Introduction

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan have become important partners for Ukraine in Asia, providing consistent assistance in the financial, economic, and humanitarian spheres. Support for Ukraine has been not only an expression of solidarity from Asian democracies but also a recognition of the interdependence between the security of Europe and East Asia, grounded in viewing Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law and an unacceptable precedent for the forcible alteration of borders. Moreover, this support has become part of a coordinated policy by the United States and other Western democracies aimed at upholding the rules-based international order and countering authoritarian challenges.

However, over more than four years of war, the conditions under which this support took shape have changed significantly. It increasingly depends on a combination of domestic political dynamics and the external policy environment. The deepening of strategic coordination between China and Russia, the intensification of threats from North Korea amid its military alliance with Russia, the war in the Middle East and the associated risks to energy security, as well as shifts in Washington’s approach both to support for Ukraine and to alliance commitments in general, are creating a more complex decision-making context for Ukraine’s Asian partners. Under these conditions, support for Ukraine is increasingly shaped not only by the assessment of Russian aggression as a violation of international law, but also by the balance of partners’ own security and economic priorities.

This raises the question of the resilience of support for Ukraine from its Asian partners. A key task for Ukraine is not only to preserve the level of engagement already achieved, but also to build a long-term strategy based on a shared understanding of threats, a convergence of strategic interests, and mutually beneficial practical cooperation.

This study analyzes how changes in the international environment are affecting the policies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan toward Ukraine, why their support cannot be taken for granted, and what approaches could help strengthen it over the long term.

Asymmetry of Approaches and Geopolitical Frameworks

From the start of the full-scale invasion, support for Ukraine from Asian democracies reached an unprecedented level. Japan’s then Prime Minister Fumio Kishida invested significant diplomatic capital in building a resilient network of assistance to Ukraine, formulating the idea that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow” – a statement reflecting a growing awareness of the unity between the European and Indo-Pacific security theaters. From Japan’s perspective, providing assistance to Ukraine is an important element of upholding the rules-based international order and condemning any attempt at unilateral, forcible change of the status quo. By taking a proactive stance in support of Ukraine, Japan also views it as a tool for strengthening engagement with like-minded states and increasing the resilience of international coordination mechanisms in the event of future crises in the region.

Today, Japan holds a special place as one of Ukraine’s key international partners and one of the largest donors of financial, humanitarian, and technical assistance. The cumulative volume of assistance provided since 2022 exceeds $15 billion and includes budget financing, humanitarian programs, and reconstruction projects. In 2026 alone, a new support package of approximately $6 billion is planned, aimed at restoring critical infrastructure and the energy sector of Ukraine, as well as implementing humanitarian and technical projects.

Tokyo refrains from providing lethal weapons due to constitutional restrictions, but within the framework of its support for Ukraine it has made a number of exceptions to its traditional postwar practice: providing non-lethal military assistance and specialized vehicles, implementing demining programs, developing satellite and intelligence cooperation, conducting rehabilitation for Ukrainian service members, and joining security-support coordination formats through NATO initiatives. Japan recently joined the PURL mechanism (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) and allocated an initial $14.6 million for the procurement of non-lethal weapons. Japan’s Ministry of Defense also sent, for the first time, four officers – two from the Ground Self-Defense Force and one each from the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces – to NSATU, NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine command in Wiesbaden. The officers will coordinate equipment deliveries and training for Ukrainian forces without taking part in combat operations.

The Republic of Korea’s support for Ukraine is largely driven by its alliance obligations to the United States, deepening security cooperation with Western partners, and its rejection of the use of force to change internationally recognized borders – though it has its limits. This has become especially pronounced since the progressive Democratic Party’s Lee Jae Myung came to power. Under President Lee Jae Myung, Seoul’s policy toward Ukraine has taken on a more reserved character: he avoids active engagement with Kyiv, and high-level political dialogue between the two countries remains limited. At the same time, the Republic of Korea maintains sanctions against Russia and provides Kyiv with support in the financial and humanitarian spheres, mainly through international organizations (including UNDP) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), directing it toward rebuilding critical infrastructure and energy networks, basic municipal services, humanitarian demining, and support for local communities.

The buildup of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea – including the supply of North Korean weapons and the deployment of North Korean troops to fight in the war against Ukraine – has created shared security challenges for Kyiv and Seoul, but has not led to a significant deepening of bilateral engagement, particularly in the military sphere. Although the Republic of Korea views Russian–North Korean military cooperation as a destabilizing factor for regional security, its policy is shaped by a desire to avoid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and to preserve the possibility of future dialogue with Pyongyang. An additional restraining factor is Russia’s threats to transfer sensitive military and missile technologies to North Korea should Seoul provide military assistance to Kyiv.

Taiwan’s support for Ukraine is shaped largely by how it views the Russian-Ukrainian war through the lens of its own security challenges and threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taipei proceeds from the assumption that the international response to the war in Ukraine could influence approaches to potential crises in the Taiwan Strait, and thus carries direct relevance for regional security in East Asia. Accordingly, support for Ukraine is viewed as a tool for expanding engagement with democratic partner states and strengthening Taiwan’s international standing amid growing pressure from the PRC.

The absence of diplomatic ties and the China factor seriously limit the development of cooperation between Ukraine and Taiwan. Under these conditions, engagement is carried out mainly through international partnerships, regional initiatives, and humanitarian programs. It covers assistance to Ukrainian refugees in EU countries through funding humanitarian projects and meeting basic needs, participation in rebuilding critical and social infrastructure in Ukraine, support for the medical and rehabilitation sectors for those affected by the war, and the supply of specialized vehicles and equipment for emergency services. In parallel, technological cooperation is developing, primarily in the field of unmanned systems and component supply, implemented mainly through the private sector and international companies.

Pressure Factors

Support for Ukraine from its Asian partners depends on a number of external and internal factors that directly affect the scope and nature of their political and practical engagement.

One key factor is the shift in the U.S. approach following Donald Trump’s return to power, reflected in a move toward a more transactional model of support for Ukraine, decreased predictability in decisions on new aid packages, and a stronger policy of shifting the financial and military burden onto European allies. As a result, roles within the Western coalition supporting Ukraine are being reshaped, which is affecting the overall structure of international aid coordination.

Alongside this, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are growing increasingly concerned about the long-term reliability of U.S. security guarantees amid rising military and political pressure from China, the deepening of the Russia–China strategic partnership, the formation of a Russia–North Korea military alliance, and threats from North Korea. U.S. demands for burden-sharing among allies, together with the less predictable nature of American foreign policy, are pushing countries in the region to pay more attention to strengthening their own defense capabilities and developing regional cooperation formats. While Washington continues to be seen as a key element of security guarantees and the foundation of regional stability, Asian allies are seeking to reduce their dependence on possible shifts in U.S. policy, which is increasingly concentrating their resources and political attention on their own security issues.

A telling example in this regard is the active focus of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on regional security: although Tokyo declares that its support for Ukraine remains unchanged, unlike the government of Fumio Kishida – which made the Ukrainian direction one of its key foreign policy priorities – Sanae Takaichi is increasingly concentrating on strengthening Japan’s position in the Indo-Pacific region amid rising tensions with China and intensifying security challenges.

The conflict in the Middle East and the blocking of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have directly affected the energy security of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which are critically dependent on oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from Gulf states. This has increased their vulnerability to price fluctuations and logistical risks in global energy markets and forced them to pay greater attention to diversifying supply and ensuring the stability of sea routes – in Japan’s case, this has manifested itself in the resumption of limited oil imports from the Sakhalin-2 project, and in South Korea’s case, in the purchase of 27,000 tons of Russian naphtha for petrochemical production by LG Chem under a temporary U.S. exemption easing sanctions on Russian oil.

While Japan and the Republic of Korea are acting within the framework of sanctions exemptions and temporary easing of sanctions on Russian oil granted by the United States, this points to a structural vulnerability for these countries on energy security issues. However, from Russia’s perspective, this situation carries far broader political significance. Moscow is systematically trying to present such exemptions as proof that Russian energy resources remain indispensable for Western countries, in order to preserve their long-term dependence on the Russian resource base.

The Trump administration’s focus on achieving a peace settlement between Ukraine and Russia, including discussions on potentially easing the sanctions regime, has served as a kind of signal to the international community about the prospects for establishing peace and the possibility of restoring economic relations with Moscow.

As a result, South Korean businesses interested in returning to the Russian market – including companies that left assets there – have stepped up closed-door negotiations with Moscow to lay the groundwork for a rapid resumption of trade and economic cooperation under a “favorable geopolitical situation.”

Meanwhile, on May 27–29, 2026, Japan sent an official delegation to Moscow consisting of Masayoshi Arai, Director-General of the Trade Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Masaki Ishikawa, Deputy Director-General of the European Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accompanied by the heads of 13 major trading companies and Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation). The stated purpose of the visit was to maintain communication channels, diversify energy procurement, and protect the assets of Japanese companies in Russia. Earlier this year, Moscow was also visited by Muneo Suzuki, a member of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party known for his pro-Russia stance, while Vladimir Putin’s envoy Mikhail Shvydkoi took part in the opening of a Festival of Russian Culture in Tokyo, attended by the widow of assassinated former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and held a meeting with Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Takehiro Funakoshi.

These steps by Seoul and Tokyo do not signify a departure from the overall policy of Western partners toward Russia, but rather reflect the Asian partners’ attempts to adapt to growing uncertainty in the international environment, shifts in U.S. approaches to support for Ukraine and to alliance commitments in general, and the ongoing dynamics of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Nevertheless, this situation carries a number of risks, as Russia is trying to use it to deepen divisions among allies and gradually undermine sanctions unity and international support for Ukraine. Moscow has recently stepped up the promotion of narratives about the need to revise relations with Russia, spread through affiliated political and expert circles and Russian diplomatic missions, including among Ukraine’s Asian partners.

Under these conditions, there is a growing need for a more systematic and comprehensive approach by Ukraine to its engagement with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, one that accounts for their security priorities, economic and energy challenges, and domestic political circumstances. It is important to recognize that support for Ukraine is a variable that requires constant political and diplomatic reinforcement. Accordingly, it becomes essential to develop new arguments and incentives that will help establish support for Ukraine as a mutually beneficial, long-term model of cooperation – one that is resilient to fluctuations in the international environment and growing regional security risks.

Recommendations

In this regard, the following recommendations can be formulated:

Consolidating Asian partners to pressure Russia and support Ukraine 

Strengthen engagement with Asian partners to convey the position that Russia is not ready to end the war, and that joint pressure on Russia therefore needs to be increased in order to compel it toward peace. Under these conditions, it is important not only to preserve the current level of support for Ukraine but also to persuade these partners of the need to increase it, in order to ensure financial stability and energy resilience, prepare damaged infrastructure for winter, support the civilian population, and carry out the urgent reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities.

Expanding Asian partners’ participation in security support for Ukraine 

Together with European partners, expand the involvement of Asian partners in joint security initiatives in support of Ukraine, building the foundation for a long-term partnership between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region amid the profound transformation of the global security environment. Japan’s contribution to PURL and NSATU can serve as a model for the Republic of Korea to deepen its participation in multilateral mechanisms supporting Ukraine through NATO, given its prior participation in financing NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine’s non-lethal needs.

Joint countering of Russia–North Korea military cooperation 

Focus the attention of European and Asian partners on the threats arising from the deepening of Russian-North Korean military cooperation, which is increasingly taking on a systemic character and directly undermining the security architecture of both Europe and Asia, with the aim of forming coordinated multilateral deterrence mechanisms and a decisive, joint response to these processes.

Deepening technological cooperation in the field of security 

Use Ukraine’s unique experience in modern technological warfare and asymmetric resistance as a basis for deepening cooperation with Asian partners – exchanging military experience and technology, developing and producing unmanned systems, and countering asymmetric, cyber, and hybrid threats and disinformation. Given existing restrictions on direct military-technical cooperation, it would be worthwhile to explore options for involving the private sector and partnership formats with European countries.

Updating the approach to relations with China 

Develop an updated approach to relations with China that takes into account the deepening comprehensive strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia – including its military-technical dimension – as well as China’s position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. It would be advisable to define general frameworks and fundamental limits on China’s involvement in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest and ensure transparency in cooperation with partners who have consistently supported Ukraine during the war and are interested in continuing to participate in the country’s recovery.

Engaging Asian partners in Ukraine’s reconstruction 

Support and translate into practical action the interest of Asian companies in participating in Ukraine’s reconstruction through systematic intergovernmental work – including by creating favorable conditions for investment and project cooperation, supporting business dialogue, organizing dedicated business forums, and involving companies in priority sectors of recovery, including energy, infrastructure, and technology. Given the absence of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Taiwan, a format should be found for engaging Taiwanese private companies in reconstruction projects.

Strengthening presence in the countries of the region 

Strengthen diplomatic and information presence in the countries of the region, build positive perceptions through sustained and continuous contacts at the interstate, interparliamentary, expert, academic, and cultural levels, and foster the development of stable pro-Ukrainian networks within political, business, and expert circles. The absence of a Ukrainian ambassador to the Republic of Korea since September 2026 negatively affects the promotion of Ukraine’s interests and does not contribute to the development of bilateral relations between the two countries.