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DIPLOMACY-2022

Foreign policy expectations of Ukrainian society

The results of the survey commissioned
by the New Europe Center





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The study is conducted by INFO SAPIENCE LLC as a part of the Omnibus. The method of the study is a personal interview, which was carried out at the respondent's home using tablets (CAPI). The field phase of the research lasted from November 8 to 29, 2021. The sample comprises 1007 people over the age of 18. The sample is representative of the population by sex, age, size of locality and a region of residence in accordance with the data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of January 1, 2019. The poll was conducted only in the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The maximum theoretical error does not exceed 3.1%.

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December, 2021
Kyiv




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
Evaluating the importance of deepening cooperation with certain countries

What is or will be your indicator of European integration taking place in Ukraine?



When will Crimea be returned?

Which of the foreign leaders is the most trusted?




SUMMARY

Security diplomacy is taking precedence over economic diplomacy. This is probably the key idea from the latest nationwide poll commissioned by the New Europe Center. Although Ukrainians see the course towards the EU as a foreign policy priority, support for NATO membership is mounting, which may be due, among other things, to the aggravated security situation around Ukraine. Moreover, it is not so much economic preferences that Ukrainians expect from the EU, as it could seem from last year's poll, but rather clear-cut security and political steps, including stronger support for Ukraine in defense and security. The three main expectations from the United States have similar emphases.

Poland ranks first among the countries with which Ukraine should deepen its relations. Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are also among the top five countries with which, according to Ukrainians, cooperation should be deepened. By comparison, the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine stipulates that its utmost strategic priority is relations with almost the same list of countries: the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and France. As can be seen, public expectations and the state's vision generally coincide, but there are some differences in the order of priority.

Among international partners, Poland seems to reign in popularity sweepstakes, with the largest number of Ukrainians favoring partnership with it and Polish President Andrzej Duda topping the list of foreign leaders most trusted by Ukrainians. In turn, the main contender for the disappointment of the year for Ukrainians is Belarus with its unrecognized president, who regularly threatens Ukraine.

An important feature of our survey is that Ukrainians have a demand for regional alliances with Ukraine's participation, so Ukrainian diplomacy should continue this trend. Ukrainians have lauded the development of the Associated Trio (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), the Lublin Triangle (Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania) and the Quadriga Format (Ukraine-Turkey). The vast majority of Ukrainians (almost 60 percent) also support the Crimea Platform.




KEY FINDINGS

1 EU integration — this, according to Ukrainians, should be the paramount foreign policy priority of Ukraine in 2022. Last year's leader of expectations — economic diplomacy in the form of opening new markets for Ukrainian producers — this time ranks third. The runner-up, like last year, is the development of Ukraine's strategic partnerships, i.e., bilateral relations with the US, Germany, France, the UK, Canada and Poland. An illustrative detail of the survey on foreign policy priorities is the fact that only one of the eleven priorities proposed has seen an increase in support — NATO integration, which is currently in the fourth place. Obviously, this is a reflection of the current security situation around Ukraine

facing an apparent threat of Russia's military invasion.

2 More positive assessments of diplomatic activities. This year, the number of Ukrainians who have assessed the effectiveness of almost all foreign policy areas positively has increased. In fact, half of the respondents (46 percent) have acknowledged that the development of relations with neighboring countries (except Russia) is efficient. Last year, this area also had the highest score but with a lower figure — 39 percent. The most positive trend in efficiency perception is observed in the field «Economic Diplomacy»: whereas last year Ukraine's work in this area was recognized as





effective by 26 percent of Ukrainians, this year the score stands at 36.6 percent. The indicator in the area "Ukraine's Foreign Soft Power Capacity-Building" has also grown significantly, from 25.1 to 34.7 percent this year.

3 Poland and Germany are the most important partners. More than 90 percent of Ukrainians consider it important to deepen cooperation with Warsaw and Berlin. These countries also took the lead last year, although Germany was first then. The next significant partners in percentage terms are Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (86 percent). More than 80 percent of respondents consider the development of relations with France, Turkey, Georgia and Lithuania to be of greatest importance. Relations with Russia are regarded as the least important, with 44.4 percent of citizens being in favor of such cooperation. In general, this year has seen a noticeable increase in the percentage of Ukrainians supporting the development of relations with a certain country. Only three of the twenty countries named have witnessed a decline in support: Italy, Belarus and Russia. The most negative trend has been recorded in Belarus: last year, 75.9 percent of those surveyed

were in favor of developing cooperation with Minsk, and this year's figure has reduced to 65.2 percent. The latter can be explained both by events in Belarus itself, Alexander Lukashenko's criticism of Ukraine, Russia's rapid takeover of the neighboring country over the past year and the artificial migration crisis created by the Belarusian authorities on the EU's borders as a springboard for a military invasion in Ukraine. An interesting fact on the Asian track is that the level of support for the development of relations with China and Japan is virtually on the same level, despite the much more noticeable presence of China in the Ukrainian public discourse and media.

4 Pro-Western course: unchanging and irreplaceable. Ukrainians are in favor of continuing the country's integration into the EU and NATO. 60.7 percent of respondents believe that Ukraine should become an EU member (compared to 66.6 percent last year). 52.7 percent believe that Ukraine should become a NATO member (against 48.4 percent in 2020). This year's special feature is that the level of support for the movement towards the EU has decreased, while the course towards NATO, on the contrary, has been on the rise.



5 **Andrzej Duda is the most trusted leader.** The President of Poland is winning over public opinion in Ukraine, with 52.5 percent of Ukrainians indicating either a strong or complete trust to him. The runner-up is former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who led the ranking last year. US President Joseph Biden ranks third with 49.8 percent of Ukrainians who trust him, an almost 20 percent increase compared to last year (apparently, a year ago Ukrainians still knew little about the newly elected politician, although Joe Biden had visited Ukraine six times as US Vice President and was constantly present in the Ukrainian information environment one way or another). There has been a significant increase in trust to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, rising from 26.8 to 41.6 percent. The least trusted among Ukrainians are

the presidents of Russia and Belarus, with 76.7 and 59.2 of distrust, respectively. In both cases, the level of distrust has increased: for Alexander Lukashenko, it has grown by as much as 10 percent.

6 **TOP-3 foreign policy achievements in 2021.** Ukrainians have identified President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's visit to the US and his meeting with Joseph Biden as the main foreign policy achievement of 2021 (33.4 percent). The Ukraine-EU summit ranks second (21.2 percent). The establishment of the Crimea Platform has earned the third place (18 percent). The already traditional (23rd in a row) Ukraine-EU summit is assessed higher than the inaugural summit of the Crimea Platform, Kyiv's unique initiative on the de-occupation of Crimea, which can be considered somewhat surprising in this section.

7 European reforms even without a European perspective. 62.3 percent of Ukrainians are of the opinion that Ukraine should continue its pro-European reforms even if the EU does not give the country the membership prospect. This year, however, we have noticed a slight decline in this indicator: in 2020, 69 percent of Ukrainians were in favor of "European reforms without European prospects".

8 Indicators of European integration. The list of key indicators proving that Ukraine is really moving towards the European Union has remained virtually unchanged in the perception of Ukrainians. Like last year, Ukrainians have indicated that for them the country's movement towards the EU will be evidenced by: 1) an improving economic situation (40.1 percent); 2) an effective fight against corruption (34.5

percent); 3) new jobs (28.5 percent). Almost a third of Ukrainians (28 percent), like last year, are in favor of eliminating the oligarchic rule in the country. It is revealing that only four indicators have become more important for Ukrainians than they were a year ago. These are: "fight against corruption is yielding results," "oligarchic rule is being eliminated", "judicial and law enforcement system is being reformed" and "better state of the environment".

9 If not the EU, then what? Ukrainian society looks a bit confused and even fragmented when asked, «What should be Ukraine's priority if the EU continues to refuse to provide a membership prospect?» 24.4 percent — the largest number of respondents — believe that in this case Ukraine should not join any union



at all. 18.2 percent are convinced that Ukraine should still demand the prospect of EU membership. The good news is that Ukrainians see no alternative to the European course. Even if the EU refuses to provide membership prospects, only 7.8 percent of Ukrainians are in favor of embarking on the Eurasian economic course.

10 Expectations from the EU: more security, less economy. The main expectation of Ukrainians from the EU is the granting of a membership prospect (23.2 percent). Interestingly, the number of Ukrainians who expect from the European Union the membership (or European) prospect is growing, albeit slowly. This has probably been

facilitated by the public rhetoric popular last year with calls to give Ukraine the membership prospect emanating from both Ukrainian high-ranking politicians and some foreign partners (particularly the President of Poland). Among the popular expectations there is also a more active role of the EU in negotiations with Russia to end the war (19.7 percent); imposition of new sanctions against Russia (19.4 percent); and stronger support for Ukraine in defense and security (19.4 percent). Last year, economic expectations were more popular, such as incentives for investors and expanded opportunities for legal employment. Thus, we can cautiously say that Ukrainians are increasingly perceiving the EU not only as a



development or economic partner but also as a security partner. Expectations, however, are divergent, with the most popular options averaging 20 percent.

11 Expectations from the United States: security guarantees and military support. Just like last year, the main expectation of Ukrainians from Washington is to provide Ukraine with security guarantees (28.4 percent). A more active role in negotiations with Russia to end the war comes in the second place (27.1 percent). Increasing military assistance ranks third (24 percent). In other words, the US, as perceived by Ukrainians, remains Ukraine's topmost security partner, despite Washington's significant contribution to Ukraine's democratic and reformist agenda.


12 Concessions will not stop Russia's aggression. Like last year, most Ukrainians do not believe that Russia will end its aggressive policy towards Ukraine if Kyiv abandons its aspiration to join the EU and NATO (59 percent). Only 21.5 percent allow for such a possibility.

13 Who helps stop the aggressor? The US is the partner that provides Ukraine with the greatest support in the face of external aggression. This is the opinion of 26.6 percent of Ukrainians (last year, the US also led the way in a similar indicator). The EU ranks second (14.3 percent), which is quite unexpected given the frequent criticism in Ukrainian public space in relation to EU countries for their indecision and softness towards Russia. The top five also include Germany (4.5 percent), which is also quite surprising, Poland (4.5 percent) and Canada (3.6 percent).

14 Ukrainians are all for regional alliances. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are positive about the regional initiatives of Ukrainian diplomacy. 56.9 percent of respondents support the development of the Lublin Triangle (Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania). 56.6 percent of Ukrainians support Ukraine's participation in the Associated Trio (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). 55.6 percent of those polled support the development of Quadriga Format (Ukraine-Turkey).


15 Ukrainians will support the US in the event of a conflict with China or Russia. Ukraine should support the United States in the event of escalation between the US and China or between the US and Russia. In both cases, the number of Ukrainians siding with the United States exceeds 50 percent.

16 Between values and interests balance wins. Ukrainians believe that when making foreign policy decisions diplomats should be guided by both pragmatic and value-based approaches. 41.4 percent of those surveyed are in favor of such balanced behavior (compared to 37.7 percent last year). At the same time, the number of those who believe that the foreign policy priority should always be placed on protecting democracy, human rights and international law has increased slightly: from 29.6 percent last year to 33.6 percent in 2021.




1 FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

1.1. THE PRIORITY OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE¹:





¹ Respondents could choose not more than five options.

1.2. EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES IN THESE AREAS².




² The number of respondents who chose the «difficult to answer» option ranged from 9% to 24.5%, depending on the direction of foreign policy.

1.3. SHOULD UKRAINE BE GUIDED IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY BY PRAGMATIC INTERESTS OR RELY ON THE VALUES-BASED APPROACH FOR DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND THE RULE OF LAW?




1.4. EVALUATE THE IMPORTANCE OF DEEPENING COOPERATION WITH THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES³.

 Rather important / Very important
 Completely unimportant / Rather unimportant
  Rather important / Very important
 Completely unimportant / Rather unimportant




³ To facilitate the perception of information, the marks "completely unimportant / rather unimportant" and "rather important / very important" were combined, respectively. The "hard to say" option is not included in the publication. The average number of respondents who chose this option did not exceed 10 percent. The only exception is Russia with 12.1% of respondents who found it difficult to assess.

1.5. WHICH OF THE ORGANIZATIONS LISTED BELOW SHOULD UKRAINE JOIN?




1.6. WHICH OF THE FOREIGN LEADERS IS THE MOST TRUSTED?



⁴ Calculated by adding 'Both the EU and NATO' and 'EU' options.


⁵ Calculated by adding 'Both the EU and NATO' and 'NATO' options.




(Answering the question on trust to a certain leader, respondents chose the option "I don't know" 45,04% 46,55% know this politician" or "hard to say").

THE MOST RECOGNIZABLE LEADERS


Which of the foreign leaders are the hardest to evaluate for Ukrainians?




1.7. IN CASE OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA, WHOM SHOULD UKRAINE SUPPORT?



1.8. IN CASE OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA, WHOM SHOULD UKRAINE SUPPORT?




1.9. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVEMENT OF 2021?




2 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION



2.1. SHOULD PRO-EUROPEAN REFORMS BE CONTINUED EVEN IF THE EU DOES NOT GIVE UKRAINE A MEMBERSHIP PROSPECT?



2.2. WHAT IS OR WILL BE YOUR INDICATOR OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TAKING PLACE IN UKRAINE?⁶




2.3. IF THE EU CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO PROVIDE A MEMBERSHIP PROSPECT, UKRAINE'S PRIORITY SHOULD BE:




3

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE US AND THE EU

3.1. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT FOR UKRAINE FROM THE EU NEXT YEAR?⁷



3.2. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT FOR UKRAINE FROM THE US NEXT YEAR⁸




⁸ Respondents had to choose the three most important indicators.


4

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

4.1. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA WILL CEASE ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE, IF UKRAINE ABANDONS ITS INTENTION TO JOIN THE EU AND NATO?





4.2. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH PARTNER PROVIDES THE GREATEST SUPPORT TO UKRAINE IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR STATE?



4.3. THE MOST PROMISING WAYS OF REGAINING CRIMEA ARE⁹:




4.4. THE RETURN OF CRIMEA WILL TAKE:




⁹ Respondents could choose an unlimited amount of answers.

**4.5. DO YOU SUPPORT UKRAINE'S CRIMEA PLATFORM
AND ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT?**




5 REGIONAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY



5.1. DO YOU SUPPORT UKRAINE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE LUBLIN TRIANGLE (UKRAINE, POLAND, LITHUANIA) AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS INITIATIVE?



5.2. DO YOU SUPPORT UKRAINE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ASSOCIATED TRIO (UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, GEORGIA) AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS INITIATIVE?



**5.3. DO YOU SUPPORT UKRAINE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE QUADRIGA FORMAT
(UKRAINE-TURKEY) AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS INITIATIVE?**



FOR NOTES





ABOUT NEW EUROPE CENTER

The New Europe Center was founded in 2017 as an independent think-tank. Despite its new brand, it is based on a research team that has been working together since 2009, at the Institute for World Policy. The New Europe Center became recognized by offering high-quality analysis on foreign policy issues in Ukraine and regional security by combining active, effective work with advocacy.

The New Europe Center's vision is very much in line with the views of the majority of Ukrainians about the future of their country: Ukraine should be integrated into the European Union and NATO. By integration, we understand not so much formal membership as the adoption of the best standards and practices for Ukraine to properly belong to the Euroatlantic value system.

More about New Europe Center: www.neweurope.org.ua



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