Analytical report on the discussion “The Asian Flank of Support for Ukraine (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan): Why Partnerships Are Not a Given and How to Strengthen Them”

On June 18, 2026, the New Europe Center organized a discussion titled “The Asian Flank of Support for Ukraine (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan): Why Partnerships Are Not a Given and How to Strengthen Them“. The event brought together Ukrainian and international experts to analyze the role of Asian democracies in supporting Ukraine and to identify promising directions for further cooperation. Following the event, the Center’s team prepared an analytical report.

TOP-10 Conclusions:

• The European and Indo-Pacific security spaces are interconnected, as confirmed by North Korea’s involvement in the war against Ukraine. This makes coordination between Europe, the United States, and Asian partners a strategic necessity, since the situation around Taiwan will directly affect the European theater of operations.
• Support from Asian democracies cannot be taken for granted. Ukraine needs to monitor domestic political processes in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, convince them of the importance of jointly countering threats, and propose concrete forms of cooperation.
• Donald Trump’s statements about a swift end to the war have triggered increased behind-the-scenes negotiations among Japanese and South Korean business circles and government officials regarding the preservation of assets in Russia and preparations for restoring trade and economic relations after the cessation of hostilities and the lifting of sanctions. This makes explanatory work critically important – namely, that Russia is not currently ready to end the war, so it is essential to maintain and strengthen joint pressure on it to force it toward peace. At the same time, even after hostilities cease, it must be taken into account that Russia will not return to the status of a full-fledged economic and international actor until all occupied Ukrainian territories are liberated.
• There is a troubling resumption of contacts between Japan and Russia: an economic mission to Moscow, a probable meeting between Ministers Motegi and Lavrov. The absence of an official meeting between Zelenskyy and Takaichi at the G7 summit in Évian (June 15–17, 2026) was symptomatic of this trend.
• Japan’s threat perception differs significantly from that of Ukraine and Europe: for Japan’s security, the number-one threat is China, not Russia. Deepening cooperation therefore requires taking this difference into account and building a strategic dialogue based on an understanding of Japanese security priorities, rather than on comparing degrees of danger.
• Ukraine has transformed from a recipient into a donor of defense technologies – drones, electronic warfare systems, and unmanned ground systems. The growing Japanese interest in cooperation opens a window of opportunity that should be seized, as this advantage will not last forever.
• Trump’s unpredictability is undermining Asian partners’ trust in American security guarantees, which opens an opportunity for Ukraine to offer its own defense developments. Of particular value is Ukraine’s unique experience in air defense against regular massive drone and missile strikes – a type of threat that Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei have not previously encountered.
• Ukraine still does not make use of existing infrastructure to deepen bilateral engagement with Asian partners. In Taiwan, the opportunity to open a trade and economic representative office or a Ukrainian Institute office – without formal diplomatic recognition and within the framework of the “One China” policy – remains unrealized, while in South Korea bilateral cooperation is hindered by the prolonged absence of appointments for an ambassador and a military attaché. Closing these gaps should become a priority for building a favorable infrastructure for cooperation.
• Frozen Russian assets should become a lever of influence and a source of funding for Ukraine’s defense, which requires a common position within the G7. Japan holds approximately $30 billion of Russian Central Bank funds and, given negative interest rates, is effectively paying to store them itself – making it advisable for Japan to move toward actively using these funds, following the example of the European “Danish model” of weapons procurement.
• Ukraine must develop a separate strategy for engagement with Asian democracies, abandoning excessive caution regarding China. The year 2022 was a time of missed opportunities, particularly with Taiwan, so going forward cooperation should be built proactively, based on Ukraine’s own national interests.

In his opening remarks, moderator Sergiy Solodkyy, Director of the New Europe Center, noted that over the past four years the New Europe Center has carried out considerable advocacy and analytical work to develop Ukraine’s relations with Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei, with the key goal of countering and defeating the Russian aggressor. He emphasized that, regardless of possible distances and disagreements between Ukraine and Asian democracies – in particular regarding approaches to responding to threats – they are united by a shared understanding of Russia’s destructive policy on the global stage and an awareness of the destructive consequences of its cooperation with other authoritarian regimes in the region, in particular North Korea and China. At the same time, the expert noted that not all countries share a common understanding of how to respond to these threats, as some partners have certain constraints or a different vision of an adequate response. In this regard, he identified one of the key tasks of the event – to discuss ways of bringing positions closer together and overcoming such constraints, so that a joint response to threats becomes clearer, more coordinated, and more organic.

Nataliya Butyrska, Senior Fellow at the New Europe Center and an expert on the Asia-Pacific region, emphasized that the European and Indo-Pacific theaters of operation are interconnected, as confirmed by North Korea’s involvement in the war against Ukraine. She stressed that Ukraine should not perceive support from Asian partners as something that forms automatically; instead, it is necessary to constantly monitor domestic political processes in these countries, consistently convince them of the importance of jointly countering common threats, and offer concrete forms of cooperation in response to these states’ own requests.

The expert drew attention to the shift in circumstances linked to Donald Trump’s rise to power and his statements about a swift end to the war, which has triggered increased behind-the-scenes negotiations among major Japanese and South Korean businesses regarding the return or buyback of assets in Russia, given the deadlines set by Russia. Against this backdrop, she said, it is critically important for Ukraine and its European partners to explain to Asian states that peace is not yet near and that Russia will not return to the status of a full-fledged actor until it withdraws from the occupied territories of Ukraine. She separately cited the example of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, which forced Japan and South Korea (within the scope of Donald Trump’s permission for a temporary easing of sanctions) to purchase Russian energy resources for the first time since 2022 – something Russia is using to reinforce the narrative of its own indispensability on the energy market, which requires systematic explanatory work on the part of Ukraine and its partners.

As an example of the difficulties in relations with Taiwan, Nataliya Butyrska described the case of journalists from Radio Taiwan International, who, despite significant efforts to build support for Ukraine from the first days of the war (sending postcards to listeners, raising funds, launching a Ukrainian-language radio program), faced prolonged problems obtaining visas to attend the Lviv Media Forum and received them only on the eve of the event. Based on this, she called on Ukraine to build a comprehensive and friendly attitude toward Asian democracies, since Ukraine’s caution regarding China (in particular on the issue of issuing visas to Taiwanese journalists) sends a signal to other partners that their own restraint with regard to China, Russia, or business interests is likewise appropriate. In her closing remark, the speaker emphasized the need for Ukraine to achieve clarity in its position on China, expressing concern about the instability of that position and the growing intensity of economic engagement with it, and also drew attention to the issue of China’s involvement in Ukraine’s future reconstruction.

Takashi Hirano, Journalist at the national news agency Ukrinform, expressed the conviction that Japan can serve as a kind of model country for developing partnerships in the region, since during the first three years of the war it provided sincere and consistent assistance to Ukraine, and this trend continues, particularly in the field of energy support. At the same time, he drew attention to a troubling symbolic signal – the absence of a meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi despite the first real physical opportunity for one at the latest G7 summit (June 15–17, 2026, in Évian, France). The speaker laid out in detail a number of recent troubling trends pointing to a warming of contacts between Japan and Russia: the dispatch of a Japanese economic mission to Moscow involving senior officials from the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the pretext of negotiations on preserving the assets of Japanese companies (something that had not been done over the previous four years); a probable Japanese proposal to organize a meeting between Foreign Ministers Toshimitsu Motegi and Sergey Lavrov, which, if realized, would signal a weakening of solidarity within the G7; and repeated invitations to Tokyo extended to Putin’s special representative Mikhail Shvydkoi, who met not only with figures from the cultural sphere but also with senior officials, including the head of Japan’s National Security Bureau.

Takashi Hirano explained these shifts by pointing to several factors. First, in his view, the value of helping Ukraine and achieving a just end to the war is not fully shared within the Japanese government: while Fumio Kishida (Japan’s prime minister from 2021 to 2024) had a full understanding of this policy and was able to ensure its implementation, his successors – Shigeru Ishiba (2024–2025) and the current prime minister, Sanae Takaichi – show less awareness of this value. Second, Donald Trump’s 2025 statements about a swift end to the war were actively disseminated in the Japanese information space, shaping expectations of an imminent peace (even one favorable to Russia) and raising questions about restoring communication channels with Moscow as a neighboring country. The speaker also focused on the strategic dimension of Japan’s threat perception, emphasizing that for Japan’s security, the number-one threat is China, not Russia, so for Japan the slogan “Ukraine today, East Asia tomorrow” represents a potential existential threat from China that should not be downplayed by comparing degrees of danger. In this context, he pointed to a strategic flaw in the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, created by the Japanese about ten years ago with the aim of containing China and drawing a greater U.S. military presence into the region: in this concept, Russia remains a “blind spot,” and Shinzo Abe’s (Japan’s prime minister in 2006–2007 and 2012–2020) attempt to use strategic partnership with China and Russia did not work and was instead exploited by them to drive a wedge between Japan and the rest of the G7.

In closing, Takashi Hirano outlined a conceptual problem of asymmetry between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific spaces in simultaneously responding to Russia and China: while Europeans (particularly given Emmanuel Macron’s and Friedrich Merz’s contacts with Beijing) tend to perceive China as the “lesser evil,” Japan is similarly beginning to lean toward perceiving Russia as the “lesser evil,” which raises concern within Japan about its own future steps. He called for a strategic dialogue that would go beyond individual areas of cooperation and be grounded in an understanding of Japan’s perception of potentially existential threats. The journalist emphasized that Ukraine now has an advantage it did not have four years ago – its own unique experience of waging a full-scale war, which could be of interest to Japan. He concluded that deepening cooperation requires adjusting Ukraine’s approach depending on whether the Japanese government is guided by the value of preserving a rules-based international order or primarily by pragmatic economic and security interests.

Yuriy Poita, Senior Associate Fellow at MERICS, assessed the situation in Taiwan as difficult and increasingly complex, driven by both domestic and foreign policy factors. On the domestic front, he noted intensifying competition between the two dominant parties, the Democratic Progressive Party and the Kuomintang, with the latter’s popularity gradually rising – a party that advocates a friendlier policy toward the PRC. According to him, this raises concerns that such a policy could open the door to Chinese influence and propaganda and weaken the island’s defense programs. The speaker emphasized that this year’s local elections in Taiwan will serve as an indicator for the scenario of the 2028 presidential election, and cited last year’s “great recall” campaign against Kuomintang lawmakers – which failed entirely – as an example of the Democratic Progressive Party’s vulnerability, signaling to both the Kuomintang and China that the ruling party faces crisis-level problems.

The expert confirmed the point made by previous speakers about the growing interconnection between the Asia-Pacific and European theaters, noting an increase in Europe of related events, conferences, and war games exploring this linkage. As an example, he cited a war game in which he took part in Berlin a few months ago, involving European experts, diplomats, American representatives, and a representative of the Japanese government: under the scenario, in 2028 a Democratic Progressive Party leader comes to power in Taiwan, while a representative of the more anti-China wing comes to power in the United States, after which, in late 2028 – early 2029, China, having prepared its military component, launches an actual blockade of the island and a strategic deployment of forces in preparation for an invasion, in order to study Europe’s reaction. The outcome of the game was that Europe’s reaction proved very weak: it did not even impose sanctions on China, demonstrating the weakness of its position in responding even through economic means to such serious actions.

The speaker separately noted that the war game also examined the possibility of coordination between China, Russia, and North Korea – in particular, whether Russia would launch military action against NATO forces at the moment of a Chinese blockade or preparation for an invasion of Taiwan; although this question remained at the level of hypothesis, it was one of the central ones explored. In conclusion, he stressed that the situation around Taiwan will directly affect the European theater of military operations over the coming years, which requires serious coordination between Europe, the United States, and Asian partners. In his closing remark, Yuriy Poita pointed to the need to build a favorable infrastructure for cooperation, citing the visa issue (including the introduction of a visa-free regime, which Taiwan already has with nearly a hundred countries worldwide), and also drew attention to the significant growth in Taiwanese interest in defense cooperation with Ukraine, driven by Ukraine’s successes in producing weapons and drones – high-tech yet inexpensive – which the Ukrainian government should carefully study and make use of.

Hanna Hopko, Chairwoman of the National Interests Advocacy Network (ANTS), stressed the importance of Ukraine developing a separate strategy for engagement with Asian democracies – alongside the course toward full EU and NATO membership enshrined in the Constitution – since the European and Asian theaters are interdependent. Drawing on her most recent visit to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in November 2025, she noted the evolution of how the Russian threat is perceived in Japanese society, given that engagement with Japan has been ongoing since 2014. The expert’s key point was that Ukraine is no longer a recipient but a donor of knowledge on the combat use of electronic warfare equipment, drones, unmanned ground systems, jamming, and spoofing. She recounted pointed questions she raised in all three capitals: whether the missile defense systems of Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei are prepared for regular massive strikes (around 600 drones and 70 ballistic and cruise missiles, three times a week) and whether American security guarantees would actually help in such a case, noting that in behind-closed-doors conversations, Donald Trump’s unpredictability is undermining trust in the United States and opening a window of opportunity for Ukraine to offer its own defense developments.

Separately, Hanna Hopko addressed sanctions and financial pressure on Russia. She highlighted the issue – sensitive for Japan and still unresolved – of confiscating Russian assets, noting that Japan holds approximately $30 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank funds and, given negative interest rates, is effectively paying to store them itself, whereas the European Euroclear earns income on roughly €190 billion, which formed the basis for the “Danish model” of procuring European and Ukrainian weapons. She emphasized the relevance of discussing within the G7 summit a common position on the Russian Central Bank’s funds as a lever of influence. The speaker also criticized the failure, over the past years, to convince partners of the interdependence of the two theaters and of the advantages a Ukrainian victory would bring to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and pointed to the flawed approach taken both by the Biden and Trump administrations and by the Japanese side (dating back to Shinzo Abe), based on a naive attempt to pull Russia away from China. She stressed that democracies declare their commitment to principles and international law but are not prepared to see things through to Russia’s defeat, failing to recognize that Russia’s defeat is precisely what offers a real chance for Japan to regain the “Northern Territories.”

In closing, Hanna Hopko outlined missed opportunities in cooperation with Taiwan, which began in 2022 as a horizontal, bottom-up (“upside down”) approach through communities, universities, and humanitarian aid, and was meant to become the foundation for official engagement (including the idea of creating a hub of civic initiatives as a representative office instead of working through intermediaries – the Czechs, Poles, and Lithuanians). She noted with regret that no Ukrainian delegation, including a parliamentary one, attended the 2024 inauguration of Taiwan’s president, out of fear of harming relations with China. The speaker also drew attention to the topic of the special tribunal, which is of interest to South Korea, and to the long-standing absence of appointments for Ukraine’s military attaché and ambassador in South Korea, which is harming bilateral engagement.

Other participants also joined the discussion, contributing practical proposals and a broader vision of possible formats for Ukraine’s cooperation with Asian partners.

Mykhailo Gonchar, President of the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI,” noted that 2022 was a period of missed opportunities in relations with East Asia, particularly with Taiwan, when, against the backdrop of massive humanitarian aid from the Taiwanese government at the time, Ukraine had a unique opportunity to open a trade and economic representative office in Taipei or a Ukrainian Institute office – without formal diplomatic recognition and within the framework of the “One China” policy – yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leadership at the time did not show sufficient boldness. The expert separately drew attention to the underestimated threat of cooperation between China and Russia in the field of drone swarm control technologies, emphasizing that Ukraine’s current advantage is not permanent and requires cooperation primarily with Japan. He also expressed skepticism about South Korea, which is moving toward adapting its economic ties with Russia (in particular through Hanwha’s contract to complete construction of LNG tankers), and proposed coordinated diplomatic action through third countries.

Andriy Ordynovych, Director for Strategic Support and Development at the Ukrainian Freedom Fund, remarked that Ukraine should proceed primarily from its own national interests and should not set cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and Ukraine in opposition to their relations with other states, and should act proactively in shaping proposals. Among his examples, he cited a joint venture with Japan to modernize Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways), modernization of the defense-technology sector through a triangle involving South Korea and Poland, and engaging Taiwan in defense-technology cooperation. The expert called on the government to open the Ukrainian market to high-tech products, which would support the country’s economic recovery, and to more actively involve Asian partners in the reconstruction agenda, rather than focusing solely on the European and U.S. dimensions.

This document was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The material reflects the position of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.