Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a central component of negotiations that are—fitfully—under way to bring Russia’s war on the country to an end.

The mutual interdependence between Ukraine and the EU explains the importance of accession to achieving peace. Kyiv seeks membership to increase its security and facilitate post-war reconstruction; the EU needs Ukraine’s military capabilities to secure its eastern flank, deter attacks on EU countries and boost its economic security.

However, ECFR interviews undertaken this March with EU officials and member state diplomats reveal that many member states are still clinging to a “merit-based” approach as the only viable way forward. This would see Ukraine plod along the membership path that was laid out when times were very different. Member states are stuck in this view largely because they believe any newly devised accession models (or, to use the term that has gained currency, “creative” models) ought also to be available to other applicant states.

Debates are intensively taking place within the EU about what to do. Officials have been examining numerous alternative models. In early March, options dubbed the “fast-track” model (like the current process, but speeded up) and the “reverse accession” model were debated in informal discussions in Brussels among member states and EU officials. (Please see the table below to compare and contrast the features of the various models, including the one proposed in this article.)

These were rejected by member state ambassadors. However, as one EU official put it, “this was not a rejection of creative models per se, but rather a reaction to being kept in the dark by EU institutions”.[1] Media leaks portraying new formats as “shortcuts” damaged the credibility of the models discussed.

In fact, despite their outward adherence to the merit-based approach, member state representatives acknowledge the current methodology is obsolete. Indeed, several member state officials caution that “the cost of non-enlargement could be higher than the cost of enlargement”. [2] They want Ukraine to join.

And so, despite the impasse, the prospect of peace means member states are likely to have to make a decision this year on a new model. (Indeed, Viktor Orban’s exit from the European Council now means Hungary’s blocking of Ukraine is no longer the only obstacle to confront.)

Dilemmas on the horizon

Diplomats in several member states foresee (correctly) that EU capitals will find it difficult to reject a peace plan where EU membership serves as the primary stabiliser.[3] For member states, being seen to ease the path to peace is ultimately more important than dry debates about Ukraine’s full adoption of the acquis communautaire.

But political leaders across the EU nevertheless face dilemmas around how to present Ukrainian membership to their voters. These include constituencies like farming sectors, whose members worry about the impact of Ukrainian agricultural goods in the single market, or sections of the electorate concerned at the prospect of increased immigration.

EU leaders need something they can make a strong case for domestically. They want, and need, Ukraine to join the EU; but they need to make sure the country implements rigorous reforms. Member states and voters will want to feel confident they are granting membership to a country that measures up in important areas, from the “fundamentals” cluster (the rule of law, judiciary and the fight against corruption) to political integration (representation in political and executive bodies of the EU, including the European Parliament and European Commission). At the same time, the chosen route to membership must be credible to parties to any eventual negotiated peace, above all to Ukraine and Ukrainian citizens.

The PACT model

The answer is to adopt an accession model which grants the political status of membership immediately to secure peace. This means enabling Ukraine to integrate into political and security parts of the EU, including immediately applying Article 42(7)—the EU’s mutual defence clause. The model would entail giving Ukraine voting rights in the council when it comes to areas covered by the fundamentals. (This would build on the reverse membership approach, but with significant changes.) Such a prospect would prove highly motivating to Ukraine’s political leaders to conclude a peace deal.

Under this PACT model—Political Accession with Commitments to Transformation—the political architecture of membership would be established from the start. The new member (any country applying, not just Ukraine) would, as noted, have the core elements of membership such as fundamentals and political integration. Other elements, such as voting rights in various sectors and funds, would be unlocked only as reforms are verified each year through assessments by the European Commission. The commission would be in charge of evaluation and propose the granting of new rights and access to the Council. To shield the EU from democratic backsliding, the model would also contain a “reversibility mechanism” that allows the commission to re-lock rights and funds if undemocratic or illiberal practices take hold.

> Compared to the fast-track model, which actually delays entry until all reforms are completed, PACT grants immediate political membership.¹

> Compared to the reverse accession model, PACT is exclusively concerned with fundamentals, safeguards and transition periods for funding. It is better tailored to address worries in member states, such as whether Ukraine would gain access to a large part of the common agricultural policy budget.

> Compared to the gradual accession model, Ukraine’s membership would be guaranteed; the question would be only how quickly the country can move through the reform process to acquire rights and powers.

How to conclude PACT

The PACT model is not an escape from reforms; it is an incentive structure with membership guaranteed, but in which the content of that membership is the reward for implemented reforms.

To take this forward this, EU leaders must first reframe the narrative by abandoning terms like reverse accession and emphasising the importance of meeting certain standards.

Once the new framing is established, EU institutions and member states must work closely together to draft an accession agreement that allows derogations while complying with the EU treaty. The agreement must make clear that judicial and anti-corruption reforms are non-negotiable for unlocking voting rights and funds; and it must establish a rigid, automatic mechanism to restore the reform-reward link. The agreement itself will serve as a crucial tool for campaigning for ratification in EU countries. It must therefore also include clear safeguards ensuring that new member states, including Ukraine, will face consequences should they deviate from core principles (a norm that ideally should apply to all EU members).

To signal their intent, the EU should make a landmark decision, akin to the 1999 Helsinki EU summit, offering a clear framework the moment a peace agreement in Ukraine is reached. The promise of this approach will help push the peace process forward. It could also spur new progress towards reform and membership for other states too, thus addressing concerns about differential treatment between countries.

The proposal to use a new model was first presented on March 23, 2026, during the roundtable “The Speed of Ukraine’s EU Accession: How to Overcome the Main Challenges” organized by the New Europe Center in cooperation with the National Interests Advocacy Network (ANTS).

The analytical material was first published on ECFR, on April 16.

[1] Author’s interview in Brussels with an EU Council official, March 2026.

[2] Author’s interviews in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, The Hague, Madrid and Vienna with diplomats and EU officials, March 2026.

[3] Author’s interviews in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, The Hague, Madrid and Vienna with diplomats and EU officials, March 2026.