New President of the United States Donald Trump identified ending the Russian war in Ukraine as a one of his foreign policy priorities. From his statements, it is clear that negotiations between American mediators and representatives from Russia have already begun. The world expects direct negotiations of the US leader with the Russian one. New Europe Center decided to ask experienced diplomats and researchers who understand Russian negotiation methods the following question: “What should the US President take into consideration before the beginning of (and during) negotiations with Putin about Ukraine?”.

The media version is kindly published by TSN.ua.

Some of the key recommendations based on the received answers:

1. First negotiations – with partners. Do not start negotiations with Putin without careful preparation. Before negotiations with Russians, the President of the US should consult with colleagues from Ukraine and key European states.
2. Smart team.
3. Limits of flexibility and security guarantees. President Trump should understand the limits of possible flexibility of Kyiv, and also, what security commitments could be provided to Ukraine by Western partners.
4. Don’t count on quick settlement. Trump should resist the temptation to see a quick, but temporary decision as a great achievement.
5. Russia is weak. No matter how Putin tries to disguise it, Russia enters negotiations with a very weak position, and with a dire need for relief from the immense harm it has inflicted on itself by its invasion of Ukraine.
6. Play the long game. Putin has reasons to believe that time is on his side, but this advantage will be lost if the West continues to support Ukraine and increase pressure on Russia.
7. Implement the concept of “peace through strength”. In order to maximize leverage on Kremlin, the U.S. should approve the decision to send large-scale long-term military assistance, to cooperate with G7 to seize Russian frozen assets for Ukraine and to tighten economic sanctions against Russia. It is also important to keep the promise about Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
8. Game changer – European troops. Despite it being the most difficult decision, it could be a possible game changer – the US and European states should be prepared to send troops to Ukraine to support a ceasefire.
9. Plan on Ukraine’s and key European countries involvement into negotiations. Trump should have a plan on how to involve Ukraine and other key European stakeholders to discussion. Bilateral U.S.-Russia negotiations will not bring a durable end to war.
10. No secrecy. Secrecy will lead to the Russian side’s own interpretation of each issue and even the agenda.
11. Permanent negotiators. Negotiations should be conducted by the same person throughout the entire process and across all topics. Otherwise, it will remind a never-ending “Groundhog Day.”
12. Avoid time constraints. It is crucial to avoid setting procedural regulations or time constraints for the negotiation process.
13. Everything should be on the record. The dialogue should be stenographed and recorded in both video and audio formats. This will allow to avoid word and position twisting.
14. Avoid joint press-releases, statements, invitations and informal meeting. Negotiations will always be accompanied by provocations from Russian counterpart.
15. Fact-checking. Every statement and “fact” from Russia should be double-checked: distracting participants with manipulative half-truths is a tool for disorienting negotiators.

Steven Pifer, nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000)

President Trump should not jump into a discussion with his Russian counterpart on the Russia-Ukraine war without careful preparation.  That includes consulting with President Zelenskyy and key European leaders, as well as maximizing U.S. leverage with Russia.

Trump first should talk to Zelenskyy to understand potential flexibility in Kyiv’s position and what Kyiv could not accept. Zelenskyy last year suggested flexibility on the territorial question but understandably linked that to firm security guarantees, ideally, NATO membership.  Trump should understand the Ukrainian position before he talks to Putin.

Putin has staked out a maximalist position and will try to manipulate Trump in a bilateral conversation.  Trump should take early action to maximize his leverage with the Kremlin:

• ask Congress to approve $40-50 billion in military assistance for Ukraine;
• work with the G7 to seize frozen Russian Central Bank assets and transfer them to a fund for Ukraine; and
• tighten economic sanctions on Russia.

These steps will make clear to Putin that the military and economic costs of his war of aggression will grow unless he is ready to moderate his demands and negotiate in good faith.

Finally, Trump should have a plan to quickly bring the Ukrainians and Europeans into the discussion.  A U.S.-Russia negotiation by itself will not achieve a durable end to the war.  This process will require preparation and patience.  Those are not notably strong traits for Trump, but he will need them if he wants to succeed on what will be an arduous negotiating process.

Roman Bezsmertnyi, representative of Ukraine in the political subgroup of the contact group for the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine (2015-2016; 2019)

The Russian side has always viewed and will continue to view any negotiations as a continuation of war rather than a tool for the declared peace. The Russian side fundamentally does not operate with the concept of compromise, but instead aims to continue the war in a different way. Any formulation presented as a compromise will be interpreted by Russia exclusively in its own interests.

During negotiations, it is unacceptable to conduct them in secrecy, involve only a narrow circle of participants, or delegate separate issues to specific groups or negotiators. Such an approach will always lead to conflicts among negotiation groups, which Russia will interpret as deliberate actions by the opposing side aimed at disrupting the negotiations.

Secrecy will soon lead to Russia imposing its own interpretations on every issue, including the agenda itself. If negotiations are to take place, they must be conducted by the same person throughout the entire process and across all topics. Otherwise, it will turn into a never-ending “Groundhog Day.”

Decisions regarding negotiation positions must be made exclusively at the highest level. Under no circumstances should decision-making be delegated or authorized to others.

It is crucial to avoid setting procedural regulations or time constraints for the negotiation process. The Russian side always exploits such frameworks, attempting to create a time crunch for the participants, forcing them into making hasty, unprepared, and poorly thought-out decisions and even comments.

The dialogue must be stenographed and recorded in both video and audio formats.

Negotiators must avoid joint press releases, statements, invitations to various parties, or informal meetings. Regardless of where the negotiations take place, they will always be accompanied by provocations from the Russian side. Any proposal from the Russian side should be treated as a trap.

During the decision-making process, delegating the final editing of texts to third parties is unacceptable, especially when double or triple translation is involved.

It must be understood that all negotiation participants will be subject to constant psychological and informational pressure, as well as coercion. Russia employs manipulative information tactics during negotiations. Distracting participants with manipulative half-truths is a tool for disorienting them. All facts and information must be verified — nothing should be taken at face value.

Daniel Fried, Former US Ambassador to Poland and Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council, The United States

The Kremlin remains, as George Kennan observed almost 80 years ago, “Impervious to the logic of reason [but] highly sensitive to the logic of force.” George Kennan, “The Long Telegram” of 1946 from US Embassy Moscow

The U.S. should not expect to find either good will or common ground with Russian President Vladimir Putin in any negotiations with Russia about Ukraine. Russia’s declared war aims include destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty, its subordination to Kremlin control, and, though inconsistently articulated, extermination of Ukrainian national and cultural identity. Russia is apt to violate terms of any agreement it reaches. Russia is also apt to try to avoid any negotiations by insisting on preconditions, e.g., Ukraine’s effective capitulation, Ukrainian and Western recognition of Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory, “guarantees” that Ukraine can never join NATO and/or the European Union, and similar demands that would cede Ukraine to Russian domination.

Some conclude that there is no point trying to talk to Russia about Ukraine, and they have a point.

However, given an unfavorable correlation of forces, as the Soviets used to put it, it may be possible to reach either a formal or, more likely, an ad hoc arrangement with Russia that includes a ceasefire roughly along the current front lines. In this case, Russia would be able to claim a sort of victory. If a ceasefire were accompanied by sustainable security guarantees, the best being NATO accession, such an arrangement could prove beneficial to unoccupied or free Ukraine.

To achieve such an outcome, the U.S. and Europe would have to increase pressure on Russia, e.g., through sanctions and other measure to restrict Russian income through oil and natural gas exports, increase weapons flows to Ukraine and, most difficult but a potential game changer, be prepared to send troops and contractors to Ukraine to support a ceasefire and even in advance of one. The troops would be European but would have U.S. backup, including through airpower.

Putin is unlikely to agree to arrangements that provide for Ukraine’s security. The U.S. and Europe should prepare to act in any case; a show of determination might convince Putin to talk seriously out of an understanding that he is not, and will not, win.

Simon Smith, Former British Ambassador to Ukraine (2012-2015)

Donald Trump operates very personally. He easily convinces himself that his personal magnetism, (or ability to intimidate) will have the crucial impacts. He has very little interest in details or complicated issues.

The Russian approach will be the opposite. From Putin down, the Russians will start negotiations fully briefed in deep detail on all the issues.

Trump needs to pick a smart team, trust them to do the hard work that’s needed and – crucially – trust them when they bring evidence that Putin is lying to him or bringing false evidence. And when they remind him that success is extremely unlikely to be achieved rapidly or without hard work, he will need patience and determination to grasp this.

The Russians will be extremely difficult, often annoying  – negotiators. Those negotiating with them are frequently fooled into thinking these attitudes are a reflection of Russian strength. It makes no sense for the U.S. or any other negotiator to belittle the Russian side. But they must keep reminding themselves that – however hard Putin tries to disguise it – Russia enters negotiations with a weak hand to play, and with a dire need for relief from the immense harm it has inflicted on itself by its invasion of Ukraine.

Trump will need to resist the temptation to see a quick but temporary agreement (e.g. an immediate ceasefire allowing time for the details of a more lasting agreement to be thrashed out) as an achievement in itself – recognising the risks that a “temporary” ceasefire can easily turn into a permanent fact. (The Korean War ceasefire enters its 73rd year during 2025.)

Success for the U.S. in negotiation with Russia will not come from any miracle of “personal chemistry” between Trump and Putin. It requires subjecting the Russian side to significant stress.

Despite their weakness, the Russians may walk away from this pressure – but the U.S. needs to be ready to make it clear “if you choose to turn your back on a pragmatic, deliverable solution, we will re-double our support for Ukraine in resisting and repelling your invasion.”

Eric Green, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Special Assistant to President Biden and Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia in the National Security Council

Play the long game. Putin is right to think that time is on his side now:  Russia is gaining territory and appears to have deeper reserves of manpower, weapons and money than Ukraine.  But that assumption gets flipped on its head if the West sustains its support for Ukraine and keeps up pressure on Russia.  The collective GNP of NATO countries is about 25 times larger than Russia’s; for the cost of a couple of cups of coffee a month per person, the West can provide Ukraine with the weapons and economic backing to defend itself.  Using the $300b in Russia’s frozen assets to fund Ukraine will further demonstrate that Putin cannot outlast us.  Ramping up sanctions and export controls will eat away at Putin’s financial cushion and exacerbate the pathologies afflicting his economy, such as high inflation, labor shortages, brain drain and a budget skewed towards military spending.

But the Russian economy is not the main factor.  Putin must see that his forces are stalemated or losing the war before he will negotiate seriously.  President Trump has reprised Reagan’s motto of “peace through strength” and there is no better test case for demonstrating American greatness than in helping Ukraine end Russia’s war on favorable terms for the United States.  On the battlefield, that means accelerating Ukraine’s integration with NATO with industrial cooperation, joint training and the deployment of defensive systems to help protect Ukrainian civilians.  Diplomatically, peace through strength means following through on NATO’s pledge to bring Ukraine into the alliance at the conclusion of the war.  Doing so will ensure Ukraine continues to develop its state-of-the-art armed forces while deterring Russia from attacking again in the future.

The material was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The material reflects the position of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.