The experts comment on the New Europe Center’s questions

As part of the regular rubric “New Europe Wonders”, the New Europe Center and TSN.ua asked Ukrainian and foreign experts the following question:

«How would you assess the current readiness and commitment of Ukraine’s Western partners – particularly within the EU – to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in the short to medium term, whether through joint production, direct investment, or the provision of military equipment; and what factors currently enable or could further facilitate such engagement in Ukraine’s defense-industrial sector?»

James Sherr, Honorary Fellow, International Centre of Defence & Security (Tallinn):

Since its inception, the greatest accomplishment of the European Union has been to make war between its members impossible. But the defence of Europe from external threats has been a Transatlantic endeavour, and that is also true for the defence of Ukraine.

The good news is that, today at least, a clear majority of European governments and defence establishments believe there is an axiomatic equation between Ukraine’s defence and their own. But electorates do not necessarily share these convictions. Which is more telling: plans to double German defence expenditure by 2029 or the fragility of Chancellor Merz’s coalition? Emmanuel Macron’s toughness towards Russia is conspicuous, but his domestic base has sharply contracted, and the electoral ban on Marine Le Pen’s participation in the 2027 elections has hardly damaged the popularity of her Rassemblement National at all. Yet amongst the ‘E3’, the biggest earthquake might come in the UK, where the pugnaciously anti-EU, Russophile Reform Party stands a good chance of becoming the largest party in Parliament after the next election. Electorates might support populist parties for reasons largely unrelated to Russia (e.g. immigration), but that does not limit the damage these parties might inflict if they come to power.

Even if the centre ground holds, important hurdles need to be cleared before European military assistance to Ukraine reaches its full potential. As Ukraine’s leadership constantly reminds us, Russia poses a danger to Europe’s security as well as Ukraine’s. But where should priorities be focused? The UK has been Europe’s biggest supplier of military assistance to Ukraine, but resources earmarked for UK home defence and other important interests (the Arctic, the Baltic, the Red Sea and Gulf) are inadequate if not alarming. Are we making the right tradeoffs? Poland, Finland and Germany confront similar questions.

Moreover, Europe needs to balance the long-term imperative of constructing an integrated, cutting-edge defence industry and meeting Ukraine’s most immediate and urgent needs. Only now is Europe addressing the chronic underfunding that has whittled away its defences since the Cold War. Yet funding is not enough.

The greatest deficiency of Europe’s defence industrial base is fragmentation.

It obstructs economies of scale and production in volumes that transform a GDP (EEA plus UK) twelve times larger that of Russia into useable military power and offsets the all but inevitable diminution of the US presence. This will not be addressed without political courage and profound and very costly structural change.

Yet Ukraine’s most acute challenges are short-term.

Europe, therefore, cannot sidestep the imperative of surging supply of the weapons systems that Ukraine needs now to shore up the integrity of its defences.

A no less critical imbalance is Europe’s deficiency of vital enablers — airlift, future generation technologies, strategic communications, intelligence and long-range strike systems — that preserve chronic dependencies on the United States. Investments designed to lessen these dependencies are offset by others — e.g. British procurement of nuclear capable American F-35As — that merely perpetuate them. Repeatedly, widely proclaimed objectives — e.g. an Anglo-French ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine — founder on the realisation that resources are simply unavailable. The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review is a far-sighted and admirably coherent document. But it offers not even a hint as to how the requisite programmes and capabilities are to be funded.

Today, these challenges are understood in ways that would not have been possible in 2022. Progress is discernible and in some areas impressive. Europe has committed itself to mobilising $40bn for Ukraine, offsetting the US share. Moreover, the US has agreed in principle to provide as much assistance to Ukraine as the European tax payer is willing to fund. NATO, which has drawn up a Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, will now include aid to Ukraine as a contribution to Allied commitments to raise defence budgets to five percent of GDP.

Plans will make provision for radar and jamming systems, drone interceptors and artillery, funded nationally by Europe and coordinated by NATO, bypassing the EU’s cumbersome procedures. In this mix, an alchemy is emerging that promises to meet Ukraine’s shorter-term needs until such time as longer-term structural changes take root and produce results. Not least important, Allies now recognise that partnership with Ukraine’s technological and industrial base advances both parties’ interests.

The imperatives of speed, innovation and structural change are becoming generally understood. But we cannot yet be confident that these challenges will be surmounted.

Carsten Sondergaard is a Danish career diplomat, retiring from service in August 2022. Most recently, Sondergaard held the position of Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2018-2022). Prior to this, Ambassador to Ireland (2014-2018), Permanent Representative to NATO (2010-2014), and Ambassador to Germany (2005-2010).

Western support has undergone changes since Russia launched its brutal invasion of Ukraine, but still some Western countries do much more than others. So, how can the support be increased.

Today, the USA is moving away from donating some military equipment to selling it.

A group of countries does still not show any significant interest in supporting Ukraine. Donations are small.

Another group continues to donate equipment, but it also moves beyond that. They buy new and better equipment. They invest in industries in Ukraine.

Ukraine faces a long-term existential threat. It makes sense for the West to invest in its industrial basis. That can be done with both public and private capital – both in Ukraine and in European countries.

War is an important driver of industrial innovation. Just think about what has happened to drone technology and electronic warfare. If you invest, you will reap the benefits of innovation.

Investment paves the way for a two-way street. It will increase predictability – no stop and go.

But – and there is a but. For this process to move forward, Ukraine will have to improve the business environment. Doubts about Ukraine’s willingness to fight corruption are not helpful at all.