After the full-scale invasion, Japan lost its illusions about resolving the issue of the Northern territories through dialogue with the Russian Federation. Positive changes also took place in Kyiv – there was less illusion about the role of China (retaining the Russian Federation), which gave us the opportunity to better develop a dialogue with Japan.
Russia’s full-scale invasion had a noticeable impact on Japan’s approach to Ukraine on various levels. First of all, Japanese society showed unprecedented sympathy for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Japanese political elites got rid of constantly considering how any of its Ukraine policies would affect the Northern Territories dispute with Russia, giving the Japanese government a free hand in terms of Ukraine support. Not only has Japan asserted its leadership as a supporter of Ukraine in Asia, it has also caught up with the other G7 countries — primarily the sanctions policy. Crucial for Ukraine Japan’s military assistance cannot compete with the rest of G7, and even change of its three principles of the transfer of armaments and technology would not turn Japan into a fullfledged military contributor in the short term — for decades of turning a blind eye to own military needs; an entrenched pacifism; and the projected image of a peace-loving nation.
Still, Japan may play the leading role in other issues, such as nuclear safety, which is important for Japan and — personally — its prime minister Fumio Kishida; reconstruction and rebuilding of Ukraine based on Japan’s own post-war experience, reconstruction after major natural disasters, and similar effort towards other post-war states (for instance, Japan is the biggest donor of financial aid to Afghanistan). In particular, Japan could play a prominent role in large-scale infrastructure projects by using Japanese technologies. The two important prerequisites for Japan to take a full-fledged part in post-war reconstruction of Ukraine are adequate security level and the absence of corruption. Of particular mention are Japan’s demining efforts, reflected in newly initiated partnership with Cambodia. Visits of Volodymyr Zelensky to Japan for the G7 summit and of Fumio Kishida to Ukraine within next few months would play a significant role not only by reinforcing the agenda of Japan’s G7 presidency but also by taking the Ukraine-Japan relations to a whole new level — even though Japan is a country that prefers multilateral formats to bilateral ones, which Kyiv should keep in mind.
In January 2023, amidst the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Japan assumed the G7 presidency. Putin’s continuing bloody aggression against Ukraine has undoubtedly influenced the agenda of Japan’s G7 presidency. Furthermore, the unprecedented since World War II armed aggression in Europe has also had an impact on the Ukraine-Japan bilateral relations. What exactly has changed in their bilateral dialogue, and how can Japan’s G7 presidency be turned into an impetus for bringing them to a significantly new level?
Read more in discussion paper by the Director of the New Europe Center Alyona Getmanchuk and Senior Research Fellow Leo Litra via link.
