the so-called Extended Deterrence, which includes the use of the entire spectrum of US defence capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defence, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities.

In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth thanks to economic assistance and security guarantees from the United States, which allowed it to focus on economic development while spending less on defence (from 1954 to 1958, the United States provided the ROK government with about \$1.5 billion in subsidies and 'development loans'). During this time, relations between the two countries were markedly asymmetrical. The alliance was initially based on the unilateral US operational control (OPCON) over the ROK military in peacetime and wartime. Initially, OPCON was in the hands of the UN Command, led by an American general. In 1978, it was transferred to the Commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC Commander (a four-star US general) simultaneously leads the United Nations Command (UNC) and the US Forces Korea (USFK). The establishment of the Combined Forces Command ensured a relatively equal bilateral command

structure between the US and the ROK, in which the deputy commander is a Korean four-star general, and the staff structure follows similar parity. This is a combined combatant command headquarters that exercises operational control over the military personnel of both countries on active duty. In wartime, control may extend to reservists and additional US forces deployed outside the Republic of Korea.

For South Korean governments, the transfer of OPCON to Korean control was considered a sovereignty imperative. In 1994, South Korea assumed control of its peacetime military forces. In 2007, the allies agreed to transfer wartime OPCON from the United States to the ROK in April 2012 as part of the 2007–2010 Strategic Transition Plan (STP). At the same time, two parallel national commands were created: the lead ROC JCS and a US auxiliary command called Korea Command (KORCOM), which emerged from USFK. Increased nuclear and missile tests by the DPRK and the coming to power of conservative President Lee Myung-bak in the ROK led to the postponement of the wartime transfer of OPCON until 2015, but it was later extended again indefinitely. In addition, the ROK and US governments have abandoned the experiment with parallel command and returned to the tried-and-tested model of integrated combined force command (CFC). For the conservative forces of the ROK, the combined command is considered critical in terms of maintaining the presence of US forces in the Korean Peninsula and deterring DPRK threats.

Therefore, the command architecture, which had been unilaterally led by the United States, has evolved into a bilateral combined arms architecture in which the ROK gradually took the lead in its own defence. However, South Korean leaders have been hesitant to take the lead in the command architecture in order not to undermine the foundations of the US presence and commitment to the alliance. In addition, the transition of wartime OPCON implies a shift

¹⁴ Statista 'Where U.S. Military Personnel is Stationed Abroad': <https://www.statista.com/chart/8598/where-us-military-personnel-is-stationed-abroad/>.

in command to the ROK, as well as broader regional commitments and operations planning. For its part, the United States is also hesitant to relinquish control too quickly: The full transfer of wartime OPCON is a fundamental change in the alliance's order, as an American will be the deputy to a Korean, the only such 'inverted' bilateral military command arrangement to which the United States will be a party. However, the transition of wartime OPCON is an officially agreed alliance policy that will be gradually implemented by the United States and the ROK, becoming the next stage in the development of the alliance structure.

In 1966, the United States and South Korea signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),¹⁵ which regulates the conditions for the deployment of US troops in South Korea. According to Article 5, the United States bears the cost of maintaining its military personnel, while South Korea bears the cost related to equipment, the maintenance of the workforce, necessary construction work, and utility services. In addition to direct financial support, the Republic of Korea provides indirect support by waiving rent for land and facilities used by U.S. military forces and exempting them from taxes. Since 1991, South Korea has covered part of the costs of maintaining US military personnel through the Special Measures Agreements (SMA) that followed.¹⁶ Today, South Korea pays about \$1 billion a year, which is 13.9% more than before 2019, when the five-year agreement expired and US President Donald Trump set conditions for a significant increase in spending to \$4.7 billion.¹⁷ The South Korean government did not agree to Donald Trump's demands. The ROK and the US managed to reach an agreement on

the spending increase and conclude a new agreement after Joe Biden became US President. In addition, the South Korean government has covered about 90% of the total cost (\$9.7 billion) for the construction of a new US military base, Camp Humphreys.

The United States bears the cost of maintaining its military personnel, while South Korea bears the cost related to equipment, the maintenance of the workforce, necessary construction work, and utility services.

The tools US Congress uses to oversee and influence the US-ROK security cooperation include annual authorisation and appropriations bills, in particular the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), and annual House and Senate Armed Service Committee hearings involving the commander of US Forces Korea.¹⁸

In 2007, the Republic of Korea and the United States signed the KORUS Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA),¹⁹ which effectively removed all barriers to trade and investment between the two countries. The KORUS FTA has not only greatly contributed to bilateral trade expansion and improved market access but has also become the basic framework for economic cooperation.

In 2009, the United States and South Korea set out a common vision for the alliance aimed at modernising relations from a bilateral to a comprehensive strategic alliance. In 2013, the

¹⁵ 'Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea'; Seoul, 9 July 1966: <https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/411%20CSB/1%20U.S.-ROK%20SOFA.PDF>.

¹⁶ *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea* <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/21-901-Korea-Defense-SMA.pdf>

¹⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, 'U.S.-South Korea Tensions: What's at Stake? 26 November 2019: <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-south-korea-tensions-whats-stake>

¹⁸ Congressional Research Service, 'U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress', 12 September 2023: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388>

¹⁹ Office of the United States Trade Representative, 'Trade & Investment Framework Agreements': <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta>.

alliance expanded its cooperation to include deterring North Korea and other regional and global challenges.

Presidents Yoon Suk Yeol and Joe Biden have developed the partnership into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance that jointly addresses the challenges of the 21st century based on shared core values, which has expanded into non-traditional security areas such as health-care, energy security, climate change, supply chain resilience, technological innovations, and development.²⁰



POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

The Mutual Defence Treaty of 1953 was widely supported by South Korean political circles and was ratified by the National Assembly. However, there was opposition to the treaty in some political circles due to a number of reservations:

Some critics believed that signing a mutual defence treaty would limit South Korea's sovereignty and increase its dependence on foreign forces.

- Some critics believed that signing a mutual defence treaty would limit South Korea's sovereignty and increase its dependence on foreign forces.
- It was feared that the US military presence in the Republic of Korea would lead to tensions with the DPRK.

- After the Korean War, a new government was elected with the support of the United States, which was disfavoured by some political elites sympathising with the communist ideology.

Over the 70 years of the US-South Korean alliance there have been several key moot points between the two countries:²¹

- The intentions by US administrations — particularly by Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter — to withdraw the US troops from the Korean Peninsula, which has led to a gradual reduction in their number from 63,000 in 1969 to 28,500 today.
- Controversy surrounding the increased costs of maintaining the US contingent under the presidency of Donald Trump, who demanded an increase in spending from Seoul, which the ROK did not agree to, causing serious concern on the part of Koreans about the future of the alliance.
- Differences in approaches to dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean issue in general. They were particularly acute during the US presidency of George W. Bush, who pursued a hardline North Korean, while South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun followed the Sunshine Policy, aimed at rapprochement with the DPRK.
- Disputes over the transfer of operational control (OPCON) to the ROK military in wartime.
- Discussions on the use of the alliance for 'out-of-region' engagement in support of global post-conflict stabilisation operations, together with the United States (ROK forces

²⁰ The White House, 'United States-Republic of Korea Leader's Joint Statement', May 21, 2022: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/>

²¹ 김재철 '한미동맹의 진화요인분석과 발전방향에 관한 연구', October, 2016: <https://oak.chosun.ac.kr/bitstream/2020.oak/13225/2/%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%B8%EB%8F%99%EB%A7%B9%EC%9D%98%20%EC%A7%84%ED%99%94%EC%9A%94%EC%9D%B8%20%EB%B6%84%EC%84%9D%EA%B3%BC%20%EB%B0%9C%EC%A0%84%EB%B0%A9%ED%96%A5%EC%97%90%20%EA%B4%80%ED%95%9C%20%EC%97%B0%EA%B5%AC.pdf>

participated in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).

- Difference in the two countries' perception of regional and global issues. The ROK focuses primarily on security issues in the Korean Peninsula, relations with neighbours (including China and Russia, which have influence on the DPRK), and only then global issues, while the US considers the importance of the Asian region from a global perspective, and only then takes note of the situation and dynamics of the Republic of Korea in the region.

The moods within the conservative and liberal (centre-left) political wings of the Republic of Korea have also changed. While, during the presidency of Park Chung Hee (1962–1979), conservatives did not rule out pursuing independent policies outside the US-ROK alliance, they have been fully committed to the United States since the 1990s. The left-wing nationalists saw their anti-Americanism start to decline in the 1990s and disappear completely in the 2000s, when some of them became government officials and appraised the benefits of the ROK's alliance with the United States in a different way, especially against the realities of the DPRK.



PUBLIC SUPPORT.

The 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was construed as an important step in ensuring South Korean security after a long and devastating war, which saw about 5.5 million Korean civilians, as well as 600,000 North Korean soldiers, 415,000 South Korean soldiers, more than 150,000 Chinese volunteers, about 100,000 Americans and soldiers from the UN-led mission, and 300 Soviet pilots and anti-air-

craft gunners killed. The South Koreans considered the Americans to be their allies in the fight against Japanese colonialism and then, against the communists from the North, so they were sympathetic for them.

However, since the 1970s, the so-called 386 Generation (young people in their 30s who were instrumental in the democratic movement of the 1980s)²² were gaining ground, which opposed the authoritarian military regime of Park Chung Hee, the architect of the South Korean 'economic miracle', and saw the United States as the regime's key sponsor. Anti-Americanism started to spread among young intellectuals.

In 1990s and 2000s, this radical sentiment transformed into regular criticism of the United States, mostly regarding its military presence in South Korea. This was due to several reasons. Firstly, the location of a US military base in Yongsan, near Seoul, created discomfort for citizens. Secondly, the growth of democracy strengthened a sense of land ownership by the Koreans, which called into question the presence of a foreign military contingent. Thirdly, South Koreans believe that military exercises and the movement of military equipment causes unnecessary noise and harm to the environment. A traffic accident in 2002 involving American soldiers, in which two South Korean girls died, caused public outcry, and led to the relocation of the military base to the city of Pyeongtaek in the south of the country.²³

Therefore, the level and nature of public support for the alliance with the US in South Korea can fluctuate over time and depend on a number of factors. Generally, most South Koreans believe the military-political alliance with the United States to be an important element of national security and stability in the region, since the US military presence helps prevent

²² The JoongAng '그때는 맞고 지금은 틀리다? «우린 선 너희 악» 386세대 DNA', 25 September 2019: <https://www.joongang.co.kr/amparticle/23586032>

²³ 디지털양주문화대전 '주한 미군 장갑차에 의한 여중생 압사 사건': '<http://www.grandculture.net/yangju/toc/GC04300521>'.

North Korean possible aggression and other threats. However, some South Koreans supportive of the alliance with the United States also seek greater autonomy and influence over national security decisions, particularly given the current geopolitical situation.

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The East Asia Institute's 2023 survey shows what South Koreans think of the alliance with the United States:

- The alliance has helped the security of the ROK: 23.7% strongly agree; 70.1% agree; 5.8% disagree.
- The alliance has helped the economic development of the ROK: 25% strongly agree; 62% agree; 12.6% disagree.
- The alliance has helped the development of democracy in the ROK: 20.4% strongly agree; 65.9% agree; 13.2% disagree.

At the same time, 66.5% believe that the ROK-US alliance could lead to South Korea being drawn into conflicts that have nothing to do with its national interests, while 33.5% do not.²⁴



WHO INITIATED THE MODEL?

The United States was the driving force behind the South Korean security model. The existence of such a treaty was an important part of US policy and strategy in South Korea for several reasons:

- Ensuring compliance with the Korean War Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 and avoiding a repeat of hostilities.
- Ensuring security and stability in the region, given the geostrategic position of the Korean Peninsula in the context of the Cold War and countering the spread of communism.
- Assisting the reconstruction of South Korea after the war, with the idea of making it an example of the success of democracy for other countries against the background of rivalry with the USSR.
- North Korea's foreign actions and ambitions, including the development of nuclear and missile programmes and missile tests, which run significant security threats to the entire region.

One of the reasons for Washington's support of South Korea is assistance in post-war reconstruction, with the idea of making it an example of the success of democracy for other countries against the background of rivalry with the USSR.

For their part, South Korean leaders and governments have actively worked to strengthen the US-ROK alliance, improving their national security strategy, modernising its military forces, and

²⁴ [EAI 여론브리핑] 2023 년 EAI 동아시아 인식조사: 미국과 한미관계, 25 September 2023: https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22108&board=kor_issuebriefing

developing their economy to increase their capabilities to ensure stability and security in the Korean Peninsula.



THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT.

The United States-Republic of Korea security alliance serves as the core of security and stability in the Korean Peninsula and in the region. The ROK counts on US support in the event of a threat of aggression.

During the Korean War, in addition to the United States, 15 other countries came to defend South Korea under UN command. According to UN Security Council Resolution 84, the United States was authorised to create a unified command of UN member states (UNC). The United States was able to secure UN Security Council support because the USSR boycotted the meeting, demanding that the seat of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Council be transferred to the PRC. This was the world's first attempt at collective security within the UN system, which included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Another five countries—Denmark, Germany, India, Italy, and Norway—provided medical or humanitarian assistance. In signing the security assurances treaty, the United States also relied on the collective strength and votes of the countries that sent their troops to maintain deterrence in the Korean Peninsula.

On the day of the ceasefire, the 16 participating countries signed the Greater Sanctions Statement, which reads: 'We affirm, in the interests

*of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the UN, we should again be united and prompt to resist. Consequences of such a breach of armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within frontiers of Korea.*²⁵

However, by the end of 1956, the military contingents of the participating countries began to withdraw their forces, and by the mid-1970s, all contingents except the United States had left.²⁶

After the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the US-led United Nations Command (UNC) was responsible for overseeing its enforcement in the Korean Peninsula. In addition, a four-star US general maintained operational control over the South Korean military under the 1953 US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty. Since October 1971, China has been a permanent member of the UN Security Council and demanded that the UNC be terminated, and discussions have also been held over the presence of US troops in the ROK. North Korea constantly demands that the US troops be completely withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula, using this factor as one of the conditions for peace and denuclearisation in the Korean Peninsula. From the standpoint of the North Korean regime, the presence of the US contingent is an obstacle to achieving the unification of the Korean Peninsula—of course, on the communist regime's terms.²⁷

The establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command in 1978 took over deterrence and defence, excluding UN involvement, from the UNC, which continues to monitor the implementation of the 1953 Armistice Treaty with the participation of mostly Americans and a small number of staff officers from participating coun-

²⁵ Office of the Historian, 'The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)', Washington, January 10, 1952: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d10>

²⁶ United Nations Command, 'Post-1953': <https://www.unc.mil/History/Post-1953-Evolution-of-UNC/>

²⁷ The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 'How to Understand North Korea's Demand for the Withdrawal of the ROK-U.S. «hostile policy»', January 21, 2022: <https://en.asaninst.org/contents/how-to-understand-north-koreas-demand-for-the-withdrawal-of-rok-u-s-hostile-policy/>

tries. Currently, the US Forces Korea (USFK) is the backbone of the UNC's ability to maintain the inter-Korean armistice, with a US general serving as the triple commander of the USFK, CFC and UNC. Since the 2010s, some of the participating states have begun sending their military personnel for joint exercises under the auspices of the UNC Multinational Coordination Center, established in 2008. However, there are no definite formal permanent commitments of partner forces that the Alliance or the UNC can rely upon in the event of a crisis or war. In addition, China and Russia will veto any participation of the UNC forces in case of violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Meanwhile, China and Russia play an important role in regional security on the Korean Peninsula, and their policies and attitudes towards North Korea affect regional developments. Russia has maintained traditional relations with Pyongyang after the collapse of the USSR and was a member of the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearisation of the DPRK.²⁸ The strengthening of military-technical cooperation between Russia and the DPRK against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which undermines the established balance on the Korean Peninsula, is a serious concern for the Republic of Korea.

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China is a key player in terms of North Korea's denuclearisation, and its support or pressure can have a significant impact on regional security. China is a signatory not only to the Korean Peninsula Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, but also to the Sino-North Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the DPRK of 1961, which reads that: "[i]n the event of an attack on one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to an armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by any means at its disposal."²⁹

Therefore, China directly influences the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

In the light of the abovementioned, South Korea seeks to build pragmatic relations with Beijing. The strategic rivalry between China and the United States makes it difficult for South Korea to maintain the *status quo*, based on the simultaneous pursuit of a security alliance with the United States and economic cooperation with China.

The relationship between South Korea and Japan is important for East Asian security. Disputes between the two countries over historical issues and territory have negatively affected their cooperation. The United States has repeatedly facilitated dialogue between Tokyo and Seoul. For instance, in August 2023, US President Joe Biden held a historic summit at Camp David with the leaders of South Korea and Japan, announcing numerous initiatives to strengthen the trilateral partnership.³⁰ The proposed measures include annual summits to coordinate strategy in the Indo-Pacific; the establishment of a crisis hotline; and the expansion of joint military exercises. The initiative seeks to strengthen cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South

²⁸ Arms Control Association 'The Six-Party Talks at a Glance', January, 2022: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks>

²⁹ News of the Communist Party of China '1961年7月11日 《中朝友好合作互助条约》在北京签订': <https://web.archive.org/web/20171116010536/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67825/4577963.html>

³⁰ The White House, 'The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States', 18 August 2023: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/>

Korea, which is important in the light of growing geopolitical instability. In addition, Japan and South Korea have resumed bilateral cooperation under the 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA),³¹ suspended in 2019 due to tensions between the two countries.

South Korea is one of NATO's global partners, along with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Collectively, they are referred to as the A4, or the Asian Four. The Indo-Pacific is important to NATO because developments in Asia directly affect the Euro-Atlantic area and pose common challenges.



SECURITY GUARANTEES.

Under the 1953 US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, the United States pledges to defend the Republic of Korea in the event of a threat or armed attack against its territory. Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, which defines the principle of collective defence: *'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area,'*³²

Article III of the 1953 US-RK Mutual Defence Treaty reads: *'Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'*³³

The US provides military support to the ROK through the deployment of US troops in its territory, a strong combined command structure, and security consultations between the US and ROK leadership. The US-ROK alliance is one of the three bilateral mutual defence alliances to which the United States is a party in the Indo-Pacific region. To deter the DPRK, the US-ROK alliance maintains a strong defence posture that includes:

- Joint military exercises and training to improve readiness and coordination of actions in the event of an armed conflict
- Sale of military weapons and equipment, through which the US supports South Korea's defence modernisation, within the framework of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) system
- Technical assistance and advice in the field of defence and security
- Joint development of military technologies and systems for security and defence

³¹ 'Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information', Seoul, 23 November 2016: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000205833.pdf>.

³² 'The North Atlantic Treaty', WashingtonD.C., April 4, 1949: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selectedLocale=uk.

³³ 'Mutual Defence Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea'; October 1, 1953: https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/H_Mutual%20Defense%20Treaty_1953.pdf

- Regular assessment of security threats and joint development of response strategies
- Nuclear umbrella (so-called Extended Deterrence)



HOW "STATIC" IS THE MODEL?

The South Korean security model cannot be seen as 'pure' or static and is constantly changing under the influence of various factors and geopolitical changes. The model has undergone significant changes throughout its history.

The first stage included the establishment of close military ties with the United States during the Korean War (1950–1953) and the conclusion of the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty which provided for security guarantees. The United States also brought the ROK under its nuclear umbrella by deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in 1958.

The second stage included the development of South Korean defence forces, particularly the army and intelligence service, in order to increase its internal defence capabilities (facilitated by the country's economic development and transition to democratic government).

The third stage was marked by the signing of several international agreements and cooperation with neighbouring countries aimed at strengthening regional stability.

The fourth stage included expanding the model's focus to emerging global challenges, such as nuclear security, cybersecurity, climate change, economic security, healthcare, etc.

Changes in South Korea's security model have become key to ensuring its national security in a changing geopolitical environment and adapting to new threats and challenges.

Changes in South Korea's security model have become key to ensuring its national security in a changing geopolitical environment and adapting to new threats and challenges.

Some novel elements that have been added to the South Korean security model include:

- *Armed forces and technology.* South Korea has significantly developed its armed forces and military technology. It produces its own military equipment, including warships, combat aircraft, tanks, and missile systems. It also develops and produces its own cyber defence to protect against cyberattacks.
- *Hypersonic missiles.* South Korea has developed and tested supersonic missiles, which has greatly enhanced its defence capabilities and ability to deter North Korea.
- *Cybersecurity cooperation.* This includes cooperation with other countries and international organisations to protect against cyberattacks and cyber threats.
- *Cooperation with international partners:* South Korea has been actively cooperating with other countries and international partners including the United States, NATO, Japan, Australia, India, etc. to strengthen regional and global security.
- *Humanitarian aid and crisis response.* South Korea has become an active donor of humanitarian aid in the event of natural disasters and global crises, providing assistance to other countries.
- *Cybersecurity and cyber warfare.* South Korea is actively developing its cybersecurity and cyberwarfare capabilities, including defence against cyberattacks.

These elements reflect growing geopolitical pressures and regional challenges, with South Korea adapting its security model to respond to these new realities.



MOTIVATION OF THIRD PARTIES.

The early popularity in the United States of the Korean War as an act of resistance to Soviet communist imperialism later gave way to disappointment over the heavy military losses, the protracted conflict, and the inability to achieve a decisive victory.

The early popularity in the United States of the Korean War as an act of resistance to Soviet communist imperialism later gave way to disappointment over the heavy military losses.

Gradually, since June 1950, the Harry Truman administration started to be associated with the bloody conflict waged by US forces under UN auspices. By 1951, the balance of power on the battlefield had levelled out and neither side could gain an upper hand. None of the parties to the conflict wanted to be seen as the defeated, and therefore, the US and the USSR began tentatively to sound out their respective positions. Despite armistice negotiations that began in July 1951, the fighting continued. Truman's strategy of conducting a limited war in Korea offered no hope of a decisive victory. American society wanted for the war to end, which turned out to be a decisive factor in the 1952 US presidential campaign. Dwight Eisenhower sharply criticised Harry Truman's Korean policy and advocated for an

end to the war. This difference, therefore, was key to Eisenhower's landslide victory, who received 55% of the popular vote, won in 39 of the 48 states, and had 442 of the 531 electoral college votes.³⁴

Polls from April-May 1953 illustrate the mood of American society at the time:

'If we do get a truce in Korea along the present battle line, would it seem to you that we had generally succeeded or generally failed in our main purpose in going to Korea?' Generally succeeded: 45%; Generally failed: 38%; No opinion: 17%.

'Would you approve or disapprove of our government signing an armistice to end the fighting in Korea along the present battle line?' Approve: 69%; Disapprove: 20%; No opinion: 11%.

'Do you think the United States should take strong steps to try to end the war in Korea, even though our allies in the United States refuse to go along with us?' Yes, strong steps: 62%; No: 31%; No opinion: 7%.³⁵

Dwight Eisenhower, who became US president in 1953, and Secretary of State Allen Dulles believed that a continuation of the Korean War was incompatible with US national security interests. In January 1953, their top priority was to find a way to end the Korean War, but neither had a clear strategy to that end, and Eisenhower's high-profile trip to Korea the previous December had not been helpful in that regard. The death of Joseph Stalin pushed all the parties to the conflict, including China and the DPRK, to end hostilities and reach an armistice.

³⁴ Robert Barnes *'Ending the Korean War: Reconsidering the Importance of Eisenhower's Election'*: <https://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/847/1/RUSI%20Article%20on%20End%20of%20Korean%20War%20Robert%20Barnes.doc>.

³⁵ *'Memorandum on Recent Polls on Korea'*, April, May, 1953: <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/korean-war/public-opinion-1953-06-02.pdf>

The death of Joseph Stalin pushed all the parties to the conflict, including China and the DPRK, to end hostilities and reach an armistice.

However, the United States was seriously concerned about South Korean President Syngman Rhee's opposition to the armistice, who dreamed of marching north and unifying Korea. The United States promised Syngman Rhee security guarantees for the ROK in exchange for agreeing to an armistice, negotiations on which started under the Truman administration. However, the parties did not agree on over what such security guarantees should be. The Truman's administration tried to engage the countries that participated in the Korean War under the UN auspices to guarantee the ROK's future security, but South Korean President Syngman Rhee insisted on a bilateral agreement. (Truman believed that the Greater Sanctions Statement, signed by 16 countries participating in the UN forces "under present circumstances, clearly preferable from standpoint ROK security to bilateral defence treaty with US".³⁶)

Eisenhower rejected a mutual defence treaty for a number of reasons. He feared that such a treaty would undermine the importance of multilateral efforts by the United Nations and provide a legal basis for North Korean communist control. In addition, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to enter into such a treaty in order not to involve the US in commitments it would rather avoid. Even two months before the Treaty was signed, the US offered various forms of security guarantees: those under the Greater Sanctions Statement;³⁷ an agreement on major US military assistance;

a promise to hold a political conference to achieve Korean unification and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the peninsula; and US support for the ROK army.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee, which rejected any alternative to a bilateral security agreement, resorted to a kind of blackmail and released thousands of unrepatriated Korean prisoners of war to disrupt the armistice negotiations (it was a major issue which stalled negotiations between the parties). In the end, the US decided to sign a mutual defence treaty as the best way to ensure President Syngman Rhee would not violate the armistice and to institutionalise hierarchical restrictions on its South Korean allies.



HOW HAS THE MODEL WORKED IN CRISES?

The US and the ROK say that their alliance was "forged in blood as a result of our fight for freedom", since it emerged from the Korean War, which saw more than 36,500 US military personnel killed, among others.³⁸

The next test of the alliance was during the Vietnam War (1965–1973), when South Korea sent about 320,000 soldiers—significantly more than any other US ally, with 5,000 of them killed. During the Cold War, Seoul sent military and support personnel during both Iraq Wars (including the largest allied contingent in 2003–2004, apart from the United Kingdom) and to Afghanistan, as well as various peacekeeping operations, usually under the UN auspices.

There have been at least two large-scale crises that could have led to military action.

³⁶ Office of the Historian 'The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea', Washington, May 22, 1953: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d545>

³⁷ 'Report to the National Security Council', Washington, June 15, 1953: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-5/05.pdf>

³⁸ Statista, 'Number of military fatalities in all major wars involving the United States from 1775 to 2023': <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1009819/total-us-military-fatalities-in-american-wars-1775-present/>

- In 1968, the North Koreans attacked and captured the USS Pueblo warship, equipped with the most modern intelligence equipment. The United States began planning a military operation, but the DPRK threatened to kill all the captured sailors. The conflict was resolved through negotiations between US President Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin, the premier of the Soviet Union.
- In 1994, the United States adopted a more coercive policy towards Pyongyang's nuclear programme, mulling nuclear strikes on the DPRK's nuclear facilities. In response, North Korea promised to wipe Seoul off the map. The conflict was stopped by former US President Jimmy Carter, who came to Pyongyang and negotiated the suspension of the North Korean nuclear programme.

In addition, the US-ROK alliance has had to deal with a number of peacetime crises in its history.

- The US helped South Korea cope with internal instability and communist insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s and establish democracy. In the 1960s, the US faced a dilemma in which it was forced to support the autocratic government of Park Chung Hee, the architect of Korea's 'economic miracle'. Although the US did not want the ROK to turn into a dictatorship, it supported Park Chung Hee for the sake of the country's stability and economic viability, because it was interested in the economic growth of the ROK. For this reason, the United States did not impose democracy, but instead supported civil society institutions that later became the driving force of the democratic movement. However, South Korean activists have long reminded the US of its support for authoritarian leaders in the interests of security over democracy.
- After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the US shifted its focus to other regions, which called into question the relevance of the alliance. It was assumed that the DPRK would not survive long without Soviet support, the threat of the spread of communism disappeared and changes

in the international system began, with the case of German reunification also seen as the future path of the two Koreas. However, in the late 1990s, North Korea acquired nuclear technology and started developing a nuclear programme, posing new challenges to the alliance.

- The 21st century is associated with the search for a solution to the DPRK's nuclear programme, which the Alliance has responded to with diplomacy (repeated negotiations on a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue), economic coercion (tough sanctions), and military measures (the concept of retaliation to deter a North Korean nuclear attack).

The 21st century is associated with the search for a solution to the DPRK's nuclear programme, which the Alliance has responded to with diplomacy, economic coercion, and military measures.

However today the US-South Korean alliance faces a slew of new challenges which are of concern to Seoul:

- Uncertainty over the United States's security commitments in the event of a change in US political leadership (Trump's presidency turned out to be a challenge for the Alliance and a cause for concern about changes in American foreign policy).
- Concerns about the US readiness to respond to threats to South Korea in the event of a potential nuclear attack on the United States itself. The ROK is concerned, in the event of the DPRK using nuclear weapons against it, about how and whether the US response will be sufficient given the threat of a retaliatory strike on its own territory, and whether this will become an argument for the US to limit its involvement in the conflict. For this reason,

support is growing in South Korea for the development of its own nuclear weapons.

- A possible emergence of simultaneous intra-regional crises in the context of confrontation between the United States and China, two nuclear superpowers, which could limit US support on the Korean Peninsula and put South Korea in a difficult geopolitical context.
- Concerns about the strengthening of Russia's cooperation with the DPRK and China, as well as the emergence of the PRC-Russia-DPRK triangle, which undermines the status quo in the region and increases threats to South Korea security.



NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

From 1958 to 1991, the United States deployed its tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea. US President George W. Bush withdrew them as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),³⁹ which provided for the reduction and withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons outside the United States, including from South Korea. In the 1970s, South Korea started a nuclear weapons programme but stopped it due to US pressure. After that, public discussion of nuclear weapons in South Korea became a political taboo.

In recent years, discussions have intensified in Seoul about the return of US tactical nuclear weapons in response to the growing nuclear threats from North Korea.

In recent years, however, discussions have intensified in the Republic of Korea about the return of US tactical nuclear weapons in response to the growing nuclear threats from North Korea. In addition, there are growing calls within the country to develop its own nuclear capabilities. A 2022 poll showed that 71% of South Koreans favoured the development of the country's own nuclear weapons, while 56% supported the deployment of US nuclear weapons. When asked to choose between the two options, 56% favoured an independent nuclear arsenal and 9% supported US nuclear deployment. At the same time, 24% of those surveyed believed that the Republic of Korea should not have nuclear weapons.⁴⁰

In April 2023, in order to calm public sentiment, Presidents Joe Biden and Yun Suk Yeol adopted the Washington Declaration, which aims to strengthen extended deterrence and response to the DPRK's growing nuclear threats.

The Declaration confirms South Korea's existing commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and bilateral treaties⁴¹ to adhere to its non-nuclear status. In return, the United States commit to consulting with South Korea on any possible use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula—a special reassurance for Seoul, since there is no formal legal requirement for the US to consult with allies before using nuclear weapons in self-defence. The two sides established a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to discuss nuclear and strategic planning with a particular focus on joint planning to support US nuclear operations with South Korean conventional capabilities, as well as the regular deployment of US strategic assets in the Korean Peninsula.

³⁹ U.S. Department of State 'Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 1991 and 1993': <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/104210.htm>.

⁴⁰ 'Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons', February, 2022: <https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Korea%20Nuclear%20Report%20PDF.pdf>

⁴¹ U.S. Department of State 'U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation': <https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/u-s-republic-of-korea-r-o-k-agreement-for-peaceful-nuclear-cooperation/>.

The Declaration also envisages new types of integration of US-ROK forces in the context of the bilateral alliance 'to closely connect the capabilities and planning activities of the new ROK Strategic Command and the US-ROK Combined Forces Command'. It is intended to reduce the likelihood of unintentional escalation due to the lack of coordinated actions in the event of a threat.⁴²



COMPARISON OF ARMIES.

At the time of the armistice, North and South Korea were almost completely destroyed by carpet bombing. Given the geographical conditions, the northern part of the Korean Peninsula has traditionally been more industrially developed (during the occupation, Japan built factories and railway infrastructure there), while the southern part was agrarian. Thanks to the assistance of the USSR, China, and other socialist countries and economic planning, the DPRK was able to recover faster than the ROK. Until the 1980s, North Korea had an economic and technological edge over South Korea, reflected in the military balance between the two countries. North Korea began to develop its military-industrial complex with a strong emphasis on foreign aid, especially from the USSR and China, including the production of weapons and the transfer of military technology.

In South Korea, reforms began only in the 1970s, under the presidency of Park Chung Hee. At the time, the US military presence was reduced, part of US President Richard Nixon's doctrine of reduced overseas military presence, pushing the ROK to develop its own military-industrial complex.

Since South Korea did not have an industrial structure conducive to a defence industry, its early efforts focused on the production of am-




munition and light weapons such as rifles and light machine guns, using US technical data and licensing agreements for production. However, since 1974, South Korea has embarked on a large-scale and systematic defence industrialisation. To that end, the Special Law on the Promotion of the Defence Industry was passed, which provided a legal framework for the development of the defence industry and granted various benefits such as financial agreements, tax breaks, land concessions, and other administrative support.

In the 1970s the US military presence was reduced pushing Seoul to develop its own military-industrial complex.

In order to attract financial resources for the development of the heavy and chemical industry, the National Investment Fund was established, which was later transformed into the Defence Industrial Promotion Fund (DIPF) to channel financial resources into the defence industry. As a result, by the mid-1980s, the ROK was able to meet most of its needs in conventional armaments and began actively searching for new strategies, structures, and weapons aimed at achieving greater efficiency and modernity in the military field. It actively modernised its defence sector, started to procure modern weapons, and focused on developing future-oriented defence capabilities.

The South Korean Defence Reform 2020 plan provided for a significant development of the country's military-industrial complex (MIC) and the active acquisition of modern weapons and equipment to improve military capabilities. The plan focused on the acquisition of reconnaissance drones, next-generation tanks and infan-

⁴² The White House, 'Washington Declaration', 26 April 2023: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/>

		CLASSIFICATION		SOUTH KOREA		NORTH KOREA	
				IISS	ROK Defence Ministry	IISS	ROK Defence Ministry
 ARMY	EQUIPMENT						
		Armoured fighting vehicles	2,614	2,300	4,060	4,300	
		Armoured vehicles	2,956	2,800	2,532	2,500	
		Artillery	4,853	5,800	6,000	8,600	
		Multiple rocket launchers	214	200	5,100	5,500	
		Surface-to-surface missile launchers	30	60	100	100	
 NAVY	EQUIPMENT						
		Combat-capable surface vessels	144	100	385	430	
		Amphibious vessels	9	10	267	250	
		Mine warfare vessels	10	10	24	20	
		Logistics and support vessels	7	20	23	40	
		Submarines	22	10	73	70	
 AIR FORCE	EQUIPMENT						
		Combat-capable aircraft	590	410	545	810	
		Transport aircraft	38	50	217	340	
		Intelligence and surveillance aircraft	38	70	30	30	
		Surface-to-air missile launchers	206	206	350	350	
		Helicopters (Army / Navy / Air Force)	693	680	286	290	

Comparison of South and North Korean military capabilities (data according to IISS and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Korea, with a slight margin of error)⁴³

try fighting vehicles, improved fire systems, and a simplified command structure.⁴⁴

North Korea's traditional military capabilities have stagnated since 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and problems with the country's governance, but it still outnumbers South Korea in terms of the size of the military. The quantitative advantage of the North Korea military is, however, inferior to the quality

of the South Korean army. The main models of North Korean weapons were manufactured between 1950 and 1970 or modernised from Soviet and Chinese models of the time, while the ROK has updated and modernised most of its military equipment according to new technologies. Since 2006, North Korea has been under severe sanctions and international isolation due to its nuclear programme, complicating the development of its military-industrial complex. However,

⁴³ Chung Min Lee, Kathryn Botto, 'Korea Net Assessment: Politicised Security and Unchanging Strategic Realities', 18 March 2020: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Korea_Net_Assesment_2020.pdf

⁴⁴ Chung-in Moon, Jin-Young Lee 'The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Defence Industry in South Korea', Security Challenges, Vol.4, No.4 (Summer 2008), pp.117-134 (18 pages): <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26459813>.

even as an isolated country with limited access to global resources and technology, North Korea still finds ways to acquire technology (through espionage, theft, etc.) to produce weapons and develop its missile and nuclear programme, or tries to improve existing technologies and develop new solutions on its own.

The development of nuclear warheads and sophisticated ballistic missiles by the DPRK affects the military balance in the Korean Peninsula. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2023 data, North Korea has about 30 warheads and fissile material for 50 to 70 warheads, exceeding its 2022 capabilities.⁴⁵ One of the reasons why the DPRK has focused on nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles is due to the growing qualitative superiority of the ROK's conventional forces.

South Korea spends about 2.7% of its GDP on defence, making it the 9th largest defence spender in the world. In August 2023, it was announced that the South Korean defence budget for 2024 would be around \$45 billion, an increase of 4.5% year-on-year.⁴⁶ The ROK's 2023 defence budget will amount to \$42.1 billion, and the DPRK's defence spending is estimated to be \$4.5 billion by the end of the year.⁴⁷ South Korea is a major buyer of US arms, with an advanced defence industry, and one of the largest arms exporters in the world, ranked 9th in 2022.⁴⁸

Over the past 15 years, South Korea has undertaken extensive reform to strengthen the global competitiveness of its defence industry by investing more resources in defence-related research and development. South Korean defence

companies are also working to expand their export markets.

Over the past 15 years, South Korea has undertaken extensive reform to strengthen the global competitiveness of its defence industry by investing more resources in defence-related research and development.

However, Pyongyang still has a quantitative advantage in conventional weapons, and a significant part of its military assets are deployed near the demilitarised zone 50 kilometres from Seoul, putting significant pressure on the ROK. After the surprise attack by the Hamas group against Israel on 7 October, 2023, South Korea is assessing the risks of a similar situation in the Korean Peninsula and planning to develop a comprehensive response mechanism.



MOBILISATION RESOURCES.⁴⁹

Military service is compulsory in both South and North Korea. In South Korea, military service in the Army and the Marines lasts for 21 months, 23 months in the Navy, and 24 months in the Air Force. Conscript age is from 18 to 35 years. In North Korea, military service is compulsory from 17 to 20 years and lasts seven years for women and 10 years for men. Soldiers in specialised units serve for 13 years.

⁴⁵ SIPRI Yearbook 2023, 'World nuclear forces', 2023: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2023/07#:~:text=At%20the%20start%20of%202023,to%20be%20potentially%20operationally%20available>.



⁴⁶ Congressional Research Service, 'U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress', 12 September 2023: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388>

⁴⁷ Global Firepower, 'Comparison of North Korea and South Korea Military Strengths (2023)', 2023: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=north-korea&country2=south-korea>

⁴⁸ SIPRI, 'Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022', March, 2023: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2022>

⁴⁹ Global Firepower, 'Comparison of North Korea and South Korea Military Strengths (2023)', 2023: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=north-korea&country2=south-korea>

NORTH KOREA



SOUTH KOREA



Service Period

In North Korea, there is mandatory military service:

- 7 years for women
- 10 years for men
- 13 years for specialized military units

Draft Age
From 17 to 20 years old

Service Period

In the South Korean army and marine corps:

- 21 months
- 23 months in the naval fleet
- 24 months in the air force

Draft Age
From 18 to 35 years old



ASSESSMENT IN UKRAINE.

The South Korean security model is negatively perceived in Ukrainian society, primarily because it is associated with territorial concessions to Russia or, at least, with the freezing of the conflict, which will be quite difficult to carry out in the case of Ukraine. A poll conducted in October 2023 showed that 80% of Ukrainians do not accept any territorial concessions for the sake of peace, regardless of how long the war lasts or what other threats might arise. However, the share of those who are ready for territorial concessions for the sake of peace and preservation of Ukraine's independence, increased from 10% to 14% compared to May 2023.⁵⁰

The Ukrainian leadership has also emphasised the unacceptability of the South Korean scenario. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy⁵¹ has repeatedly stated that Ukraine will not agree to freezing the conflict. In addition, the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, has adopted a resolution that rules out any territorial concessions to end the war.⁵²

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian experts agree that the South Korean model cannot be applied in Ukraine, since the security situation in Ukraine is significantly different from that in the Korean Peninsula.

- If the Russian-Ukrainian war ends without full liberation of Ukrainian territories, some of them will remain occupied by the Russian Federation, which will not constitute a division of the country, as in the case of the Republic of Korea and the DPRK along the 38th parallel.

- The formal freezing of the war in Ukraine does not guarantee a lasting peace, since Russia is determined to destroy Ukraine's statehood and can resume hostilities at any time. An attempt to freeze the war was already made in 2014–2022, but instead led to a full-scale invasion by Russia and genocidal war.
- Ukraine's security situation is significantly different from that of South Korea. The US military and an international contingent under the UN banner fought on the side of the ROK, while in the case of Ukraine, the US and NATO are seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia, and only provide military, technical, financial, and economic assistance.
- Russia's military capabilities are much greater than those of North Korea's.



ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OTHER COUNTRIES.

In American political and expert circles, the 'Korean scenario', i.e., the freezing of the conflict in Ukraine and the cessation of hostilities, with neither side recognising the winner and not agreeing to end the war, is discussed as one of the probable and even the most optimal options for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. They deem the scenario viable given that neither Kyiv nor Moscow is ready to admit defeat, creating the risk of the war turning into a long-term conflict of attrition; and the fear of a nuclear escalation with Russia or its uncontrolled collapse with the subsequent loss of control over nuclear weapons.

⁵⁰ KIIS, 'Dynamics of readiness for territorial concessions for the early end of the war: Results of a telephone survey conducted on 29 September-9 October 2023': <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1301&page=1>

⁵¹ Interfax-Ukraine, 'Zelenskyy: Ukraine will never agree to freeze the conflict', 28 June 2023: <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/919551.html>

⁵² Official website of the Parliament of Ukraine. 'Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts resolution excluding any territorial concessions to end the war', 23 August 2023: <https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/razom/240357.html>

The US officials stand ready to offer bilateral security commitments for Ukraine, enshrined in a future bilateral agreement, but not guarantees, as is the case with South Korea.

At the same time, US officials stand ready to offer bilateral security commitments for Ukraine, enshrined in a future bilateral agreement, aimed at long-term support for Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia. However, the security commitments currently being discussed between Kyiv and Washington have nothing to do with the security guarantees provided under the 1953 US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty. In addition, there is nor even a discussion of the possible deployment of US military bases or US tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, as was the case in the 'Korean scenario'.

NATO and its Western partners have repeatedly emphasised the unacceptability of freezing the conflict and support for Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty within the internationally recognised borders. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has also pointed out NATO's commitment to reduce the risks of the freezing of the conflict and ensuring a stronger negotiating position for Ukraine.⁵³



ASSESSMENTS IN RUSSIA.

After the failure of its blitzkrieg, Russia has been exerting targeted diplomatic, military, and information pressure on Ukraine to achieve its 'pacification'. However, Russian President

Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have repeatedly stated that Moscow is ready for a '*serious dialogue on a settlement in Ukraine*' if '*Kyiv fulfils the demands voiced earlier*' and takes into account '*new territorial realities*'.⁵⁴ Therefore, Russia demands that the occupied Ukrainian territories be recognised as Russian as a precondition for negotiations. In the case of North and South Korea, a foreign state does not occupy another state's territory; rather, there are two states whose governments have proclaimed themselves the only legitimate authorities in the entire Korean Peninsula.

In the case of North and South Korea, a foreign state does not occupy another state's territory; rather, there are two states whose governments have proclaimed themselves the only legitimate authorities in the entire Korean Peninsula.

In this regard, the 'Korean scenario' does not meet Russia's interests. According to Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, the implementation of the Korean scenario is impossible because '*the Donbas republics exist not as independent states but as subjects [constituent entities] of Russia*'.⁵⁵ Moreover, the Russian authorities openly declare that they seek to destroy Ukraine's statehood and take over its entire territory, and so any agreements on a lasting ceasefire and the maintenance of the *status quo* are not in the interests of Russia.

⁵³ Radio Svoboda, 'We would like to see a Ukraine that is able to push back Putin's soldiers'. Exclusive interview with NATO Secretary General, 4 April 2023: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/ukrayina-nato-stoltenberg-kontrnastup/32348361.html>

⁵⁴ The Moscow Times, 'Civilised ways to ensure security are impossible'. Putin explains war in Ukraine due to threat of NATO expansion', 11 October 2023: <https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/10/11/tsivilizovannie-sposobi-obespechit-bezopasnost-nevozmozhni-putin-obyasnil-voynu-vukraine-ugrozoi-rasshireniya-nato-a109664>

⁵⁵ LENTA.RU, 'Medvedev mulls dividing Ukraine by Korean scenario', 7 February 2023: <https://m.lenta.ru/news/2023/02/07/koreya/amp/>

However, a temporary freezing of the conflict on the current frontline would most likely benefit Russia, allowing it to restore its military potential, wait for the weakening of support for Ukraine from its Western partners—In the light of the US presidential elections with the possible victory of Donald Trump and political changes in other Western countries—and prepare for a new invasion.



+ - PROS AND CONS

PROS

CONS

- + Achieving a lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula
- + Cessation of hostilities ceased the killing of military personnel and civilians
- + The armistice helped contain the conflict within the Korean Peninsula and avoid a clash between major powers
- + With US assistance, South Korea has rebuilt a country, achieving advanced economic and technological development

- The parties are yet to negotiate a peace treaty
- South and North Korea are still hostile towards each other
- Lack of trust between the parties encourages amassing military capabilities
- Permanent defence expenditures to strengthen one's defence and maintain the US contingent
- North Korea's nuclear programme increases tension not only in the Korean Peninsula but in East Asia
- The engagement of foreign actors in conflict resolution and their own geopolitical interests are not conducive to the settlement of the Korean conflict



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

The Korean scenario for ending the war provides for freezing the conflict and Russia retaining control over some of the Ukrainian territories. This scenario would allow Russia to retain military and political leverage not only over Ukraine but also the West as a whole by imposing its conditions for ending the war against Ukraine; resuming hostilities at any time or blackmailing with the resumption of hostilities against Ukraine; and confirming Russia's belief in the West's inability to withstand Russian challenges, a sort of signal for Moscow to double down on its destructive actions against the EU and NATO.


From a strategic standpoint, the risk is that the Korean scenario will not bring sustainable and guaranteed peace in Ukraine but only a temporary freezing of the war. If the risk of a repeat of war or violation of the ceasefire persists (the front line in Ukraine is thousands of kilometres long and it is difficult to monitor the ceasefire; it is also unclear who will take over this function—in Korea, a contingent under the UN auspices took part in the war and took over this function after the Armistice Agreement was signed), it is unlikely that Ukraine will see a rapid and full economic recovery.

From a strategic standpoint, the risk is that the Korean scenario will not bring sustainable and guaranteed peace in Ukraine but only a temporary freezing of the war.

The positive aspect of this scenario is the cessation of hostilities, which will spare military personnel and civilians and create a basis for Ukraine's reconstruction and economic recovery. However, it is highly probable that Ukrainian society will deem the freezing of the war as territorial concessions to Russia, which could lead to an internal political crisis. In addition, Ukraine lacks confidence in any agreements with Russia, since history has shown that a ceasefire with Russia does not guarantee a sustainable and lasting peace.

There is currently no reason to believe that the South Korean security guarantees model can be fully exported to Ukraine. The South Korean security model was established in response to the challenges that arose in the Korean Peninsula more than 70 years ago, although it has changed in line with the geopolitical situation. The key to maintaining the *status quo* is not only South Korea's economic and technological superiority over the North and the two countries' relative military parity in terms of conventional weapons and military forces, but also the US-ROK 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty with tangible security guarantees—and not security commitments currently being discussed between Kyiv and Washington; the presence of the US military personnel in the Republic of Korea; the US-ROK combined military command; and the US nuclear umbrella. There exists a substantial asymmetry in military, economic and human potential between Russia (the world's largest nuclear power by territory) and Ukraine, and the US is not ready to deploy either its troops or strategic assets in Ukrainian territory.

THE ISRAELI SECURITY MODEL



BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL.⁵⁶

In effect, the security model traces its origins to the recognition of Israel's independence. The United States was the world's first country to recognize the new state in 1948. At the same time, it is worth noting that the core of the Israeli security model is the reliance primarily on its own army. In this respect, US support is a valuable resource, but Tel Aviv considers it strategically important that Israel does not pin its hopes only on external forces when it comes to security matters.

The US support is a valuable resource, but Tel Aviv considers it strategically important that Israel does not pin its hopes only on external forces when it comes to security matters.

The Israeli security strategy was first formulated during the tenure of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (particularly as part of the 1953 government decision on national defence policy). It was premised on five principles: a qualitative advantage in conventional weapons; a nuclear deterrence image; special relations with superpowers (France, the United States); technological and economic superiority; national resilience based in part on Jewish immigration and the connection with the Jewish people in the diaspora.⁵⁷ The fundamental approaches to strategic response during Ben-Gurion's time came down to: 1) moving the fight into enemy territory and 2) making military decisions in the shortest possible time in view of the economic hardship associated with the deployment of large-scale reserve forces in a prolonged military campaign and the difficulties associated with retaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international community regarding the long-term use of military force.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ The comprehensive list of questions can be found at the end of this document in Appendix 1.

⁵⁷ Shay Shabtai, 'Israel's National Security Concept: New Basic Terms in the Military-Security Sphere' (Strategic Assessment, Vol. 13, No.2, August 2010): [https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/\(FILE\)1283413333.pdf](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/(FILE)1283413333.pdf)

⁵⁸ Gadi Eisenkot, Gabi Siboni, 'Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy', The Washington Institute, October 2, 2019: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5731?disposition=inline>

Surrounded by hostile Arab countries, Israel has to constantly take care of strengthening the capabilities of its own armed forces. Here is a list of just some of the military campaigns where Israel was involved: Palestine War (1947–1949); Suez Crisis (1956); Six-Day War (1967); War of Attrition (1973); Yom Kippur War (1973) and others.

At the same time, the country had to counter violent acts carried out by armed organisations that acted with the support of Arab states (and Iran). This type of Israeli struggle is known as conventional or routine security and is also referred to as the '*Campaign between the Wars*'.⁵⁹ In 2015, the Israel Defense Forces used this exact name as the title of their strategy.

Tel Aviv is forced to rely exclusively on its own armed forces (with a high level of assistance from an ally with significant resources). Since 1987, Israel has been included in the list of *US Major Non-NATO Allies* (MNNA).⁶⁰ This status provides a number of advantages for security partners; however, in the case of Israel, it is rather symbolic: the main parameters of aid to Israel do not necessarily stem from the MNNA status.

Since 2008, the United States has taken on a legislatively enshrined obligation to ensure Israel's *Qualitative Military Edge* over military threats (QME — in accordance with 22 U.S. Code § 2776 — Reports and certifications to Congress on military exports). The term "QME" implies "*the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any*

individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors".⁶¹

Throughout its independence, Israel has received aid in the total amount of \$158 billion. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel was Washington's largest recipient of military aid.

Throughout its independence, Israel has received aid in the total amount of \$158 billion.⁶² These funds have been allocated to solving complex security threats, bolstering interoperability via joint exercises and achieving the *Qualitative Military Edge*.⁶³ Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel was Washington's largest recipient of military aid.

Israel most certainly possesses nuclear weapons; Ukraine, on the contrary, relinquished them long ago.⁶⁴ At the same time, Tel Aviv resorts to a wide range of actions — both military and non-military — in order to prevent its foes from developing nuclear weapons.



POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

«We said [that in the war with the Arab armies] we have a secret weapon and our secret weapon is: no alternative, we must win because we have nowhere to run to except the

⁵⁹ Amr Yosse, 'ISRAEL'S CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE WARS: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES?', (Modern War Institute, 2021): <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/israels-campaign-between-the-wars-lessons-for-the-united-states/>

⁶⁰ Currently 18 countries are designated as MNNAs, namely Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Thailand and Tunisia. Taiwan is also considered an MNNA without an official definition as such.

⁶¹ 22 U.S. Code § 2776 — Reports and certifications to Congress on military exports: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2776>

⁶² Congressional Research Service, 'U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel', March 1, 2023: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>

⁶³ U.S. Department of State, 'U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel', July 30, 2021: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-israel/>

⁶⁴ Yair Evron, 'Opaque proliferation: The Israeli case', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2008: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/01402399008437418?scroll=top&needAccess=true>

sea," — stated Golda Meir, a former Prime Minister of Israel.⁶⁵ This opinion largely reflects the reasons for political support for the country's current security model: Israel has no choice but to strengthen its army in various ways since external threats are mostly existential in nature. In this respect, Meir's opinion is consistent with Ukraine's informal approach to waging a liberation struggle against the Russian aggressor: *"If Ukraine stops the war, Ukraine will simply cease to exist. If Russia stops the war, there will be no more war."*

Among Israeli political circles, there is full support for the correctness of the chosen course to strengthen the country's own army by searching for ways that would make the Israel Defense Forces technically and operationally more powerful compared to the overwhelming quantitative might of the enemy. Israel's army, which is smaller in terms of the number of soldiers, is forced to look for asymmetric ways of countering external threats. Discussions in Israel on security and defence issues may refer to individual accents of a non-strategic nature (for instance, which categories of citizens may or may not have the right to be exempt from mandatory military service). The debate may be about political responsibility for miscalculations in strengthening defence capabilities. However, basic issues related to the defence of the state remain out of the discussion: Israel is monolithic in supporting the army, developing allied relations with the US, prioritising national interests over international law, etc. This does not mean that there is a permanent mutual understanding between the US and Israel: the relations between the two countries have repeatedly been overshadowed by heated discussions on various topics (the Iranian nuclear

program, the view on Palestinian statehood, etc.). Tellingly, however, these discussions do not affect strategic cooperation on security and defence.



PUBLIC SUPPORT.

In Israel, there is a stable and solid consensus on the awareness of the role of citizens in defence and their readiness for military actions for the survival and development of the state. Reliance on one's own forces, one's army, has become part of the social and political culture of Israel. The US was and is perceived as a key ally essential for achieving military superiority in the region.

The IDF — the backbone of the country's security model — enjoys a high level of support among the country's citizens. For instance, 80% of respondents rate the operational capacity of the state's armed forces as good or excellent.⁶⁶ At the same time, there has recently been an increase in the share of citizens opposing mandatory military service in Israel (in 2021, 47% were in favor of abolishing conscription, up from 38% in 2017).⁶⁷

Hamas' attack on Israel in October 2023 revealed a deep distrust among Israelis in the government's ability to defend the country.⁶⁸ 94% of respondents have blamed the government for the failure of defence systems in the southern settlements. 92% of respondents felt fear and panic after the attacks, which to some extent could be interpreted as citizens' lack of confidence in the state's defensive capabilities (such sentiments, however, might be temporary).

⁶⁵ The American Presidency Project, *'Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel'*, September 25, 1969: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-prime-minister-golda-meir-israel-0#:~:text=In%201948%2C%20when%20we%20were,run%20to%20except%20the%20sea>

⁶⁶ The Times of Israel, *'Poll: Almost half of Jewish Israelis support making IDF a professional army'*, 23 November, 2021: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-almost-half-of-jewish-israelis-support-making-idf-a-professional-army/>

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Middle East Monitor, *'Poll: 94% of Israelis say gov't failing to protect them'*, October 13, 2023: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231013-poll-94-of-israelis-say-govt-failing-to-protect-them/>

At the same time, Israelis have a consistently high level of positive perception of the US. Over the last 10 years, the number of those with a friendly attitude to the US in Israel has never fallen below 80%.⁶⁹ An extremely high proportion of Israelis (89%) believe that relations between Israel and the US are good (74% of Americans share this opinion).⁷⁰



WHO INITIATED THE MODEL?

In the case of Israel, it is difficult to identify a single initiator of the model since in this occasion various factors were at work. At the same time, even in the US itself, which was the first to recognize Israel's independence, discussions on this matter (meaning the President's entourage) continued until the last moment. One of the key driving forces behind the creation of the State of Israel and its prioritisation in US foreign policy was the American Jewish community.

One of the key driving forces behind the creation of the State of Israel and its prioritization in US foreign policy was the American Jewish community.

Washington itself was also aware of the importance of nurturing close relations with Israel, which fit into the paradigm of global competition between the US and the USSR during the Cold War. From the very onset of statehood, Israel also understood that, without proper support from the outside, it would not be able to resist the Arab camp (more powerful in terms of military and human resources). Israel can be

considered the main initiator of the model: the US is a tool in it rather than the main actor since Tel Aviv seeks to maintain a high level of independence in decision-making in the defence and security spheres. In general, the work on the implementation of the nuclear program, which was not supported in Washington, is the best proof of Israel's superiority in the formation of its own security model. In the 1960s, by the way, the US saw considerable and rather prolonged discussions before it started selling arms to Israel.



THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT.

Israel's security model relies heavily on large-scale and comprehensive support from the US. The United States is the primary exporter of weapons to Israel, followed by Germany and Italy (between 2000 and 2019).⁷¹ However, the share of weapons imported by the Americans is extremely high and is virtually beyond any comparison with other countries: 81.8% (US) against 15.3% (Germany) and 2.6% (Italy). The total value of Israeli arms imports from 2000 to 2019 exceeded \$9.6 billion.⁷²

Since 1999, the US and Israel have signed 10-year Memoranda of Understanding. At the current juncture, military aid to Israel is provided for by the Memorandum of Understanding for 2019–2028 and is in the amount of \$38 billion (in the case of Ukraine, the amounts will be much higher given the scale of the Russian threat). The United States provides \$3.3 billion annually as part of the Foreign Military Financing program and another \$500 million within the framework of cooperation programs for the development of anti-missile defence. Since 2009, the US has allocated a total of \$3.4 billion for missile de-

⁶⁹ Pew Research Center, 'Israeli views of the U.S.', (July 11, 2022): <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/07/11/israeli-views-of-the-us-2/>

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Share of arms imported in Israel between 2000 and 2019, by supplier country: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1210645/israel-share-of-arms-imports-by-supplier-country/>

⁷² Ibid.

fence, including \$1.6 billion for the Iron Dome.⁷³ Washington's aid to Tel Aviv increased by about 6% in the current decade (2019–2028).⁷⁴

For Tel Aviv, however, it has always been a matter of principle to maintain a high level of self-sufficiency in ensuring its defensive capability in order to minimise dependence on third parties in case of crises. To this end, Israel has significantly stepped up its production capacity. As a result, according to experts, there are few types of weapons or equipment that the country could not produce.⁷⁵ The exception may be the F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, but even parts of these aircraft are currently manufactured in Israel.⁷⁶ For example, according to the contract signed in 2011, Israel Aerospace Industries is to produce 811 pairs of wings for the F-35A (potential cost — \$2 billion).

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Incidentally, Israel has long been among the world's top ten arms exporters. According to the 2021 ranking of the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, the Top 100 world arms manufacturers include three companies from Israel: *Elbit Systems* (28th), *Israel Aerospace Industries* (38th) and *RAFAEL* (45th).⁷⁷



SECURITY GUARANTEES.

The deepened politico-military cooperation between Israel and the US does not involve the direct participation of the US army in Tel Aviv's military operations. Israel channels all its efforts to achieve a high capacity to defend itself with its own forces. The country believes that it cannot and should not rely on others to conduct military campaigns. As history shows, there have been some exceptions, but these were not permanent and were motivated by certain historical circumstances. For instance, in 1956, France deployed air squadrons to protect Israel's skies. The deployment of American anti-missile batteries in Israel in 1991 and 2003 can also be considered an exception. One of the explanations for such US activity is that Washington sought to discourage Israel from independent action against Iraq, which could destroy the Arab coalition.⁷⁸



HOW "STATIC" IS THE MODEL?

The basic principles of Israel's security model have generally remained unchanged from the very beginning. That said, some "burnishing" of the model still occurred. Israel is known for not having an officially approved security strategy. On the one hand, this indicates that there are unwritten and steadfast tenets of the country's security vision. On the other hand, Israel can feel flexible in adapting to new changes in the security environment. The basic principles of the Israeli vision of guaranteeing security in the past were as follows:⁷⁹

⁷³ BBC, 'Israel-Gaza: How much money does Israel get from the US?', 24 May, 2021: <https://www.bbc.com/news/57170576>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Vox, 'How the US became Israel's closest ally', October 13, 2023: <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23916266/us-israel-support-ally-gaza-war-aid>

⁷⁶ Israel Aerospace Industries, June 12, 2022: <https://www.iai.co.il/f-16-aerostructures-and-f-35-wing-lockheed-martin>

⁷⁷ THE SIPRI TOP 100 ARMS- PRODUCING AND MILITARY SERVICES COMPANIES, 2021: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/fs_2212_top_100_2021.pdf

⁷⁸ Yaakov Amidror, 'Israel's National Security Doctrine', The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 2021: <https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-israels-national-security-doctrine/>

⁷⁹ Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi, 'Israel's National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later', 2019: https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Memo187_11.pdf

- the state faces an existential threat;
- there is a clear asymmetry in favour of the Arab states (in terms of territory, population, economic base, political and military support, etc.);
- Israel should not depend on allies (US aid in this respect is not considered as an end in itself, but as a tool to achieve this independence).

The key provisions of the security strategy were articulated in the 1950s during the tenure of David Ben-Gurion. At the centre of this vision lie the Israel Defense Forces. Israel's defensive vision was to prevent harm to Israel, while its offensive military doctrine was to wage the war on enemy territory (with pre-emptive strikes, as appropriate).⁸⁰ Israel's traditional security doctrine is premised on the security triad: deterrence in order to prevent war; sufficient intelligence warning of war; and a fast and decisive victory to quickly end the war.⁸¹

Israel's traditional security doctrine is premised on the security triad: deterrence in order to prevent war; sufficient intelligence warning of war; and a fast and decisive victory to quickly end the war.

As time went by, the situation changed, with asymmetry shifting somewhat in Israel's favour. Some Arab states lost the external support they had during the Cold War (from the USSR). Israel signed peace agreements with some Arab states. Economic power and technological progress also played in the hands of Tel Aviv. In the end, Israel apparently succeeded in developing nuclear weapons.



MOTIVATION OF THIRD PARTIES.

One of the main reasons for US reliance on Israel as one of the key allies in the region was the competitive nature of US foreign policy during the Cold War, when Washington and Moscow competed for spheres of influence in different parts of the world. Israel chose a pro-Western vector in contrast to the Arab countries, which mostly preferred deepening cooperation with the Soviet Union. In addition, American Jews and Jewish support groups (lobbyists) influenced the promotion of Israeli interests.

The US policy of comprehensive support for Israel is based on a number of goals: first of all, strengthening security and stability in the Middle East as a strategically important region; second of all, joint countermeasures against international terrorism. Another important motive is supporting the state which has embarked on a democratic path of development.

The United States is trying to take a balanced approach to the development of partnerships with various countries in the region, including those states that previously engaged in war against Israel. In the US itself, even in President Harry Truman's team, debate raged over the recognition of the State of Israel as it endangered Washington's relations with Muslim countries. Today, the discourse of the Arab states is dominated by the perception of the US as a country that takes a pro-Israeli stance. Washington, which has sought and strives to act as an independent mediator, is perceived as a biased party.

The partnership between the US and Israel has evolved with each decade — from simple recognition, political, humanitarian or economic support to the level of tangible military assistance. Contrary to popular belief, relations between the US and Israel have not always been close:

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

for most of the first two decades of Israel's independence, Washington did not provide it with significant financial or military aid. '*Special relations*' — this is how US President John Kennedy defined interaction with Israel in 1962.⁸² The Six-Day War of 1967 served as a kind of a trigger for the rapid development of cooperation between the two countries, when Israel quickly defeated the hostile coalition of Arab states. For the US, whose troops were bogged down in the Vietnam War, Israel became an attractive ally capable of solving problems on its own and quickly.⁸³

Contrary to popular belief, relations between the US and Israel have not always been close: for most of the first two decades of Israel's independence, Washington did not provide it with significant financial or military aid.

The US initially refused to supply Israel with weapons. Here are some of the arguments that could have held Washington back:

- 1) the country was strong enough to defend itself without US weapons; this was confirmed by Israel's success during the Suez Crisis (1956);
- 2) The United States did not want to create the impression that it was starting an arms race in the Middle East;

3) the US sale of weapons to Israel would force the Arabs to ask for weapons from the USSR and China;

4) US military aid to Israel would repel the Arabs.⁸⁴

In the first years of Israel's independence, weapons were mainly sourced from France (three days before the Six-Day War, Charles de Gaulle imposed an embargo on the supply of weapons to the region).⁸⁵ According to some sources, Washington still encouraged Paris to supply arms to Tel Aviv through secret channels.⁸⁶

In 1962, Israel received its first substantial arms shipment from the United States. John F. Kennedy agreed to sell HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Israel (the Department of State opposed this decision, but the White House was concerned about the Soviet supply of bombers to Egypt).⁸⁷ It was a truly historic moment, as it involved not only a significant supply of weapons, but also intensive trainings of Israeli soldiers in the United States. In 1966, the Department of State announced the sale of 200 Patton tanks to Israel. In the same year, the US reported about a new agreement to provide Tel Aviv with Skyhawk light attack aircraft. Still, at that time, Washington was seeking to implement a policy of not giving strategic advantage to any country in the region. The US, for example, also supplied weapons to Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

In 1968, US President Lyndon Johnson decided to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel.⁸⁸ It became a turning point in the US policy towards the Middle

⁸² Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, '*The United States and Israel since 1948: A «Special Relationship»?*', *Diplomatic History* Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 231-262, Published By: Oxford University Press': <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913659>

⁸³ Vox, '*How the US became Israel's closest ally*', October 13, 2023: <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23916266/us-israel-support-ally-gaza-war-aid>


⁸⁴ Mitchell G. Bard, '*U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: The 1968 Sale of Phantom Jets to Israel*', Jewish Virtual Library : <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-1968-sale-of-phantom-jets-to-israel>

⁸⁵ Jay Cristol, '*When Did the U.S. and Israel Become Allies?*', History News Network, 2002: <http://hnn.us/articles/751.html>

⁸⁶ Mitchell G. Bard, '*U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: The 1968 Sale of Phantom Jets to Israel*', Jewish Virtual Library : <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-1968-sale-of-phantom-jets-to-israel>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.



East: from that moment on, it became obvious that Washington was backing away from the policy of neutrality in supplying weapons to the region and made a significant contribution to maintaining the qualitative superiority of Israel over its Arab neighbours.⁸⁹ It is important to note that the decision was preceded by complex discussions both within the United States and between the politicians of the two countries. Lyndon Johnson, according to some observations, was annoyed by the persistence of American Jews, especially given the challenging political juncture: the discussion of the sale of the Phantoms fell on the US presidential election campaign. Both candidates for the presidential seat — Republican Richard Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey — spoke in favour of this decision. Such a political lay of the land largely left the president with no choice. The decision was announced on December 27, 1968; Israel was to receive 16 aircraft at the end of 1969 and another 34 in 1970. The agreement was valued at \$285 million.⁹⁰

Relations between the two countries were not always rosy: the visions of the US and Israel on various issues of international relations and processes in Israel itself often differed, as reflected in the exchange of caustic statements

Relations between the two countries were not always rosy: the visions of the US and Israel on various issues of international relations and processes in Israel itself often differed, as reflected in the exchange of caustic statements. However, diplomatic disagreements on individual issues did not affect the stability of US support. Different views of the two countries still exist — for example, regarding the Palestinian-Israeli settlement, the development of nuclear weapons by Israel, the expansion of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories contrary to the resolutions of the UN Security Council, etc.



HOW HAS THE MODEL WORKED IN CRISES?

In all the wars with countries that surpassed it resource-wise, Israel has come out victorious. In general, the military campaigns, with rare exception, were short-term and led to relatively insignificant losses on the battlefield (especially when compared to the Russian-Ukrainian war). Therefore, we can conclude that the Israeli model has proven its effectiveness.

The real test for Israel was the attacks on the southern settlements of the country by Hamas in October 2023. They became the virtual proof

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.


of the shortcomings of the Israeli security model (the triad) since the country had not managed to prepare for the attack in advance (the special services failed); the Israeli army showed its weakness (at least in the first days); the political leadership, which was going through a turbulent period, also demonstrated the country's vulnerability to external threats. At the time of preparing this analysis, it was not clear how long Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip would last.



NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Israel is preoccupied with the development of nuclear programs on the part of Iran. Tel Aviv has probably developed nuclear weapons itself, which it uses as a deterrent in its security model. This is yet another proof of how Israel is trying to solve its problems without relying on third parties. That said, a number of Western governments are believed to have assisted Israel in its nuclear program. According to various sources, the Israel Defense Forces have from 80 to 400 nuclear warheads at their disposal.⁹¹

Below is the list of Israel's military campaigns.



⁹¹ Avner Cohen, *The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's bargain with the Bomb*, Columbia University Press, 2010: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe13698>




COMPARISON OF ARMIES.

According to the Global Firepower Index, an annually updated statistical resource that tracks defence-related information, the Israel Defense Forces is one of the 20 most powerful armies in the world. The country has some of the most technologically advanced defences globally, including the Iron Dome anti-missile system. Israel has about 1,300 tanks and other armoured vehicles, 345 fighter jets and a huge arsenal of artillery, drones and state-of-the-art submarines.⁹²

The Israel Defense Forces is one of the 20 most powerful armies in the world. The country has some of the most technologically advanced defenses globally, including the Iron Dome anti-missile system

Although Israel is not a declared nuclear power, the number of warheads it possesses is estimated at several dozen (at least 80). Israel has one of the world's most famed intelligence



⁹² France 24, 'The Israel-Hamas military balance,' October 16, 2023: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231016-the-israel-hamas-military-balance>

networks, including Mossad; the famous spy agency is considered one of the best, trailing only the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.⁹³ Against the background of the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, the special services were heavily criticised: after all, the group, which is considered terrorist in Israel, managed to accumulate weapons and plan attacks without being noticed.⁹⁴

Israel does not disclose the exact volume of its defence budget, but the SIPRI report says that in 2022, Israel spent \$23.4 billion on defence.⁹⁵ To this should be added more than \$3 billion in US aid. (Iran's defence budget is approximately the same — \$24.6 billion).⁹⁶

At present, it is difficult to conduct an accurate calculation to compare the army of Israel and those of its enemies. First, for more than 70 years of Israel's independence, the list of foes has changed significantly, with Tel Aviv signing peace treaties with some of the former enemies (for example, with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994). On the other hand, countries that have partner relations sometimes resort to statements that are perceived by Israel as hostile (as was the case with Turkey at the end of October 2023, although it would be unreasonable to list Ankara as an enemy of Tel Aviv).⁹⁷

In general, it can be stated that the former asymmetry in the armed forces of Israel and the Arab coalition has shifted in favour of Tel Aviv: some of the countries are in decline (Syria) and Israel has managed to develop a powerful economy. In addition, in recent years,

Israel has constantly increased the number of countries with which it has successfully normalised relations by signing relevant agreements: with the UAE (2020), Bahrain (2020), Sudan (2020), and Morocco (2020). On October 14, 2023, Saudi Arabia suspended negotiations on the possible normalisation of relations with Israel (although the countries were close to this — one version has it that Iran provoked the attack by Hamas in October, 2023 to disrupt the normalisation of relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh).

It can be stated that the former asymmetry in the armed forces of Israel and the Arab coalition has shifted in favor of Tel Aviv



MOBILISATION RESOURCE.

In Israel, there is a mandatory conscription for all citizens over the age of 18 of both sexes. After being accepted for military service, the minimum duration of service is 32 months for men and 24 months for women.⁹⁸

According to the British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are 169,500-strong.⁹⁹ In addition, it has 400,000 reservists, of which 360,000 were mobilised after the Hamas attack in October, 2023.

⁹³ NDTV, 'Israel Military Strength: F35s, 1,200+ Artillery Units, 7 Attack Submarines', 2023: <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/israel-military-strength-f35s-1-200-artillery-units-7-attack-submarines-4472109>

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ 'Iran Boosts Military Budget To Stand Among Top 15', 2022: <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202204261827>

⁹⁷ Arab News, 'Israel recalls diplomatic staff from Turkiye as Erdogan steps up criticisms against Gaza siege', 29 October, 2023: [xxx https://www.arabnews.com/node/2399351/middle-east](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2399351/middle-east)

⁹⁸ 'Our soldiers', <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/our-soldiers/>

⁹⁹ France 24, 'The Israel-Hamas military balance,' October 16, 2023: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231016-the-israel-hamas-military-balance>

At present, Israel's undoubted recent archenemies have come not so much from the circle of states as non-state actors (such as Hamas). In 2021, Hamas was able to fire 4,000 rockets at Israel during the 11-day war.¹⁰⁰ As for the strength of the military wing of Hamas, there are different data, running the gamut from 7,000 to 50,000 people. Its brigades are known to have significant stockpiles of light weapons, including home-made rockets, mortars and other explosives. In addition, the presence of anti-tank guided missiles and portable anti-aircraft missiles places Hamas among the best-equipped guerrilla armies in the world.¹⁰¹ Hamas has heavy weapons from across the Middle East, including Iran, Syria, as well as pistols and assault rifles from China and elsewhere.¹⁰²

According to some sources, Hezbollah (a Lebanese paramilitary Islamist organisation), may have 100,000 soldiers in its ranks.¹⁰³ However, experts consider this figure to be an exaggeration, estimating the strength of Hezbollah at 15,000 — 20,000 trained fighters.¹⁰⁴ Iran is considered the main supplier of weapons to the militants. In any case, the resources of the Israeli army are in no way comparable to the resources of the militants.

Therefore, the comparison of the mobilisation resource of Israel and non-state armed formations is clearly not in favour of the latter.



ASSESSMENT IN UKRAINE.

The discourse inside Ukraine had long been dominated by favourable assessments of the Israeli security model. Kyiv was primarily interested in its components: a strong army, a solid economic, innovative and technological base, a professional intelligence apparatus, and multifaceted interaction with the United States. As time went by, however, more critical assessments began to surface, indicating the incorrectness of the comparison and the unsuitability of the Israeli model for Ukraine (for example, due to the alleged presence of nuclear weapons in Israel or the presence of nuclear weapons in hands of Ukraine's enemy — Russia).

An article published in *The Wall Street Journal* on May 22, 2023 stirred up a heated debate on this topic:¹⁰⁵ since NATO is not ready to grant Ukraine membership, the allied countries are said to be considering the possibility of providing Kyiv with "guarantees" that would resemble the "Israeli model." As the publication put it, these guarantees can be provided on the basis of the Kyiv Security Compact — a concept developed by a working group led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO Secretary-General, and Andrii Yermak, the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. A security agreement modelled after the "Israeli model" would involve the transfer of arms and military technology on a long-term basis.

**President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
clearly stated that Ukraine would not
agree to alternative proposals that
could replace NATO membership**

¹⁰⁰ DW, 'How do Hamas and Hezbollah compare with Israel militarily?', 2023: <https://www.dw.com/en/how-do-hamas-and-hezbollah-compare-with-israel-militarily/a-67166698>

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ The Wall Street Journal, 'To Aid Ukraine in Fight Against Russia, Allies Look to Security Model Like Israel's', May 22, 2023: https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-aid-ukraine-in-fight-against-russia-allies-look-to-security-model-like-israels-8a05f0e5?mod=world_major_1_pos8

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy clearly stated that Ukraine would not agree to alternative proposals that could replace NATO membership.¹⁰⁶ Dmytro Kuleba, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, spoke of the Israeli model approvingly (as he did of any other model) but emphasised that it should not be a substitute for NATO membership: *'We will not give up NATO membership for any promises. Because everyone understands and the partners understand that the strongest, most powerful guarantee of that there will be no more war in Europe is Ukraine's membership in the Alliance. All the other security guarantees are good. But nothing can replace NATO membership. This is the President's principled position.'*¹⁰⁷

As for public perception, it can be assumed that it most likely reflects the sentiment of the political elite: the Israeli model is useful, but NATO membership is still the most effective model. A survey conducted in Ukraine in January 2023 showed fairly high positive assessments of Israel.¹⁰⁸ The majority of respondents — 52% — consider Israel a friendly country. 12.5% of respondents do not think so, and another 36% of respondents are undecided. 87% of Ukrainians are convinced that Israeli technologies and knowledge can be useful for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

In December 2022, sociologists asked Ukrainians to choose the option that best guarantees Ukraine's national security after Russian aggression.¹⁰⁹ Joining NATO received the largest

number of votes — 49% of respondents, 17% of Ukrainians are convinced that only Ukraine itself can become the best guarantor of its security through the development of its own armed forces (following the example of Israel or Switzerland).



ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OTHER COUNTRIES.

The Israeli model has long been considered by various US stakeholders as one of the most optimal ones for implementation in Ukraine. US President Joseph Biden spoke publicly on this topic, suggesting that the US could offer a certain "security framework" based on the Israeli model before Ukraine joins NATO.¹¹⁰ At the same time, the Americans admit that it cannot be fully reproduced in the Ukrainian case. The multilateral security configuration for Ukraine, premised on the Israeli model, has already been and continues to be implemented in Ukraine, but the US is also aware of the considerable differences between the two: Israel has nuclear weapons and does not face a nuclear power.¹¹¹

American experts point out that Kyiv and Washington should use the example of the Israeli-American "legal codification of obligations".

¹⁰⁶ European pravda, "Ukraine will be uncompromising on the way to NATO membership, says Zelenskyy", 5 April 2023: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/04/5/7159254/>

¹⁰⁷ Radio Liberty, "Kuleba on Vilnius summit and cancellation of MAP: Ukraine's journey to NATO is now shorter", 12 July 2023: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viy-na-nato-vilnyuskyy-samit/32499810.html>

¹⁰⁸ Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Attitude of the population of Ukraine towards Israel, 3–11 January 2023: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1176&page=10>

¹⁰⁹ The results of the survey in the macro-regions of Ukraine, conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation "Democratic Initiatives" together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center with the support of the MATRA program from December 13 to 21, 2022: <https://djf.org.ua/article/pidsumki-2022-pid-sino-zhovtim-praporom-svobod>

¹¹⁰ 'CNN Exclusive: Biden says war with Russia must end before NATO can consider membership for Ukraine', July 9, 2023: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/09/politics/joe-biden-ukraine-nato-russia-cnntv/index.html>

¹¹¹ Eric Ciaramella, "Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2023: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Ukrainian_Version_-_Long-Term_Security_Arrangements.pdf

American experts who advocate the use of Israeli experience in the Ukrainian case point out that Kyiv and Washington should use the example of the Israeli-American "*legal codification of obligations*,"¹¹² so to speak. While there is no formal defence treaty between the US and Israel, Washington's commitment to maintaining Israel's security is included in US law — particularly in the form of maintaining the aforesaid Qualitative Military Edge.¹¹³ In 2008, Congress codified the definition of QME and placed the onus on the executive branch to ensure that any arms sales to Israel's neighbours would not harm its Qualitative Military Edge.¹¹⁴

In the classical sense, the QME concept certainly has little to do with Ukraine since in this case any military cooperation between the US or its allies with Russia is out of the question — the West in any case supports only Ukraine. The main difference is that Kyiv will not be able to achieve a real qualitative advantage over Moscow due to the fact that it does not possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, the US sees Ukraine as having its strengths (unlike Israel): Ukraine is a much larger country, it can create a powerful, well-equipped and trained deterrent force. Therefore, the question may be about creating not a qualitative military edge over Russia, but a "*qualitative deterrent balance*"¹¹⁵.



ASSESSMENTS IN RUSSIA.

It is doubtful that Russia will be satisfied with the Israeli security model in its full-fledged form (for example, Moscow will not tolerate the development of nuclear weapons). At the negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022, Russia clearly stated its demand to cut down the Armed Forces of Ukraine as part of the so-called "demilitarisation." In particular, the list contained the following provisions: to reduce the number of tanks to 342 (instead of 800, which Kyiv insisted on); reduce the strength of the National Guard from 50,000 to 15,000 soldiers; artillery shells were to be reduced to 519 units (Ukraine insisted on 1,900).¹¹⁶

Russia will be satisfied with the Israeli model in a reduced form, excluding nuclear weapons and imposing significant limitations on the Ukrainian army.

However, Moscow's primary declared goal was the cessation of NATO expansion and Ukraine neutrality. This implies that Russia accepts certain components of the Israeli security model — however, precisely those that will weaken Ukraine, not strengthen it. In other words,

¹¹² Ibid.


¹¹³ The Arms Export Control Act 22 USC § 2776(h) (3) defines the term QME as "*the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors*".

¹¹⁴ Eric Ciaramella, "*Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine*", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2023: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Ukrainian_Version_-_Long-Term_Security_Arrangements.pdf

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ "*List of Russia's demands to Ukraine at negotiations in March 2022 becomes known*", TSN: <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/stav-vidomiy-spisok-vimog-rosiyi-do-ukrayini-na-peregovorah-u-berezni-2022-roku-foto-2352175.html#:~:text=Ініціатор%20нового%20%22мирного%20плану%22%20повторював,істотно%20скоротити%20збройні%20сили%20України>

Russia will be satisfied with the Israeli model in a reduced form, excluding nuclear weapons and imposing significant limitations on the Ukrainian army. Russia also does not accept the supply of weapons by the US and other Western countries to Ukraine.



PROS AND CONS

PROS

- + A strong, self-sufficient army
- + Stable financial aid from the US for military needs, enshrined in US legislation
- + The image of a country in possession of a nuclear arsenal
- + An advanced economy, industrial base
- + A developed military-industrial complex enabling Israel to be independent from third-party arms supplies
- + Effective special services
- + The country has substantial technological innovations making the Israel Defense Forces particularly modern and efficient
- + An influential Jewish diaspora in the US, which is mostly successful in advocating decisions that matter for Israel

CONS

- The country may rely solely on itself in its military campaigns. The Israeli model does not provide for security guarantees
- The country has proven to be vulnerable to attacks by non-state paramilitary organisations
- Being in a mostly unfriendly environment, the country cannot become part of defensive alliances



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

The Israeli security model has repeatedly proven its effectiveness in addressing security challenges, which makes it attractive to many experts and policymakers seeking to offer the optimal defence framework for Ukraine. With more limited resources, Israel was able to quickly achieve victorious results in military campaigns against a single state or a coalition of enemy states. This approach is also called the "*porcupine strategy*" (achieving such a level of military readiness that continuing the war would be extremely painful for the enemy).

The potent Israel Defense Forces and the special services remain at the core of Israel's security strategy. The country's security model is premised on the following principles: deterring the enemy; intelligence advantage; defence; victory in the shortest possible time. Special relations with the US are of a permanent nature, obligations to Israel are incorporated into American legislation; the change of presidents and the balance of power in Congress do not affect the fulfilment of Washington's obligations to Tel Aviv.

Israel has long been the main recipient of US military aid (in total, the country has received more than \$150 billion; at this stage, Tel Aviv receives \$3.8 billion annually). Currently, Ukraine occupies the first place: since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine has received more than \$46.7 billion¹⁷. In the second year of the Russian-Ukrainian large-scale war, the US is

experiencing political turbulence, which complicates the sustainability of military and financial aid to Ukraine. Washington's intentions to implement the Israeli security model in Ukraine are practically being undermined by unproductive blocking decisions in Congress. The US must also understand that the scale of the Russian threat will require incomparably greater resources for Ukraine than in the case of Israel.

The US must understand that the scale of the Russian threat will require incomparably greater resources for Ukraine than in the case of Israel.

The main difference of the Israeli security model is that the country most definitely possesses nuclear weapons.

To a certain extent, the Israeli security model is already being implemented in Ukraine. This applies primarily to large-scale military aid. However, the full application of this model will not be achieved in any case. The primary reason is that Russia has significantly more resources than Israel's current enemies. In addition, Moscow has a powerful nuclear arsenal. Israel's wars were usually accompanied by relatively minor losses of the country's Defense Forces and were short-lived (with some exceptions).

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, 'U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,' October, 2023: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/>


Israel's current main enemies are groups recognized as terrorists by a number of states (in particular, Hamas). The attacks by Hamas in October 2023 also showed the vulnerability of Israel's security approaches: the miscalculations of the intelligence community, the weakness of the army in the first hours of the attack and the lack of international legitimacy of the war in the Gaza Strip.

An important component of the Israeli security model is the development of its own military-industrial complex, which is based on innovation and high technologies. US companies also cooperate with leading Israeli companies in the field of arms production. Emphasis on the development of military equipment is related to Israel's principle of independence from third parties in its military campaigns.

Israel was not immediately able to secure the full support of the US, which tried to pursue an impartial, neutral policy in relation to various countries in the region. The first significant arms deliveries took place in the late 1960s and were preceded by heated discussions in the American political community. This situation is to some extent similar to the ongoing discussions in the US regarding the allocation of aid to Ukraine.

The calculation of the supporters of the Israeli model that it can be more acceptable for Russia than Ukraine's NATO accession is rather questionable. Already at the negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, Russia clearly stated the need for «demilitarisation» — a reduction in the number of armed forces and military hardware. Moscow reacted sharply to the supply of weapons by Western countries, perceiving them as an escalatory factor. Therefore, the hopes of supporters of the Israeli model that it is less "escalatory" than Ukraine's NATO accession are unsubstantiated.

THE TAIWANESE SECURITY MODEL



BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL.¹¹⁸

After the severance of diplomatic relations between the USA and Taiwan in 1979, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was cancelled and the Taiwan Relations Act¹¹⁹ was adopted, which is the main document defining the defence cooperation of the USA and Taiwan, and Taiwan's security model in general.

According to the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, 1982,¹²⁰ the Six Assurances of 1982,¹²¹ and a number of other documents, the United States will 'provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character'

and, in the event of China's use of force, 'will make available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability'. This enables Taiwan to purchase arms and ammunition from the US; carry out their maintenance and logistic support; conduct personnel training; conduct joint defence developments and production; share technology and intelligence, etc. At the same time, the obligation regarding armed defence of Taiwan by the United States in the event of Chinese aggression remains uncertain, as the Law and other documents do not clearly state this, and the US continue their policy of so-called strategic ambiguity¹²² on this issue. That being said, the public rhetoric of the US leadership¹²³ and the actions of their armed forces in the region demonstrate readiness for military defence of Taiwan.

The defence model of Taiwan itself is built on the basis of the asymmetric defence concept (unofficial name — «porcupine strategy»), which consists in the fact that Taiwan, not having enough resources to achieve military parity with China, builds a defence system that: a) maximises the price China would pay in case of its invasion;

¹¹⁸ The comprehensive list of questions can be found at the end of this document in Appendix 1.

¹¹⁹ 22 USC Ch. 48: TAIWAN RELATIONS.(n.d.). <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter48&edition=prelim>

¹²⁰ American Institute in Taiwan, 'Three Communiqués': <https://www.ait.org.tw/tag/three-communiques/>

¹²¹ US Congress, 'H.Con.Res.88 — Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations', 2016: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/eh>

¹²² Model Diplomacy, 'Strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan' 2023: <https://modeldiplomacy.cfr.org/pop-up-cases/strategic-ambiguity-toward-taiwan>

¹²³ BBC News, 'Biden says US will defend Taiwan if China attacks', 2022: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59005300>

b) uses cheaper, smaller and dispersive means that can inflict damage on vulnerable areas of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) in the event of an invasion.¹²⁴

The defense model of Taiwan itself is built on the basis of the asymmetric defense concept (unofficial name – "porcupine strategy").

Other concepts, according to the Taiwan National Defense Report-2022, which are being implemented simultaneously:

- the concept of '*resolute defence and multi-domain deterrence*',¹²⁵
- the concept of '*denial of territory instead of control of it*',¹²⁶
- the concept of '*self-reliant defence*',¹²⁷ '*all-out defence*',¹²⁸ and '*defence in depth*'.¹²⁹

Based on this, priority is given to: the Air Force and Navy; anti-air and missile defence systems; anti-ship missiles; surface-to-surface missile systems with a range of up to 2000 km; reconnaissance and attack UAVs; portable anti-tank systems and MANPADS.

Thus, the implementation of a comprehensive approach makes it possible to ensure not only the protection of the contingent '*porcupine*', but also the provision of the means of long-range damage and suppression of the enemy.



POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

In general, there was a consensus in Taiwan's political circles regarding the effectiveness of the implemented model, which has ensured Taiwan's security for decades and prevented Chinese invasion. Besides, the model is quite optimal from the «cost-benefit» point of view, as it allows, with the help of cheaper asymmetric means and the help of the associates, primarily the United States, to create and maintain the China deterrence system.

There was a consensus in Taiwan's political circles regarding the effectiveness of the implemented model, which has ensured Taiwan's security for decades and prevented Chinese invasion.

At the same time, in light of the PLA's significant increase in offensive capabilities and China's more aggressive policy, as well as after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, discussions about the effectiveness of the existing strategy have

¹²⁴ ROC MND, '*Taiwan National Defense Report*', 2023: <https://www.ustaiwandefence.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2023.pdf>

¹²⁵ It consists in the possibility of launching air, missile, and naval strikes with the aim of disrupting the operational pace of the enemy's offensive, increasing the risk of failure and thus deterring aggression.

¹²⁶ It consists in the possibility of launching strikes against the so-called «operational centers of gravity» of the enemy — key military objects on the territory of China.

¹²⁷ It consists in the active use of the local defence industry, primarily shipbuilding and aircraft construction, to meet the needs of the Armed Forces.

¹²⁸ It consists in strengthening the capabilities of the reserve component of the Armed Forces of Taiwan and thereby maximally involving the civilian population for the country's defence needs.

¹²⁹ It consists in monitoring the preparatory actions of the enemy and launching preventive strikes using the Navy and against ship missiles and UAVs in the depth of the enemy's territory at mobilisation points, «centres of gravity» in order to disrupt the operational pace and disrupt their actions

intensified in Taiwan's political circles and society.

The main debate is about such issues: whether Taiwan will be able to repel a Chinese invasion using existing means; whether asymmetric means should be strengthened with traditional (symmetric) weapons; how should the civilian component be involved in the country's defence system; whether the US will provide military aid to Taiwan, and what kind; whether the US should abandon its policy of strategic uncertainty and switch to a policy of strategic clarity. Doubts in society are actively being used by China, trying to lower the faith of the Taiwanese public in the ability of its own armed forces and undermine the trust in the United States as a partner.



PUBLIC SUPPORT.

Overall, the model is supported by society, as it provided for: a) the island's security; b) a status-quo, according to which Taiwan is a de-facto independent state, though it doesn't declare its independence de-jure; c) sales of arms to Taiwan and presence of certain security guarantees from the USA. Other than that, the support is affected by the absence of different alternatives for Taiwan: joining collective security organisations or establishing a defence alliance is not possible at this time; ensuring its security on its own will weaken Taiwan's defensive potential; accession to China is not a popular option among Taiwan's society.

In particular, according to a poll conducted by the Elections Study Center of the National Chengchi University in June of 2022, the society's support for the accession to China was the lowest since 1995 and constituted 6.5% (1.3% of which in favour of immediate union and 5.2% — in favour of retention of the status-quo with gradual movement towards a union). In this light, the amount of those in favour of status-quo retention with or without consequent factual independence is prevalent and growing (28.6% — in favour of status-quo retention and making a decision at a later time, 28.3% — in favour of status-quo retention for an undefined amount of time, 25.2% — in favour of a status-quo with movement towards independence).¹³⁰

The above-mentioned reveals society's unwillingness towards accession to China, which is also based on the military aid from the USA, supported by the majority of the Taiwanese people. For example, according to a poll by Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation conducted in August of 2023, two-thirds (67%) expressed gratitude and support towards the US military aid (20% — opposed the aid).¹³¹

At the same time, the amount of those confident that the US will defend Taiwan constitutes less than half of the population. A poll in February of 2023 showed that 42.8% believe in US military protection, all while 46.5% don't. The amount of believers is gradually rising after a decline (in March of 2022 their fraction constituted 34.5%, while in 2021 it was 65%).¹³² A similar pattern is observed in public confidence in the ability of Taiwan's own armed forces to defend Taiwan:

¹³⁰ Newsweek, 'Taiwan's Desire for Unification With China Near Record Low as Tensions Rise', 2022: <https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-china-politics-identity-independence-unification-public-opinion-polling-1724546>

¹³¹ Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, 國人對美國總統拜登軍事援助的態度 (Chinese people's attitude towards U.S. President Biden's military aid), 2023: <https://www.tpof.org/%e5%9c%8b%e9%98%b2%e5%a4%96%e4%ba%a4/%e5%9c%8b%e9%98%b2/%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e7%be%8e%e5%9c%8b%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e6%8b%9c%e7%99%bb%e8%bb%8d%e4%ba%8b%e6%8f%b4%e5%8a%a9%e7%9a%84%e6%85%8b%e5%ba%a6%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b4%8e%6%9c%8822%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/>

¹³² Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, 如果中共武力犯台，國人對美國派兵協防台灣有信心 (If the CCP invades Taiwan with force, the Chinese people will have confidence in the United States to send troops to help defend Taiwan.), 2023: <https://www.tpof.org/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e9%97%9c%e4%bf%82/%e5%85%a9%e5%b2%b8%e8%bb%8d%e4%ba%8b/%e5%a6%82%e6%9e%9c%e4%b8%ad%e5%85%b1%e6%ad%a6%e5%8a%9b%e7%8a%af%e5%8f%b0%ef%bc%8c%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e7%be%8e%e5%9c%8b%e6%b4%be%e5%85%b5%e5%8d%94%e9%98%b2%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%9a%84%e4%bf%a1/>

in February of 2023 those assured of this constituted 45.3% of the population (47.2% gave a negative answer).¹³³

The number of Taiwanese people confident that the United States will defend Taiwan constitutes less than half of the population (42.8%). 46.5% of those surveyed do not believe in the military protection from the United States.

All of this demonstrates Taiwan's desire to continue the existing political course and the security model that ensures it, while at the same time, half of the society has doubts over its effectiveness (regarding the ability of its own armed forces and the readiness of the US to come to the rescue).



WHO INITIATED THE MODEL?

Partnership with the US as an element of the current security model dates back to the US signing the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. Discussions about the necessity of waging an asymmetric war in particular began to appear in the 2000s after a significant change in the parity between the Taiwan Armed Forces and the PLA in favour of the latter, especially in terms of the number of combat aircraft and ships, after which the concept of asymmetric war appeared in Taiwan's defence documents. In practice, it began to be actively implemented around 2016, after the coming to power of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party. The strategy was first introduced to the general public by

the then-commander-in-chief of Taiwan's armed forces, Lee Hsi-ming, in 2017, describing it as the «porcupine strategy» and thus visualising the mountainous island of Taiwan filled with mobile anti-aircraft, anti-tank and anti-ship armaments.¹³⁴



THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT.

Taiwan's security model has both an internal and an external component. The internal component consists in Taiwan having developed and manufacturing a significant part of its weaponry independently with the help of its own defence industry (and with the help of partner technologies). This applies to its own air defence systems, anti-missile systems, anti-ship missiles, medium-range surface-to-surface missiles, warships, small arms, etc. Part of the weapons that Taiwan does not produce for one reason or another is provided by the United States, Taiwan's main security donor. In particular, the US supplied Taiwan with F-16 aircraft, combat helicopters of various types, strategic UAVs MQ-9B, Harpoon anti-ship systems and Patriot anti-missile systems, etc. In addition, the USA provides personnel training for the use of these systems and their logistic support.

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¹³³ Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, 國人對國軍保衛台灣的能力有信心嗎? (Do the Chinese people have confidence in the ability of the Chinese military to defend Taiwan?), 2023: <https://www.tpof.org/%e5%9c%8b%e9%98%b2%e5%a4%96%e4%ba%a4/%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e5%9c%8b%e8%bb%8d%e4%bf%9d%e8%a1%9b%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e7%9a%84%e8%83%bd%e5%8a%9b%e6%9c%89%e4%bf%a1%e5%bf%83%e5%97%8e%ef%bc%9f%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b42%e6%9c%8821%e6%97%a5/>

¹³⁴ Epicenter, 'Protecting the porcupine: Why Taiwan matters', 2023: <https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/protecting-porcupine-why-taiwan-matters>

Supplies from other countries have been episodic and currently do not play a dominant role.

Regarding security guarantees in the event of a Chinese invasion, the US, in addition to providing assistance with weapons, are trying to involve their allies in the region as much as possible within the framework of «*integrated deterrence*», primarily Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and India. Strengthening their combat potential, interoperability, dispersion and survivability of forces and assets plays a positive role in deterring China, while their involvement in direct hostilities against China is currently debatable. The countries of the region are trying to avoid direct combat with the PRC, preferring to limit themselves to logistical support or the placement of US military facilities on their territory. However, it is likely that in the event of a full-scale confrontation between the United States and China, their role will be much greater.



SECURITY GUARANTEES.

According to the signed documents that are in the public domain, the US neither confirm, nor deny the participation of their armed forces in hostilities, supporting the policy of strategic ambiguity. The Taiwan Relations Act states that the U.S. will '*provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character*' and, in the event of China's use of force, '*provide Taiwan with defensive products and services in amounts that may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability*'.¹³⁵

This can be interpreted in different ways — from the provision of weapons to direct participation in hostilities, while at the same time leaving the real obligations of the United States uncertain

for the general public until a direct decision is made by the president. At the same time, the latest rhetoric of the US leadership increasingly speaks about their direct involvement in the event of China's aggression.¹³⁶ In addition, the intensity and focus of US military exercises with allies in the region and other military activity indicate that the Armed Forces are preparing for such a scenario, including the possibility of direct participation.¹³⁷



HOW "STATIC" IS THE MODEL?

In general, after the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the cancellation of the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act, the existing model has not changed significantly. Individual changes were made in some elements regarding which weapons are better and more effective in ensuring the security of the island. As a result, Taiwan switched to an asymmetric defence strategy, which, along with traditional means, involves the more active use of light and portable weapons (anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-tank), which are aimed at hitting the enemy's weak points. Currently, there is a discussion going on about the need of expanding the depth of damage to the enemy and not being limited to the coastal area.



MOTIVATION OF THIRD PARTIES.

The United States' motivation is that Taiwan's security directly affects the US global leadership and technological security, as Taiwan is an extremely important element of the global semiconductor manufacturing chain (Taiwan accounts for 60% of the world's production of

¹³⁵ 22 USC Ch. 48: TAIWAN RELATIONS.(n.d.). <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter48&edition=prelim>

¹³⁶ BBC News, '*Biden says US will defend Taiwan if China attacks*',2022: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59005300>

¹³⁷ Faunce, L., Sevastopulo, D., &Hille, K. '*How the US is deepening military alliances in China's backyard*'. Financial Times, 2023: <https://www.ft.com/content/38c13dc2-c2bb-4f56-807a-554310fae483>

conventional chips and 90% of the state-of-the-art ones). In addition, Taiwan's security directly affects global economic stability, as approximately 50% of all cargo ships pass through the Taiwan Strait. Also, peace and stability in Taiwan directly affects regional and global security, the preservation of the liberal democratic system and the rules-based international order. Other than that, China's seizure of Taiwan from a military point of view will give the PLA a number of advantages and allow it to continue its military expansion to the so-called «second island chain» and project its power in the region. As a result, the image of the United States as a reliable partner and ally will be at risk. Therefore, the support for Taiwan has a bipartisan consensus and is the dominant position in all US think tanks.

The motivation of other partner countries in the region (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India, etc.) lies within the ongoing military expansion of the PRC and its attempts to change the existing status quo being a strategic challenge. And, in case of China's seizure of Taiwan, the significant growth of threats to them from China is also a factor. At the same time, the level of motivation is different, depending on the closeness of the partnership with the USA, and the feeling of being under threat from China, the security environment, foreign policy tradition, etc. In this aspect, the motivation of Japan, Korea, and Australia is the greatest, and that of India and Vietnam — the least.

The rationale and level of support for the existing model has changed over time. During the period of maximum interaction between the United States and China («US-China strategic engagement»), the support for Taiwan from the United States regarding the sale of arms (and from other partners, in particular in Europe) was minimal, as Washington was interested in developing economic relations with Beijing. Af-

ter the PLA acquired the capabilities to seize Taiwan and the transition of US-China relations to the phase of strategic competition, the security of Taiwan became a key element of US foreign policy and security strategy.¹³⁸ This position is also shared in Europe, that, in light of a growing concern about challenges from China, is trying to play a more active role in ensuring security in the Taiwan Strait.



HOW HAS THE MODEL WORKED IN CRISES?

In general, the model in question has proved to be effective and, from 1979 until the present day, has ensured a fairly successful deterrence of China from the use of force. A notable instance of China's show of force since this time was in 1995–1996 during the so-called Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, when in response to a private visit by Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to the United States, China launched combat missiles and began a series of large-scale manoeuvres at sea. In response, guided by its security obligations, the US sent two aircraft carriers, one of which passed through the Taiwan Strait. As a result, China was forced to back down and take steps to de-escalate.

The risk of PRC aggression is currently assessed as low, but it tends to increase. The period between 2027 and 2030 is expected to be the most threatening in this aspect.

At the same time, the effectiveness of this model may be lower at present due to the significant increase in China's military capabilities over the

¹³⁸ According to US National Security Strategy 2022: “We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention”: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

past decades. Therefore, the US has already begun to improve Taiwan's security model, which generally consists of: increasing the combat capabilities of Taiwan's defence forces; strengthening the combat capabilities and coordination of allied forces in the region; increasing the military presence and survivability of US forces in the region, etc.

The risk of PRC aggression is currently assessed as low, but it tends to increase due to the approach of the capabilities of the PLA to the level sufficient to capture Taiwan or to implement other scenarios (sea blockade, capture of remote islands, missile or air strike, etc.). The period between 2027 and 2030 is expected to be the most threatening in this aspect. Other estimates point to 2035, which is designated by the PLA as the year to establish control over the first island chain, which includes Taiwan. Currently, the PLA is trying to use the method of «*salami slicing*» and «*grey zone*» operations (balancing on the border of peace and war, but not crossing the line that could lead to military conflict), thus trying to maintain and increase pressure on Taiwan to receive concessions.



NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Taiwan's public documents do not have any estimates of the PRC's use of nuclear weapons against itself, presumably because China would not use them against territory it considers its province, and China's officially published terms of use of nuclear weapons do not include an operation to establish control over the island.¹³⁹

At the same time, taking into account the PRC's possession of nuclear weapons, as well as plans

for their significant expansion (by 2035 — almost by three times), it is expected that in the event of an operation against Taiwan, the PRC will use nuclear blackmail in order to prevent the US and its allies from interfering in the conflict.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, the risk management associated with China's nuclear weapons lies on the shoulders of the United States.



COMPARISON OF ARMIES.

Professional publications often compare the potential of Taiwan's Armed Forces with the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands of the PLA, which are geographically located next to a possible combat zone and would be directly involved in military operations in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁴¹ Other Theater Commands are expected to be primarily involved in diverting the forces of Japan, South Korea, and India from assisting Taiwan and the United States.


As of 2021, the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands had an advantage over the Taiwan Armed Forces in the number of ground personnel by 4.7 times, tanks — 7.9 times; artillery means — 6.4 times; warships — 3.7 times; submarines — 17.5 times; jet fighters — 1.8 times.

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¹³⁹ The policy of China's use of nuclear weapons consists of the no first use rule and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear weapons-free zones.

¹⁴⁰ That conclusion was drawn from a series of discussions in 2022 with Chinese experts affiliated with the government, who noted that Russian nuclear blackmail against the West had been extremely effective, and the US was unlikely to go to war with a nuclear power.

¹⁴¹ National Defense University Press, 'Crossing the Strait, China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan', Washington, D.C., 2022: <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Crossing-the-Strait/>



means — 6.4 times; warships — 3.7 times; submarines — 17.5 times; jet fighters — 1.8 times. At the same time, the quantitative advantage and the development of qualitative capabilities of the PLA are still significantly offset by the characteristics of Taiwan's geographical location. In particular, this applies to the location on the island, at a distance of 180 km from mainland China; a small number of places favourable for amphibious landing; the extremely high complexity of an amphibious operation from the standpoint of its implementation, logistical support and coordination; the lack of experience of the PLA in conducting similar operations.

The above-mentioned, despite the numerical advantage, makes the capture of the island an extremely difficult and risky task for the PLA. At the same time, in order to assess the balance

of forces, other factors should be taken into account, regarding which there is currently no clear answer: the scenario that the PLA will choose and the procedure for its implementation; the response of the United States and allies; the current state of combat readiness of Taiwan's armed forces; the ability of the Taiwan Armed Forces to provide resistance after a massive missile and air strike by the PLA; forms of participation of third countries on the side of each of the parties.



MOBILISATION RESOURCE.

Approximately 2.185 million people are in active service in the PLA, the mobilisation reserve is 1.17 million people (of which 510,000 are the active

reserve of the PLA), and 660,000 are members of paramilitary formations (the total number of armed forces can potentially amount to 4 million), the staffing system is mixed.¹⁴²

Reserve training takes place via conscription. It is estimated that in order to invade Taiwan, China must have hundreds of thousands of military personnel, weaponry, the adequate material and rear support and means of transfer (sea and aircraft).¹⁴³ Currently, China has a sufficient number of active duty personnel in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands to carry out the operation (the number of amphibious warfare ships is still insufficient), while partial mobilisation would still be required for partial re-staffing of individual military units, service in paramilitary police formations in the rear and to replenish losses. It should also be taken into account that in wartime the People's Armed Police and the Chinese Militia act as a reserve and auxiliary element of the Ground Forces.

The Armed Forces of Taiwan have a mixed staffing system: there are 215,000 people in active service, the mob reserve consists of 2.3 million people, the training is carried out at via conscription (from 2024 — the term is extended from 4 months to 1 year, annually up to 70,000 people are called up). At the same time, according to some data, Taiwan's resources, stockpiles of equipment and weapons allow for the deployment of approximately 200,000 additional military personnel divided into four categories depending on their training and operational assignment. Currently, the government's efforts are aimed in particular at strengthening the reserve component of the Armed Forces

within the framework of the concept of «all-out defence» mentioned above.



ASSESSMENT IN UKRAINE.

The discourse of the top political leadership is currently aimed at the notion that «there is no alternative to NATO», but understanding the low probability of joining the alliance during an active war, «Ukraine needs security guarantees until the end of the war»,¹⁴⁴ without pointing towards a specific model.

Amongst the experts, there are no thorough studies fully devoted to Taiwan's security model and its acceptability for Ukraine. One of the few publications on the topic of security models with a brief overview of Taiwan is an article by the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security Council of Ukraine, in which a few sentences indicate the possibility of integrating certain elements of the Taiwanese model for Ukraine (supplying Ukraine with better equipment, training and intelligence), but it is stated that the USA makes statements about the readiness to protect Taiwan, while it does not do so in the case of Ukraine.¹⁴⁵



ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OTHER COUNTRIES.

In general, in the US, the Taiwan model is considered optimal, as it allows for maintaining a sufficient level of security of its ally and the Indo-Pacific region in general, and at the same

¹⁴² U.S. Department of Defense, 'Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, A Report to Congress', 2023: <https://media.defence.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>

¹⁴³ National Defense University Press, 'Crossing the Strait, China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan', Washington, D.C., 2022: <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Crossing-the-Strait/>

¹⁴⁴ Ukrinform, 'No NATO country will be forced into the war by Ukraine — Zelenskyy', 2023: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3717485-zodnu-krainu-nato-ukraina-ne-vtaguvatime-u-vijnu-zelenskij.html>

¹⁴⁵ Center for Countering Disinformation, 'Which Western security guarantee model suits Ukraine', 2023: <https://cpd.gov.ua/main/yaka-zahidna-model-bezpekovyh-garantij-pidhodyt-ukrayini/>

time having the opportunity to maintain relations with China.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, discussions are intensifying in the US that the model may not be effective enough, due to the significant increase in the combat capabilities of the PLA. Therefore, it should be improved, in particular, with the help of the so-called integrated deterrence, which involves strengthening the island's own defence system along with improving the combat and coordination capabilities of the United States and its allies in the region. The opinion that in the new circumstances the US cannot single-handedly ensure the security of its partners, so they must take on more responsibility is becoming more widespread. Another topic of discussion is the need for the US to abandon the policy of strategic ambiguity¹⁴⁷ and to clearly demonstrate the PRC its readiness to defend Taiwan.¹⁴⁸

Regarding the implementation of the Taiwanese model in Ukraine, it is likely that its elements regarding the provision of weapons, technologies, intelligence information, training and exercises are fully supported by the USA and other key partners of Ukraine (which at the same time needs to be enshrined in the legislation of the security guarantor countries), and are already basically implemented for Ukraine. At the same time, the provision of security obligations regarding the military protection of Ukraine is still unlikely.



ASSESSMENTS IN RUSSIA.

The Taiwanese model has already been partially implemented in Ukraine (provision/sale/maintenance/repair of weapons; training of Ukrainian servicemen; provision of intelligence information).

The Taiwanese model has already been partially implemented in Ukraine (provision/sale/maintenance/repair of weapons; training of Ukrainian servicemen; provision of intelligence information).

Issues that have not been implemented regarding Ukraine — the signing of a separate US law on support and security obligations; the US sending a military contingent for protection and a show of force; readiness of the USA (at least at the level of rhetoric and probably at the level of strategic planning) for the military protection of a partner country; significant US/allied military presence in the region on a permanent basis.

It is obvious that Russia will always oppose all elements that would strengthen Ukrainian defence capabilities or provide security guarantees. Therefore, all elements of the model will be unacceptable to Russia; however this is no reason for Ukraine to not try to achieve them.

¹⁴⁶ 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS): «The Department will support Taiwan's asymmetric self-defence commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy», <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

¹⁴⁷ The policy of «strategic ambiguity» is based on the theory that it is best to keep all sides guessing as to whether and to what extent the US military will intervene in the Taiwan Strait war.

¹⁴⁸ Schuman M. 'No More 'Strategic Ambiguity' on Taiwan', *The Atlantic*, 2022: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/09/joe-biden-taiwan-china-strategic-ambiguity/671512/>



PROS AND CONS.

PROS

- + Enshrining the need to ensure Taiwan's security in American law (particularly in the Taiwan Relations Act and the "Six Assurances"), which is the result of a broad consensus on the importance of Taiwan to the US national interests
- + The status of a major partner outside NATO (without formal recognition), which demonstrates the strategic importance of the partnership
- + Demonstration at the level of statements of the top political leadership and actions of the US military regarding the readiness to defend Taiwan, practicing manoeuvres and preparing the US military for a conflict with China in the event of an invasion of the PLA, naval blockade or other actions
- + The possibility of Taiwan receiving a wide range of US-made weapons
- + Absence of reservations about not launching strikes on the enemy's territory. This was achieved by the fact that Taiwan developed and put into service its own attack systems that can strike the territory of the PRC, while the United States supplied weapons that are more aimed at defence, and not for attacks on objects on the territory of the PRC
- + The United States repeatedly sending a military contingent to the region in order to demonstrate its strength and warn the PLA against military action
- + Constant exchange of intelligence information between the United States and Taiwan in a bilateral format, as well as periodically — in a multilateral format with other countries and within the framework of the "Five Eyes" alliance
- + The self-sufficiency of Taiwan's own defence industry in many respects — the production of warships, air defence systems, anti-missile systems, long-range missiles, satellite reconnaissance systems and low-orbit satellite communications, etc.
- + Provision of US defence technologies and joint development of weapons and military equipment

CONS

- The absence of a mutual defence agreement and unequivocal security guarantees in the Taiwan Relations Act regarding the direct protection of Taiwan by the US. This, among other things, creates the possibility for manipulation of public opinion by China regarding the undermining of trust in the US in Taiwan
- Dependence of the US and other partners on economic relations with China, which has led to a decrease in support for Taiwan during periods of improved relations with China. Currently, this shortcoming is less relevant due to the fact that the improvement of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China is unlikely
- Absence of a permanent US military presence on national territory ready for a show of force and armed defence in the event of a war scenario
- Military cooperation in personnel training is limited — it mainly concerned the training of operators of transferred equipment, pilots, small units of the special operations forces, and combined military units up to and including the company. Military cooperation does not yet include the training of large units, such as the brigade level, and conducting joint large-scale exercises. At the same time, this shortcoming was due to the desire of the United States to develop relations with China, which is currently less relevant
- Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the US will transfer only "defensive weapons" to Taiwan, which: a) imposed restrictions on the transfer of long-range weapons capable of striking mainland China; b) placed the dependence of Taiwan's security on the political situation in the USA, since weapons can be classified as both defensive and offensive at the same time
- The difficulty of fully involving other partners in the region in Taiwan's security model, the lack of representation in international organisations due to diplomatic restrictions, and the "One China" policy, etc. The reason for this shortcoming is the incomplete diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, which is less relevant for Ukraine




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

The Taiwan model, only in the case of its full implementation, provides an opportunity to build and maintain a relatively self-sufficient defence system of Ukraine and to deter Russia from further aggression, since the US (although following a policy of strategic ambiguity) with a high probability, together with other partners, intends to protect Taiwan. At the same time, the question remains precisely in this element of the Taiwan model — the readiness of the US to intervene in the war waged by Russia, which in the case of Ukraine seems unlikely. Therefore, for Ukraine, it is possible to borrow individual elements of various models, including the Taiwanese one. In particular: a separate law on the importance of Ukraine as an element of regional and world security; specific security obligations and provision of high-tech weapons; joint production of weapons and exchange of technologies; a 24/7 exchange of intelligence information.

At the same time, in addition to the provision of weapons and security commitments from the US, the Taiwan model is based on the independent development and production of a large

part of the armaments, which refers to such elements as air defence/anti-missile defence/navy/medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. The above, taking into account the US' approaches to «de-escalation», gives Ukraine the opportunity to: have its own systems of long-range damage and deterrence; ensuring its own security in the event of a change in the political situation (politicians opposed to supporting Ukraine coming to power in the USA).



THE WESTERN GERMAN SECURITY MODEL.¹⁴⁹ GRADUAL ACCESSION TO NATO



BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL.¹⁵⁰

After the end of WWII, Germany was divided into four areas of occupation: Soviet, French, British, and the US. Until 1948 there was a certain coordination between the four powers on the 'management' of the German territory. But the gap between the Soviets and the West was widening and the relations of former allies became quickly hostile.

The first signs of real tensions came with the 1948 Berlin crisis (Berlin Blockade) which lasted almost a year and is remembered as Berlin Airlift — the Allies were providing food and fuel for western Berlin despite the land and water blockade of the western Berlin by the Soviets. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 gave to Allies a sense of urgency to deal with security in the region of Western and Central Europe being afraid that a new war could expand to the region. Initially, the plan to deal with this

was the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) — an idea that came from France. However, the EDC, despite being preferred by the allies, including the US, was evolving slowly mainly due to fears of German military resurrection, especially voiced by France. At the same time, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer wanted to have the US as part of any military alliance that Germany joined, since he saw it as a *sine qua non* condition for guaranteeing the security of Germany against a growing threat from the Soviet Union. That is in part why he preferred to join NATO, despite significantly decreasing the chances for the reunification of the country. His thoughts on this dichotomy were made most clear in a statement he made to the French High Commissioner to West Germany in 1954: «Do not forget that I am the only Chancellor Germany has ever had who preferred the unity of Europe to the unity of his country.»

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer wanted to have the US as part of any military alliance that Germany joined, since he saw it as a *sine qua non* condition for guaranteeing the security of Germany against a growing threat from the Soviet Union.

The London-Paris conferences of 1954 determined the status of West Germany, including

¹⁴⁹ NATO, 'Germany and NATO': https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_185912.htm

¹⁵⁰ The comprehensive list of questions can be found at the end of this document in Appendix 1.

the end of occupation and joining of NATO in exchange for, among others, a commitment from Bonn to strive for a peaceful return of the territories under the Soviet occupation. On 6 May 1955 Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO, leaving its Soviet-occupied East Germany outside and thus minimising the possibility of a reunification. In turn, Western Germany developed quickly under the NATO umbrella and from a country that had no army at all at the moment of joining to one of the leading countries in NATO. Just a few days after West Germany joined NATO, the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact which shaped the border of the Iron Curtain until 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification took place, and a single country was rebuilt.



POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

The political debates about the best model to include West Germany in the security architecture of the West were multi-faceted, but all of them agreed with the basic idea that West Germany had to be part of the Western security framework. The opposition widely supported the process of aligning with the West, especially from the perspective that the new security framework should have taken place simultaneously with the signing of the General Treaty which governed the relations with the UK, France, the US, and the Federal Republic of Germany and thus ended the occupation regime and restored sovereignty of West Germany.¹⁵¹

The discussions about the security model for West Germany were spanning across three main options: the creation of the German feder-

al police which aside from being in charge with domestic security issues would be the basis for the future army; integration of West Germany into NATO and having integrated command and forces; and the creation of the European army that would also integrate the German units. The least controversial within the political circles was the first option.¹⁵²

The post-war atmosphere in Germany was strongly opposed to any plans to re-arm the country. The popular movements against militarisation were taking shape, especially with the creation of the so-called pacifist groups. Most prominent of these connected with the Protestant Churches, the German Trade Union Federations, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), although there were also cross-cutting movements across the groups.¹⁵³

Today, except for the extreme radical voices, the model of Konrad Adenauer is not contested, for obvious reasons — Germany survived, developed, and reunited. Konrad Adenauer understood that it was more important to have a solid defence agreement and that West Germany joined NATO. His decision was brave since it meant unity was not going to happen easily.¹⁵⁴ Although, at that time, today's result did not seem evident and it took years to prove Adenauer was right.

Today, except for the extreme radical voices, the model of Konrad Adenauer is not contested, for obvious reasons — Germany survived, developed, and reunited.

¹⁵¹ Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and FRG, May 26, 1952: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/10/1/b1885d93-c91a-4fa7-80bd-e1d3b3171b87/publishable_en.pdf

¹⁵² Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

¹⁵³ Emilia Salvanou, 'Memory and Protest in the West German peace movement of 1960s', SCIRP, July 2022: <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=118906>

¹⁵⁴ Steven Erlanger, 'If a divided Germany could enter NATO, Why not Ukraine?', NYT, May 26, 2023: <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/26/world/europe/ukraine-nato-germany.html>



PUBLIC SUPPORT.

The wider public did not support any plans to develop an army and militarise West Germany. The trauma of the WWII was fresh and deeply rooted in the society. All the ideas that included re-armament were strongly declined by the public and opposition. Aside from groups in the Protestant church, trade unions, and political opposition such as SPD, other grassroots movements emerged in the early 1950s that opposed the re-armament. These movements, among them the most popular Emergency Association for Peace in Europe and the Women's Peace Congress, were centred around the slogan *Ohne Mich* (Without Me) which posed strong pressure on the German leadership to not engage in the rearmament.¹⁵⁵

The leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was instrumental in overcoming the fears of the integration of West Germany with NATO. It was not easy to convince the population that the reunification would be postponed indefinitely, and millions of Germans would be left to live in the communist regime and that young Germans would be again drafted to the army and prepared to fight a possible war. Adenauer's victory in 1957 federal elections with the slogan *Keine Experimente* (No Experiments) proved once again that persuading the population was possible and achievable.¹⁵⁶

However, the fact that Konrad Adenauer was elected as chancellor of West Germany until he resigned in 1963 meant that the public supported him and the group of people willing to integrate with the Western security system was prevailing.

Today's legacy of the decisions of Konrad Adenauer and the Allies are not contested and are seen as the right choice at that time.

It was not easy to convince the population that the reunification would be postponed indefinitely, and millions of Germans would be left to live in the communist regime and that young Germans would be again drafted to the army and prepared to fight a possible war.



THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT.

When NATO was born, there was no evidence that Germany (west) was envisaged to become a member. Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO defined the Alliance mission short and sharp: '*Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down*'.¹⁵⁷ In 1949 it was unthinkable that anyone would speak in favour of German NATO membership.

However, with the Soviet Union quickly expanding its influence and posing a threat to the Western powers, the Allies were reflecting and changing their perspective on the role of Germany. The same Lord Ismay wrote in his book about the first five years of NATO that German participation in the defence of the West is a stern necessity.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Emilia Salvanou, '*Memory and Protest in the West German peace movement of 1960s*', SCIRP, July 2022: <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=118906>

¹⁵⁶ Francois Heisburg, '*How to End a War: Some Historical Lessons for Ukraine*', Taylor and Francis Online, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/00396338.2023.2233347?needAccess=true&role=button>

¹⁵⁷ Lord Ismay: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm

¹⁵⁸ Lord Ismay, '*NATO, the first five years (1949-1954)*': https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/216977/NATO-The_first_5_years_1949-1954_by_Lord_Ismay_.pdf



The Federal Republic of Germany becomes a member of NATO. Paris, France, 6 May 1955.

Resource: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/5664176447>

The Allies' opinion on the German re-armament and security alignment with the West was evolving, except for France which was still resistant. As a first option, France considered creating the European Defense Community (EDC) and leaving Germany outside of NATO. This plan was supported by the Allies, including the US which was initially bidding on EDC.

The EDC was drafted and put in the pipeline in 1952 in an accelerated mode due to the changing security environment. Despite the ratification by Germany of the EDC together with the

General Treaty, the ratification in France appeared to be problematic due to the growing opposition to the new treaties. French leadership tried to alleviate the widespread fears by demanding new concessions from Germany such as a longer subordination of German military units under French command and on the French-administered Saar region.¹⁵⁹ The issue of EDC was aggravated also by the position of the US, namely of the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who insisted on the EDC and even threatened to reduce US support should EDC fail. The US position was understandable

¹⁵⁹ Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

considering US commitments worldwide, especially on the Korean theatre, and the difficulties in honouring these.¹⁶⁰ However, despite the ratification of the EDC by all countries, except the United Kingdom who declined the offer, the French National Assembly voted, ironically, to refuse the creation of the EDC, because of fears of a military resurrection of Germany. That opened the gates for Western Germany's NATO integration which took place in 1955.

Germany's NATO accession was fully dependent on third parties and the role of the US was instrumental in making it happen. The security context which was deteriorated by the war in Korea between the communist North and non-communist South and the parallels with East and West Germany raised the question from the possibility of the war to the probability of the war. The support of the Allies to Germans was among others in stopping the dismantling of its industry and letting them connect their capacity to the European projects. In the beginning, Germany joined NATO in fact without an army and created it later in 1955 increasing its capacity after the revision of the General Treaty. The US support for Germany was vital and massive in all the areas, including military and economic.¹⁶¹ Over the years, as the Franco-German alliance was developing and the parties managed to build a relationship of trust, Bonn became a serious contributor to the security — all these under the US umbrella.

Kremlin was strongly opposed to the re-arming of West Germany and its acceptance in NATO. Earlier in 1952, the Soviets admitted that the reunification of Germany was possible on the Kremlin's terms, especially the neutrality of

the future unified Germany so that it was not able to join NATO — just like the Austrian scenario. Similarly to Germany, the Soviets also strongly opposed the integration of Greece and Turkey but could not stop the process. It is not excluded that the decision of NATO countries to accept West Germany could have been influenced by the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 and a period of certain reformatting of foreign policy approaches by the new leadership of the USSR.¹⁶²



SECURITY GUARANTEES.

The model is provided by the guarantee of Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the nuclear umbrella of the NATO nuclear sharing agreement. The collective guarantee of NATO worked well and provided the necessary framework to avoid any attack.

At the same time, aside from the guarantees that came with NATO membership, Germany continued to host foreign troops on its territory and regulated their presence with the Force Convention agreement. Even today, Germany comes second, after Japan, that hosts the biggest number of US troops — 33 948 soldiers.¹⁶³ Also, West Germany publicly committed not to develop atomic, biological, or chemical weapons in return for guarantees from partners.

**Germany comes second, after
Japan, that hosts the biggest
number of US troops —
33 948 soldiers.**

¹⁶⁰ Benjamin M. Simpson, 'The Re-arming of Germany 1950-1954: A Linchpin in the Political Evolution of Europe', *Naval War College Review*, 1971.

¹⁶¹ NATO, 'Germany and NATO': https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_185912.htm

¹⁶² Mark Kramer, 'The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe', *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 3-66.

¹⁶³ Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad, 'Infographic: US military presence around the world', *Al Jazeera*, September 10, 2021: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/10/infographic-us-military-presence-around-the-world-interactive>

The most important part, especially in relation to Ukraine, West Germany committed that the reunification of the country would be pursued only by peaceful means and its foreign policy will be in accordance with Art 2 of the UN Charter.¹⁶⁴



MOTIVATION OF THIRD PARTIES.

The third powers' motivation in helping Germany to become a NATO member were different, depending on the country. The main motivation was that West Germany needed NATO to secure its existence and NATO (and the US) needed West Germany to enforce the security of the region which quickly deteriorated on the background of the Korean war and a more assertive Soviet Union.

NATO (and the US) needed West Germany to enforce the security of the region which quickly deteriorated on the background of the Korean war and a more assertive Soviet Union.

The fear that the Soviets could use East Germany to attack West Germany was growing and that is why the NATO option, after the EDC failed, was considered. Aside from security issues, the Allies considered optimising the costs they spent on the security of West Germany. The US was busy with fulfilling its commitments across the world, the UK was diminishing its defence budget and withdrawing its troops from West Germany and

France was having a hard time domestically due to several crises, including the one generated by the departure from Indochina. Also, France wanted to use the accession of Germany to NATO in order to resolve the issue of the Saar status, which was envisaged to get autonomy but remain economically linked to France. The referendum in the Saar region to accept the French blueprint took place. France thought it would be an easy gain but the results proved the contrary.¹⁶⁵

With the unification of Germany, the "German NATO model" ceased to exist. Germany became an "ordinary" member of NATO and thus the motivation and the background changed radically.



HOW HAS THE MODEL WORKED IN CRISES?

The model of West Germany's accession to NATO offers a brilliant lesson on how to reverse the course, offer security to Bonn, and strengthen the Alliance. By joining NATO, Adenauer solved several issues at once. First, he significantly improved the security of West Germany, especially in the context of the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union. Second, he restored its sovereignty which led to the de-occupation of West Germany. Third, he paved the way for European integration.¹⁶⁶ The EU integration was also boosted by the security guarantees that came together with NATO.

The fact that the US stood behind West Germany's accession to NATO and created a credible deterrence was instrumental for the model to succeed. Any crisis was unlikely having behind you the US and some of the most powerful

¹⁶⁴ Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

¹⁶⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, 'Causes and consequences of the plebiscite in Saar', December, 1955: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40392788>

¹⁶⁶ Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

economies of the world. It also helped in avoiding creating crises and not only facing crises.

Konrad Adenauer solved several issues at once: significantly improved the security of West Germany; restored its sovereignty which led to the de-occupation of West Germany; paved the way for European integration.

The West German model was tested above all in 1961 during the construction of the Berlin Wall and subsequent pressure from the Soviet Union to push out the Allies. In addition to the existing guarantees of defence, the Allies developed a covert military plan called *LIVE OAK* that was meant to protect Allies access to West Berlin by air, rail and road. About 400 000 foreign service personnel were deployed in West Germany, including 10 000 in West Berlin in order to deter the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁷

deployment of intermediate-range nuclear systems in West Germany.¹⁶⁸

The situation with the nuclear umbrella is actually depending very much on the international security context. For instance, in 2016, a whopping number of 85% of Germans wanted the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Germany. However, in 2022, after Russia attacked Ukraine, more than half of Germans wanted the US to keep its nuclear weapons in Germany. Following this, Germany also decided to go with the F-35 order which means it will keep the technical capability to participate in nuclear sharing for the decades to come.¹⁶⁹

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

The Federal Republic of Germany benefits from the nuclear umbrella of NATO through a nuclear sharing agreement and in the custody of the US. In the beginning, the Germans relied on the buildup of the conventional army. Then, when the Soviets posed an increased risk to the West, Germany had to introduce a nuclear weapons system, although the decision was difficult for the German leadership and society. For instance, the Schimidt government fell in 1982 due to the



COMPARISON OF ARMIES.

The West Germany had no army when joining NATO. However, it had great potential, despite the enormous loss during WWII. Especially, it was not so much about manpower, but about the industrial base that could have been used to re-arm West Germany and the West after integrating Bonn into the Western security framework.

¹⁶⁷ NATO, 'Germany and NATO': https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_185912.htm

¹⁶⁸ Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

¹⁶⁹ Liviu Horovitz and Michal Onderco, 'How Germans Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, Then Probably Start Worrying Again', War on Rocks, October 9, 2023: <https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/how-germans-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-bomb-then-probably-start-worrying-again/>

The lack of an army in Western Germany was particularly striking when comparing it with the strength of its adversary — the Soviet Union. In 1954, the Soviet Union, together with Eastern Germany and Soviet satellites had an army of over 6 million people. Out of these, 4,5 million were ground forces with a high state of preparedness. The forces for rapid advance in Western Europe were composed of 22 Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany and an additional 60 divisions. If mobilised, the Soviets could have gathered in 30 days about 400 divisions. Additionally, the Soviet Union strengthened its air power by having a fleet of about 20000 aircraft.¹⁷⁰

The strength of the Soviet Union, its increasing influence, and its support for the Korean War were the main causes for the rapid accession of West Germany into NATO and the reanimation of its army and industry — the Allies could not commit an amount of force to Western Germany capable to successfully deter the Soviet Union.

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Initially, as part of the European Defense Community, German soldiers were supposed to be deployed under an integrated General Staff under the French, but without having its own army. The drop of the EDC and the accession to NATO changed this perspective. It mandat-

ed Bonn for the creation of its own army. The process of creating the Bundeswehr was slow and difficult despite having bipartisan support. Problems ranged from lack of military infrastructure such as barracks to the unwillingness of the volunteers to sign up for the army. Only in 1957, two years after West Germany joined NATO, Bonn assigned the first German division to NATO. West Germany became fully integrated into NATO structures and within 10 years since the creation of the Bundeswehr had become the backbone of NATO's defence forces in Europe.¹⁷¹ But the Bundeswehr never reached 12 divisions and 560000 men as foreseen in 1954.¹⁷²



ASSESSMENT IN UKRAINE.

There hasn't been a real discussion on the Western German model of joining NATO. Officially, the Ukrainian leadership sticks to the policy of full victory against Russia and restoring the 1991 borders. This position does not allow for an open reflection at the political level. At the same time, the article of Commander in Chief Valery Zaluzhny who found out that the war is moving into a deadlock unless Ukraine gets technically advanced weapons, might create the conditions for a discussion on possible models for ensuring the security of Ukraine and its survivability and development.

The only statement made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy that alluded to Germany's NATO model was made during his statements at the Vilnius Summit. He said *"I'm certain that Biden and Scholz won't betray [Ukraine], but still, I have to make it clear that we will never trade a [NATO member status] for our territories — even for a single village that stands deserted but for one old man. We won't relinquish our territories and will never trade them for a frozen conflict. This will*

¹⁷⁰ Lord Ismay, 'NATO, the first five years (1949-1954)': https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/216977/NATO-The_first_5_years_1949-1954__by_Lord_Ismay_.pdf

¹⁷¹ NATO, 'Germany and NATO': https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_185912.htm

¹⁷² Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany's accession to NATO 50 years on', NATO Review, June 01, 2005: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/06/01/germanys-accession-to-nato-50-years-on/index.html>

never happen. Our partners know my position well."¹⁷³ The statement of the President ruled out a West Germany NATO membership for Ukraine. The President's statement was somehow echoed by an adviser to the head of the President's office Mykhailo Podolyak who mentioned that Putin has to be defeated, otherwise, the war will return¹⁷⁴ and we should not pass it to the next generations.

Ukraine's expert community is quietly reflecting on the model, with predominantly negative attitudes. Some experts¹⁷⁵ note that the situation after WWII and now are not comparable — not only because we have an active war today while in 1955 there was no war. It is also, they claim, about the fact that NATO is the US + others and for the US the main enemy is China and not Russia — that complicates the NATO prospect for Ukraine. The reason is allegedly that the US is still hoping it can have Russia on its side in a potential confrontation with China. But there are also opinion leaders who potentially support the West German model. One of these is Vitaly Portnikov who is positively assessing the German model, especially under the scenario of diminishing Western support.¹⁷⁶

Political opposition is bolder on West Germany's NATO model for Ukraine. The freshly minted opposition politician Oleksiy Arestovich has proposed to temporarily give up on occupied territories in exchange for NATO member-

ship following Germany's model.¹⁷⁷ The fatigue that is observed in the opinion polls might offer a fertile ground for his ideas in the future.



ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OTHER COUNTRIES.

The NATO countries are reflecting way more on the German NATO model for Ukraine than anyone else. Although we have no official statements on this, there are indications that the model is discussed. The conference speech of Stian Jenssen, director of the private office of the NATO Secretary General is illustrative. He suggested that Ukraine could become a NATO member and terminate the war if it gave up a portion of its territory to Russia.¹⁷⁸ Although the official rolled back on his words and labelled these as a mistake, it is difficult to imagine that such a conclusion appeared out of the blue, without previous reflections.

The issue was also raised by the former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, who underlined that there is already a precedent (Germany), the only difference is that Germany was already divided in 1955.¹⁷⁹ The argument raised by the former SG is probably the one that is most discussed in the West. The fact that Germany had a clearly defined border and committed to "return" occupied territories only by peaceful

¹⁷³ Ukrainian Pravda, 'Zelenskyy: We won't trade a single Ukrainian village for NATO membership', July 12, 2023: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/12/7411049/>

¹⁷⁴ Yeni Şafak, 'Ukraine rejects 'West Germany' model', August 17, 2023: <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/ukraine-rejects-west-germany-model-3669075>

¹⁷⁵ Ukrinform, 'Joining NATO following the example of West Germany: why it is not suitable for Ukraine', November 14, 2023: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3736015-vstup-do-nato-za-prikladom-zahidnoi-nimeccini-comu-ce-ne-pidhodit-ukraini.html>

¹⁷⁶ Radio Free Europe, 'Will Ukraine dare to pursue NATO membership? Exploring the new accession concept | Dialogues with Portnikov': <https://youtu.be/5mFpzElodss?si=LvgsjAW3sCzQ7JO4>

¹⁷⁷ Dmytro Gulichuk, 'Arestovich says it is possible to temporarily «exchange» occupied territories for NATO membership', TSN, July 16, 2023: <https://tsn.ua/politika/arestovich-zayaviv-pro-mozhlyvist-timchasovo-obminyati-okupovani-teritoriyi-na-vstup-do-nato-2371387.html>

¹⁷⁸ Jenni Reid, 'NATO official admits comments on Ukraine giving up territory to gain membership were a 'mistake'', CNBC, August 16, 2023: <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/16/nato-official-dials-back-comment-on-ukraine-ceding-land-to-gain-membership.html>

¹⁷⁹ Eva Zhvinkite, 'Divided Germany joined NATO, why Ukraine can't?', LRT.lt, August 21, 2023: <https://www.lrt.lt/ua/novini/1263/2059313/rozdilena-nimechchina-vstupila-do-nato-chomu-ukrajina-ne-mozhe>

means is something that is missing in Ukraine. The border issue is important, from the Western perspective, since it is crucial in defining the application of Art 5. The biggest fear, as portrayed in the West, is that accepting Ukraine into NATO without having control of its entire territory is an almost a certain way to drag NATO members into the war. The argument is sharpened even more when considering that the Art 5 for NATO in a conflict with Russia could also involve a nuclear dimension.¹⁸⁰ Thus, from this perspective Russia could escalate more if Ukraine is invited to join NATO in a German style.

The NATO strategy of declining Ukraine's chance to get in NATO until the war is over motives Russia to continue the war.

How strange it may sound, but there are almost no discussions on the benefits of Ukraine joining NATO by the German model. The debate is highly one-sided and does not pose the question what happens if Ukraine is denied indefinitely the NATO membership, even German style. The former NATO SG Rasmussen points that the NATO strategy of declining Ukraine's chance to get in NATO until the war is over motives Russia to continue the war.¹⁸¹ Henry Kissinger adds another important element that the NATO membership of Ukraine would be a means of protecting it (Ukraine) but also a means of restraining it.¹⁸²



ASSESSMENTS IN RUSSIA.

Russian officials have been very productive in declaring that Ukraine's NATO membership is unacceptable. According to them, Russia started its war against Ukraine including because *'they didn't want to let Ukraine into NATO'*. The narrative is flawed as Russia attempted to control Ukraine earlier despite being non-aligned.

In November 2023, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry called even partial membership of Ukraine in NATO unacceptable: *'We constantly clarify our position regarding Ukraine's accession to NATO... By parts or without any parts, in any form, the accession of Ukraine to the Atlantic bloc for Russia is unacceptable.'*¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Judy Dempsey, *'Judy Asks: Is Ukraine's NATO membership realistic?'* Carnegie Europe, July 06, 2023: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/90137>

¹⁸¹ Ukrainian Pravda, *'Former NATO Secretary General calls for inviting Ukraine to join Alliance before war ends'*, November 02, 2023: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/2/7426943/>

¹⁸² Francois Heisburg, *'How to End a War: Some Historical Lessons for Ukraine'*, Taylor and Francis Online, August–September, 2023: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/00396338.2023.2233347?needAccess=true&role=button>

¹⁸³ «European Pravda», *'Zakharova stated that the Russian Federation will not accept Ukraine's «partial accession» to NATO'*, November 15, 2023: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/11/15/7173636/>



PROS AND CONS.

PROS

CONS

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Ukraine is in NATO and has the security guarantee, including the Art 5 and the long-term commitment for defence from its members. Once Ukraine is in NATO, they should expect NATO to feel more obliged to contribute to Ukraine's security and also Kyiv to contribute to NATO's security + Once in NATO, Ukraine can do reconstruction without being afraid that the newly reconstructed projects will be subject to Russian attack + The security that comes with NATO membership will allow to keep people in Ukraine and provide conditions for Ukrainian refugees to return + The war is stabilised and the scenario of endless war is fading away + Once in NATO, there is a minimum likelihood that Russia will start a new war + As the 21 months of war show Ukraine's partners spent a fortune helping Ukraine defend itself, the cost of being a NATO member is much cheaper than transforming Ukraine into a militarized hedgehog | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ukraine will not be able to swiftly return its occupied territories. The example of Germany shows that one may need decades until that could be possible - NATO risks to be dragged into the war and Art 5 could be tested by Russia - Ukraine will have to coordinate and agree with other NATO members of all its military plans - The invitation to NATO could be coupled with certain compromises from Ukraine on Crimea - As long as Russia understands that Ukraine cannot join NATO while the war, in different forms, is still continuing, is motivating Kremlin to continue its war. Breaking the circle and the "veto" of Russia on the question of Ukraine's NATO membership is an important element of the future of the war |
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

The German model for Ukraine is quite applicable provided that the war becomes low-intensity and has a "border" by the actual state of affairs at the moment of joining. The current counter-offensive, despite being labelled by many as failed, has managed to stabilise the frontline.

The main benefit of the proposed model is that as a NATO member, Ukraine will very likely make it impossible for Russia to continue the war and start a new war. That would give Ukraine a good possibility to undergo a process of reviving its force and carry out the reconstruction process. Most importantly, it would cost incredibly less for Ukraine and its partners to have it in NATO.

The important and unresolved part is how to manage the question of occupied territories. The German model indicates that Ukraine will have to commit to a peaceful reintegration of the country, which would mean millions of Ukrainians will live in the occupied territories and will be forced to undergo brutal brainwashing and russification. It is quite difficult to predict what would be the repercussions for the Ukrainian political elite and for Zelenskyy personally. As the Adenauer case shows, all lies in the communication. What appeared to be a weakness of Adenauer ended up with a decisive strength.

At the same time, the human capital, which is currently escaping from Ukraine, would have the necessary conditions to return and contribute to the revival of Ukraine, including to the reconstruction of the country. If the process of NATO accession will be coupled with the EU accession and backed by the US, Ukraine has the chance to repeat the German miracle.



APPENDIX 1

THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF QUESTIONS



Background and description of the model. Brief background information on the security model. Key points that may be useful for Ukraine.



Political discussions. To what extent was the launch and implementation of the model supported by the country's political class? What was the criticism from its opponents at the time when the model was launched? Is the model a matter of political debate today?



Public support. Does the model enjoy public support today? What was the situation at the time when the model was launched? The main arguments, assessments in public discourse today regarding the effectiveness of the chosen security model.



Who initiated the model?



Third-party support. How dependent is the security model on third parties? How many countries and associations provide support? What assistance does the country representing the model receive from third parties? Who is the biggest contributor?



Security guarantees. Does the model provide for security guarantees (participation of the armies of third countries in hostilities on the side of the country representing the model)?



How "static" is the model? How much has it changed? What additions to the model have come about?



Motivation of third parties. Why do third parties contribute to supporting the security model under study? Has the reasoning changed since the launch of the model as of today? How consistent has the level of third-party support been? Key stakeholders that influence the sustainability of the security model in third countries (lobbyists, think tanks, etc.).



How has the model worked in crises? Has the model in question been tested in dealing with acute crises and conflicts? Has the country dealt with external aggression? How high is the risk of external aggression against the country?



Nuclear weapons. Does the country face a threat of a nuclear attack? Does the model provide for defence in case of a nuclear attack?



Comparison of armies. Comparison of the armed forces of the country representing the model and the hostile country or countries (at the time of the model's introduction and today).



Mobilisation resources. Comparison of the mobilisation resource of the model country and the enemy country.

(Number of soldiers, type of army service (conscription/contract/mixed), reserve formation, etc.).



Assessment in Ukraine. How is the model assessed in Ukraine by the leadership, politicians, and experts? How acceptable can the model be to Ukrainian society? Opinion polls data, expert forecast.



Assessment in the United States, other countries. How acceptable is the model to the third parties on which its implementation in Ukraine will depend?



Assessments in Russia. Acceptability of the model for Russia (primarily at the political level).



Pros and cons. Comparative table with advantages and disadvantages of the security model in question.



Summary and conclusions. Can the security model be applied to Ukraine and to what extent is it capable of protecting Ukraine from future Russian aggression?



ABOUT NEW EUROPE CENTER

The New Europe Center was founded in 2017 as an independent think-tank. Despite its new brand, it is based on a research team that has been working together since 2009, at the Institute for World Policy. The New Europe Center became recognized by offering high-quality analysis on foreign policy issues in Ukraine and regional security by combining active, effective work with advocacy.

The New Europe Center's vision is very much in line with the views of the majority of Ukrainians about the future of their country: Ukraine should be integrated into the European Union and NATO. By integration, we understand not so much formal membership as the adoption of the best standards and practices for Ukraine to properly belong to the Euroatlantic value system.

More about New Europe Center: neweurope.org.ua

