Ukraine and Japan’s Roles in Global Security

Analytical Report of the VI Ukraine–Japan Forum on Peace Prospects, the Indivisibility of Security, and Coordination among Democratic States

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that security in Europe and the Asian region is interconnected. The deepening cooperation between Russia and North Korea, the growing role of China as a strategic challenge, and shifts in U.S. foreign policy are shaping a new reality for democratic states. The VI Ukraine–Japan Forum served as a platform to discuss these processes–particularly the prospects for a peaceful settlement, the evolution of the Ukraine–Japan strategic partnership, security guarantees, and the transformation of “soft power” in wartime conditions.

Top 10 Forum Takeaways:

Ukraine views strengthening air defence as a priority for security cooperation with Japan. Russia’s massive attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure heighten the need for air defence systems and interceptor missiles, which are being depleted rapidly. Ukraine sees Japan as a partner capable of contributing to reinforcing the air shield through existing mechanisms and flexible formats of cooperation.

Ukraine calls on Japan to join the PURL programme as a NATO partner in the Asian region. Participation in this initiative would open additional opportunities to expand defence and non-lethal support.
Ukraine is interested in Japanese investment in Ukraine’s high-tech and defence sectors. Signing an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technologies could open a new stage of cooperation.
Japan is one of Ukraine’s leading donors, providing more than USD 20 billion in assistance. Tokyo’s financial, humanitarian, energy, and technical support is systemic and plays a key role in ensuring budget stability, restoring critical infrastructure, and preserving the country’s social resilience.
Japan’s support is long-term and strategic. It is aimed not only at covering urgent wartime needs, but also at reconstruction, demining, strengthening institutions, and Ukraine’s economic modernisation.
Security in Europe and the Asian region is indivisible. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the coordination among authoritarian regimes form a shared security challenge for democratic states.
Prospects for a peace settlement remain uncertain and depend on foreign-policy dynamics. Inconsistent international initiatives and tensions in transatlantic relations create additional risks of prolonging the war.
Russia–North Korea military cooperation has become strategic. It creates long-term threats not only for Ukraine, but also for Japan and the broader Asian region.
“Soft power” has become a key element of democratic states’ strategic resilience. It includes information security, protection of institutions, and countering manipulation in response to Russia’s and China’s use of instrumentalised “sharp power.”
Ukraine is transforming from a recipient of assistance into a donor of security knowledge and technologies. Experience from modern warfare, the development of defence innovation, and asymmetric solutions are shaping Ukraine’s new role in the future security architecture of Europe and its partners in Asia.

Keynote Speech and Welcoming Remarks

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine views strengthening air defence as a priority for security cooperation with Japan. Russia’s massive attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure heighten the need for air defence systems and interceptor missiles, which are being depleted rapidly. Ukraine sees Japan as a partner capable of contributing to reinforcing the air shield through existing mechanisms and flexible formats of cooperation.
Ukraine calls on Japan to join the PURL programme as a NATO partner in the Asian region. Participation in this initiative would open additional opportunities to expand defence and non-lethal support.
Ukraine is interested in Japanese investment in Ukraine’s high-tech and defence sectors. Signing an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technologies could open a new stage of cooperation.
Japan is one of Ukraine’s leading donors, providing more than USD 20 billion in assistance. Tokyo’s financial, humanitarian, energy, and technical support is systemic and plays a key role in ensuring budget stability, restoring critical infrastructure, and preserving the country’s social resilience.
Ukraine’s experience of modern war has strategic significance for Japan. Lessons in resisting aggression, developing defence technologies, unmanned systems, and new forms of warfare are being taken into account by Tokyo as it revises its national security strategy.
Ukraine–Japan relations have effectively acquired the features of a strategic partnership. The Ukraine–Japan Forum is viewed as an important platform for generating new initiatives in security, defence-industrial cooperation, technology transfer, and post-war reconstruction.

In his speech, Igor Zhovkva, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and Diplomatic Adviser to the President, underscored the strategic nature of the Ukraine–Japan partnership and expressed gratitude for Japan’s systemic support, which since the start of the full-scale aggression has exceeded USD 15 billion and includes financial, humanitarian, and non-lethal assistance. A particular emphasis was placed on budget support – specifically the planned USD 6 billion for the current year – which is critical for Ukraine’s macro-financial stability during the war. At the same time, Igor Zhovkva encouraged Japan to join the PURL programme as a NATO partner in the Asian region, which would allow for expanded formats of support, including in the areas of security and non-lethal cooperation.

A key security issue in the speech was the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence amid Russia’s massive attacks using ballistic and cruise missiles and hundreds of drones. Igor Zhovkva stressed the critical need for air defence systems and interceptor missiles, noting that this resource is being depleted quickly and requires constant replenishment. He also highlighted Japan’s оперативна (rapid) support in the energy sector–supplies of generators, transformers, and cogeneration units–as well as support for the rehabilitation of Ukrainian servicemen. Ukraine, for its part, expressed readiness to deepen defence-industrial cooperation, including joint production and technology transfer.

A separate block of the speech addressed prospects for economic and investment cooperation. Igor Zhovkva emphasised that Japanese companies are welcome investors in Ukraine, particularly in high-tech and defence sectors, and that an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technologies could open a new stage of cooperation. He also underscored the indivisibility of security in Europe and Asia and the importance of Japan’s active role given the global interconnectedness of threats. Overall, the speech reflected Ukraine’s aspiration not only to receive support, but also to build a long-term strategic partnership with Japan based on mutual interests, security, and investment in a shared future.

Sergiy Solodkyy, Director of the New Europe Center, noted that the Ukraine–Japan Forum was conceived from the outset as a platform to assess what has been achieved and to develop new initiatives needed to elevate bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership. He stressed that despite geographic distance, Ukraine and Japan are united by shared values, interests, and a common perception of threats – particularly from Russia and China. He argued that the mutual interest rests on the complementarity of experiences: Ukraine’s resilience in war and Japan’s model of security guarantees and modernisation. Sergiy Solodkyy underscored the fundamental importance of a rules-based international order as the key shared foundation of cooperation and thanked Japan for its consistent support for Ukraine at both bilateral and multilateral levels, describing the Forum as a venue for finding new ways to strengthen each other amid growing global threats.

Ayano Kunimitsu, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, emphasised Japan’s unwavering support for Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s aggression, which, in her words, undermines the foundations of the international order. She praised the courage and unity of the Ukrainian people and the leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, noting that Japan acts in close coordination with the international community to achieve a just and lasting peace. The total amount of Japan’s assistance to Ukraine, covering financial, humanitarian, and defence components, is approximately USD 20 billion.

Ayano Kunimitsu stressed that Japan’s support goes beyond immediate needs and includes projects for recovery, demining, development of the agricultural and industrial sectors, and strengthening democratic institutions. She also highlighted the inseparable link between security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and the importance of preserving a rules-based international order.

Masashi Nakagome, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Ukraine, emphasised Japan’s practical, solidarity-based support for Ukraine amid winter conditions and Russia’s ongoing attacks on critical infrastructure. He noted that Japan systematically assists Ukraine’s energy sector by providing generators, transformers, and other equipment to mitigate the impact of destruction and ensure basic resilience for the population. The Ambassador confirmed that Japan remains one of Ukraine’s key partners, having provided about USD 20 billion in assistance, including long-term budget support, and continues to increase its financial commitments.

In a broader security context, Masashi Nakagome underscored the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s firm refusal to accept a world order based on the rule of force. He stressed that supporting Ukraine is not only a matter of solidarity but also a strategic interest for Japan, which is revising its national security strategy by taking into account lessons from Ukraine’s experience of modern warfare and technological innovation. Nakagome also noted the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation – from security and demining to business and recovery – and reaffirmed Japan’s readiness to continue supporting Ukraine to achieve a just and lasting peace.

Yurii Lutovinov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Japan, stated that against the backdrop of the fourth year of the full-scale war and intensified international discussions on peace, Russia continues targeted terror against Ukraine’s civilian and energy infrastructure, making sustained pressure on the aggressor critically important. In this context, he highlighted Japan’s special role as one of Ukraine’s leading donors and a reliable partner, which – despite a difficult domestic socio-economic and political situation – consistently provides financial, humanitarian, and technical assistance exceeding USD 15 billion, including new budget decisions, grant programmes, and support through international financial mechanisms.

Yurii Lutovinov noted that Russia’s aggression and the strengthening alliances among authoritarian regimes have demonstrated the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, creating a basis for qualitatively deepening the Ukraine–Japan partnership. He emphasised Ukraine’s interest in cooperation with Japan in the context of Japan’s defence-policy transformation, particularly in modern military technologies, unmanned systems, cyber security, and joint research and production. The Ambassador stated that bilateral relations have effectively reached the level of a strategic partnership, and that the Forum should serve as a venue for generating new ideas and strengthening coordination in security, recovery, and post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

The War of Democracies Against Dictatorships. A Reality Check for Ukraine and Japan

Key Takeaways:

Prospects for a peace settlement remain uncertain and depend on U.S. foreign-policy dynamics. Inconsistent U.S. initiatives and tensions between the United States and Europe create a window of opportunity for Russia, which continues to escalate despite domestic economic and mobilisation constraints.
Territorial issues and security guarantees are central to any potential ceasefire. Changing borders by force is unacceptable, and decisions regarding sovereignty must be made exclusively by the Ukrainian people.
Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has become strategic. Pyongyang not only supports Russia’s war economy but also gains experience of modern warfare, creating long-term threats to the security of Japan and South Korea and increasing instability in the Asian region.
Democratic states are at a critical juncture. The weakening role of democratic values in U.S. foreign policy and the coordination among Russia, China, and North Korea indicate a transformation of the global order and a growing logic of force in international relations.
Ukraine plays a key role in containing a systemic crisis of international security. Its refusal to capitulate and preservation of agency have helped stabilise Europe and prevent deeper disintegration of the EU and NATO.
Ukraine is transforming from a recipient of assistance into a donor of security knowledge and technologies. Experience from modern warfare, the development of drones, electronic warfare, and asymmetric solutions are shaping Ukraine’s new role as a critical element of Europe’s future security architecture.
Europe must move from declarations to practical strengthening of defence capabilities. The absence of indigenous missile defence systems, long-range strike capabilities, and a shared nuclear doctrine preserves strategic dependence; under conditions of potential simultaneous crises in Europe and Asia, this creates additional risks for the entire democratic camp.

Tomoyuki Yoshida, Chief Executive Director of Japan’s Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), outlined the unstable dynamics of peace efforts regarding Ukraine. According to him, ceasefire negotiations mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump remain inconsistent, and Washington’s attention may shift to other regions. Russia is exploiting this uncertainty by intensifying attacks on Ukraine, while at the same time facing internal constraints – difficulties with mobilization, declining energy revenues, and signs of economic stagnation. Yoshida suggested that under certain conditions Moscow might prefer negotiations, but warned that strained relations between the United States and Europe, as well as declining willingness of some countries to support Ukraine, make the prospects for a sustainable ceasefire uncertain. He emphasized that territorial issues and security guarantees remain key: although changing borders by force is unacceptable, decisions regarding sovereignty must be made exclusively by the Ukrainian people.

Tomoyuki Yoshida also paid particular attention to the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, which has acquired a strategic character. Pyongyang is not only sending combat units but also engineering and labor resources, supporting Russia’s war economy while simultaneously gaining practical experience in modern warfare, particularly in drones and electronic warfare. This creates serious long-term security threats for Japan and South Korea. He noted that even if hostilities cease, cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang may continue as a tool of pressure on the West and a means of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the broader global dimension, Yoshida stressed that democratic states are at a critical juncture. He pointed to the declining role of democratic values in U.S. foreign policy, which weakens the overall resilience of the democratic camp. At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the coordination between Russia, China, and North Korea have demonstrated the indivisibility of security between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

Hanna Hopko, Chairwoman of the ANTS NGO Network and former Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament, emphasized that Ukraine must proceed from a realistic understanding of the global situation and should not rely on a rapid restoration of U.S. democratic resilience. She stressed that it is a strategic mistake to count the war only from 2022, as the disruption of the international order began with the occupation of Crimea in 2014 amid an insufficient Western response. The expert noted that the current massive shelling and strikes on civilian infrastructure show signs of genocide, and that international policy should shift from containment and mitigation of the war’s consequences to actively compelling Russia to defeat, since humanitarian assistance cannot replace strategic deterrence of the aggressor.

She outlined the transformation of Ukraine’s role from a recipient of assistance to a donor of knowledge and technology, particularly in modern warfare – drones, electronic warfare, cyber defense, and asymmetric solutions. She noted that in certain areas Ukraine already surpasses NATO partners. In this context, Hanna Hopko emphasized the potential for an equal defense partnership with Japan, including joint research and production, and called for more active use of frozen Russian assets as a source of financing for defense and reconstruction projects.

Michito Tsuruoka, Professor at Keio University, stated that the alliance with the United States remains the central element of Japan’s security system and will likely continue to be so in the long term, as the United States is Japan’s only formal treaty ally. At the same time, he pointed to shifting priorities in U.S. foreign policy, including a growing focus on the Western Hemisphere and increased attention to containing China. Under these conditions, Japan’s and the United States’ strategic interests cannot be fully identical, which necessitates strengthening Japan’s own defense capabilities, including through increased defense spending. The professor emphasized that despite domestic political uncertainty, a broader consensus is forming within Japanese society on the need for greater responsibility for its own security.

He acknowledged the high level of frustration in Japan, Europe, and Ukraine over the unpredictability of U.S. policy during Donald Trump’s presidency, but cautioned against prematurely abandoning the transatlantic partnership. Despite all difficulties, Japan and European states share far more common values and strategic interests with the United States, and abandoning cooperation would be a strategic mistake.

Separately, Michito Tsuruoka stressed that Japan’s support for Ukraine is not a one-sided process. He underlined that Japan is already learning important lessons from Ukraine’s experience, and that this process should deepen. Ukraine is becoming a key element of Europe’s future defense and of deterrence against Russia after the war. Ukraine is the only European state with real experience of modern warfare against Russia, making it critically important for NATO’s defense architecture.

Mykhailo Samus, Director of the New Geopolitics Research Network, described a deep crisis of the international order, drawing attention to shifting political and moral reference points in global politics. He stressed that statements and positions of U.S. President Donald Trump effectively legitimize Vladimir Putin’s actions, including strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure in Ukraine that bear the signs of war crimes. According to the expert, this reflects the formation of a new world order in which the principles of international law are уступing to the logic of force and imperial thinking. In this context, the world increasingly resembles a system of interaction among several “empires,” notably Russia, China, and the United States, openly asserting spheres of influence.

The expert emphasized that Ukraine’s refusal to capitulate has been a key factor in restraining this dangerous shift, and that the public confrontation between Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump a year ago was a manifestation of Ukrainian agency and readiness to defend not only its own interests but also Europe’s security as a whole. He warned that imposing a “bad peace deal” on Ukraine with de facto recognition of occupation would not only undermine Ukrainian statehood but also accelerate the disintegration of the European Union and weaken NATO. Mykhailo Samus paid particular attention to the scenario of synchronous escalation – simultaneous Russian aggression against NATO states and Chinese aggression against Taiwan – stressing that under such conditions the ability of the United States and the Alliance to respond effectively raises serious doubts.

In practical terms, Mykhailo Samus called for moving from declarations to concrete decisions regarding European security. He highlighted critical gaps in Europe’s capabilities, including the absence of its own production of missile defense systems, long-range ballistic missiles, and a unified nuclear doctrine. According to him, without political decisions to create joint European defense capabilities and without incorporating Ukraine’s modern warfare experience, Europe will remain strategically dependent.

Ad hoc Alliances, Ambitious Partnerships: How Cooperation in Europe and Asia Has Changed Since 2022?

Key Takeaways:

Uncertain signals from the United States regarding China increase the risk of strategic miscalculations. Historical experience shows that ambiguity in Washington’s position may be misinterpreted by authoritarian states, particularly Beijing in the context of Taiwan, creating additional risks of escalation in the Asian region.
The Chinese threat has a systemic and predictable character. Beijing’s strategic intentions remain unchanged, its military capabilities are growing, and the intensification of “gray zone” operations and military-civil fusion indicates preparation for potential crisis scenarios, including the possibility of preemptive actions against the United States and its allies.
China is already a key factor in Russia’s war-fighting capacity. Technological and economic support for Moscow, as well as the use of control over rare earth materials as a tool of pressure, create direct risks for the defense industries of Europe and Asia.
The outcome of the war in Ukraine will have global consequences. The precedent of Ukraine’s success or defeat will influence China’s strategic calculations regarding Taiwan and the assessment of deterrence effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific region.
The alliance with the United States remains the central element of Japan’s security, but its reliability is no longer perceived as unconditional. Tokyo is strengthening its own defense capabilities, increasing defense spending, developing counterstrike potential, and at the same time expanding partnerships with like-minded states.
“Ad hoc alliances” have limited effectiveness without strategic coherence and long-term interests. Even if the United States maintains a leading role, Japan, Europe, and Ukraine must deepen mutual learning, exchange experience, and strengthen their own defense capabilities.
The North Korean factor has significantly altered the security landscape. Military integration between Russia and the DPRK, the participation of North Korean troops, and the modernization of Pyongyang’s weaponry create long-term threats not only for Ukraine but also for Japan, South Korea, and the broader Asian region, requiring a more coordinated response from democratic states.

Ken Endo, Professor at Tokyo University, stated that the signals the current U.S. administration is sending to Beijing, particularly in the context of planned summits with China, raise concerns. In his view, historical experience shows that ambiguous or misinterpreted signals from Washington may lead to strategic miscalculations by authoritarian states. In the short term, this creates the risk of China misjudging U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan. Nevertheless, Japan remains a reliable partner of Ukraine, already ranks among the top five donors of financial assistance, and is ready to continue support within its constitutional constraints.

The professor noted that a certain degree of Japanese restraint is explained by domestic political turbulence and the need to adapt to the unpredictability of U.S. policy, as the United States remains Japan’s only formal ally. However, he personally expressed the view that Japan could expand its involvement, including by sending Self-Defense Forces personnel for humanitarian demining on land and in the Black Sea, as well as considering the provision of counter-drone and counter-missile systems. Such participation would allow Japan not only to support Ukraine but also to gain practical experience in modern warfare.

Speaking about the “Coalition of the Willing,” the professor acknowledged its positive significance, particularly the readiness of the United States to support states under aggression. At the same time, he questioned the sufficiency of the current security guarantees, which may prove weaker than mechanisms similar to NATO’s Article 5. In his view, the world is entering a “post-liberal” international order in which even a broad coalition of partners has limited capacity to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security.

Yuriy Poita, Head of the Asia-Pacific Section at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CACDS), assessed the Chinese threat using classical threat theory, which analyzes intentions, capabilities, and opportunity. China’s strategic intentions remain unchanged, military capabilities are steadily growing, and therefore the likelihood of conflict is increasing. The decisive factor may be the moment Beijing considers favorable for action. Poita stressed that the dynamics of these three components allow partial forecasting of escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific region.

Among key trends, he highlighted China’s long-term and systemic military buildup, increasingly complex People’s Liberation Army exercises, and the intensification of “gray zone” operations – including regular incursions by Chinese aircraft and vessels into the airspace and maritime zones of neighboring states. The expert paid particular attention to the concept of military-civil fusion, whereby the civilian sector is integrated into military scenarios, including the use of fishing fleets for intelligence and to block third-party access to a potential theater of operations. He also cited assessments from Japanese and South Korean experts pointing to a possible final stage of China’s preparations for a Taiwan scenario and the risk of preemptive strikes on U.S. and allied facilities to prevent their intervention.

In the European dimension, Poita emphasized that China has already become a key technological “enabler” of Russian aggression against Ukraine and is conducting coordinated actions aimed at weakening transatlantic unity. He identified China’s control over rare earth materials as an additional risk factor, which could significantly impact the defense industries of Europe and Asia.

Dmytro Shulga, Programme Director of “Europe and the World” at the International Renaissance Foundation, explained why the VI Ukraine-Japan Forum devoted so much attention to the United States. The reason is that U.S. security guarantees have long been a key pillar of the global order. The United States possesses unique capabilities to project power and provide security in any region of the world – a capacity that neither Europe nor any other state can match. However, alliances depend on two elements: strategic coherence (shared values, threat perceptions, and long-term objectives) and real capacity. Today, the United States retains its power but is rethinking its strategic vision of the world, creating uncertainty for allies.

He also emphasized Ukraine’s importance for Japan and other partners. Supporting Ukraine is not only a matter of solidarity or values but also pragmatic calculation. International politics largely operates through precedents: states observe conflicts and draw conclusions about the strength or weakness of deterrence systems. Just as the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan affected global perceptions, so too will the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly impact China, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific security.

In his view, “ad hoc alliances” are unstable if not grounded in strategic coherence and long-term interests. Even though the United States remains an indispensable ally for Japan due to its military capabilities, this does not eliminate the need to strengthen mutual learning, cooperation, and national capacities. Ukraine’s unique experience confronting Russia and North Korea – particularly in air defense, missile defense, and counter-drone warfare – makes deeper cooperation and intelligence sharing a practical path toward strengthening shared security.

Nataliya Butyrska, Expert on East Asia and Associated Senior Expert at the New Europe Center, referred to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s 2022 statement (“Today Ukraine – tomorrow East Asia”), emphasizing that it reflected a strategic understanding of the interconnectedness of security processes in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Japan sought to convey to Europe that threats in both regions are part of a single system. Events have proven this approach correct: North Korea participates directly as Russia’s military ally, China acts as a systemic supporter, while Japan and South Korea support Ukraine. The outcome of the war in Europe will directly affect scenarios around Taiwan and regional security.

She placed particular emphasis on the North Korean factor. Previously underestimated, the DPRK now supplies a significant share of Russia’s ammunition; around 15,000 troops, as well as engineers and workers, have been deployed to support Russia’s military and war economy. Pyongyang is gaining combat experience, technologies, and modernizing its weaponry. KN-23 missiles, previously inaccurate, are now used far more effectively. The military-industrial integration between Russia and the DPRK creates long-term threats not only for Ukraine but also for Europe, Japan, and South Korea.

According to her, sanctions against North Korea have proven insufficiently effective: Western components are found in missiles, and international accountability for the DPRK’s participation in the war is barely discussed. Participation in the war has elevated Pyongyang’s international status – Kim Jong Un appears more confident and advances his own demands, including recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status. Without a coordinated response from democratic states, this threat will continue to grow.

Tsuyoshi Goroku, Associate Professor at Nishogakusha University, noted that Russia’s war against Ukraine has significantly influenced Japan’s perception of U.S. security guarantees, which have underpinned Japanese defense policy for over half a century. The events in Ukraine confirmed the importance of formal alliance commitments but also demonstrated that an alliance alone is insufficient – a state must be prepared to defend itself independently. This conclusion was reflected in Japan’s National Security Strategy adopted in December 2022.

Under the updated strategy, Japan is implementing three complementary directions. First, an unprecedented strengthening of its own defense capabilities, including increased defense spending and the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities. Second, deeper integration with the United States within the alliance framework, viewed as essential not only for Japan’s security but also for maintaining regional stability. Third, expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners, including Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, European states, and Ukraine. Although these formats are not formal alliances and do not include security guarantees, they strengthen deterrence.

At the same time, Japan is not distancing itself from the United States; on the contrary, it seeks deeper integration within the alliance while expanding security cooperation with like-minded partners in Asia and Europe, including Ukraine. Nevertheless, concerns remain in Tokyo about the long-term reliability of U.S. guarantees and possible shifts in Washington’s strategic priorities. Despite this, no realistic alternative to the alliance with the United States is currently considered, so Japan is focusing on strengthening its own capabilities alongside developing existing alliance mechanisms.

Soft Power: What Has Changed Over the Past Four Years?

Key Takeaways:

“Soft power” has evolved and become inseparable from information security. Even under Donald Trump’s administration, the United States continues to view it as an important instrument of global influence, but today its effectiveness depends not only on the attractiveness of values and culture, but also on the ability to protect the information environment and counter manipulation.
The instrumentalization of “soft power” and the growing role of “sharp power” have become the new reality. Russia and China actively use informational and cultural tools to undermine democratic societies and the rules-based international order, which requires a comprehensive response from democratic states.
Ukraine already possesses significant “soft power” resources. Its resilience, struggle for freedom and democratic values, and defense innovations are shaping a positive international image and strengthening its appeal as a reliable partner.
Ukraine’s recovery should be based on the concept of human security and integrated approaches. Support for basic infrastructure, development of human capital, demining, and reconstruction are defined as the foundation of long-term resilience.
In Japan, there remains a clear perception of Ukraine as a victim of aggression, but public attention to the war is declining. A high level of critical attitudes toward Russia is combined with the absence of a systematic state policy to counter disinformation and with caution regarding sanctions due to economic interests.
Long-term strengthening of Ukraine–Japan relations requires the institutionalization of knowledge about Ukraine. The development of Ukrainian studies in Japanese universities and the active work of the Ukrainian community are strategic factors for sustaining interest in Ukraine and embedding its narrative in Japan’s public space.

Atsuko Higashino, Professor at the University of Tsukuba, emphasized that even under Donald Trump’s administration the United States continues to view “soft power” as an important tool of global influence, as reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025. At the same time, the very content of the concept has changed: whereas “soft power” previously rested primarily on the attractiveness of culture, values, and institutions, today it is inseparable from the integrity of the information environment and the ability to counter manipulation. After 2014, and especially with the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the struggle for control over the information space has become a key element of global confrontation. In this context, she highlighted the trend toward instrumentalizing “soft power” for strategic purposes and the growing role of so-called “sharp power,” which Russia and China actively employ to undermine democratic societies and the rules-based international order.

The professor also stressed that modern “soft power” can be effective only when combined with strong institutions, a protected information environment, and reduced economic vulnerabilities. In this regard, she noted that Ukraine already has substantial “soft power” resources thanks to its resilience, determination, and struggle for democratic values. An important element in strengthening Ukraine’s international influence could also be its technological achievements, particularly in defense innovation. Although defense is traditionally associated with “hard power,” Ukraine’s effectiveness in resisting aggression shapes a positive international image and enhances its appeal as a state capable of defending freedom and democracy amid global challenges.

Osamu Hattori, Chief Representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), emphasized that JICA’s approach to Ukraine’s recovery is based on the concept of human security, which places human dignity, people’s ability to shape their own future, and community resilience at the center. He identified three key directions: ensuring the functioning of basic infrastructure (energy, water, transport, education), preserving and developing human capital (digital education centers, textbooks, support for youth and veterans), and guaranteeing security through demining. According to him, recovery should be localized, decentralized, and community-oriented, because without security, education, and infrastructure it is impossible to ensure sustainable reconstruction and the return of people.

Among priority initiatives for the coming years, he highlighted integrated approaches with long-term impact: combining demining with the restoration of the agricultural sector, and managing the consequences of destruction through principles of circular reconstruction, drawing on Japan’s experience after natural disasters. He also underscored the importance of human capital and institutional capacity as the systemic foundation of recovery. At the same time, reconstruction should be not only safe and people-centered but also environmentally sustainable, opening prospects for Ukraine’s sustainable economic growth in the future.

Takashi Hirano, Head of the Japan Section at the Ukrinform agency, noted that the overall perception of Ukraine and Russia in Japan has not fundamentally changed: Japanese society still views Ukraine as the victim of aggression and Russia as the aggressor state. However, public attention to the war has significantly declined, due to the protracted nature of the conflict and the absence of tangible turning points on the battlefield. As a result, the war is gradually being pushed out of the media agenda, and the emotional mobilization characteristic of the first years of the full-scale invasion is weakening.

At the same time, negative attitudes toward Russia in Japan remain consistently high. By some estimates, 90–95% of the population maintain a critical view of Russia’s actions. After 2014, Japanese society became more resilient to Russian information narratives, and the experience of disinformation campaigns was carefully analyzed by the expert community. However, a systematic state policy to counter information influence has still not been formed: discussions on possible mechanisms continue, but the government remains cautious about any steps that could be perceived as limiting freedom of speech.

Another trend is the growth of pessimistic sentiment regarding prospects for ending the war, which affects domestic debates on sanctions policy and economic cooperation. In particular, the strategic importance of the Sakhalin-2 energy project for Japan drives caution in introducing additional sanctions against Russian energy companies. Russia also seeks to promote its narratives through cultural ties and supporters of Russian culture in Japan, appealing to historical contacts and humanitarian exchanges. In these conditions, a key task remains maintaining high-quality, consistent communication with Japanese society to preserve a clear understanding of the causes and consequences of the war.

Yulia Dzyabko, Associate Professor at Ibaraki Christian University, emphasized that Ukraine’s visibility in Japan largely depends on the quality and volume of available information, and on how well it is academically developed and institutionally закреплено. In recent years, Japan has seen translations of key works on Ukrainian history as well as collective academic publications devoted to decolonizing Ukrainian studies and countering the ideology of the “Russian world,” which helps form an independent scholarly approach to studying Ukraine’s history and culture outside Russia’s imperial paradigm. At the same time, she pointed to the lack of systematic Ukrainian studies in Japanese universities, stressing that long-term formation of knowledge about a country is possible only through institutionalized study of the language, history, and culture – the very model that ensured the success of Japanese studies in Ukraine.

She also highlighted the role of the Ukrainian community in Japan as an important factor in shaping a positive image of the country. Despite its small size, the community shows a high level of self-organization, actively engages in cultural, educational, and literary initiatives, and creates sustained public interest in Ukraine. The positive image of forced migrants, their everyday interaction with Japanese society, and participation in public events help закрепить the Ukrainian narrative in the information space. Thus, the combination of developing Ukrainian studies and supporting the community’s activities is seen as a strategic direction for strengthening Ukraine–Japan relations and building long-term knowledge about Ukraine.