Dealing with the EU Neighbours: in the Search of Ukraine’s Neighborhood Policy

On December 7, the New Europe Center held the on-the-record round-table discussion “Dealing with the EU neighbours: In the search of Ukraine’s Neighbourhood Policy”.

At the event we have launched a new report “New European Neighbourhood Policy of Ukraine. What has the law on education “stress test” shown?” The paper examines the relations between Ukraine and its European neighbours, identifies existing challenges, and provides a set of recommendation for the new strategic vision of Ukraine’s neighborhood policy.

The main points of the speakers (in the language of the original)

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, New Europe Center

We have our strategic partners today, but tomorrow we can lose them. Neighbors, on the other hand, remain neighbors, and we need to work with them in any case.
It is important to deliver on our promises if we do them at the highest level. If we are not prepared to do this, we should not promise it. We are talking about a clear management of expectations from our partners, so that there is no impression that if we are the victim of Russian aggression, we are allowed to do anything. The aggressor, perhaps, is allowed to do anything, but the victim can not afford a permissiveness syndrome, especially in the context of relations with the states that are extremely important to us.
On the part of our neighbors, it is absolutely unacceptable to block the Association Agreement or declare the blocking of the Agreement. Obviously, everyone knows what price Ukraine has paid and continues to pay for this Agreement, and I think that this is absolutely not the argument that our partners should use. And with more statements from our neighbors that do not contribute to mutual understanding, they take more arguments from supporters of these states in Ukraine and supporters of Ukraine’s partnership with them.

Daria Gaidai, Research Fellow, New Europe Center

The conflict around the law on education has shown that Ukraine lacks a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the national policy on relations with European neighbors. The key findings from the analysis of the “stress test” caused by the law on education became the basis for recommendations for a qualitative reboot of Ukraine’s relations with its EU neighbors.
Ukrainian authorities are currently unable to communicate effectively with both their own citizens and foreign partners, and different branches of government cannot act in concert and formulate a unified position
to protect and communication the interests of Ukraine abroad. Along with the lack of trust toward Ukraine, this creates a basis for conflicts. Our interlocutors in both Budapest and Bucharest noted that neither experts, nor the media had a clear understanding of what the Verkhovna Rada voted for, and this situation lasted for weeks. Meanwhile, Russian media and pro-Russian resources in Ukraine stirred up the hysteria about “total Ukrainization” supposedly launched by the MES of Ukraine.
One of the consequences of the process of Ukraine’s nation-building is the revision of the status quo in such issues as citizenship, language, historical narrative and monuments, etc. The situation is even worse due to the fact that in the context of aggression, the Russian factor is often critical in making certain decisions. This situation reminds of historical disputes with Poland, when Polish-Ukrainian relations become a victim of Ukrainian-Russian historical confrontation. In these conditions, it is important to be prepared to cooperate with the neighbors in a systematic and strategic method, especially in the case of the EU member states that could become motors of Ukraine’s European integration.

Vasyl Bodnar, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Ukraine’s neighborhood policy is based on such things (values) as equality, good neighborliness, and mutual respect.
The educational law has caused publicity, a resonance. We had the dialogue after the adoption of the law on different levels, from ministers to experts. We are trying to find something constructive. However, certain parties do not want to hear the arguments of the Ukrainian side, although they have even more severe conditions for national communities in their internal laws.
The negative that is hyped up by the press does not exist. The analysis from our side shows that there is no narrowing of rights (of the national communities). Considering, first and foremost, the national interests of Ukraine, we will take into account the Venice Commission’s decisions as much as possible.
Today, the national interest of the state is to strengthen Ukrainian language as a state one, certainly, not at the expense of limiting the rights of national minorities, but through enhancing the teaching of Ukrainian language, so that it could become the language of communication for all Ukrainian citizens, an opportunity for integration into society.
The dialogue with foreign partners will be continued. Through dialogue, we managed to deescalate the problems with Poland (and we signed the relevant protocol), Bulgaria, and Greece, the states that initially joined the critical camp. The educational law is a framework one, and its implementation requires development of a law on secondary specialized education. A separate program will be developed for every group of schools with the participation of representatives of national minorities and in consultations with concerned states, primarily with Hungary and Romania.
The law does not actually provide how many hours should be taught in Ukrainian or how many Ukrainian-language subjects should be in the program. Therefore, this is a question of dialogue, and we are calling both Hungarians and Romanians to join it.
Let’s talk about how we will develop our further relations with our neighbors, what is important to us, and how we could counteract the trends unleashed by the third parties. The fact is that the Russian side is trying to put Ukraine against its neighbors using influence, money, and elements of hybrid technologies. There is a targeted action, which requires a targeted counteraction. The development of bilateral good neighborly relations is an adequate response to this challenge.

Ernst Reichel, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Germany to Ukraine

If you imagine Europe as a village, we (Germany) live in a house after neighbor’s house. So, it does matter to us what happens in Ukraine and around Ukraine. Neighborhood relations of Ukraine are not limited to article 7 of the educational law, and the problems that Ukraine has with some of its neighbors are not limited by this law. For instance, there are quite a few issues with history. These issues are highly emotional and easily played by the populists. The nice thing about history is that you can speak about it at any time that is useful for you. I respectfully do not want to give advice, but restrain and sensibility on all sides would be useful.
On educational law, Germany does not have any stakes here. We do not have a significant minority with schooling issue. However, we have a big interest in Ukraine’s political future and indeed we do want Ukraine to get along with its direct Western neighbors.
I do not think it is only a matter of ‘communicating better’ Ukrainian position to the outside world. We have to allow also a possibility that Ukraine also makes political mistakes or takes decisions that are questionable. Honestly, I think this last-minute change of article 7 of the educational law was a mistake. And I think, currently Ukraine is paying the price for this. It’s a pity, because it’s a good piece of legislation and it turned into a foreign policy problem. However, when I say it was a mistake, I do not mean that the reaction of Hungary was adequate.
The government rightly offers a discussion on the implementation of the law to the affected countries and affected communities. And indeed, the law gives some flexibility in the implementation.
Venice Commission decisions are always complex and differentiated. Therefore, the first thing I would expect is a controversy in whose favor this decision is and what it really contains. Everybody is likely to pick and choose what they like from the text.

Balazs Jarábik, nonresident scholar, Russia and Eurasia program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; short-term expert at Association4U project

I would like to make a few points on a similar conflict between Hungary and Slovakia. Although I have to stress: similar, but not the same. We can compare various mechanisms, as well as cases, but I do think that Ukraine’s situation is quite unique.
The conflicts were about the use of language not in the education, but in the public sphere. The issues were overpoliticized in Slovakia and Hungary already in the 1990s. And there was not enough political will in the Slovak Parliament to address legally the issues connected with Hungarian minority. I am assuming that if Venice Commission says to change the article 7, there might not be enough political will too.
One of the key mechanisms that exist between Hungary and Slovakia is a legal interstate framework. This framework between two states concerns not only minority issues, but a wide range of issues. And this mechanism is based on working groups on various sectors, and minority issue is one of the sectors. The framework agreement was signed in 1996; its implementation has its ups and downs, but at the same time, this is a key mechanism for this kind of issues. Those working groups are working out the solutions to the most sensible issues. It should be discussed on the expert interstate level, instead of doing it in the Parliament.
Obviously, there is a peer pressure from the EU. There are the Copenhagen Criteria, which countries should keep in mind. The EU is expecting that the member states will be capable to solve conflicts, particularly when it comes to the ethnic minorities, between themselves.
Prime Minister Robert Fico was famous to use minority issues in his election campaign. At the same time, there was Victor Orban coming to power in Hungary. Many people were afraid that this conflict would elevate on the higher gear after elections. Surprisingly, the opposite happened. These two politicians were able to agree and either put aside the most important issues, or deescalated the conflict to the level of working groups. The reason why it happed is because of political consolidation on both sides. Once Fico and Orban won and formed the governments, there was political consolidation in both countries. It opened the way to conflict resolution mechanism.

Roland Kovats, Director of the ENGAGE project

I would like to speak not in the official position, but as someone whose family is from Transcarpathia and who carries half of his identity from that region.
Elections are coming up in Hungary. However, the Hungarian elections, as it looks right now, would be an easy walk for the current Government coalition. Therefore, I would not put high emphasize and high hopes on the post-election period in Hungary. The Hungarian domestic politics is very much of a new sort of philosophy that goes beyond liberalism versus conservatism. The Hungarian paradigm is opportunistic, pragmatic and foremost about power and retaining power. Power politics will continue be the case in Hungary.
Ukrainian educational law has managed to do something that for a long time neither Hungarians, nor the EU were able to do. And that is to create the greatest possible political coalition, to create political consensus in Hungary. The last time we had such consensus was before 2004, in our hopes and expectations for accession to the EU. The Hungarian parliamentarians were the first to adapt unanimously the statement about Ukrainian educational legislation.
In Hungarian mind, preserving identity means preserving language. The language is a primary connecting point in the Hungarian identity.
The most liberal media, that would be labeled in other case as Soros block, wrote not one article about Ukraine’s educational law. And if you look at Hungarian media reporting, you will see that they do not call it educational legislation, but “language law”.
Within European integration, Hungary had to come to terms with its neighbors. One of the most important was Hungarian-Romanian treaty that allowed Hungary to start effective accession to the EU. It was one of the stumbling blocks for Hungary’s integration to the EU.
Conflict management within the EU has its own mechanisms, has its own tools. For Ukraine, the one way to demonstrate its Europeanness is to learn to use existing European instruments that provide really comprehensive resolutions.
V4 has a V4 Plus initiative, of which Ukraine is part of. The beauty of this formant is that it allows bringing the issues to the technocratic expert level. It provides an opportunity to revisit history, education and other issues jointly. V4 opens the possibility for scientific cooperation as well.
Based on the Charter on Minority Rights, Ukraine, Slovakia, and Romania might develop a common platform, have a common European model. Ukraine could be the driver in dealing with minority languages in education and provide an example to other countries.

Leonid Litra, Senior Research Fellow, New Europe Center

Judging by the Romanian media, Romania is akin to implement the vision that will be presented by the Venice Commission. I think it is a very sober position. The law has not only created the political coalition inside Hungary; moreover, it created even more exotic coalition between Romania and Hungary. To certain extern, of course, since the views and positions of Hungary and Romania have different accents. The key element is Romania’s commitment to the Venice Commission decision. I would like to see such kind of commitment from the Ukrainian side as well. However, in the end, it is Parliament’s right to decide.
The key words that should describe the actions of the Parliament should be credible and predictable. It’s hard to understand the logic of Ukrainian Parliament that first adopts the Association Agreement and then the same Parliament adopts the laws (like the timber export ban), which contradict the Association Agreement.
There are fewer problems and more emotions in these discussions. Of course, the argument that Ukraine should strengthen the use of state language is legitimate and understandable. But this process should take place in a predictable manner. So, this kind of issue would not become issues of foreign policy disputes.
Regional cooperation is very important for Ukraine. Things work best when proposed together (maybe, the best example is EUBAM).

Our discussion served as a platform for an exchange of opinions between Ukrainian experts and officials about the further steps the Ukrainian authorities should take in relation to the neighbours for re-establishment an effective and mutual beneficial cooperation.

The event is supported by the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of the German Marshall Fund.