Ukraine on its path toward EU membership

The European Union is entering a new and serious stage in its enlargement crisis. Ukraine has breathed new life into the EU, motivating it to overcome the enlargement fatigue that followed earlier accession rounds. Yet the actions of a single member state seem to have rendered the Union unable to seize this opportunity, thus jeopardising the EU’s broader strategic objectives.

Since submitting its application for membership in February 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated an unprecedented level of determination in advancing towards EU accession. Despite the full-scale war, the country has been implementing reforms, meeting obligations, and conducting accession negotiations at a pace that outstrips that of any previous candidate country.

One of Ukraine’s key integration goals for 2025 is to enter into parallel negotiations in all clusters. At present, Ukraine is urging its European partners to take the procedural steps necessary to open Cluster 1 (i.e. Fundamentals) in the near term. The European Commission has acknowledged both Ukraine’s substantial progress and the legitimacy of its expectations.

Hungary blocks EU accession talks

Paradoxically, the main obstacle facing Ukraine is no longer a lack of readiness on its part but rather political inertia on the EU side. This is engendered by Hungary’s unilateral blockade of key steps in the negotiation process. Thus, in addition to grappling with Russian aggression and internal anti-reform forces, Ukraine must now also deal with the injustice of EU procedures that allow a single member state to stall the entire process.

Ukrainian civil society, working closely with national institutions and EU partners, has played a pivotal role in ensuring reform transparency and accountability thus far. However, unjustified delays in negotiations threaten to erode trust in the EU within Ukrainian society, fuel pro-Russian narratives and undermine the credibility of the enlargement agenda as a whole.

This moment calls for a reassessment of EU procedures, particularly with regard to the need to minimize opportunities for individual member states to abuse their veto powers during technical phases in the accession process. The merit-based approach must remain the cornerstone of enlargement policy. Moreover, it may also be time for the EU to seriously consider invoking Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Can the EU keep up with Ukraine’s exemplary speed?

When Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership in late February 2022, few took this truly historic step seriously. A country undergoing a massive attack from an aggressive Russia was not expected to have any realistic prospect of joining the European Union. However, subsequent events have shown that Ukraine is capable of changing the course of history and overturning old assumptions. It has withstood Russia’s military onslaught and successfully challenged the stubborn enlargement fatigue that had set in in the EU.

In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status, and in December 2023, EU leaders agreed to open accession negotiations. One year ago, the EU officially launched accession talks with Ukraine, and Ukrainians quickly got to work meeting obligations and completing the procedures associated with the next stage of the accession process, in hopes of bringing membership closer.

Ukraine continues to demonstrate a high level of commitment to its European goal. The Ukrainian government, parliament, and civil society have been rapidly building up their expertise, preparing extensive documentation, and have pledged to implement all obligations with the same levels of determination and quality. Ukrainian policymakers understand the significance of the moment and have declared their readiness to meet all requirements not just on time but at an even faster pace than other candidate states did during previous rounds of EU enlargement. The key question remaining is whether the EU is prepared to respond appropriately: not only by matching the swift pace of Ukraine’s decision-making but also by demonstrating the strategic resolve to welcome the country as a member in the near future. Ukrainian officials have publicly voiced the expectation that Ukraine will achieve full EU membership by 2030.

Talks on four negotiating packages concluded

To this end, the Ukrainian Government is intensively studying and adopting best practices for negotiations and for the effective, swift implementation of EU requirements. The Government reports that bilateral screening meetings have already been completed in four of the six negotiation clusters:[1]

• Cluster 1 – Fundamentals
• Cluster 2 – Internal market
• Cluster 3 – Competitiveness & inclusive growth[2]
• Cluster 6 – External relations

Currently, Ukraine is awaiting decisions from its European partners on the procedural steps required to open negotiations on Cluster 1. “Ukraine has fulfilled all the necessary prerequisites for opening the first negotiation cluster,” emphasizes Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Minister of Justice.[3] This readiness is supported by finalized roadmaps on the rule of law and on public administration reform, which are key conditions for opening the cluster. The roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions and the Action Plan on safeguarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities have also been finalized.

Observers in both Ukraine and the EU have noted that these strategic documents were developed in record time, considering their scope and the large number of stakeholders involved—which include government agencies, civil society, and international experts.[4]

Cluster 1, Fundamentals, is the always the first cluster to be opened in accession talks. Negotiations in this cluster will focus on the alignment of core areas of Ukraine’s legislation with EU law. One of the most complex and most important clusters, Cluster 1 is typically the last cluster to be closed in the negotiation process. It encompasses a wide range of topics that are of critical importance for Ukraine’s Europeanization—including the sustainability of democratic institutions, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and more.[5]

Ukraine’s formula: inspiration & Europeanization

Support for a future EU membership remains very high in Ukraine: 90 percent of Ukrainians want to see their country join the European Union according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).[6] Ukrainians also generally have a positive attitude toward EU pressure to move forward with reforms: in a November 2024 survey conducted by Info Sapiens on behalf of the New Europe Center, over 60 percent of respondents considered it appropriate for the EU and the US to press for action to combat corruption in Ukraine.[7]

However, the same New Europe Center survey also revealed some trend towards increasing scepticism. The percentage of respondents who believed that “the EU and the US are looking for excuses to deny Ukraine greater support” had increased slightly compared to a similar survey conducted in 2023.[8]

Public demand for Europeanization in Ukraine is strong, creating additional leverage for those promoting a reformist agenda in the country. This leverage has enabled an active civil society, reformers within government institutions, and the EU to work together to push through many crucial changes. Thus, the current situation affords a unique opportunity to implement vital transformation in Ukraine. At the same time, it creates a window of opportunity that other candidate countries can turn to their own benefit.

However, it is crucial that the process of accession be transparent and fair, and it must be one that rewards the candidate country for progress made on reform. Recently, tones of frustration have become increasingly audible in Kyiv, as certain EU member countries appear to be blocking Ukraine’s accession process for no justifiable reason.

Hungary’s campaign against Ukraine’s accession to EU

Hungary has repeatedly raised objections aimed at delaying or even blocking Ukraine’s EU accession process. Initially, Budapest cited concerns about the rights of national minorities in Ukraine as justification for such action. However, after Ukraine demonstrated its commitment to addressing these issues, Hungary’s lines of argument changed, and it became possible to discern other motivations that may lie behind a possible veto on its part.

Hungarian officials, including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, have launched an active campaign to discredit Ukraine. Notably, Orbán has claimed that Ukraine’s accession would mean that “all Hungary’s money” would have to be spent on Ukraine.[9] Hungary’s Minister for EU Affairs János Bóka has stated that “Ukraine can only function as a buffer zone”.[10]

Budapest has repeatedly blocked EU sanctions against Russia and has put up obstacles to EU-level military assistance to Ukraine. It appears increasingly likely that Hungary intends to block Ukraine’s EU path without putting forth any plausible justification for doing so.

The resulting reality is one in which Ukrainians are fighting on three fronts: against Russian imperial ambitions, against anti-reform forces within their own country, and against unjust practices within the EU itself. In recent years, most EU countries have demonstrated their ability to support Ukraine on those first two fronts, i.e., in resisting Russia’s aggression and promoting Europeanization. Now, Ukrainians expect their European partners to support them on this third front as well, demonstrating solidarity and understanding by helping them counter anti-Ukrainian manipulation from within the Union.

In April 2025, Ukrainian civil society organizations appealed to the foreign ministers of EU countries to increase their efforts to build a consensus on opening negotiations on Cluster 1, warning that bilateral issues threatened to obstruct the overall accession negotiation process, while also emphasizing their full support for what they described as “the idea that the accession process should follow a merit-based methodology.”

Orbán’s blocking tactics…

Thus far, EU has managed to achieve a consensus on many proposed actions despite efforts by Hungary to block them, a case in point being the packages of sanctions against Russia (although, Hungary’s objections have at times resulted in the adoption of weaker measures than those originally proposed). Similarly, despite Budapest’s resistance, Ukraine has been enabled to make progress on the path toward European integration.

One widely cited example (now considered a case study in creative EU diplomacy) occurred in December 2023, when the EU voted to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. On that occasion, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán left the room in which the Council was sitting, enabling the remaining 26 member states to proceed without his veto. Reportedly, then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suggested that Orbán go out for a coffee break to facilitate the move.

Ukraine continues to emphasize the importance of dialogue and partnership with all EU member states. This was reflected in Ukraine’s efforts to engage in intensive dialogue with Budapest on national minority issues. However, Hungary has grown increasingly hostile in its rhetoric towards Ukraine, focussing less on bilateral concerns and taking on a more obstructive stance toward Ukraine’s EU aspirations.

… and the search for creative answers

After allowing the Council to approve the opening of accession talks in 2023, Orbán pointed out that the Hungarian government would still have “about 75 occasions … to stop this process” (referring to the votes on opening and closing the more than 30 negotiation chapters). It appears that Budapest is now acting on this threat by blocking the opening of Cluster 1 negotiations.

The EU faces a serious dilemma: It must either devise 75 separate “creative” solutions to persuade Hungary not to block Ukraine’s accession, or it must find one sustainable mechanism that will accomplish the same thing. The former path would demand a significant investment in institutional resources, time, and sometimes financial incentives.

This may be the moment for the EU to review certain technical procedures involved in the accession process. It should not be necessary for all EU member states to approve the opening of each and every negotiation cluster or chapter. These are largely technical steps, guided by specific indicators and measurable progress.The requirement of unanimous approval enables the “bilateralization” of the accession process, i.e. it allows a single member state to insert politically motivated roadblocks into the process, with the result that that state’s domestic interests are allowed to distort the collective agenda. This undermines the EU’s credibility and efficiency.

 In view of all this, calls for the activation of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union have been increasingly in frequency. (This mechanism allows certain rights of a member state to be suspended). However, it may be impossible to attain the unanimity necessary for this step, as Hungary could well find allies to prevent this scenario.

No ad-hoc-solutions, please!

Thus, the EU continues to expend time and resources managing internal obstruction in an attempt to keep its enlargement agenda alive. One recent ad hoc idea was to “decouple” the accession processes of Ukraine and Moldova and open negotiations with Chișinău only. This suggestion was strongly criticized by Ukraine. From Kyiv’s perspective, such a move would be profoundly unfair—and would amount to punishing a candidate country for the misconduct of an existing member state. It is the latter that should be subjected to conditionality in such a case, not the candidate country. Pursuing Moldova’s accession process separately would increase Ukraine’s isolation, which is exactly what Hungary is aiming for when it promotes the idea of enlargement without Ukraine. The interests of Hungary and Russia coincide strangely on this point.

The blockage of Ukraine’s EU accession could reduce Ukrainians’ motivation to pursue internal reforms and its efforts to cooperate with other candidate countries to achieve joint progress. Thus, its impact would extend well beyond Ukraine and its relations with the EU: Ukraine has been the main driver of the enlargement process. Its isolation could jeopardize security interests of the EU as a whole and would ultimately play into the hands of the EU’s adversaries.

Accession to the European Union represents a cornerstone of Ukraine’s plans for post-war recovery and is a key guarantee of long-term stability. Hungary’s actions undermine these vital objectives.

Civil society: ready to help – and in need of support

Contrived delays in the enlargement process risk discrediting the EU in the eyes of citizens in candidate countries. The window of opportunity for reforms will gradually close, while voices amplifying Russian propaganda narratives (e.g., “Europe doesn’t want Ukraine”) will grow louder. Corrupt elites in candidate countries, along with the Kremlin, would welcome such an outcome.

What Ukraine is seeking is the chance to prove that it can become a success story of democratic transformation. Thus, the repercussions of failing to give it this chance at the very start of its journey would be especially harmful and dangerous. Blocking or unnecessarily delaying Ukraine’s EU accession process could have wide-ranging negative consequences. Undermining enlargement would weaken Europe and hand a victory to those invested in the EU’s decline.

Despite suffering greatly from Russian aggression, Ukraine continues to implement the necessary reforms on its path toward EU membership. Ukrainian civil society, which has been playing a key role in holding its government accountable, remains open to close cooperation with EU stakeholders to ensure Ukraine’s success.

Non-governmental experts are actively involved at every stage of the accession process: from preparing documents and participating in decision-making discussions to providing independent assessments of reform progress. Many of these experts are formally included in negotiation working groups responsible for each chapter of the EU accession process.

Ukrainian NGOs continue to actively support the European integration agenda although they have been significantly affected by the U.S. decision to halt all assistance to Ukraine. In this regard, additional support from the EU may be needed to strengthen Ukraine’s independent expertise.

The best guarantee that Ukraine will not backslide on its reformist agenda is the rule that the EU will hold all actors – not just candidate countries – to high standards. The EU must seriously consider the long-term risks that result from allowing individual member states to misuse procedural rules and their privileged status in the Union of developed democracies.

Recommendations to the EU and Germany:

1. The EU should establish sustainable and clear procedures that prevent manipulation of the accession process. Germany and other member states should consider possible changes to the decision-making methodology for the accession process to prevent a single state (or a visible minority of states) from blocking progress from one technical procedural stages to the next.
2. Consider the activation of Article 7 as a last resort. Although the EU is unlikely to achieve unanimity on this issue, this mechanism should not go entirely unmentioned in EU discussions. Germany can explore ways of influencing member states that abuse EU procedures and disregard fundamental EU values. By ignoring Hungary’s current approach, the EU may risk encouraging other member states to abuse EU procedures in the same way.
3. Maintain solidarity against politically motivated obstruction. Germany should lead efforts to challenge attempts by member states to block Ukraine’s EU path with no valid justification.
4. Reject the proposal to decouple Ukraine’s accession process from those of other candidate countries. Decoupling Ukraine’s process from that of Moldova or other candidates would unfairly penalize Ukraine for internal EU disputes over which it has no influence. Enlargement policy must be based on fair and consistent principles.
5. Technical procedures should not be politicized. Germany and other EU member states should actively support Ukraine’s efforts towards an accelerated accession process, also by opening all six negotiation clusters by the end of this year. It is crucial that the opening of Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) take place without delay, Ukraine having already fulfilled all the necessary prerequisites. The opening of clusters should be a swift and technical process, while greater political attention from the EU would be more logical at the stage of cluster closure.
6. Ensure a merit-based accession process. Rather than seeking special treatment, Ukraine is advocating for a fair and transparent evaluation of its reform efforts. Politically motivated obstacles will undermine trust in the EU.
7. Support Ukrainian civil society. EU assistance for and engagement with Ukrainian civil society and non-governmental experts plays a vital role in enabling them to hold their government accountable and drive reform forward. Member states should advocate for and provide additional support to strengthen Ukraine’s independent expertise, ensuring transparent monitoring and sustained reform momentum.
8. Take steps to counter disinformation and support Ukraine’s Europeanization narrative. Germany and its partners should actively counter Russian propaganda and disinformation that undermine support for Ukraine’s accession and reform efforts, by reinforcing the message that Europe stands firmly with Ukraine.

The policy brief was first published by LibMod on June 18, 2025

[1] Ukrainska Pravda, “Half of Ukraine’s EU accession clusters already screened, says bloc”, 23 April 2025. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/23/7508856/

[2] The European Integration, “Ukraine has successfully completed the EU screening under Cluster 3”, 6 June 2025. https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-uspishno-zavershyla-skryning-z-yes-za-klasterom-3-konkurentospromozhnist-ta-inklyuzyvnyj-rozvytok/

[3] Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukraine has fulfilled all the necessary prerequisites to open the first negotiation cluster for EU accession – Stefanishyna”, 15 May 2025. https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1071921.html

[4] European Pravda, “EU on the accession talks with Ukraine: half of Ukraine’s EU accession clusters already screened”, 23 April 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/23/7210106/

[5] European Pravda, “Key negotiation chapter with the EU: Which reforms must Ukraine implement”, Ivan Nahorniak, Maria Shalamberidze, 18 March 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2025/03/18/7207364/

[6] KIIS, “Dimensions of Attitudes Towards the EU and NATO and Attitudes Towards the USA”, 14 January 2025. https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1468

[7] New Europe Center, “Foreign policy and security. Opinions of Ukrainian society” 10 December 2024. https://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva/

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Guardian, “Orbán’s stance on Ukraine pushes Hungary to brink in EU relations”, 19 April 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/19/orban-ukraine-hungary-eu-relations-kyiv

[10] European Pravda, “Hungary wants Ukraine to be buffer zone between Russia and EU”. 20 March 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/03/20/7207654/